Natural Kinds Research Papers - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
In philosophy, there is an as yet unresolved discussion on whether there are different kinds of kinds and what those kinds are. In particular, there is a distinction between indifferent kinds, which are unaffected by observation and... more
In philosophy, there is an as yet unresolved discussion on whether there are different kinds of kinds and what those kinds are. In particular, there is a distinction between indifferent kinds, which are unaffected by observation and representation, and interactive kinds, which respond to being studied in ways that alter the very kinds under study. This is in essence a discussion on ontologies and, I argue, more precisely about ontological levels. The discussion of kinds of kinds can be resolved by using a semiotic approach to ontological levels, building on the key semiotic concept of representation. There are three, and only three, levels of semiosis: non-or proto-semiotic processes without representation, such as physical or causal processes; semiotic processes with representation, such as the processes of life and cognition; and second-order semiotic processes with representation of representation, such as self-awareness and self-reflexive communication. This leads to the distinction between not two, but three kinds of kinds: indifferent, adaptive and reflexive kinds, of which the last two hitherto have not been clearly distinguished.
Unity of science was once a very popular idea among both philosophers and scientists. But it has fallen out of fashion, largely because of its association with reductionism and the challenge from multiple realisation. Pluralism and the... more
Unity of science was once a very popular idea among both philosophers and scientists. But it has fallen out of fashion, largely because of its association with reductionism and the challenge from multiple realisation. Pluralism and the disunity of science are the new norm, and higher-level natural kinds and special science laws are considered to have an important role in scientific practice. What kind of reductionism does multiple realisability challenge? What does it take to reduce one phenomenon to another? How do we determine which kinds are natural? What is the ontological basis of unity? In this Element, Tuomas Tahko examines these questions from a contemporary perspective, after a historical overview. The upshot is that there is still value in the idea of a unity of science. We can combine a modest sense of unity with pluralism and give an ontological analysis of unity in terms of natural kind monism.
Abstract: The aim of this article is to develop an argument against metaphysical debates about the existence of human races. I argue that the ontology of race is underdetermined by both empirical and non-empirical evidence due to a... more
Abstract: The aim of this article is to develop an argument against metaphysical debates about the existence of
human races. I argue that the ontology of race is underdetermined by both empirical and non-empirical evidence due
to a plurality of equally permissible candidate meanings of “race.” Furthermore, I argue that this underdetermination
leads to a deflationist diagnosis according to which disputes about the existence of human races are non-substantive
verbal disputes. While this diagnosis resembles general deflationist strategies in contemporary metaphysics, I show
that my argument does not presuppose controversial metametaphysical assumptions.
Episodic memory (EM) involves re-experiencing past experiences by means of mental imagery. Aphantasics (who lack mental imagery) and people with severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM) lack the ability to re-experience, which... more
Episodic memory (EM) involves re-experiencing past experiences by means of mental imagery. Aphantasics (who lack mental imagery) and people with severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM) lack the ability to re-experience, which would imply that they don't have EM. However, aphantasics and people with SDAM have personal and affective memories, which are other defining aspects of EM (in addition to re-experiencing). This suggests that these supposed aspects of EM really are independent faculties or modules of memory, and that EM is a composite faculty rather than a natural kind. Apparent varieties of (normal and "defective") EM (as well as some closely related kinds of memory) are different combinations of these modules, and the EM construct itself adds little if any explanatory value to these modules.
Some philosophers search for the mark of the cognitive: a set of individually necessary and jointly su cient conditions identifying all and only the instances of cognition. They claim the mark is necessary to answer di cult questions... more
Some philosophers search for the mark of the cognitive: a set of individually necessary and jointly su cient conditions identifying all and only the instances of cognition. They claim the mark is necessary to answer di cult questions concerning the nature and distribution of cognition. Here, I will argue that, as things stand, given the current landscape of cognitive science, we are not able to identify a mark of the cognitive. I proceed as follows. First, I clarify some factors motivating the search for the mark of the cognitive, thereby highlighting the desiderata the mark is supposed to satisfy. Then, I highlight a tension in the literature over the mark. Given the literature, it is not clear whether the search aims for a mark capturing the intuitive notion of cognition or a genuine scienti c kind. I then consider each option in turn, claiming that,either way, no mark satisfying the desiderata can be provided. I then de ect a foreseeable objection and highlight some implications of my view.
