Selections From an Interview With Du Daozheng (original) (raw)

Oct. 16, 2009

On the making of Zhao Ziyang’s memoir:

The English title is ‘Prisoner of the State.’ I wrote the preface for the Chinese version...The book was written based on the narration recorded by Zhao. It involved two parts, first was recording his remarks, the second was taking transcription from the tape. I was not familiar with the transcription part of it. [Later] his family members sought my advice. I agreed to publish the book, but I wished to publish the book after [the 20th anniversary of the crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations on] June 4th, to find a more suitable time to publish the book. His family members and I are on very good terms, but they didn’t take my advice. His family members believed that since Zhao has been dead for four years, and June 4th happened 20 years ago, to publish the book at this time is good for the party and good for the country, and with its historic and political value, would have a big impact. It is a very big, good thing to have this book published on China’s modern history. It is good of [Zhao’s former top aide] Bao Tong and his son to publish the book, to take the responsibility to the history, responsibility to our nation. It is a good thing.

It took about eight or nine years from the very beginning to the end, and involved five people....Of the five of them, three of them died.

...There were several sets of the tapes, either 16 or 32 in all, there were different versions. The person who provided the tape recorder was my good friend. He told me that I have the best recorder and I have the best tapes. I’ll give both of them to you. Go back to Beijing....At the beginning I used my pen to take down Zhao’s narration.........but in the 1990-something he got the tape-recorder. We kept it very secret. Before June 4th all of us were minister-level officials, and are old aides to Zhao. So before June 4th we kept close contact, but after June 4th until 1992, all contact was cut off. Zhao moved out of Zhongnanhai in 1992 and we resumed the contact. From 1992 up to his death, I saw him around 40 times. Most of these 40 times I was working on this taping. We reached a consensus among the five of us, that June 4th was a historic event. It was a milestone, a turning point in Chinese history and party history. The slogan of June 4th was anti-corruption and calling for democracy and political reform. This was a patriotic democratic movement. Students rose up, and ordinary people rose up. Whatever the slogan was, it had profound meaning.

On the years leading up to June 4th:

Deng has his own position in China’s history but unfortunately he failed to carry out political reform with his big influence...In retrospect, in terms of political reform and construction, Hu [Yaobang] and Zhao were far ahead of Deng. History will prove that Deng was wrong. Hu and Zhao were right. Deng was wavering on political reform, he was not like Li Xiannian, who was always a hardliner against reform...

[The protests that culminated in] June 4th were initiated by intellectuals calling for political reform and opposing the income gap and corruption to promote democratic movement. If the party was wise enough it should have made better use out of the civil rights momentum to promote democratic reform. People were extremely angry at corrupt officials. But the government at that time made a mistake to crack down with military force. June 4th should be considered as great a democratic mass movement as the May 4th Movement in China’s history. Our party should have followed the historic tide. But unfortunately the party at that time used military force to crack down. It went against the momentum of history.

On listening to Zhao talk on tape about June 4th:

Other old cadres and I, we had a lot of thoughts on June 4th. So we shed a lot of tears. We were crying our eyes out. It was really painful. We were old. Sometimes we wept for the whole night. Because the situation had forced a whole group of people to give a lot of thought, in-depth thought.

My wife and I and some of my friends were sitting in our living room on the night of June 3, and cried from our hearts. We received a lot of phone calls. All of us shared one feeling: the Communist Party was over, the Communist Party was over. How can we shoot our own people?

I joined the party in 1937 when I was 14. There were many young communist party members in our generation. I shouldered a gun when I was 14. I had four grenades. I was even the youth league secretary...when I was only 15. I went to the Central Party School...after the Japanese party school. As I wrote in my book, the Communist Party did have some great achievements, and I was part of it. The CPC made big mistakes and had failures and I was also part of that.

For example, during the Anti-Rightist Movement, I was the [Xinhua News Agency] bureau chief. I labeled four people as ‘rightists’. I used to be a believer in Maoism. I was cultivated by the Communist Party, I persecuted other people, and I was also persecuted several times. I was labeled as a ‘rightist opportunist’ just because I wrote a 5000-character letter telling the central government that people in Guangdong were starving, for criticizing the party’s policy. Thirty million people starved to death during that period of time...

Not only Zhao but all of us old cadres had a lot of deep thoughts on the success and the failure of our party. [But] Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were ahead of us in terms of in-depth thinking.

On what happened to him after the June 4th Incident:

There was an investigation team from the Central Organization Department. The investigation group summoned me to have a talk and asked me to betray Zhao Ziyang. They told me, ‘We know you two are on close terms. Just tell us what did he say during June 4th.’ I said, ‘We talked for 40 minutes, but Zhao didn’t say anything. It was me who did all the talking to him. I told Zhao that Tiananmen Square was in chaos.’ I didn’t say anything bad about Zhao.

