Practical Reasons and Rationality Research Papers (original) (raw)

2025

THIS THIRD ANALYTIC PAPER examines the formal logical-structure of both theories through the skeletal, abstract-notation of mathematical Set-Theory. It’s a good metaphor. This strict ‘bare-boned’ notation displays and tests the... more

2025

Die zentrale Thernatik dieses Kapitels ist die Frage, wie Intentionen in Handlungen iibersetzt werden. Hypothesen iiber diese Obersetzungsprozesse werden gewonnen, indern zunachst die Funktion von Intentionen beim Realisieren von Wiinschen bestirnrnt wird. Dabei wird zwischen Zielintentionen oder Absichten ("Ich will den gewiinschten Endzustand X erreichen!") einerseits und Vorsatzen ("Ich will die Handlung Y ausfUhren, sobald die Situation Z vorliegt!") andererseits unterschieden. Vorsatze werden als im Dienst einer zugehorigen Zielintention stehend betrachtet. Sie legen fest, wann, wo und wie die Zielintention zu realisieren ist. SchlieBlich werden Studien referiert, die einen positiven Effekt von Vorsatzen auf das Verwirklichen von Zielen belegen, sowie weiterfiihrende Studien, die auf die Prozesse verweisen, die fUr diesen Effekt verantwortlich sind. Urn dern Leser einen leichteren Zugang zu der hier favorisierten Intentionstheorie zu geben, werden zunachst zwei gegensatzliche traditionelle Ansatze (Ach vs. Lewin) vorgestellt, sowie ein aktueller Ansatz, der vor allern in der Sozialpsychologie bekannt ist . Intentionen karnen urn die Jahrhundertwende in das Blickfeld psychologischer T~eorienbildung, als die Wiirzburger Schule begann, sich fUr die Analyse des Wl1lens zu interessieren. Der prorninenteste und wohl auch reprasentativste Vertreter der aufkornrnenden Willenspsychologie war NarziB Ach. Sein vorrangiges Forschungsziel zusammenfassend siehe Ach, 1935) war, das Wollen als eigenstandigen psychologischen Gegenstand zu etablieren und darnit seine Forderung zu unterstreichen, daB die Willenspsychologie ein e.igen~tandiger Zweig der Psychologie sein miisse. Ach betrachtete die Inten-tIOn, In einer konkreten Situation eine bestimmte Handlung auszufiihren, als

2025, JEBO

We investigate how the intentionality of investors or trustees' actions affects third party compensation and punishment interventions after a trust game. Investors and trustees are randomly assigned to conditions where they either make intentional choices or their choices are made by a random machine. Overall, we find that lack of reciprocity is punished more than lack of trust, and third parties exhibit strong preferences for compensation over punishment. We find that only the punishment choice is affected by the intentionality of parties' actions, whereas compensation occurs in all conditions, whether lack of trust or reciprocity has been intentional or unintentional.

2025, Cost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation

Value incommensurability Sometimes, items that are valuable are difficult to compare in conventional ways. Neither of two items seems better than the other, but they do not seem equally good either. It can be hard to compare strawberry ice-cream and lemon tart, a successful career as a lawyer and a successful career as a health economist, and the works of Mozart and the works of Michelangelo. In some of these cases, the reason the comparisons are hard is lack of information. In those cases, gathering more information can help establish how the items relate to each other. Perhaps the lemon tart is stale, perhaps choosing a career as a lawyer means losing meaningful friendships, and perhaps it will be discovered that Mozart was a fraud who plagiarized less famous composers. In other cases, it has been suggested that the comparisons are hard because there simply is no fact of the matter of which conventional comparative relation hold between them with respect to overall goodness.

2025, Auctoritas Prudentium

The growth of natural law theories and arguments over the past half century or more has been accompanied by the development of arguments in support of the doctrine of the sanctity of human life. But both the content of that doctrine, and the best form of argument in favor of it, are contested. In this essay, I address the question of both the content and the nature of the argument by way of contrast with a very different approach to the ethics of killing, the future of value argument of the late Don Marquis.

2025

Ο υπερφυσιοκρατικός ηθικός ρεαλισμός ανάγει την ευθύνη για την ηθική μας δράση σε ένα τέλειο, αιώνιο και πανάγαθο όν που βρίσκεται έξω από εμάς και τον κόσμο μας. Ως θεωρία, καταφέρνει μέσα από αυτή τη μορφή του Θεού, να προσφέρει στον άνθρωπο βεβαιότητες, που διαφορετικά είναι δύσκολο να δικαιολογηθούν. Στο παρόν θα εξετάσω συνοπτικά κάποια θετικά σημεία του υπερφυσιοκρατικού ρεαλισμού και τον τρόπο με τον οποίο αποφεύγει το πρόβλημα της ιδιορρυθμίας του Mackie. Στη συνέχεια, μέσα από το επιχείρημα του Harman, θα υποστηρίξω πως αποτελεί έλλειψη οικονομίας. Αν πρέπει να πιστέψεις σε κάτι, ώστε να πράξεις ηθικά, γιατί πρέπει να πιστέψεις σε ένα όν που υποδεικνύει τις ηθικές αρχές και να μην πιστέψεις εξαρχής στις ίδιες τις ηθικές αξίες; Το πρόβλημα, βέβαια, είναι ότι δεν μπορούμε να αποδείξουμε, αν υπάρχουν αυτές οι ηθικές αξίες και ποιες ακριβώς είναι, όμως το ίδιο ακριβώς πρόβλημα αντιμετωπίζει κατά τη γνώμη μου και ο υπερφυσιοκρατικός ρεαλισμός. Δεν μπορεί να αποδείξει την ύπαρξη του Θεού, ούτε με ποιόν τρόπο εμείς γνωρίζουμε τις εντολές του. Δεν θα ασχοληθώ κατά συνέπεια καθόλου με το σημείο αυτό, αν δηλαδή υπάρχουν αντικειμενικές ηθικές αξίες και πως τις γνωρίζουμε, αλλά θα θεωρησω δεδομένη την ύπαρξή τους. Τέλος, αφού αναφερθώ σε κάποιες επιπλέον ενστάσεις αλλά και στις απαντήσεις του υπερφυσιοκρατικού ρεαλισμού σε αυτές, θα καταλήξω στο προτέρημα που πιστεύω πως η πίστη σε ηθικές αξίες χωρίς Θεό παρουσιάζει έναντι του υπερφυσιοκρατικού ρεαλισμού. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, θα υποστηρίξω την ‘τυφλή δέσμευση’ σε ένα άλλο ον που κατευθύνει την πραγμάτωση της ηθικής πράξης, ως μειονέκτημα, σε σύγκριση με την αυτόνομη επιλογή των ηθικών αρχών, ως αντικειμενική επιλογή του πράττειν.