Final version available here:... more
En el presente artículo se propone una interpretación del pensamiento de Hume para la comprensión de temas y problemas filosóficos que Hume, en su tiempo, no tuvo en consideración, pero que el día de hoy son relevantes. En primer lugar,... more
En el presente artículo se propone una interpretación del pensamiento
de Hume para la comprensión de temas y problemas
filosóficos que Hume, en su tiempo, no tuvo en consideración,
pero que el día de hoy son relevantes. En primer lugar, se analiza
el principio de semejanza y se postula la tesis de la unidad de
las percepciones a partir de dicho principio. En segundo lugar,
mediante un razonamiento analógico se trata de aplicar la doctrina
de las percepciones en Hume para la comprensión y fundamentación
filosófica de los derechos humanos, en especial en
lo tocante al principio de igualdad y simpatía entre seres humanos.
Finalmente, se considera una concepción contemporánea
de semejanza que nos permite replantear el problema y reafirmar
la importancia de la imaginación y la fantasía en la comprensión
y fundamentación de los derechos humanos.
Psychopathy is a personality disorder that has attracted considerable interdisciplinary interest. In fact, the idea of a group of people with abnormal morality and interpersonal relations raises important philosophical, legal, and... more
Psychopathy is a personality disorder that has attracted considerable interdisciplinary interest. In fact, the idea of a group of people with abnormal morality and interpersonal relations raises important philosophical, legal, and clinical issues. However, before engaging these issues, we ought to examine whether this category is scientifically grounded, namely whether this way of grouping individuals is explanatory and not merely a byproduct of our tendency to segregate people seemingly different from us. In this paper, we frame the issue in terms of the question whether ‘psychopathy’ designates a natural kind. We argue that currently there is no sufficient evidence for an affirmative answer to this question. Furthermore, we draw some philosophical implications of this result and examine three ways of dealing with the category of psychopathy. These include: We could eliminate the category, revise it, or subscribe to a more encompassing account of kinds, which will be able to capture psychopathy as it is currently conceptualized. We argue that a revision of the category of psychopathy is to be expected with the empirical and theoretical advancements. However, we also emphasize its current role in research, clinical and forensic practices as a scientific category in the making, or as we argue, a pragmatic kind.
de Queiroz (1995), Griffiths (1999) and LaPorte (2004) offer a new version of essentialism called “historical essentialism”. According to this version of essentialism, relations of common ancestry are essential features of biological... more
de Queiroz (1995), Griffiths (1999) and LaPorte (2004) offer a new version of essentialism called “historical essentialism”. According to this version of essentialism, relations of common ancestry are essential features of biological taxa. The main type of argument for this essentialism proposed by Griffiths (1999) and LaPorte (2004) is that the dominant school of classification, cladism, defines biological taxa in terms of common ancestry. The goal of this paper is to show that this argument for historical essentialism is unsatisfactory: cladism does not assume that relations of common ancestry are essential attributes of biological taxa. Therefore, historical essentialism is not justified by cladism.► Griffiths (1999) and LaPorte (2004) argue that cladism supports historical essentialism. ► The consensus necessary to warrant historical essentialism among cladists is absent. ► Biological taxa can be monophyletic without possessing historical essences.
There have been many attempts to determine what makes a natural kind real, chief among them is the criterion according to which natural kinds must be mindindependent. But it is difficult to specify this criterion: many supposed natural... more
There have been many attempts to determine what makes a natural kind real, chief among them is the criterion according to which natural kinds must be mindindependent. But it is difficult to specify this criterion: many supposed natural kinds have an element of mind-dependence. I will argue that the mind-independence criterion is nevertheless a good one, if correctly understood: the mind-independence criterion concerns the unification principles for natural kinds. Unification principles determine how natural kinds unify their properties, and only those natural kinds that have a mind-independent unification principle should be considered real.