They were really disappointed. In the end the investigator said, ‘Comrade Du, according to our observation, you have a stunningly good memory. How come you can’t remember anything that Zhao said?’ They were intending to give me a chance to ‘redeem my guilt’. [They said:] ‘You go home and think about it. Whatever you recall, give us a call and we will give you a second chance.’ Obviously they wanted me to betray my friend. If I w anted to betray my friend, I could just make something up. They said, ‘We’ll wait for around a week for you.” A week later, I was removed from my post. There were six batches of ministry-level officials being fired, and I was among the second batch. On June 18th, somebody from the secretariat of the party Central Committee came to meet with me. He said, ‘Comrade Du, I must inform you that you are removed from the post. Do you have any other request?’ I said no.

A few days later, at a general meeting in my working unit, the official announcement was made that Comrade Du, as a high-ranking party official, implements party policy unwaveringly when it is clear, but he wavered when party’s policy was not clear. More than thirty ministers were removed from their posts in total.

On how he helped convince Zhao to leave his memoir:

We were aides to Zhao, so after June 4th, we were forced to draw lessons from it. Zhao was totally muzzled by the party. The entire media was criticizing Zhao and a leading newspaper in Beijing [Guangming Daily] wrote 26 points criticizing Zhao. They denied the entire report of the 13th party congress. I told the chief editor of that newspaper, ‘if you go on criticizing like this, on the surface you are criticizing Zhao, but in reality you are criticizing Deng. You’ll end up denying the achievement of the Third Plenum of 11th party congress [in 1978, which ushered in the era of Reform and Opening]. They denied the entire thought of Deng Xiaoping, even including the land reform in late 70th.

...There was only one voice after June 4th, only the prosecutor’s voice. Defendants were totally muzzled. It was outrageous. We really hoped that Zhao, as the lead defendant, could speak up.

In 1992, several of us resumed contact. I was thinking about letting his voice be heard. I would write it up in detail. Zhao had some doubts about recording. He said, ‘What is the point of this narration and recording? It will never get published.’ I explained and tried to persuade him several times. The last few times, I was really tough. I told him, ‘This is not your just personal issue. This is a historic issue. You were the secretary general of the party. If you keep silent, when you pass away some years from now, this part of history will remain unclear for ever. History will be distorted. This is your responsibility to speak up. You must be responsible to our nation, our party. He said, ‘Okay then’. I still have these two notebooks.

On the risks of the secret recording sessions:

It was not like during the Cultural Revolution. We knew they would not arrest us. They probably wouldn’t put us in jail. There might be surveillance on us. We were fully prepared for that. They could have somebody stand in front of the house. Sometimes my telephone was cut off...

During the first couple of times, I was there listening and Zhao was recording. Later, I said, ‘You can just speak into the recorder. We don’t have to sit here watching you.’ He had a very clear mind, a fantastically good memory. He finished all the recording by himself. He had drawn up an outline first. I also came up with two outlines for him, I still keep the two original copies and I will publish them eventually. Zhao is extremely talented. He is quite an extraordinary person. As I just told you, I was sure they wouldn’t execute us, wouldn’t put us in jail. The worst was that they might expel me from the party, cut off my salary or medical care, which was not a big deal. [But] We did have some small worries.

On how the old men kept the tapes secret:

Towards the end of the recording, we had to make three duplicate copies of the tape. It was like a shrewd rabbit that has three holes. Zhao kept one copy, [??] had one copy, and I had one copy. I was afraid that somebody would search my house. I have like five or six houses so I moved it all the time. I have four girls. My youngest daughter was educated in US. Eventually, I concealed the tapes in the underwear drawer of my youngest daughter, in her wardrobe. My daughter knows everything. Later I asked my daughter to take the tapes to Hong Kong. On her way to Hong Kong, she kept calling me at every stop. Once she crossed the border in Shenzhen, I finally calmed down. The day after the tapes arrived in Hong Kong., she rented a safe deposit box at the bank. There are 16 tapes. The tapes in Hong Kong were a complete set. The set Zhao kept were missing a few tapes, but then they found them again. But I have no idea how [Zhao’s former top aide] Bao Tong got hold of Zhao’s tape. It was Zhao’s family members’ right [to publish]. Before Zhao’s death, he never said anything like “Du, you are responsible for these tapes to the end.” Zhao’s widow is still alive. The book it is based on Bao’s tapes.

We asked [another of the ex-officials involved] Yao Xihua to take down the entire transcript keeping all the original mistakes Zhao made during the narration. Zhao was a special person talking about a special incident. So his transcript must be kept as original as possible. Not even a single word should be altered. Otherwise people will doubt the authenticity. So Yao’s version was the most precise one. We took down the transcript around 2001. We didn’t want to get a book published. We just want to get it recorded for future historical study. It was our noble cause.