2025, Southern Journal of Philosophy

This article surveys the state of the currently burgeoning debate on motivating reasons, which spans across theoretical and practical philosophy. I focus on the metaphysical project at the forefront of this debate, that is, the quest for an account of the nature of motivating reasons, which covers both reasons for which we act as well as reasons for which we hold attitudes. The discussion is organized around two questions at the heart of this project: (i) What kind of entity are motivating reasons? (ii) How are motivating reasons related to the actions or attitudes we perform or hold for them?

2025, Καλαισθητικές κρίσεις στον Καντ

2025, الإشكال البيوتكنولوجي من منظور إيتيقا المسؤولية

نسعى في هذه الورقة البحثية إلى تناول بعض الإشكالات القانونية والأخلاقية التي تطرحها البيوتكنولوجيا، والتي لم تعد خاصة بالمجتمعات و"الديمقراطيات" الغربية، بل صار لها طابع عالمي بفضل سيرورة العولمة التي تشمل كل المجالات، وخاصة المجال التقني والمجال الثقافي المصاحب له. وقد تناونا تلك الإشكالات من خلال أمثلة كل من الإنجاب والإجهاض وزراعة الأعضاء لنبين أهمية المقاربة الفلسفية الأخلاقية لتأسيس منظور قانوني-حقوقي يتلاءم مع قيمة الحياة وغائيتها، مبرزين راهنية إتيقا المسؤولية؛ بما هي إتيقا للحياة، في معالجة إشكالات البيوتكنولوجيا.

2025, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Jonathan Dancy is known for defending bold and often controversial positions. Practical Shape, in which Dancy defends what he calls a 'Neo-Aristotelian' theory of reasoning, is no exception in that regard. Let me first sketch what I take to be the most important claims advanced in Practical Shape, and then raise some general worries with the resulting account. There are two chief reasons that Dancy associates the theory with Aristotle. First, Aristotle famously claimed that practical reasoning, via a syllogism, concludes in an action. Though, for Dancy, practical reasoning is not syllogistic, he claims that we can nevertheless reason 'directly' to an action. Thus, practical reasoning need not (necessarily) conclude in mental state which acts as intermediary for action. Second, for Aristotle, practical and theoretical reasoning bear the same fundamental underlying structure, chiefly because both forms of reasoning can be cast in syllogistic form. Again, Dancy repudiates Aristotle's explanation, but agrees that reasoning is unified. A third important claim made by Dancy, perhaps the most controversial claim defended in the book, is that inference is of far less significance, as a structural feature of reasoning, than many would think. We are led (or rather, misled) into the difficulties which beset practical reasoning, conceived as a basically inferential process, by conceiving of practical reasoning in light of theoretical reasoning. Instead, we ought to see things the other way around. We should first understand practical reasoning in its own terms, and model our theory of theoretical reasoning on our theory of practical reasoning. A fourth important claim is that Dancy's theory of reasoning is avowedly realist. It is realist because reasoning is responding correctly to a state of affairs, where that state of affairs has a 'normative shape' insofar as it stands in various normative relations, centrally the favouring relation. Dancy does not defend this realist position in Practical Shape; it figures as a central background assumption of his theory. A fifth important aspect of the book is not a claim, but a methodology. Dancy spends some time persuading us that his theory of reasoning is not in the business of providing necessary

2025, Philosophia

In a recent paper, Gregory defends the claim that a normative reason is a good basis for Φ-ing. He claims that a Bbasis^is what is commonly known as a motivating reason. By Bgood^Gregory means good in its attributive sense, as something which is good as a kind. In this paper I argue that it is not plausible that normative reasons are motivating reasons that are good as an instance of their kind. I argue that in order to assess this claim, pace Gregory, we need to know what it is for a motivating reason to be good as a kind. I canvas some potential answers to this question provided by Gregory, first that motivating reasons are things that play a role in a causal structure, and second that motivating reasons are what is believed to be a normative reason. I argue that since neither of these is plausibly good as a kind, we should reject RGB.

