Muses Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

The aim of the book is to reconstruct Plato’s self-portrait as an author through a fresh reading of the Phaedrus, with an Introduction and Conclusion that contextualize the construction more broadly. The Phaedrus is Plato’s most self-referential dialogue, as I argue on the basis of largely neglected data, both internal and external. I take my cue from Plato’s reference to four Muses in Phaedrus 259c-d (Terpsichore, Erato, and the couple Ourania and Calliope), which I read as a hint at the “ingredients” of philosophical discourse. Plato’s dialogues—and this is the book’s main contribution to the field of Hellenic Studies—turn out to be, among other things, a form of provocatively old-fashioned mousikê.

My Introduction steers clear of the usual question “why did Plato write (dialogues).” More radically, I ask what is a Platonic dialogue. My starting point is Plato’s “self-disclosures,” that is those passages where he implicitly refers to his dialogues as poetry and music. Such “self-disclosures” have been partially studied by Konrad Gaiser, Stephen Halliwell, and others. The Introduction, together with the Appendix, aims to provide the most complete discussion of this aspect so far and to pave the way for my reading of the Phaedrus, where I detect a new set of powerful “self-disclosures.” In order to introduce the reader to the Phaedrus, I also provide some general background for its interpretation and new evidence on its self-referential character.

Chapter 1, “Terpsichore,” argues that the first half of the Phaedrus is also a consistent re-enacting of Stesichorus’ Helen poem and, more specifically, of its performance, as I demonstrate by discussing unexplored linguistic, philological, and metrical data. By appropriating Stesichorus, who was highly valued by Plato’s Pythagorean friends, Plato builds on the opposition between Stesichorus and Homer, and thus conceptualizes philosophy as a topical or flexible discourse as opposed to “rhapsodic,” or crystallized, rhetoric. In this formulation, philosophical discourse is unique in its capacity to adjust itself “musically” to the needs of different listeners.

Chapter 2, “Erato,” focuses on Helen. I argue that, in his great speech, Socrates reproduces the quadripartite structure of Gorgias’ Encomium and also toys with Isocrates’ Helen. Both works allude to Sappho 16 Voigt, and so does Plato, who makes Helen’s presence felt through the Phaedrus’ plane-tree, which refers to the arboreal cult of Helen. The as yet unnoticed reworking of 16 Voigt is integral to Plato’s definition of philosophy as eroticized rhetoric. Plato inherits from Sappho a notion of erotic oblivion: lyric eros proves crucial for severing the ties that bind us to the sensible world, and for sparking the process of recollection. Plato’s recollection, however, differs markedly from Sappho’s in that it uncovers the general as opposed to the particular.

Chapter 3, “Ourania and Calliope,” takes its cue from Ion’s magnet simile. My argument in this case is that the image applies equally well to philosophy, which the Phaedrus specifically assigns to the two Muses. Sokratikoi logoi take the form of an oral chain of accounts, whereby the human “rings” experience precisely the same symptoms as Ion and his audience. This, once again, points to philosophy as inspired mousikê as against uninspired rhetoric. Philosophy, however, distances itself from epic rhapsodies in that the rings are vigilant and active. Similarly, the story of the cicadas is Plato’s re-enacting of a common myth, i.e. the poet’s initiation as a result of the Muses’ epiphany in the country (cf. Hesiod, Archilochus, Epimenides). Again, deviations from the pattern are the code Plato uses to highlight the special status of his own production, which is, among other things, rationally vigilant and intrinsically dialogic (hence two Muses).

Chapter 4, “The Muses and the tree,” begins with a new interpretation of Socrates’ prayer to Pan in the light of poetic initiation: in fact, Socrates invokes a poetic license and hints at the possibility of heroization. Comparison with similar stories of heroism in fieri (especially Posidippus) and with the relevant honors (I compare Socrates’ statue in the Academy’s mouseion with that of other poet-heroes) allows one to interpret the passage in the light of the cult of Socrates, as developed in the Academy from the fourth century onwards. The setting of the Phaedrus, I argue, prefigures both the cult of Socrates in the Academy, where he was worshipped as a logos-inspirer (i.e. a quasi-poet) and that of Plato, the writer (and quasi-poet too) who constantly disavowed authorship. In other words, the Phaedrus provides an aition for the foundation of Plato’s Academy.

In my Conclusion I argue that Plato’s return to mousikê, a recurring theme in a number of dialogues, amounts to a self-conscious paradox, which I construe to be the hallmark of Plato as author. I conclude with Socrates’ conversion to “demotic” as opposed to metaphorical music in the Phaedo, which, I maintain, closely parallels the Phaedrus and is apologetic in character, since Socrates was held responsible for dismissing traditional mousikê. This parallelism reveals three surprising features that define Plato’s works: firstly, a measure of anti-intellectualism (Plato “musicalizes” philosophy so as to counter the rationalistic excesses of other forms of discourse, thus distinguishing it from prose as well as from poetry); secondly, a new beginning for philosophy (Plato conceptualizes the birth of Socratic dialogue in, and against, the Pythagorean tradition of the birth of philosophy, with an emphasis on the new role of writing); thirdly, a self-consciously ambivalent attitude with respect to the social function of the dialogues, which are conceived both as a kind of “resistance literature” and as a preliminary move towards the new poetry to be performed in the Kallipolis.