The Twin Earth scenario assumes reference to natural kinds is unique and never changes (rigid designation), and that we can give justice to the intuition of reference-permanence and things having a deep structure only by pushing meaning... more
The Twin Earth scenario assumes reference to natural kinds is unique and never changes (rigid designation), and that we can give justice to the intuition of reference-permanence and things having a deep structure only by pushing meaning outside the brain or mind (semantic externalism). This, I'll show, doesn't follow. Besides, the intuition itself is misconstrued here. To say the term “water” expressed a thought or concept or belief denoting H2O before its actual discovery around 1750, is to make a claim without real content and be guilty of after-the-fact rationalizing. If anything, Twin Earth undercuts the theory of semantic externalism and its core-notion of rigid designation. A pluralized, descriptivist model of reference, I claim, is a better fit for our scientific data and ordinary intuitions either way.
Natural Kind Essentialism (NKE) is the view that the objects of sciences like physics, chemistry and biology fall into natural kinds, and that such kinds have essences—sets of properties possession of which is necessary and sufficient for... more
Natural Kind Essentialism (NKE) is the view that the objects of sciences like physics, chemistry and biology fall into natural kinds, and that such kinds have essences—sets of properties possession of which is necessary and sufficient for kind-membership. Since Putnam and Kripke brought NKE back onto the philosophical agenda, it has found many advocates. But comparatively little attention has been paid to the question how this view can be positively motivated. After illustrating the current need for an argument for NKE through critical discussions of Putnam’s, Kripke’s and Ellis’ arguments for NKE, this article aims to show that Hegel offers the resources for an original argument for the view. This argument works by deriving metaphysical implications from an account of what it means to understand an explanandum.
The field of the scientific study of consciousness has seen a flourishing of methodologies and theories. The debate over what defines consciousness and how we should study it is, however, yet to be settled. Philosopher Tim Bayne has... more
The field of the scientific study of consciousness has seen a flourishing of methodologies and theories. The debate over what defines consciousness and how we should study it is, however, yet to be settled. Philosopher Tim Bayne has proposed the “natural kind” approach, suggesting that consciousness properties should be empirically informed rather than defined a priori. Relying on the cross-talk between philosophy and empirical science, he proposes a cautious and integrative outlook that takes into account the diversity of the conscious phenomenon, defending a multidimensional model of conscious states.
This paper maps the landscape for a range of views concerning the metaphysics of natural kinds. I consider a range of increasingly ontologically committed views concerning natural kinds and the possible arguments for them. I then ask how... more
This paper maps the landscape for a range of views concerning the metaphysics of natural kinds. I consider a range of increasingly ontologically committed views concerning natural kinds and the possible arguments for them. I then ask how these relate to natural kind essentialism, arguing that essentialism requires commitment to kinds as entities. I conclude by examining the homeostatic property cluster view of kinds in the light of the general understanding of kinds developed.
Individuality is an important concept in biology, yet there are many non-equivalent criteria of individuality expressed in different kinds of biological individuals. This paper evaluates these different kinds in terms of their capacity to... more
Individuality is an important concept in biology, yet there are many non-equivalent criteria of individuality expressed in different kinds of biological individuals. This paper evaluates these different kinds in terms of their capacity to support explanatory generalizations over the systems they individuate. Viewing the problem of individuality from this perspective promotes a splitting strategy in which different kinds make different epistemic trade-offs which suit them for different explanatory roles. I argue that evolutionary individuals, interpreted as forming a functional kind, face difficulties of individuation and explanatory power that are mitigated by relying on more structurally based properties and non-evolutionary kinds.