2025, Philosophical Studies

Deontic, as opposed to evaluative buck-passing theories seem to be easier to accept, since there appears to be an intimate connection between deontic properties, such as 'ought', 'requirement', and 'permission' on the one hand, and normative reasons on the other. However, it is far from obvious what, precisely, the connection consists in, and this topic has suffered from a paucity of discussion. This paper seeks to address that paucity by providing a novel deontic buck-passing view, one that avoids the pitfalls both of the most straightforward view on the matter (what I call the ''standard view'') as well as a recently articulated view, due to Matt Bedke. It does so by appealing first to the distinction between a reason for, and a reason against, and uses this distinction to clarify what are taken to be two fundamental, but distinct, deontic properties-ought and requirement. The resulting view allows us to capture these properties, the structural relations between them, and does so in a way that avoids making supererogation impossible.

2025, Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie

Has Kant's universalism had its day? An intervention.
Moral universalism is obsolete for some, it has always been untenable for others. Irritating statements in the oeuvre of its most respected representative, Immanuel Kant, seem to bring it emphatically into disrepute. The philosopher of freedom, autonomy, human dignity, the rule of law, of universal peace is confronted with accusations of racism, sexism, homophobia, classism and anti-Semitism in several of his writings. Is Kant’s universalism ultimately nothing more than a facade with racist and colonial thinking behind? Is Kant’s universalism obsolete? Does this finally indicate that moral universalism in general is obsolete? I argue that whatever will be an adequate interpretation of those anti-universalist statements in Kant, (i) the systematic core of Kant’s moral philosophy is universalism, and (ii) Kant’s universalism is not only far from being obsolete, but it conceives of the presuppositions of what constitutes a moral standpoint in general.

2025, Acta Analytica

Buck-passing analyses of normative concepts in terms of normative reasons face the so-called 'wrong kind of reason' (WKR) problem. Most work on this topic has focused either (i) on the WKR problem for the buck-passing account of value or (ii) more generally as an issue for 'reasons fundamentalists' (those that hold that all normative concepts can be analysed into normative reasons). This paper concerns the buck-passing analysis of deontic concepts, in particular the concept of wrongness, understood as an analysis into normative reasons for action. I first address the question of whether wrong kind reasons for action are possible in the first place, before examining and rejecting some accounts of the WKR/RKR for action. I end with a suggestion which points to a positive account of the distinction, and I explain one way in which appealing to this distinction can help to resolve the WKR problem.

2025

Plaider pour une éthique professionnelle en éducation perçue par excellence comme un domaine de recherche et de réflexion, de souci et d'inquiétude et non pas de promesse, de thérapie ou de résolution fait appel à un mouvement de pensée et d'expérience intenses et tenaces, tout en introduisant une tension praxique qui renforce la compréhension du professionnel non pas comme un espace rassurant de moralisation parsemé de prises de décisions sages et optimales, mais comme un espace fertile bien qu'hargneux de relations, de croyances et des jugements fragiles où l'élément dilemmatique émergent affaiblit les certitudes tout en servant de levier pour le déclenchement de la réflexion éthique. D'une part la complexité et la multicritérialité des questions éthiques et d'autre part le conflit inépuisable et incommensurable entre la partie dure de l'éthique -codes, lois, règlements, conventions, coutumes, empreintes culturelles et socialeset sa partie douce liée aux tourments de la subjectivité et des circonstances multiples créent un paysage tortueux à travers lequel les sujets doivent choisir leur propre, précaire, chemin. De plus, affronter des cas de vulnérabilité extrême, riches en connotations et complications existentielles et idéologiques, des cas tendant à mettre en question la prétention rationnelle sur la base de la nécessité de régler plus ou moins définitivement, ce qui reste en suspens, rend aussi nécessaire la reconnaissance de la tension entre le rationnel et l'émotionnel ou même l'irrationnel à travers un travail assidu de raisonnement et de délibération, qui vise à la constitution pénible d'une clairvoyance professionnelle. Cette clairvoyance n'est pas exempte d'une vigilance à l'égard des complications inattendues par reconnaissance et incorporation dans le jugement des éléments indociles créant de tensions multiples (p. x. le radical, le contradictoire, le tragique, le faillible, l'incertain, l'obscur, l'instable, 1. Bateson Gr. (1987). Steps to an ecology of mind (p. 128). London : Jason Aronson Inc. La distinction ricoeurienne entre éthique et morale et les lectures se développant dans la même logique (Lagarrigue J., Lebe G., 1997) est significative également pour la compréhension d'une distinction analogue entre le dilemme moral et le dilemme éthique.

2025, Philosophy & Social Criticism

Only recently has Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality begun to be read as a genealogy rather than a variation on the social contract tradition. This article argues that reading Rousseau as a genealogist not only clarifies his analysis of amour-propre's inflammation, but also illuminates a conception of freedom achieved through the continuous political practice of shaping of amour-propre. In the first section of this article, I situate this conception of freedom against two separate but relevant bodies of Rousseau scholarship: those who read him as a genealogist, and those who emphasize the ambiguities of amourpropre. Next, I look to The Social Contract's passages on censorship and court of honor in order to evaluate their roles as institutions that forestall the inflammation of amour-propre. Finally, I examine the social institutions that citizens actively participate in as they practice their freedom: the festivals, dances, balls and games described in The Letter to D'Alembert and Considerations on the Government of Poland. It is in these institutions that we see the political implications of Rousseau's genealogical system manifest: because his genealogy illuminates the human tendency toward vice, the cultivation of virtuous citizenship appears as a constant struggle rather than an idealist achievement.

