Inheritance - Freedom, Testation, Wills | Britannica (original) (raw)

The power of an owner of property to determine who is to have it upon his death is thought to stimulate economic activity: it is also considered desirable that a property owner be allowed to modify the rigid rules of the intestacy laws so as to adapt them to the particular situation of his family by preferring, for instance, a disabled child over one of proven capacity. The freedom to disinherit a child may be used to induce filial obedience, but freedom of testation also implies the freedom of making provision for charity. The possibility of abuse for ends of spite, arbitrariness, or whimsy is the price society has to pay for such power. Freedom of testation developed slowly, and nowhere does it exist without limitations. The questions of what the limits shall be, especially to what extent an owner of property shall be free to disinherit close members of his family and to what extent he shall have the power to tie up property from beyond the grave, have been answered in widely diverse ways.

Historical development

In a primitive or archaic society in which property is owned by the kinship or neighbourhood group rather than by individuals, freedom of testation cannot exist. Transition from group to individual ownership has rarely if ever occurred in one single step. As to land, even when its use was regarded as rightfully belonging to an individual, its free alienation by sale or gift, and even more so by will, was for long periods hedged in by superior rights of the kinship group, the village, or the feudal lord. Transition to free alienation has often been achieved by means of subterfuge, such as the adoption of the “purchaser” or “devisee” as a son, or, once free alienation had become possible inter vivos (between living persons) but not yet upon death, by fictitious sale or gift to a middleman who would promise to let the grantor keep the property as long as he should live and upon his death to deal with it as directed by the grantor. Such use of adoption occurred in ancient Babylonia, China, Japan, India, and other societies of an archaic patriarchic order. In ancient Greece effects similar to those of a will were achieved by gift, to take effect upon the death of the donor or, where the only child of the family was a daughter, by giving her in marriage together with the estate. Transfer by use of a middleman became possible among the Germanic peoples following the decline of the Roman Empire.

In ancient Rome the institution of the will appeared at an early stage of cultural development, but there, too, it seems to have been preceded by a stage in which its effects could be achieved only by indirection. The so-called will made in assembly (testamentum comitiis calatis) seems to have been the approval by the assembly of the adoption of a son by the childless chief of an aristocratic house so that the house and the worship of its deities would be perpetuated.

By the 5th century bce the head of a Roman family seems to have been able during his lifetime to achieve the purposes of a testamentary transaction by fictitious sale to a middleman, familiae emptor (purchaser of the family property). In the period of the early principate (1st century ce), the testament was fully recognized in its proper sense. In the mature form in which it is dealt with in the Corpus Juris (6th century ce), it became in the late Middle Ages the model for continental Europe.

Among the Anglo-Saxons and other Germanic peoples, land was subject to ties of the kinship group and, later, of feudalism, so that there was no place for disposition by will. Chattels were more freely alienable. In establishing freedom of testation, a prominent role was played by the church, which desired thereby to obtain funds for its activities, which included the bulk of medieval education, charity, and cultivation of the arts. In England the church succeeded shortly after the Norman Conquest in establishing the jurisdiction of its courts for matters concerning succession upon death to personal property. Through the church the will of the Roman pattern became firmly institutionalized, but a testator still had to leave a “reasonable part of the estate” (ordinarily at least one-third) to his wife and children.

Once the alienation of real property had again become possible by gift or sale, there grew up all over Europe that same practice of indirectly achieving the effects of a will by fictitious grant to a middleman (German Salmann, “sale man”; English feoffee to uses) that, in analogous circumstances, had grown up at other times and places. On the Continent, the will as such became again available when Roman law was rediscovered and “received,” which occurred from the 11th century onward, first in Italy and then north of the Alps. In France and Germany the will of the Roman pattern was fully recognized in the late 15th century. Just about that time, however, the enfeoffment to uses, which had been popular in England, was abolished by Henry VIII’s Statute of Uses in 1535. The King wished to restore to the crown its prospects of escheat and of certain feudal duties, which could be evaded by the alienation to uses. Public indignation was so strong, however, that five years later the King found it advisable, by the enactment of the Statute of Wills, to open the way for true testamentary disposition of land. Restrictions limiting devises of those lands of which ownership was connected with the duty of rendering military service were abolished at the time of the Restoration by the Military Tenures Act of 1662. In Scotland, testamentary disposition of land remained precarious until the enactment of the Titles to Land Consolidation Act in 1868.