Ethnobiology has a long tradition of metaphysical debates about the " naturalness, " " objectivity " , " reality " , and " universality " of classifications. Especially the work of Brent Berlin has been influential in developing a "... more
Ethnobiology has a long tradition of metaphysical debates about the " naturalness, " " objectivity " , " reality " , and " universality " of classifications. Especially the work of Brent Berlin has been influential in developing a " convergence metaphysics " that explains cross-cultural similarities of knowledge systems through shared recognition of objective discontinuities in nature. Despite its influence on the development of the field, convergence metaphysics has largely fallen out of favor as contemporary ethnobiologists tend to emphasize the locality and diversity of classificatory practices. The aim of this article is twofold: First, I provide a historical account of the rise and fall of convergence metaphysics in ethnobiology. I show how convergence metaphysics emerged as an innovative theoretical program in the wake of the " cognitive revolution " and the " modern evolutionary synthesis " but failed to incorporate both theoretical insights and political concerns that gained prominence in the 1980s and 1990s. Second, I develop a positive proposal of how to engage with metaphysical issues in ethnobiology. By integrating traditional research on convergence of classifications with more nuanced accounts of distinctly local categories, a revamped metaphysics of ethnobiological classification can make substantial contributions to debates about ontological difference in anthropology and about the relation between applied and theoretical ethnobiology.
Despite numerous and increasing attempts to define what life is, there is no consensus on necessary and sufficient conditions for life. Accordingly, some scholars have questioned the value of definitions of life and encouraged scientists... more
Despite numerous and increasing attempts to define what life is, there is no consensus on necessary and sufficient conditions for life. Accordingly, some scholars have questioned the value of definitions of life and encouraged scientists and philosophers alike to discard the project. As an alternative to this pessimistic conclusion, we argue that critically rethinking the nature and uses of definitions can provide new insights into the epistemic roles of definitions of life for different research practices. This paper examines the possible contributions of definitions of life in scientific domains where such definitions are used most (e.g., Synthetic Biology, Origins of Life, Alife, and Astrobiology). Rather than as classificatory tools for demarcation of natural kinds, we highlight the pragmatic utility of what we call operational definitions that serve as theoretical and epistemic tools in scientific practice. In particular, we examine contexts where definitions integrate criteria for life into theoretical models that involve or enable observable operations. We show how these definitions of life play important roles in influencing research agendas and evaluating results, and we argue that to discard the project of defining life is neither sufficiently motivated, nor possible without dismissing important theoretical and practical research.
While the tradition of Locke scholarship holds that both Locke and Boyle are species anti-realists, there is evidence that this interpretation is false. Specifically, there has been some recent work on Boyle showing that he is, unlike... more
While the tradition of Locke scholarship holds that both Locke and Boyle are species anti-realists, there is evidence that this interpretation is false. Specifically, there has been some recent work on Boyle showing that he is, unlike Locke, a species realist. In this paper I argue that once we see Boyle as a realist about natural species, it is plausible to read some of Locke’s most formidable anti-realist arguments as directed specifically at Boyle’s account of natural species. This is a break from the tradition because no one in the literature has yet suggested that some of Locke’s arguments in Book III of the Essay include a criticism of Boyle’s doctrine of species. Moreover, identifying Boyle as Locke’s intended target illuminates some of the more vexing passages in the Essay concerning real essences.
Celem artykułu jest przyjrzenie się sposobowi w jaki współczesna teoria esencjalizmu metafizycznego, oparta na pojęciu modalności de re oraz prawd koniecznych aposteriori, wyjaśnia problem istoty. Stanowisko to scharakteryzowane zostaje... more
Celem artykułu jest przyjrzenie się sposobowi w jaki współczesna teoria esencjalizmu metafizycznego, oparta na pojęciu modalności de re oraz prawd koniecznych aposteriori, wyjaśnia problem istoty. Stanowisko to scharakteryzowane zostaje jako esencjalizm sztywnego odniesienia (ESO), gdyż w strukturę modalności de re zaangażowana jest akceptacja teorii sztywności nazw własnych oraz analiza w terminach światów możliwych. Zdaniem autora, ESO nie jest adekwatną teorią esencjalistyczną ponieważ schemat generujący sądy esencjalistyczne zaproponowany przez zwolenników ESO jest niepoprawnie skonstruowany. Struktura tego schematu, ujętego jako mechanizm generowania sądów esencjalistycznych (MGSE) zawiera trzy elementy: (1) ostensywną definicję, (2) twierdzenie empiryczne oraz (3) warunek tożsamości. W artykule wykazuje się problematyczność wszystkich tych elementów, zaś całe rozumowanie w ramach MGSE uznane zostaje za wikłające się w problem petitio principii. Wnioskiem jest stwierdzenie, że ESO oparty o schemat MGSE nie jest adekwatną teorią esencjalizmu.