2025

Yet again our world appears hell-bent on destruction and self-destruction, so much so that one might wonder whether there are (e.g.) cogent criteria of justice; and if there are, whether such criteria are at all useful, and why they are... more

2025

Why do you realists think there is a singular, real world? REALIST: By "real" we mean that there exists a world and that it is what completely independent of how I (or we) think about it, cognize about it, b about it, know about it, and so forth. The relationship between the worl our cognitive dealings with it, although not worked out in some final sen basically one of the world's existing in some mind-independent manner and causing or influencing our thinking, believing, cognizing, and so forth about IRREALIST: You've told me what you believe, but not why. The assum • you make in what you just said are typically taken to be common sense, what argument is there for them? REALIST: I don't need an argument to defend common sense since the other•• sition, antirealism, is so counterintuitive and itself without any decent argum IRREALIST: Counterintuitive it is. I agree. But it's not without argument. C sider this one, for example. Take any two apparently contradictory metaph cal claims. Suppose, for the moment, each claim is equally well epistem• justified (warranted, known, etc.). Add to those claims the additional pr that contradictions are impossible. What metaphysical conclusion should reach? The most straightforward result is that there is more than one world that truth is world-relative. For example: ( r) Contradictions are impossible. (2) Metaphysical freedom exists. (3) Metaphysical freedom does not exist. (4) Therefore, there are at least two worlds, one in which metaphysical free• dom exists, one in which it does not. ( 5) Therefore, truth is world-relative. REALIST: Before I give you what I take to be the obvious solution to the pr !em, let me ask what you mean by "world." How can there be two or worlds? For example, is the action I'm now performing both free and not f

2025, Quarteto eBooks

De acordo com um princípio básico de racionalidade, a decisão de empreender uma determinada acção deve ser determinada somente pela análise das suas consequências. Assim sendo, considerações a respeito do uso prévio de recursos não devem exercer qualquer influência no processo de tomada de decisão do agente. Porém, acontece por vezes que os agentes persistem numa actividade que eles próprios consideram não ser a melhor nas circunstâncias porque já despenderam recursos no decurso da sua execução. Quando este é o caso, diz-se desses agentes que estão a exibir o efeito dos custos afundados. Este género de comportamento é observável com frequência e ocorre numa grande variedade de situações. Mais ainda, os agentes que exibem este efeito tendem a fazê-lo de modo consistente. Em geral, a literatura psicológica é favorável à hipótese de que este efeito decorreria de um viés cognitivo que se manifestaria como um "erro robusto de julgamento" (Arkes & Blumer) 1 . Este diagnóstico considera todos os casos de manifestação do efeito dos custos afundados como sendo de natureza intrinsecamente irracional, na medida em que todos eles consistiriam num afastamento sistemático do comportamento dos agentes em relação às prescrições do modelo normativo. Dado este diagnóstico, a questão que ficaria por resolver seria então apenas a de encontrar o mecanismo psicológico subjacente a tais desvios da racionalidade. Arkes, um investigador proeminente na psicologia dos custos afundados, sugeriu que este mecanismo estaria associado a um desejo poderoso manifestado por muitos

