Should Britain relinquish sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory? (original) (raw)

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On 3rd October, His Majesty’s (HM) Government announced an agreement to cede sovereignty of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) – otherwise known as the Chagos archipelago – to Mauritius. This decision has aroused considerable debate from across the political spectrum, and beyond British shores. So, in this week’s Big Ask, we asked eight experts: Should the United Kingdom (UK) relinquish sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT)?

Dr David Blagden

Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Exeter

A key British interest has motivated the deal with Mauritius on the future of the Chagos islands: namely, retaining assured use of the joint British-American base on Diego Garcia. By securing a 99-year lease in which it will exercise sovereign functions – as well as the option to extend – the UK has carved out a de facto Sovereign Base Area covering the archipelago’s most important island. The UK thus keeps access to the base for its own needs, retains a valued lever in its ‘special relationship’ with the United States (US), and continues to contribute to balancing against potential adversaries’ revisionism in the Indo-Pacific. Chagos relinquishment may also lessen diplomatic opposition to the UK’s and US’s regional positions; a pressing concern for Washington, DC as it seeks to win regional states to its side vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as an irritant for London.

However, the deal has two critical flaws pertaining ‌to the islands’ sovereignty: Britain’s past treatment of the Chagossian people, and Mauritius’ sovereignty claims. The former was heinous; the UK should have long ago permitted – and facilitated – the Chagossians’ return to the islands (excluding territory specifically needed for basing purposes). But it does not follow that Mauritius – a country which has itself treated the Chagossians badly, which never exercised sovereignty over the islands, which illiberally outlawed dissent over their status, which has already received payment once for the islands’ ownership, and that has close relations with the PRC – should be granted sovereignty instead. To be sure, the International Court of Justice had advised against the UK’s position – but such judgements are outcomes of the power and interests of such institutions’ members, not some objective truth. Overall, therefore, the recent settlement comes with steep downsides for both British interests and Chagossians’ justice.

Dr Hillary Briffa

Senior Lecturer in National Security Studies, King’s College London

From a realpolitik, Anglo-centric perspective, the ceding of the Chagos islands from Britain to Mauritius could be viewed in two ways. On the one hand, amid mounting international pressure over questions of sovereignty – particularly in the wake of the International Court of Justice’s ruling that the islands should be returned to Mauritius – the government has been able to find a resolution which will curry international favour and recoup some moral legitimacy, while still finding a compromise over the contentious issue of the military base at Diego Garcia – the primary interest for the US. On the other hand, the hawks will fret considerably about the precedent this decision sets, and the implications for other allies, from France to Australia.

Amid all the discussions, the voice which will continue to be crowded out is that of the Chagossians themselves. Their forceful displacement from the archipelago in the 1960s has been deemed a crime against humanity under international law. Yet, how far have we really come? Decisions are still being taken without representation from the indigenous communities, who have been displaced yet again from the negotiating rooms. Just as the world was carved up by imperial powers during the Congress of Vienna, the Chagossians continue to be deprived of a seat at the table. Anyone arguing to decide on their behalf only perpetuates the structural violence of colonialism. If we want to understand whether the Chagos islands should remain part of the UK, be part of Mauritius, or opt for self-determination, here is a novel idea: Why don’t we ask the Chagossians themselves?

Sam Goodman

Senior Director of Policy, China Strategic Risks Institute

Whether it was under pressure from the Biden administration, abiding by rulings of the International Court of Justice, or taken of its own volition for other strategic purposes, the exact rationale for the new Labour government to relinquish control of the Chagos Islands within its first few months of office it remains unclear.

It stands as the most high-profile foreign policy decision of this new government, as well as the first-time HM Government has ceded territory since Hong Kong in 1997. As with Hong Kong, this agreement does not appear to have taken into consideration the views of the Chagos islanders. Nor the views of Parliament, given the announcement of the deal came during parliamentary recess.

Claims that the PRC might set up a military base on the Chagos islands are unconvincing, as are denials by Conservative leadership hopefuls that these negotiations do not build upon the last government’s own talks.

The view from Beijing – if it indeed has much of a view – is likely that it reaffirms its perception of the UK as a declining ‘middle power’, with limited influence in the Indo-Pacific, and heavily reliant on catering to US foreign policy interests with the continued leasing of the Diego Garcia military base.

What remains to be seen is how this decision fits with the illusive vision of what the UK’s purpose should be in an increasingly geopolitically unstable world.

Euan Graham

Senior Analyst, Australian Strategic Policy Institute

The rationale for the UK establishing and maintaining sovereignty over BIOT begins and ends with the joint British-American military base on Diego Garcia, which plays a critical part in maintaining a favourable balance of military power in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

The Labour government initially failed to communicate effectively its motivations for concluding a comprehensive sovereignty deal with Mauritius in apparent haste. But as more details about the agreement emerged, the agreement appears to present the best option for securing the long-term operation of the Diego Garcia military base, and settling the sovereignty dispute with Mauritius on terms acceptable to Britain.

If the UK and US have mutual confidence in Mauritius’s commitment to maintain the status quo on Diego Garcia – which remains under British administration for the 99-year lease period – and its willingness to oppose any hostile military or paramilitary presence elsewhere in the archipelago, then HM Government should sign and ratify the deal to relinquish sovereignty over the BIOT.

The decision to give up sovereign territory should never be taken lightly, and will necessitate robust assurances to Britain’s remaining overseas territories. But it now appears clear that the UK was facing the strong probability of an international court issuing a binding judgement in Mauritius’s favour, risking diplomatic consequences for Britain and further legal uncertainty which has already disrupted operations at the base, driving up costs. The BIOT has unfortunately become a net liability to the UK, and the dispute with Mauritius, an irksome distraction from the positive Indo-Pacific partnerships which the UK has established.