Joseph LaPorte, Genoveva Martí and Nathan Salmon have argued that general terms, natural kind terms in particular, are semantically akin to proper names. They have singular reference, they designate individuals. The most plausible... more
Joseph LaPorte, Genoveva Martí and Nathan Salmon have argued that general terms, natural kind terms in particular, are semantically akin to proper names. They have singular reference, they designate individuals. The most plausible candidates for these designata are abstract universals. So the “designation theory” of general terms favours the doctrine of abstract universals. However, in this paper we argue that this preference involves serious metaphysical problems. Both contemporary doctrines of abstract universals, the Russellian and Neo-Aristotelian, suffer from the problem that they cannot give a theoretically satisfactory account of instantiation of universals by particulars. Hence we conclude that notwithstanding its theoretical appeal owing to its elegant simplicity, the designation theory of general terms ought to be reconsidered.
The main thesis of this paper is that a large part of human behavior cannot be understood in terms of natural kinds but by appealing to normative kinds. In the first section we explain the distinction between natural kinds and normative... more
The main thesis of this paper is that a large part of human behavior cannot be understood in terms of natural kinds but by appealing to normative kinds. In the first section we explain the distinction between natural kinds and normative kinds. In the second section we focus on the notion of "human behavior", proposing a distinction between type A and type B behaviors and pointing out that psychology deals with type B behaviors, which are also included as diagnostic criteria for mental disorders. In the third section we analyze the strategies used in biomedical research to find specific etiologies ("essences") in order to explain such disorders. We argue that their results are inconsistent and that the lack of biomarkers that are clinically useful to refine the diagnoses is due to the fact that, unlike certain neuro-pathologies, there are no physiological essences behind such disorders. On the other hand, we argue that, as we are dealing with type B behaviors, we must interpret mental disorders as normative kinds. Keywords: human behavior, natural kinds, normative kinds. RESUMO A tese principal deste artigo é que uma grande parte do comportamento humano não pode ser entendida em termos de tipos naturais, mas deve recorrer a tipos normativos. Na primeira seção, explicamos a distinção entre tipos naturais e tipos normativos. Na segunda seção, ressaltamos a noção de "comportamento humano", propondo uma distinção entre comportamentos do tipo A e tipo B e salientando que a psicologia lida com comportamen-tos do tipo B, que também são incluídos como critérios de diagnóstico para transtornos mentais. Na terceira seção, analisamos as estratégias utilizadas na pesquisa biomédica, a fim de encontrar etiologias específicas ("essências") para explicar esses transtornos. Argu-mentamos que seus resultados são inconsistentes e que a falta de biomarcadores clinica-mente úteis para refinar os diagnósticos se deve ao fato de que, diferentemente de certas neuropatologias, não existem essências fisiológicas por trás desses transtornos. Por outro lado, argumentamos que, ao lidarmos com comportamentos do tipo B, devemos interpre-tar os transtornos mentais como tipos normativos. Palavras-chave: comportamento humano, tipos naturais, tipos normativos.