2025, Colibri eBooks

R: A Filosofia da Acção é aquela parte da filosofia que tem como tópico o estudo da acção humana. Há, evidentemente, um conjunto de problemas que a constituem. Estes definem, por sua vez, sub-áreas de estudo dentro da Filosofia da Acção. A título de exemplo, posso indicar os seguintes problemas e sub-áreas. Em primeiro lugar, o problema da identificação das acções. Refiro-me aqui ao problema de saber como se caracteriza uma acção -o que é uma acção? Em segundo lugar, o problema da individuação das acções. Refiro-me por meio desta expressão ao problema de determinar como é que se distinguem acções umas das outras. Em terceiro lugar, o problema da dimensão temporal da acção, isto é, o problema de determinar em que período do tempo é que é apropriado considerar-se que uma acção decorreu. Estes três problemas definem uma sub-área da Filosofia da Acção que poderíamos, talvez, designar como Ontologia da Acção. Outra sub-área desta disciplina é a da Metafísica da Acção. Aqui interessa, sobretudo, saber se as acções podem ser livres e, caso possam ser livres, em que é que consiste essa liberdade. Outra sub-área ainda é a da Epistemologia da Acção, a qual se constitui a partir da tentativa de perceber em que é que consiste explicar uma acção. Finalmente, há também problemas associados à compreensão da acção colectiva, ou seja, àquele conjunto de acções cuja execução pressupõe não apenas que o agente aja de uma determinada maneira, mas também que os outros agentes ajam igualmente de uma determinada maneira. Neste sentido, é necessário compreender como é que emerge a coordenação necessária a que a acção do agente possa ter o conteúdo que nós lhe atribuímos, quais são os princípios subjacentes a essa coordenação, etc. Creio que estes são os problemas mais importantes com que a filosofia da acção lida, e que tem que discutir, e que, por conseguinte, aquelas que eu referi são também as sub-áreas nucleares da Filosofia da Acção. P: Alguns autores incluem na filosofia da acção algumas questões de filosofia moral. Qual a sua opinião sobre isso? Considera que a filosofia da acção é uma área completamente separada da filosofia moral ou não? R: Eu creio que a filosofia da acção pode ser prosseguida de uma forma independente da filosofia moral. P: E quais são as relações objectivas que vê entre filosofia da acção e economia? R: Há uma relação muito óbvia, que é a relação que se estabelece em virtude de uma das categorias essenciais subjacentes ao pensamento económico ser a categoria da racionalidade. Uma das coisas que os economistas debatem é precisamente a de saber o que é, em geral, ser racional, e como é que o agente pode agir racionalmente em certas situações específicas. Ora, a caracterização do conceito de racionalidade é também uma questão que é tratada na Filosofia da Acção. Na apresentação que há pouco fiz dos principais problemas que esta deve tratar, não me referi especificamente a este problema porque ele aparece integrado no âmbito daqueles tópicos que eu designei como sendo os tópicos da identificação das acções e da individuação das acções. O primeiro, como disse, investiga o que é que faz com que um certo evento seja considerado uma acção (ou seja, como é que nós distinguimos acções de não-acções) e o segundo investiga como é que distinguimos umas acções das outras. Ora, se prosseguirmos a discussão em torno destes tópicos, veremos que uma das categorias fundamentais que é chamada à colação para especificar as distinções necessárias ao seu tratamento é a categoria da racionalidade. Neste sentido, a Filosofia da Acção lida com um aspecto fundador da teoria económica, que é precisamente o aspecto de determinar o que é ser racional no âmbito da acção. R: A este respeito, posso começar por dizer que acções são coisas que acontecem no tempo em associação com agentes. Mas é claro que podem acontecer coisas no tempo em associação com agentes que não são acções. Então o que é que faz com que possamos distinguir os comportamentos dos agentes que são acções dos que o não são? De uma forma geral, a resposta pode ser dada em termos da recondução dos primeiros às razões do agente. E aqui entra em cena o conceito de intencionalidade. Portanto, dizse das acções que elas são intencionais, no sentido em que elas decorrem das razões do agente, ao contrário de outros comportamentos (instintivos, reflexos, etc.) que, sendo protagonizados também por agentes, não são, porém, considerados acções, precisamente porque não decorrem de razões do agente para se ter comportado da forma como se comportou. O que aparece como distintivo das acções é, então, a um primeiro nível, muito elementar, a sua associação com agentes (ao contrário de outras coisas que acontecem no mundo e que não estão ligadas a agentes), e, a um segundo nível, -aquele no contexto do qual temos que fazer a distinção entre comportamentos de agentes que são acções e comportamentos de agentes que não são acções -o facto de haver intencionalidade associada ao comportamento agencial. Depois podem ainda introduzirse algumas especificações mais subtis. Por exemplo, num caso em que o agente faz alguma coisa intencionalmente, no sentido em que está a implementar um comportamento que decorre das suas razões, ele pode também, ao mesmo tempo, e de forma não intencional, gerar outras consequências. Considera-se que essas consequências são resultado da acção do agente, e portanto são atribuíveis ao agente como sua acção, apesar de não terem sido intencionais. Como é que então podemos incorporar estas duas dimensões do problema? Dizendo, por exemplo, que um determinado comportamento dirigido do agente conta como uma acção se houver uma descrição desse comportamento de acordo com a qual esse comportamento foi intencional. Mesmo que tenha gerado outras consequências que não foram intencionais. Mas como há pelo menos uma descrição desse comportamento debaixo da qual esse comportamento conta como uma acção, então essas consequências contam também como consequências da acção, o que permite que o agente seja responsabilizado, etc. P: Um movimento instintivo do corpo, por exemplo: afastar um mosquito enquanto estudamos. Em que sentido esse movimento não pode ser considerado uma acção, ou porque é que não pode ser considerado intencional?

2025, Philosophia

Each person has a special relation to his or her own well-being. This rough thought, which can be sharpened in different ways, is supposed to substantially count against objectivist theories on which one can intrinsically benefit from, or be harmed by, factors that are independent of one's desires, beliefs, and other attitudes. It is often claimed, contra objectivism, that one cannot be alienated from one's own interests, or that improvements in a person's well-being must resonate with that person. However, I argue that every theory of wellbeing must allow that we can be alienated from our own well-being, and that sophisticated objectivists can accept and make use of a resonance constraint against their opponents.

2025

Summary Between utopia and myth: the social theories of Georges Sorel The French social theorist and essayist Georges Sorel (1847-1922) was highly critical of utopian models of society, which derived according to Sorel from scientism. The strong moral impetus o f Sorels work led him to develop alternative conceptions o f fu ture societal constellations. Starting from a constructivist theory o f knowledge the ini tial approach was syndicalist and reformist. Subsequently, Sorel shifted towards the concept of the revolutionary ‘social myth’. In this article it is argued that, although Sorels concept of myth includes the danger of populism, the social theories o f Sorel contain valuable elements (a.o. constructivist theory o f knowledge, pluralist conception of society, critique of interventionist state) which are neglected so far by academic so ciology. Abandoning the biased treatment o f Sorels work will give it the place it de serves: an original counterpoint in the early phase ...

2025

The Unprotected Flank in the Works of Michel Foucault and Georges Sorel. Michel Foucault's and Gilles Deleuze's "Gesprek over intellektuelen en de macht" ([Conversation on Intellectuals and Power] Raster, 1979, 10) and other works show how Foucault's theory of power and criticism of the Enlightenment philosophies are combined with romantic fascination for popular insurrections. He used a genealogical method to describe the insurrection of subjugated knowledge, ie, authentic and popular types of knowledge exiled to underground social circles by scientific discourse. His support for the Iranian Shi'ite revolution is fully in line with this idea. A comparision with Les Illusions du progres ([The Illusions of Progress] Paris, 1908) and other works by Georges Sorel, a romantic critic of the Englightenment who considered the French labor union movement as a popular antiutopian revolt, shows that Sorel's idea of myth as a rousing device closely resembles Fouca...