It makes sense to reach an amicable settlement now, ahead of elections in Mauritius and the US, which could increase political risk.

Dr Carl Patrick Stephen Hunter

Chairman, Coltraco Ultrasonics and Member of the Advisory Council, Council on Geostrategy

Sovereignty over the BIOT means the UK has a clear responsibility for global security, and self-determination, alongside its natural ones, as a custodian of its islands and ocean territory. The decision to cede the archipelago will have impacts elsewhere, not least of which to Britain’s remaining overseas territories. Self-determination has guided British policy since the end of Empire, but is not being applied in the BIOT. It would mean far more to the islanders, given their unfortunate expulsions, if it were today.

The BIOT covers 60 square kilometres in land area, but 640,000 square kilometres of ocean, with the largest ‘no-take’ marine conservation area in the world. The UK may be proud of its custodianship of nature and the joint strategic base at Diego Garcia that Britain’s wider security requires.

In the Indo-Pacific, AUKUS nations and their allies face an array of threats. Russia operates 25-27 submarines in its Pacific Fleet, while the PRC operates a fleet of 62-75 nuclear and conventional submarines. Combined, these are systemic and strategic threats. It is therefore unsurprising that Adm. Sir Tony Radakin, Chief of the Defence Staff, described the upcoming Strategic Defence Review as a ‘disruptive review for a disruptive world.’ The US Navigation Plan 2024 mandates that the US Navy surpass the PRC in terms of war readiness by 2027. While Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy calls for more ‘focused forces’ operating with ‘strategic reach’ to hold at long-range the Chinese maritime threat.

Applying self-determination to the people of the BIOT, while maintaining the ability to control a sizeable area of the Indian Ocean, in defence of the free and open international order, the BIOT’s ‘strategic UK reach’ denies the PRC geostrategic advantage and marine environment disruption, something surely rather important to uphold, in our disruptive, competitive and contested world.

Paul Mason

Associate Fellow, Council on Geostrategy

The signals Britain is trying to send to the global community could not be clearer. David Lammy, Foreign Secretary, regaled Russia not just with accusations of imperialism at the United Nations (UN) Security Council, but invoked a slave revolt in Guyana to do so.

It was an undisguised message to the ‘Global South’, many of whose leaders have wavered over support for international law in Ukraine, that he was speaking from a set of new British priorities, aimed at rebuilding trust with the developing world. His colleague, Lord Hermon KC, Attorney General for England and Wales, told delegates at Labour’s party conference that the new government would not only uphold international law but promote it.

So it was a no-brainer that, given the advanced stage of negotiations between Britain and Mauritius over the legal status of the Chagos islands, the UK would seek a deal. The agreement secures British-American use of Diego Garcia as a base and ends the possibility that an international legal judgement could disrupt the military presence of countries which support the free and open international order in a critical strategic location.

The agreement should have seen the Chagossians more actively consulted, but it is unlikely to create the kind of precedent claimed by its opponents – threatening Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands.

James Rogers

Co-founder and Director of Research, Council on Geostrategy

In the 2021 Integrated Review, HM Government censured belief in a ‘rules-based international system’ – an enticing but simplistic discourse which had gained traction over the preceding 30 years. It noted that Russia and the PRC had gained so much influence over the international architecture that ‘a defence of the status quo is no longer sufficient for the decade ahead.’

Although the new thinking attracted attention in the Cabinet Office and Ministry of Defence, it did not become pervasive in the Foreign Office, even as Russia and the PRC showed they had no qualms about denuding international rules. The Kremlin tore through the most fundamental of rules in Ukraine – by waging a war of imperial conquest – while Beijing seized control of islands and low-tide elevations in the South China Sea, shoving smaller countries, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, out of the way – and discrediting the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the process.

This is not a call for Britain to engage in the predatory imperialism of Russia and the PRC. But it is a call for HM Government to prioritise upholding the UK’s own long-term strategic interests, particularly when facing the politicised and non-binding rulings of international courts.

Just as Britain is no longer an imperial superpower with numerous territories to give away to appease irritants, it cannot afford to abide by rules that others ignore or weaken. While the UK may retain control under the upcoming agreement – through a lease – of the military facility on Diego Garcia for at least 99 more years, it is surrendering sovereignty over a prime geostrategic location. And it is doing so at some financial cost to the British people (described as a ‘package of support’ for Mauritius), for little more than the promise of goodwill in the so-called ‘Global South’ – goodwill which will surely evaporate as soon as the Chinese (or Russians) offer a fresh package of inducements.

Dr Emma Salisbury

Research Fellow on Sea Power, Council on Geostrategy

The ceding of sovereignty over the BIOT to Mauritius does nothing for the Chagossian people while representing what is likely to be a considerable strategic mistake for the UK and its allies. While the deal retains at least a 99-year lease over the base at Diego Garcia, the Mauritian government could now do what it likes with the other islands, which is of concern given its friendly relations with the PRC.

The Chinese have been looking to expand their network of overseas bases in the region for some time, and a friendly Mauritian government may take the opportunity to strike a deal to allow the construction of a base of some kind, giving the PRC a new strategic foothold in the centre of the Indian Ocean that it would not have been able to contemplate without this deal. Giving the PRC this opportunity will have considerable strategic consequences in the event of a wider conflict. Given the ever-increasing geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific and the need for both the UK and the US to think carefully about how to contain a more assertive PRC, the decision to surrender sovereignty over BIOT looks likely to become a huge own goal.

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