Though biologists identify individuals as ‘male’ or ‘female’ across a broad range of animal species, the particular traits exhibited by males and females can vary tremendously. This diversity has led some to conclude that cross-animal... more
Though biologists identify individuals as ‘male’ or ‘female’ across a broad range of animal species, the particular traits exhibited by males and females can vary tremendously. This diversity has led some to conclude that cross-animal sexes (males, or females, of whatever animal species) have “little or no explanatory power” (Dupré 1986: 447) and, thus, are not natural kinds in any traditional sense. This essay will explore considerations for and against this conclusion, ultimately arguing that the animal sexes, properly understood, are “historical explanatory kinds”: groupings that can be scientifically significant even while their members differ radically in their current properties and particular histories. Whether this makes them full-fledged natural kinds is a question I take up at the very end.
In this paper, I will, firstly, outline the traditional view on meaning and reference. By following this, I will talk about Putnam's famous thought experiment Twin Earth and his theory of reference. Since Putnam is influenced by Saul... more
In this paper, I will, firstly, outline the traditional view on meaning and reference. By following this, I will talk about Putnam's famous thought experiment Twin Earth and his theory of reference. Since Putnam is influenced by Saul Kripke in terms of the theory of rigid designator, it is worth to mention briefly Kripke's clustor or historical theory of proper names, i.e, baptism, though the difference between them appears when the context based reference is in manner. I will also place Putnam's theory more than Kripke in this paper since I believe that his theory of reference has sort of ambiguity by reason of natural kind terms. Morover, even though this paper will be merger of two areas, philosophy of language and philosophy of science, I will mostly be attached to the area philosophy of language.
The advent of contemporary evolutionary theory ushered in the eventual decline of Aristotelian Essentialism (Æ) – for it is widely assumed that essence does not, and cannot have any proper place in the age of evolution. This paper argues... more
The advent of contemporary evolutionary theory ushered in the eventual decline of Aristotelian Essentialism (Æ) – for it is widely assumed that essence does not, and cannot have any proper place in the age of evolution. This paper argues that this assumption is a mistake: if Æ can be suitably evolved, it need not face extinction. In it, I claim that if that theory’s fundamental ontology consists of dispositional properties, and if its characteristic metaphysical machinery is interpreted within the framework of contemporary evolutionary developmental biology, an evolved essentialism is available. The reformulated theory of Æ offered in this paper not only fails to fall prey to the typical collection of criticisms, but is also independently both theoretically and empirically plausible. The paper contends that, properly understood, essence belongs in the age of evolution.
Ethnobiology has become increasingly concerned with applied and normative issues such as climate change adaptation, forest management, and sustainable agriculture. Applied ethnobiology emphasizes the practical importance of local and... more
Ethnobiology has become increasingly concerned with applied and normative issues such as climate change adaptation, forest management, and sustainable agriculture. Applied ethnobiology emphasizes the practical importance of local and traditional knowledge in tackling these issues but thereby also raises complex theoretical questions about the integration of heterogeneous knowledge systems. The aim of this article is to develop a framework for addressing questions of integration through four core domains of philosophy -epistemology, ontology, value theory, and political theory. In each of these dimensions, we argue for a model of “partial overlaps” that acknowledges both substantial similarities and differences between knowledge systems. While overlaps can ground successful collaboration, their partiality requires reflectivity about the limitations of collaboration and co-creation. By outlining such a general and programmatic framework, the article aims to contribute to developing “philosophy of ethnobiology” as a field of interdisciplinary exchange that provides new resources for addressing foundational issues in ethnobiology and also expands the agenda of philosophy of biology.
This paper starts out highlighting a particular criticism that psychiatry faces and continues by investigating approaches to classification in psychiatry that operate with a " relaxed " (non-essentialist) notion of natural kind. Two... more
This paper starts out highlighting a particular criticism that psychiatry faces and continues by investigating approaches to classification in psychiatry that operate with a " relaxed " (non-essentialist) notion of natural kind. Two accounts are examined, one by Rachel Cooper (2005; 2013) and one based on the work of Richard Boyd (1991; 1999; 2003; 2010). While these accounts do not directly pursue such a goal, the main aim is to probe whether deploying a " relaxed " notion of natural kind would be able to neutralize the criticism. While the conclusion is in the negative, the analysis raises doubts that it is possible to completely neutralize this criticism without assuming an overly simplistic view of the causal structure of the world.