2025, Existential Essay of Creative Emergent Acts-Solitude

The purpose of this inquiry is to explore the experiential circumstances of one who chooses to continue the private work routine in the same way it has always been pursued with those external alterations necessitated by the new situation. It is proposed that one aspect of what emerges by being alone in this new situation is no longer simply privacy. Being alone in these circumstances instantiates a different range of experiences that is more than one’s simple privacy. In this context, it will be shown that being alone does not by itself constitute an authentic solitude. This inquiry attempts to determine the circumstances in which authentic solitude is engaged and transcends a merely private being alone, and is the term adopted to distinguish its constituent properties. The assertion is that authentic solitude is a commitment to a mode of living in which loneliness, understood as attachments to one’s spouse, friends, and other associates, is an edge on which one who engages solitude balances. It may be that sustained mediated relations through Zoom, Skype, or other mediating technologies develop a kind of we-relation more dependent on on imaginatively induced properties that are qualitatively different than genuinely direct interactive experience. Such mediated relations require independent investigation and exploration. (The single term solitude from here designates the complete term authentic solitude, unless otherwise indicated.)

2025, Abstracta

In chapter 5 of his 1992 book A Study of Concepts, Christopher Peacocke claims that his account of concepts can be reconciled with naturalism. Nonetheless, despite Peacocke's greatest efforts to convince the skeptics that the mentioned accommodation is viable if one accepts his approach to concepts, some suspicion survives. In a recent paper on this very topic, Jose Luis Bermudez raises questions about Peacocke's supposed naturalization by arguing that the approach in question is not able to make sense of the distinction between misapplying a concept one nonetheless possesses and not possessing that concept at all. What I am going to do here is, on the one hand, defend Peacocke's concept naturalization project from Bermudez's objection and, on the other hand, show that the latter's suggestion cannot save the surely crucial distinction between making a mistake in using a concept and being incapable of a mistake or a correct use because of not having the concept.

2025, Actas I Congreso Nacional sobre Pseudociencia

Las opiniones sobre la ciencia caen a veces en el dogmatismo: creer sin crítica todo lo que en su nombre se dice. Algunos sin embargo se van al extremo opuesto: al escepticismo, puesto en boga por algunos filósofos de la ciencia. Estos equiparan por su lado negativo el saber científico con el de cualquier otro tipo de conocimiento, o de "pseudociencia" como aquí denominamos. Pero lo mismo sucede con las llamadas pseudociencias. Las opiniones sobre ellas pueden igualmente caer en ambos posicionamientos radicales: credulidad dogmática y descalificación total. Quienes así piensen, sin matizaciones, acerca de la ciencia o de las pseudociencias ni serán buenos historiadores ni buenos epistemólogos. De ello deseo ocuparme en esta conferencia. Pienso que los juicios extremos sobre ellas ni son adecuados ni pueden dimanar de un pensamiento racional y razonado. En consecuencia, las críticas indiscriminadas a todas las pseudociencias tampoco ayudan a prestigiar la razón. Antes de pasar adelante me siento obligado a definirme en relación a nuestro contexto: el presente Congreso organizado por la Asociación A.R.P. Cuando se habla de una Alternativa Racional a las Pseudociencias parece que se presupone una identidad entre ciencia y pensamiento racional, mientras que se equiparan, en el bando opuesto, las pseudociencias con el pensamiento noracional o irracional. Como si ambas parejas de conceptos fuesen coextensivas. Como si racionalidad e irracionalidad no se entremezclaran en las ciencias y en las pseudo. Como si las ciencias agotasen el ámbito de lo racional y las pseudociencias el de lo irracional. Pero desde sus comienzos el llamado pensamiento racional fué más amplio que la ciencia e incluyó el complejo filosófico-científico-tecnológico. Hago hincapié en el lógico que distingue la técnica -puramente pragmática-de la tecnología -que es una técnica impregnada de teoría e interactiva con ella 1 . Lo mismo sucede en el bando opuesto: el pensamiento irracional o no-racional nunca se ha limitado a las pseudociencias. Siempre ha incluido a la religión, más o menos evolucionada; así como a la mitología, que a veces se solapa con

2025, Philosophy in review

Writing about romantic love is a tricky business. The cynical will worry that one's theory will be mere autobiography leading to the reification of one's emotional life. Jealous lovers may think jealousy essential to love; the monogamous-and the insecure?-will think exclusivity essential to love. The religious will find god between the sheets. Thus, there are many words of commonsense wisdom that one may choose to reify into an overarching theory. Love is way of seeing, yet love is blind. Love will set you free, yet love is a drug. Love bestows value: beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Yet love responds to the value discovered: he loved her for her wit and kind words. A second problem concerns idealization-not the idealization lovers are said to have for their beloveds, but that of the theorists who want love to be a certain way because that would be best, or most edifying. Hence many writers slip into the moralizing language of true love, genuine love or authentic love, as if they were ashamed that plain ol' love wasn't so beautiful. Finally, a third caution is needed. It is extremely difficult to identify what the core phenomena of love are and distinguish them from typical or usual consequences of the phenomena. One might believe that the majority of romantic lovers love only one person at a time, but is this essential or just common? Such problems are the common lot for writers on love. Troy Jollimore's preferred metaphor for love is vision. In his pleasantly written study Jollimore attempts to persuade us that love is a way of seeing. His view is objectcentered. The beloved responds to the valuable characteristics of the beloved. Although these are reasons to love, these 'reasons' don't imply that these properties justify one's love, such that it would irrational not to love a person with these lovely properties. What kind of vision, then, is love? Jollimore writes: 'What matters is that… one's way of seeing picks him out uniquely, which means making him a subject of special kind of attention that is not directed to others ' (44). But what kind of special attention is this? Jollimore discusses a number of issues here. For example, we will not stop and pause to decide between our lover and a stranger when both are in danger and only one can be saved. We see the beloved as the important one. Love's vision may also involve a kind of blindness to the faults of the beloved and, in the other direction, can involve a special awareness of the valuable properties of a person that others will not see. Acknowledging the power of Aristophanes' famous speech about lovers being two halves of one person, Jollimore agrees that love makes us see the world in terms of the interests of the couple and not the individual. Jollimore is keen to show that the cynics are wrong and that love is no obstacle to seeing clearly: the commitments of love do not necessarily transgress on the commitments of epistemology. Rather, the favorable light and faith we have that those we love are innocent, despite evidence to the contrary, for example, often reveal our great understanding of the beloved that strangers would fail to have.