I was just taking politics into consideration. We were waiting for a perfect timing [to publish]... Zhao never said that he wanted to get it published. We never thought of publishing the book. That’s why we kept it confidential so successfully. Only my wife and my youngest daughter knew about this. Even [Mao’s former personal secretary] Li Rui didn’t know.

It was said that there were two video cameras [in Zhao’s courtyard], in the north and northeast corner. We were not sure whether the telephone was bugged or the house was bugged. I asked Zhao, ‘Do you think someone is watching us?’ Zhao said, ‘I don’t think so’.

We have to get registered every time we visit him. In his courtyard, the study was in the middle, the bedroom was in the back, and a team of soldiers stayed in the front yard. If you knock on the door the guard will open the door, and get you registered. Normally you give your name and your ID card. Then they would report to the secretary and the secretary will bring you in. Sometimes the state security will have a car parked outside. Security was sometimes tight, sometimes loose. We put ourselves out there and we were not afraid.

On what motivated him to go about his role in the memoir in May:

I had a physical check-up in March and during that time, Zhao’s family contacted me asking for a preface. At first I intended to wait until after June 4th, but they insisted on having it as soon as possible. So I wrote the preface during my stay in the hospital. I handed in my preface on March 25. It is a good, big thing for China that the book can be published They took the risk. But I still believe that if you want to publish the book, you should keep it as original and accurate as possible. They changed some subheadings and the sequence of the chapters, which I disagree with. I disagree with them because Zhao is a special person. The book is special, the timing special. This book is historically valuable, so they shouldn’t change anything.

And I also disagree with the English version of the book, in which they valued Zhao’s achievement more than Deng’s. I don’t think so. Deng was number one in charge. Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were only at province-level officials [after the start of reforms]. They were not powerful enough to combat the conservative forces. Deng was the mastermind. [Veteran party leader] Chen Yun was also important part of it. I was the head of domestic news with Xinhua, so I knew the situation. Deng was the decisive figure in the reform. He made some errors, but he was definitely the Number One.

On the party’s reaction to his role in Zhao’s memoir:

You are from America. [But] it is not so strange to Chinese people. It’s much better here than in Mao’s time. After my book came out, people asked me, ‘Are you under home arrest? Telephone bugged? Can you go out?’ Nothing bad really happened. I wrote the preface for the book and the book was in the limelight, so my daughter and my wife were a little bit worried.

On June 25, an active and very high-ranking official in charge of media came to my home and he said a lot of things, but to put it in brief terms, he said first, ‘I read the book, and read your preface. You are the mastermind behind the book. You operated the recorder. In a word, it is understandable why you did this. Zhongnanhai and the party central can understand why you did this.’ I felt very satisfied with his comment. It was a neutral comment, it was not criticizing or praising, and there was no mention of criticism or blame or an investigation. [What they meant is,] as an old friend, an old aide to Zhao Ziyang, it is understandable. Taken from a more positive perspective, it is forgivable. Another high- ranking official gave me a call and said, “You did something you should do.” If you know the Communist Party’s history, you can see that this is a significant comment.

On whether party will ever acknowledge that the June 3-4th crackdown was a mistake:

You should pay attention to the different versions of how they have referred to June 4th. First it was a ‘counter-revolutionary riot’. Later they called it a ‘riot.’ Then they called it ‘turmoil’, and then they called it an ‘incident’. The party released a formal eulogy on Zhao’s death. It said that Comrade Zhao made serious mistakes during the period in the spring and summer of 1989. It didn’t even mention the word ‘riot’ or ‘incident’...You can see that gradually the party is retreating on this...So I wrote in the preface [to Zhao’s memoir] that we are not happy with the party’s explanation of June 4th, but still you can see this retreat by the party, which is progress in China’s history.

There always have been two factions within the party itself there are two forces... We haven’t reached any consensus. Zhongnanhai is never a monolithic block. It is like in America. You have the Democratic party and the Republican. It is never [all united]. So let’s see which force is taking the upper hand on the other force. You guys are young, So you will see which way...

...It took more than 20 years for South Korean government to redress the Guangju incident. It takes for 30 years to redress the [228 Massacre by Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist army]...We hope the sooner the better. We believe [through] the majority of party members, the conscience of the majority of the people, the issue will be solved properly.

We should take a two-step plan in terms of June 4th. The first level is we have soften the tone on this incident. Release all prisoners from June 4th, give people some compensation who suffered in 1989, take away the ‘counterrevolutionary’ label, allow asylum seekers to return from overseas.