There exist at present several definitions of ‘life’, and consensus over them is not foreseeable. The disagreement is not only about the concrete features to be demanded in order to attribute life to a particular being, but also about the... more
There exist at present several definitions of ‘life’, and consensus over them is not foreseeable. The disagreement is not only about the concrete features to be demanded in order to attribute life to a particular being, but also about the kind of definition to be proposed. After reviewing the main trends concerning this problem, the possibility that life might be a natural kind is discussed. It is argued that life could be easily considered as a natural kind if the proposal of understanding them as homeostatic clusters of properties –and not as classes defined by an essence– is accepted.
In this paper I criticize the interpretations of John Locke on natural kinds offered by Matthew Stuart and Pauline Phemister who argue that Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding allows for natural kinds based on similar real... more
In this paper I criticize the interpretations of John Locke on natural kinds offered by Matthew Stuart and Pauline Phemister who argue that Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding allows for natural kinds based on similar real essences. By contrast, I argue for a conventionalist reading of Locke by reinterpreting his account of the status of real essences within the Essay and arguing that Locke denies that the new science of mechanism can justify the claim that similarities in corpuscular structure imply similarities in sensible qualities. I argue further that Locke rejects as meaningless any talk of kinds that appeals to similarities among real essences. On my reading of Locke, similarities in real essences are not only irrelevant to species, but natural kind theories based on them are unintelligible.
In this chapter, it is suggested that our epistemic access to metaphysical modality generally involves rationalist, a priori elements. However, these a priori elements are much more subtle than ‘traditional’ modal rationalism assumes. In... more
In this chapter, it is suggested that our epistemic access to metaphysical modality generally involves rationalist, a priori elements. However, these a priori elements are much more subtle than ‘traditional’ modal rationalism assumes. In fact, some might even question the ‘apriority’ of these elements, but I should stress that I consider a priori and a posteriori elements especially in our modal inquiry to be so deeply intertwined that it is not easy to tell them apart. Supposed metaphysically necessary identity statements involving natural kind terms are a good example: the fact that empirical input is crucial in establishing their necessity has clouded the role and content of the a priori input, as I have previously argued (Tahko forthcoming). For instance, the supposed metaphysically necessary identity statement involving water and its microstructure can only be established with the help of a controversial a priori principle concerning the determination of chemical properties by microstructure. The Kripke-Putnam framework of modal epistemology fails precisely because it is unclear whether the required a priori element is present. My positive proposal builds on E. J. Lowe’s work. Lowe holds that our knowledge of metaphysical modality is based on our knowledge of essence. Lowe’s account strives to offer a uniform picture of modal epistemology: essence is the basis of all our modal knowledge. This is the basis of Lowe’s modal rationalism. I believe that Lowe’s proposal is on the right lines in the case of abstract objects, but I doubt that it can be successfully applied to the case of natural kinds. Accordingly, the case of natural kinds will be my main focus and I will suggest that modal rationalism, at least as it is traditionally understood, falls short of explaining modal knowledge concerning natural kinds. Yet, I think that Lowe has identified something of crucial importance for modal epistemology, namely the essentialist, a priori elements present in our modal inquiry. The upshot is that rather than moving all the way from modal rationalism to modal empiricism, a type of hybrid approach, ‘empirically-informed modal rationalism’, can be developed.
Scientists represent their world, grouping and organizing phenomena into classes by means of concepts. Philosophers of science have historically been interested in the nature of these concepts, the criteria that inform their application... more
Scientists represent their world, grouping and organizing phenomena into classes by means of concepts. Philosophers of science have historically been interested in the nature of these concepts, the criteria that inform their application and the nature of the kinds that the concepts individuate. They also have sought to understand whether and how different systems of classification are related and more recently, how investigative practices shape conceptual development and change. Our aim in this paper is to provide a critical overview of some of the key developments in this philosophical literature and identify some interesting issues it raises about the prospects of the so-called “special sciences”, including psychiatry, psychology, and the mind-brain sciences more generally, to discover natural kinds.