2025, Synthese

This paper explores the idea that deep disagreements essentially involve disputes about what counts as good reasoning, whether it is theoretical or practical reasoning. My central claim is that deep disagreements involve radically different paradigms of some principle or notion that is constitutively basic to reasoning-I refer to these as "basic concepts". To defend this claim, I show how we can understand deep disagreements by accepting the indeterminacy of concept-formation: concepts are not set in stone but are responsive to human needs, and differences in individuating and ordering concepts lead to clashes in paradigms of reasoning. These clashes can be difficult to resolve because linguistic concepts, especially basic concepts, impose a normative structure onto thought to make reasoning possible at all. This, I also argue, is an authentically Wittgensteinian account of the nature of reasoning. While deep disagreements involving theoretical and practical reasoning both stem from the same root problem of clashing paradigms of basic concepts, I will also draw attention to the particularly radical indeterminacy of moral concept-formation, which makes moral deep disagreements more difficult to resolve. Over the course of the paper, I will discuss two examples of deep disagreements to illustrate and defend my central claim: deep disagreements over vaccines and the concept of "evidence" (theoretical reasoning) and deep disagreements over affirmative action and the concept of "fairness" (practical reasoning). I conclude by suggesting how my account of reasoning does not lead to moral relativism.

2025

First, a review of personal identity literature. Second, a critical perspective of the literature. Third, a utilitarian thesis to solve the problem of personal identity.

2025, Teorema Revista Internacional De Filosofia

2025, Episteme

A number of philosophers have recently argued that there is such a thing as ‘epistemic blame’: blame targeted at epistemic norm violations qua epistemic norm violations. However, Smartt (2024) and Matheson and Milam (2022) have recently provided several arguments in favour of thinking epistemic blame either doesn’t exist, or is never justified. This paper argues these challenges are unsuccessful, and along the way evaluates the prospects for various accounts of epistemic blame. It also reflects on the dialectic between sceptics and realists about epistemic blame, and what choice-points are available for moving the debate forward.

2025, Philosophical Studies

It is almost universally believed that consequentialists and their opponents disagree about which actions are fight and wrong and about what makes them fight and wrong. It is widely believed that the content of that disagreement is to be drawn in terms of agent-relative rules (accepted by non-consequentialists, rejected by consequentialists). I shall dispute both of these beliefs.

2024, simonpetervanrysewyk.substack.com

Even if we grant that a community is irrational in adhering to its practices, does this mean that the community must discontinue them?

2024

please do not circulate without permission are"-would surely help. And fortunately, we have a lot to say about this-though no consensus exists, a number of systematic, well-developed accounts of rationality in belief are on offer. What about the agent's desires-"whatever they are"? 1 As co-equal participants in shaping dispositions to act, must they, too, show a modicum of rationality? That sounds reasonable enough. After all, in everyday life we often attribute the irrationality of an act-our own or that of another-less to irrational beliefs than to irrationality in the desires that shaped or motivated it. In clinical practice, likewise. Such desires might be arbitrary, groundless, obsessive, phobic, infantile, compulsive, delusive, incorrigible, uncontrollable, disproportionate, self-defeating, distorted by mood or emotion, …-it is a very long list. 2 1 At the outset, I will follow conventional usage among philosophers and treat the term desire as a generic term for motivating states of all sorts-from bare urges and appetites to considered preferences and goals. Aversions, too. Later I will identify something more specific for desires to be. Calling these forms of irrationality in desire seems about as natural as saying that arbitrariness, groundlessness, obsession, phobia, immaturity, compulsion, etc. are forms of irrationality in belief. Moreover, even though those of us who have (what would normally be called) irrational desires typically also have associated irrational beliefs, it does not seem that we can reduce all forms of irrationality in desire to irrationalities in belief. In many cases, it seems the other way 'round-irrationality in desire is driving irrationality in belief. Neither do all apparently irrational desires derive from false beliefs. Individuals in the grip of addictive or compulsive desire can have a frighteningly clear view of their situation.

2024, Theoria

The topic of this article is the ontology of practical reasons. We draw a critical comparison between two views. According to the first, practical reasons are states of affairs; according to the second, they are propositions. We first isolate and spell out in detail certain objections to the second view that can be found only in embryonic form in the literaturein particular, in the work of Jonathan Dancy. Next, we sketch possible ways in which one might respond to each one of these objections. A careful evaluation of these complaints and responses, we argue, shows that the first view is not as obviously compelling as it is thought by Dancy. Indeed, it turns out that the view that practical reasons are propositions is by no means unworkable and in fact, at least under certain assumptions, explicit considerations can be made in favour of a propositional construal of reasons.

