Nuclear Disarmament NATO (original) (raw)

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Arsenal and Missile Types

U.S. Nuclear Weapons on the Territories of 5 NATO States

Arsenal Size

• Approximately 100 U.S. nuclear warheads stored across five NATO nations.
• Six U.S. nuclear weapon facilities in five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey.
• B-61-3 and -4 gravity bombs are deployed in Europe.

Weapons System

• U.S. non-strategic gravity bombs (B61-3, B61-4)
• Delivery systems: U.S. F-15 E, F16C/D, B-52H, Belgian, Dutch, and Turkish F-16s, and German and Italian PA-200 Tornado

Modernization

• The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is currently modernizing the non-strategic warheads deployed in European NATO countries. NNSA is refurbishing and replacing components of the aging B-61-3 and B-61-4 warheads, converting them into the updated B-61-12 model to extend the warhead life by 20 years. Production began in 2020 with an expected conclusion date of 2026.
• Turkey, the Netherlands, Italy, and possibly Belgium are planning to buy nuclear-capable F-35A Joint Strike Fighters from the United States, which will begin replacing existing NATO aircraft in 2024. Germany is expected to extend the service life of its nuclear-capable PA-200 tornado through the 2020s.

Capabilities and Developments

Destructive Force

• B-61-3: maximum yield of 170 kt
• B-61-4: 45 kt
• B-61-12: 50 kt

Warheads Dismantled

• In 1971, U.S. nuclear warheads in Europe peaked at approximately 7,300. Since then, more than 7,000 warheads have been removed.

Commitments and Policies

Nuclear Weapons Related Policies

• The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) serves as NATO’s body for reviewing and discussing nuclear policy. The NPG consists of representatives from all members of the alliance with the exception of France.
• 1999 NATO Strategic Concept confirmed commitment to deploying nuclear weapons in Europe to maintain the “minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.”
• NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit Communique criticized Russia’s annexation of Crimea and reiterated the deterrence role of nuclear weapons. NATO also stated that it is regrettable that the prospects for disarmament are “not favorable today.”
• During the 2018 Brussels Summit, NATO reaffirmed that the fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear forces is deterrence and that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.
• In its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Trump Administration reaffirmed its commitment to have “nuclear weapons forward-deployed to Europe, to the defense of NATO.”
• In 2022, NATO reaffirmed that the fundamental purpose of NATO nuclear forces is deterrence, and that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. It further stated that NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture “relies on the United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and the contributions of Allies concerned. National contributions of dual-capable aircraft to NATO’s nuclear deterrence mission remain central to this effort.”
• The five NATO states with U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on their territory support the Australia-led Humanitarian Initiative. While the alternative Austria-led Initiative maintains that nuclear weapons should not be detonated, the Australia-led initiative has not made that declaration.
• NATO’s status as a nuclear alliance has once again been reaffirmed by the recent Russia-Ukraine conflict. NATO has stated that because of Russia’s willingness to brandish their nuclear abilities, it is now more important than ever that NATO has the ability to credibly deter nuclear activity from other states.

Treaty Commitments

• The five NATO countries that share U.S. nuclear weapons are all parties to the NPT, PTBT, and have signed and ratified the CTBT. They do not support, and have not signed, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).
• In the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration, NATO criticized the TPNW, saying it “risks undermining the NPT, and is inconsistent with the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence policy.”

Use of Nuclear Weapons

• NATO adopts a policy of calculated ambiguity and does not determine in advance how it would react to aggression. However, the organization does acknowledge the Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) that guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used or their use threatened against NPT non-nuclear weapon states in compliance with their treaty obligations.

Explore the Collection

Glossary

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military alliance that was formed in 1949 to help deter the Soviet Union from attacking Europe. The Alliance is based on the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949. The treaty originally created an alliance of 10 European and two North American independent states, but today NATO has 28 members who have committed to maintaining and developing their defense capabilities, to consulting on issues of mutual security concern, and to the principle of collective self-defense. NATO is also engaged in out-of-area security operations, most notably in Afghanistan, where Alliance forces operate alongside other non-NATO countries as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). For additional information, see NATO.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military alliance that was formed in 1949 to help deter the Soviet Union from attacking Europe. The Alliance is based on the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949. The treaty originally created an alliance of 10 European and two North American independent states, but today NATO has 28 members who have committed to maintaining and developing their defense capabilities, to consulting on issues of mutual security concern, and to the principle of collective self-defense. NATO is also engaged in out-of-area security operations, most notably in Afghanistan, where Alliance forces operate alongside other non-NATO countries as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). For additional information, see NATO.

Deployment

The positioning of military forces – conventional and/or nuclear – in conjunction with military planning.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons

Non-strategic nuclear weapons: See entry for Tactical nuclear weapons

Kiloton

Kiloton: A term used to quantify the energy of a nuclear explosion that is equivalent to the explosion of 1,000 tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT) conventional explosive.

Dismantlement

Dismantlement: Taking apart a weapon, facility, or other item so that it is no longer functional.

Deterrence

The actions of a state or group of states to dissuade a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict through the credible threat of retaliation. To be effective, a deterrence strategy should demonstrate to an adversary that the costs of an attack would outweigh any potential gains. See entries for Extended deterrence and nuclear deterrence.

Disarmament

Though there is no agreed-upon legal definition of what disarmament entails within the context of international agreements, a general definition is the process of reducing the quantity and/or capabilities of military weapons and/or military forces.

Nuclear Posture Review

Under a mandate from the U.S. Congress, the Department of Defense regularly conducts a comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review to set forth the direction of U.S. nuclear weapons policies. To date, the United States has completed four Nuclear Posture Reviews (in 1994, 2001, 2010, and 2018).

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The NPT: Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.

Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)

The PTBT: Also known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water prohibits nuclear weapons tests "or any other nuclear explosion" in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. While the treaty does not ban tests underground, it does prohibit nuclear explosions in this environment if they cause "radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control" the explosions were conducted. The treaty is of unlimited duration. For additional information, see the PTBT.

Ratification

Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

The CTBT: Opened for signature in 1996 at the UN General Assembly, the CTBT prohibits all nuclear testing if it enters into force. The treaty establishes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to ensure the implementation of its provisions and verify compliance through a global monitoring system upon entry into force. Pending the treaty’s entry into force, the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is charged with establishing the International Monitoring System (IMS) and promoting treaty ratifications. CTBT entry into force is contingent on ratification by 44 Annex II states. For additional information, see the CTBT.

Negative security assurances

A pledge by a nuclear weapon state that it will not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state. Some states have policies that allow for the use of nuclear weapons if attacked with other WMD by a non-nuclear weapon state. See entry for Positive security assurances.

Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS)

Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS): Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), NNWS are states that had not detonated a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967, and who agree in joining the NPT to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons (that is, all state parties to the NPT other than the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China).

Sources

1. Hans M. Kristensen, “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Special Report No 3,” Federation of American Scientists, May 2012, www.fas.org.
2. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011,” Nuclear Notebook, Natural Resources Defense Council, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 2010, pp. 64-73, https://thebulletin.metapress.com.
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8. Hans M. Kristensen, “Status of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe 2010,” Federation of American Scientists, 12 February 2010, www.fas.org.
9. United States Government Accountability Office, “NNSA Has a New Approach to Managing the B-61-12 Life Extension, but a Constrained Schedule and Other Risks Remain,” GAO-16-218, February 2016, pp. 10-25, www.gao.gov.
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17. “Nuclear Posture Review,” Department of Defense, 2 February 2018, www.defense.gov.
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