7 areas of blame for Grenfell from 'dishonest' firms to 'defensive' government (original) (raw)

A damning report into the Grenfell Tower fire that claimed 72 lives has made clear blame lies far and wide - from central and local Government, to the construction industry, to the fire and rescue services.

The public inquiry into the 2017 disaster concludes that blame doesn't lie in a single place but identifies “many failings of a wide range of institutions, entities and individuals over many years that together brought about this situation”.

Complacency, incompetence and dishonesty are terms that repeatedly come up in the inquiry’s report, painting a picture of how “shortcomings” and ignored warnings led to the tragedy. A domino effect of dishonest manufacturers, overseen by incompetent regulators and a complacent Government has led to a "web of blame" for the fire.

The long-running inquiry's second and final report spans 1,700 pages and is just over a million words long. It uncovered how the tower block came to be in a condition where a kitchen fire could have spread 19 storeys in approximately 12 minutes.

Here are the seven key areas where blame lies.

The public inquiry released a diagram showing the 'web of blame' for the fire (

Image:

Grenfell Inquiry)

1. The Government

Inquiry chairman Sir Martin Moore-Bick’s report found the Government received “numerous warnings” about cladding risks over years - and yet failed to take them seriously. The Department for Communities and Local Government was found to have "displayed a complacent and at times defensive attitude to matters affecting fire safety”.

David Cameron's government's push to tear up red tape was found to have "dominated" thinking across departments. Lord Pickles, who served as Communities Secretary between 2010 and 2015, told the inquiry that deregulation had not applied to building regulations and that was "ludicrous" if officials believed it had.

Former Communities Secretary Lord Pickles' evidence was rejected by the inquiry (

Image:

Daily Mirror)

But in an extraordinary conclusion, the inquiry was “unable to accept” this as it was “flatly contradicted” by his officials and other documents from the time. Instead it found that officials were under “pressure because of the policy of deregulation” and were “inhibited” from advising ministers. Lord Pickles was earlier criticised when he confused Grenfell’s death toll with the number of those who died in the Hillsborough disaster during his inquiry evidence session.

Brian Martin, who was the principal construction professional at the department, was also found to have been given "too much freedom of action without adequate oversight" and repeatedly failed to bring fire safety risks to the attention of his superiors.

2. Local council

In the first week after the fire, the response of the Government and Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) was “muddled, slow, indecisive and piecemeal”, the inquiry found. RBKC was found to have a “wholly” inadequate system to deal with “mass homelessness and mass fatalities” in the aftermath leaving people “abandoned”.

Nicholas Holgate was found to have been 'unduly concerned' for the council's reputation in the aftermath (

Image:

Press Association Images)

Its chief executive, Nicholas Holgate, was found to have been “unduly concerned for RBKC’s reputation” and had “no clear plan” in the aftermath of the fire. The inquiry also identified “evidence of racial discrimination” in the treatment of the survivors in the days after the fire, such as a lack of effort to cater to Muslims observing Ramadan. “Certain aspects of the response demonstrated a marked lack of respect for human decency and dignity and left many of those immediately affected feeling abandoned by authority and utterly helpless,” it said.

3. Tenants' group

Residents of the 24-story tower block faced an “uncaring and bullying overlord” as their warnings about fire safety were ignored by the local authority tenants’ organisation. The council’s arm’s-length Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) regarded some residents as “militant troublemakers led on by a handful of vocal activists”.

The inquiry also revealed the TMO’s incomplete fire safety provisions. The report found the TMO’s only fire assessor was "allowed to drift into that role without any formal selection or procurement process”. Former firefighter Carl Stokes was found to have misrepresented his experience and even “invented” qualifications, making him “ill-qualified to carry out fire risk assessments on buildings of the size and complexity of Grenfell Tower”. Concerns were even expressed by the London Fire Brigade "his competence" but the TMO "continued to rely uncritically on him”, the inquiry said.

The tower block's fire assessor Carl Stokes was found to have misrepresented his experience and even 'invented' qualifications

4. Cladding firms

Construction manufacturers' “systematic dishonesty” was a “very significant reason” why Grenfell Tower came to be covered in flammable materials, the inquiry found. Phase one of the inquiry concluded that the principal reason flames shot up the building so quickly was the combustible aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding with polyethylene core.