2024

The editors would like to thank all those individuals and institutions thath ave supported us in one wayo ra nother. Several of the contributions to this volume have been presented at the conference "WhyB eM oral?",which was organized by the Tromsø Ethics Research Group in the fall of 2013.The group is based at the PhilosophyD epartment of UiT,T he Arctic Universityo fN orway.O ther chapters have been written for the present collection independently. We thank all the authors for their commitment to the project and the institutions mentioned for their organisational and financial assistance. The authorsand the editors of the book owe special thanks to Peter Dennis, Fellow in the Department of Philosophy, Logic, and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics,who was ac opy editor as competent and reliable as

2024, Praktisches Wissen

In erkenntnistheoretischen Zusammenhängen hat sich für praktisches Wissen seit Ryle die Unterscheidung zwischen propositionalem knowing that und nicht-propositionalem knowing how etabliert. In der Handlungstheorie wird praktisches Wissen dagegen als ein im Handeln selbst als Wissen wirksames Wissen verstanden. Umstritten ist nach wie vor wie die Besonderheit dieser Wissensform angemessen zu erfassen ist. Der Band nimmt die Thematik des praktischen Wissens auf, indem unterschiedliche Diskussionsstränge zu diesem Begriff in historischer und systematischer Orientierung aus Handlungstheorie, Metaethik und Erkenntnistheorie zusammengeführt werden. Die Beiträge wollen das Konzept eines praktischen Wissens hinsichtlich seiner Potentiale und weiterer Forschungsfragen erschließen und dabei als essentiell für die Grundlagen der praktischen Philosophie herausstellen.

2024, Synthese

We constantly assess each other's epistemic positions. We attempt to distinguish valuable from worthless information, reliable from unreliable informants, etc. Without established social practices of epistemic evaluations we could not navigate the flood of information we are exposed to every day in order to perform essential selections of valiable information. Yet the way we epistemically evaluate each other, ascribe or deny knowledge, who we deem knowledgeable or ignorant, and whom we refer to as an expert or a layman also crucially shape our epistemic milieu and the structure of our society. Epistemic asymmetry often results in and reflects social asymmetry; higher epistemic appraisal often increases social standing. Also, epistemic evaluations such as knowledge ascriptions are commonly performed against the background of certain epistemic and non-epistemic (e.g., practical) concerns and interests. Consequently, epistemic and non-epistemic factors interact in guiding our epistemic practice. To advance our understanding of how they do so is not only a worthwhile project from an epistemological point of view but can be expected to have repercussions on decision making, in debates within political and social theory as well as within ethics, and help us understand and evaluate how we act and even how to act. Moreover, it might shed light on the perennial question of how theoretical and practical rationality relate to one another. A much-discussed question in recent debates on knowledge ascriptions is the question of whether-and if so, how-epistemic standards (standards of how much it takes to count as knowing or as a knower) are influenced by, and/or contextually vary with, non-epistemic factors such as stakes, interests, aims, etc., and whether this in turn affects the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions or only their assertibility (or sayability) conditions. This has been a main point of contention between contextualists, invariantists and relativists (of various brands) concerning knowledge acsriptions (cf.,

2024, Philosophical Quarterly

Epistemologists have recently argued that there is such a thing as 'epistemic blame': blame targeted at purely epistemic norm violations. Leading the charge has been Cameron Boult, who has argued across a series of papers that we can make sense of this phenomenon by building an account of epistemic blame off of Scanlon's account of moral blame. This paper argues a relationship-based account of epistemic blame is untenable, because it eliminates any distinction between blameworthy and excused agents. Attempts to overcome this problem cannot succeed because of the important but unrecognised ways his account deviates from Scanlon's, and because of differences in how our moral and epistemic conduct are affected by our attitudes and expectations.

2024

Joseph Raz became well-known for his concept of exclusionary reasons, which he applied in the analysis of various practical concepts, such as decisions, rules and obligations. However, the scholarly literature displays a high degree of skepticism regarding the existence of exclusionary reasons and even the coherence of the concept itself. Throughout his work, Raz consistently focused on two types of exclusionary reasons: directly motivational reasons and evidential ones. The concept has faced numerous criticisms, likely stemming from this particular focus. In this article, I emphasize another category of exclusionary reasons that Raz neglected: reasons that are excluded by their very nature. I argue that this category not only shows that the concept is not empty or inconsistent, but also plays a crucial role in elucidating a significant moral domain, specifically, the domain of affective relationships.

2024, Philosophical Studies

Lockean accounts of personal identity face a problem of too many thinkers arising from their denial that we are identical to our animals and the assumption that our animals can think. Sydney Shoemaker has responded to this problem by arguing that it is a consequence of functionalism that only things with psychological persistence conditions can have mental properties, and thus that animals cannot think. I discuss Shoemaker's argument and demonstrate two ways in which it fails. Functionalism does not rid the Lockean of the problem of too many thinkers.

2024, Philosophical Studies

2024, The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics

Consequentialism, as I take it here, offers a theory that ranks any items in a set of mutually exhaustive, jointly exclusive possibilities from a neutral perspective.

2024, Journal of Applied Philosophy

Ruth Chang argues against three dogmas of normativity. Her argument, as least about the first two, is defensible, and defensible on a naturalistic account of normativity of a distinct kind from her own account.

2024

Book Reviews 189 do, wq need to know about the agent's values, goals, ends, aims, desires, preferences and so forth. And how does the fact, if it is one, that we can be motivated without such antecedent conative states challenge this view? The normative theory is concerned not with the explanation of action but with its justification. Despite what seem to me to be flaws in several of Dancy's central arguments, there is much to be admired in this book-not the least of which is Dancy's inclusion of his own list of weak points in his argument. Refreshing candor.

2024, HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe)

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.