The Philosophical Quarterly Research Papers (original) (raw)

O ne of the most pressing problems in contemporary moral theory is that of providing a correct account of the relationship between an agent's having a normative reason to act (what she ought to do) and an agent's being motivated to act (what she actually does). Broadly speaking, there are three rival accounts of this relationship on offer. Neo-H umeans (e.g. Michael Smith, Stephen D arwall, Bernard Williams) argue that an agent has a normative reason to act if and only if so doing would satisfy some desire of the agent; consequently, their task is to show that there is an internal relation between an agent's having a normative reason to act and an agent's having a desire to act. Kantians (e.g. Christine Korsgaard, Thoma s Nagel) argue that any agent who has a normative reason to act, and who is practically rational (i.e. not suffering from some debilitating form of practical irrationality, such as weakness of will or depression), will act; consequently, their task is to show that normative reasons always have overriding authority and that it is always irrational not to act upon them. Neo-A ristotelians (e.g. John McD owell, Philippa Foot, D avid Brink) argue that normative reasons for action are derived from facts about human well-being, and that an agent will be motivated to act provided that she has been habituated into having desires, guided by reason, to act for her own well-being; consequently, their task is to show how normative reasons can be derived from facts about human well-being and whether it is always in an agent's best interest to act morally. A ll of the thirteen original essays in this collection, the majority of which were presented at the E thics and Practical R eason Conference held by the D epartment of Moral Philosophy at the U niversity of St A ndrews in March 1995, are devoted to some aspect of the problem of practical reason, and most of them side with one of the three accounts described above. James D reier defends the neo-H umean position that 'the only ultimate sort of reasons are instrumental reasons' (p. 96), although he does so by arguing that fellow neo-H umeans are wrong to claim that there are no categorical imperatives, since there is one categorical imperative, namely, the means/end principle of instrumental reason: 'If you desire to ¥, and believe that by ø-ing you will ¥, then you ought to ø' (p. 93). H is defence of the categorical nature of this principle is similar both to Peter R ailton's argument that there cannot be a purely hypothe tical account of why we must conform to certain forms of practical reason, and to D avid Velleman's argument (against D avid G authier) that our reasons for favour ing certain principles of practical reasoning over others cannot themselves be practical. Meanwhile Michael Smith argues, with his customary optimism, that the neo-H umean dispositional theory of value can provide a perfectly satisfactory account of human freedom and responsibility.