Arconic Architectural Products, which made and sold Reynobond 55 cladding panels with a polyethylene (PE) core used in Grenfell Tower, was found to have “deliberately concealed” from the market “the true extent of the danger” of the product sold in a particular variant, known as "cassette form". By 2011, the firm was well aware it "performed much worse in a fire and was considerably more dangerous than in riveted form" but was "determined to exploit what it saw as weak regulatory regimes in certain countries (including the UK) to sell it in cassette form "including for use on residential buildings".

Earlier in the inquiry, it heard that Claude Wehrle, an Arconic manager, told colleagues in an email that poor fire test results on its product needed to be kept "very confidential".

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Kingspan, whose products made up 5% of the insulation in the Grenfell block, was found to have “cynically exploited the industry’s lack of detailed knowledge” about cladding tests and classifications. It "knowingly" misled the market over its K15 product, making "false" claims about safety tests. Tests it undertook in 2007 and 2008 were "disastrous" yet Kingspan failed to withdraw the product from markets "despite its own concerns about its fire performance".

The inquiry heard in one evidence session that Kingspan manager Philip Heath said a contractor "can go f*ck themselves" after they raised safety concerns about their products. And in text messages seen by the inquiry Kingspan employees appeared to joke about the fire performance of the "s*** product" and that claims about its safety were "all lies".

Celotex, who manufactured the majority of insulation boards used in Grenfell's refurbishment, was also found to have "embarked on a dishonest scheme to mislead its customers and the wider market" in an attempt to break into a market which had been dominated by Kingspan.

Bereaved families accused Kingspan, Arconic and Celotex of being "little better than crooks and killers".

Kingspan's Philip Heath said a contractor 'can go f*ck themselves' after raising safety concerns

5. Regulators

A web of failings allowed the cladding manufacturers' “dishonest strategies” to succeed.

The Building Research Establishment, which the report said had held a trusted position within the construction industry, was "marred by unprofessional conduct, inadequate practices, a lack of effective oversight, poor reporting and a lack of scientific rigour" from 1991. It had been a government agency providing independent advice and information on building performance, construction and fire safety in the UK, before it was privatised in 1997.

Elsewhere the “incompetence” of the British Board of Agrément, the country’s certification agency, led to it handing out “misleading” certificates for the products. The “underlying problem” was that it was conflicted by commercial interests, the inquiry said.

Local Authority Building Control, which guides projects through building regulations, must also "take its share of the blame" for its acceptance of Celotex's and Kingspan's products for use on buildings over 18 metres in height. "There was a complete failure on the part of the LABC over a number of years to take basic steps to ensure that certificates it issued in respect of them were technically accurate," it said.

The National House Building Council also failed to ensure “its building control function remained essentially regulatory" as "it was unwilling to upset its own customers”.

Zak Maynard, Rydon’s commercial manager, had boasted the firm was 'quids in'

6. Refurbishment firms

Grenfell Tower came to be covered in flammable cladding during a disastrous refurbishment in 2016. Rydon, the design and building contractor, Studio E, the architect, and Harley Facades, the cladding subcontractor, all took "an unacceptably casual approach", Sir Martin said. "None of their employees engaged on the project understood the relevant provisions of the building regulations, the statutory guidance or such guidance from industry sources as was available."

Earlier in the inquiry, one example heard was that Zak Maynard, Rydon’s commercial manager, had boasted the firm was “quids in” when it switched to cheaper - and deadly - cladding panels in the Grenfell project. He told the inquiry he had been “joking”.

Exova, the firm that provided fire safety advice to the TMO for the refurbishment, was also found to have "considerable responsibility for the fact that Grenfell Tower was in a dangerous condition on completion of the refurbishment". The "most serious criticism" it said, was that Exova "failed to produce a final version of the fire safety strategy" for the refurbished building and had "failed" to warn the design team about the potential consequences of that.

The London Fire Brigade was found to have failed to learn lessons from a 2009 fire (

Image:

Shivansh Gupta/PA Wire)

7. London Fire Brigade

The London Fire Brigade was found to have failed to learn lessons about the "shortcomings in its ability to fight fires in high-rise buildings" after the 2009 Lakanal House fire.

The report said it assumed “external wall fires of the kind that were known to have occurred in other countries would not occur in this country”, as it had “an entrenched but unfounded assumption that the Building Regulations were sufficient”.

Its response on the night was also criticised with control room and fireground staff “forced to resort to various improvised methods of varying reliability” due to a lack of training.