- by Jaipreet Mattu and +1
- •
- Philosophy of Science, Natural Kinds, Classification
I discuss Benacerraf's epistemological challenge for realism about areas like mathematics, metalogic, and modality, and describe the pluralist response to it. I explain why normative pluralism is peculiarly unsatisfactory, and use this... more
I discuss Benacerraf's epistemological challenge for realism about areas like mathematics, metalogic, and modality, and describe the pluralist response to it. I explain why normative pluralism is peculiarly unsatisfactory, and use this explanation to formulate a radicalization of Moore's Open Question Argument. According to the argument, the facts -- even the normative facts -- fail to settle the practical questions at the center of our normative lives. One lesson is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension.
Peter Harrison's Gifford Lectures demonstrate that the modern concepts of “religion” and “science” do not correspond to any fixed sphere of life in the pre-modern world. Because these terms are incommensurate and ideological, they... more
Peter Harrison's Gifford Lectures demonstrate that the modern concepts of “religion” and “science” do not correspond to any fixed sphere of life in the pre-modern world. Because these terms are incommensurate and ideological, they misconstrue the past. I examine the influence and affinities of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy on Harrison's study in order to argue that Harrison's project approaches Wittgenstein's. Harrison's book is a therapeutic history, untying a knot in scholarly language. I encourage Harrison, however, to clarify how future scholars can progress in their study of phenomena once termed “scientific” or “religious” without succumbing to these same mistakes.
In this paper I criticize the interpretations of John Locke on natural kinds offered by Matthew Stuart and Pauline Phemister who argue that Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding allows for natural kinds based on similar real... more
In this paper I criticize the interpretations of John
Locke on natural kinds offered by Matthew Stuart and Pauline
Phemister who argue that Locke’s Essay Concerning Human
Understanding allows for natural kinds based on similar real
essences. By contrast, I argue for a conventionalist reading of
Locke by reinterpreting his account of the status of real essences
within the Essay and arguing that Locke denies that the new
science of mechanism can justify the claim that similarities in
corpuscular structure imply similarities in sensible qualities.
I argue further that Locke rejects as meaningless any talk of
kinds that appeals to similarities among real essences. On my
reading of Locke, similarities in real essences are not only
irrelevant to species, but natural kind theories based on them
are unintelligible.
In this paper I argue against Simion’s (2018) Epistemic Limiting Procedure for conceptual engineering and put forward a more permissive alternative, according to which epistemic losses do not systematically block amelioration, but merely... more
In this paper I argue against Simion’s (2018) Epistemic Limiting Procedure for conceptual engineering and put forward a more permissive alternative, according to which epistemic losses do not systematically block amelioration, but merely provide reasons against it. On this less restrictive view, epistemic losses will be permissible, provided that they are compensated by the non-epistemic gains of the amelioration. After fleshing out the details of my proposal, I discuss two case studies in relation to which Simion’s restrictive procedure seems to yield the wrong predictions. I argue that my alternative accommodates these cases significantly better.
The identity of a natural kind can be construed in terms of its causal profile. This conception is more appropriate to science than two alternatives. The identity of a natural kind is not determined by one causal role because one natural... more
The identity of a natural kind can be construed in terms of its causal profile. This conception is more appropriate to science than two alternatives. The identity of a natural kind is not determined by one causal role because one natural kind can have many causal roles and several functions and because some functions are shared by different kinds. Furthermore, the microstructuralist thesis is wrong: The identity of certain natural kinds is not determined by their microstructure. It is true that if A and B have the same microstructural composition then a sample of a chemical substance A is of the same chemical substance as a sample of B. However, the reverse does not hold. It is not the case that if a sample of a chemical substance A is of the same chemical substance as a sample of B then A and B have the same microstructural composition. This is because a macroscopic NK can be “multiconstituted” by different microstructures.