...Before the 20th anniversary of June 4th, I wished they could take some of our suggestions, but they didn’t. The thinking and the rhetoric of the party remained in the old fashion, still taking the approach of prevention, control, and suppression, of blocking instead of channeling. Among middle-aged intellectuals and officials, according to my observation, there are more and more people in the younger generation who have their own independent ideas. Another favorable development is that we have more and more intellectuals coming back from studying in the West. Some of them are very high-ranking officials or professors in important universities. That could be considered a very beneficial force...But we have a misleading approach in the textbooks. June 4th is never mentioned. Lately we had this grand celebration of Li Xiannian’s birthday. Old cadres were opposed to this, Li Xiannian was good during the cultural revolution, but after that, he was anti-Hu Yaobang and Anti-Deng Xiaoping. He has always been leftist and conservative...He was one of those who insisted on shooting the students.

On the market positioning of his journal, Yanhuang Chunqiu:

Our magazine has been established now for 18 years. Our magazine is not a big deal. We are just seeking truth from fact. The first point is to seek out the truth, the second is to reflect the historic trend of democracy, to get ordinary people’s voices out. Of course it takes a lot of guts for us to do this. We have more than 100 old pals among us, 100 old former ministers, former generals. All of them are very influential in the party and in society. We did not asked for a penny from the government, no official position, and no housing from the government. It is done all by ourselves. It started from printing 2000 or 3000 copies. The current circulation is 105,300. Every time we are persecuted by the central propaganda department, the circulation goes up. It is not a big deal. If the [Communist Party-published] People’s Daily or Seeking Truth magazine can be a little bit liberal, then we would present no competition. The government gives them billions of renminbi [yuan] every year. But we have only a few dozens of hands. We are just speaking from the bottom of our hearts. If other publications could be freer and more democratic, it would not be necessary for us to exist anymore. On the other hand, if our magazine fell into the same category as Seeking Truth Magazine, it would not be necessary for us to exist either.

Now we are enjoying a lot of popularity, especially among old people. We are artful at handling the tricky bottom line. We never touch [the following subjects]: Deng Xiaoping, June 4th, active top leaders, the last leadership or their family members. We are smarter in this aspect than some newspapers in southern China. A former propaganda department deputy chief once said, ‘Yanhuang Chunqiu is very irritating. We always want to close it down. But Du is very shrewd.’

On how he and Yanhuang Chunqiu have weathered their recent pressures:

The central government is more tolerant now. In the past, we probably would be dismissed from the party if we published Zhao’s book. But now they are being very tolerant and polite to us. Among the two forces in Zhongnanhai, the progressive, truth-seeking, democratic and mild force welcomes our magazine. Our magazine is such an influential publication, nobody dares close it. Otherwise he will go down in history with a bad name.

[About retired Party leader Jiang Zemin]:

He has no evidence, and it is not his era anymore. There was some small commotion last year, and some old cadres called us, taking a very tough stance. They said if the magazine is closed, we will take to the street. We are old, in our 80s. We have heart problems. If we take to the street, we will probably die in the street, and you can carry our bodies to continue the demonstration. Many people signed the petition letter [defending the magazine]. So the conservatives won’t take any action against us. They are afraid of taking responsibility

On how he has parried the recent pressures:

We had a personnel reshuffle, we had youth movement. Most of our editors are middle-aged. [Chief editor] Wu Si is only 52, and [deputy chief editor] Yang Jisheng is 67, and others are only in the late 40s or early 50s. I’m not at the office all the time. I am still the president, in order to push back against the pressure from above. Otherwise, young editors may not be strong enough. I am still the president, this is [my] principle.

[The order party authorities target him with] is called Document No. 24. It involves acting and retired officials, it basically covers everybody...The document itself is not precise enough so there is a lot of loopholes, i just ignore it.

On word that other President Hu Jintao might have intervened on his behalf late last year:

That is rumor, it might be. My feeling or my guess is that from the bottom of Hu’s heart, they don’t hate us, they don’t resent us. Based on our independent thinking, we support Zhongnnahai. We never laugh at the current government, we never want to overthrow the regime. We wholeheartedly hope CPC will do good. We truly love it.

On how he responded the last time he was asked to step down:

The order was relayed by the Ministry of Culture and I told them we have finished the reshuffling Wu Si is the chief-editor and vice president. I am the honorary president assisting him. On April 25, the minister of culture told me we should obey the Document No. 24. I said we have already finished the personnel reshuffle. I continue to sit in my position because I am old enough and I am tough enough. If there is any pressure from the government, I can hold on here.

On the political influence of aging party liberals like himself today:

It is hard to say, we are trying our best. In the past 30 years, the Communist Party regime has built up like a 100-story building because we have great achievements, getting more and more reputation internationally. But we have inherent defects... This building is still ramshackle. So if we don’t set it straight the building will collapse. Old cadres like me, we are the healthy and moderate force within the party. We see the building collapsing, and we want to support it. We never wish to overthrow the building. We are not passers-by laughing at the party. We want to save this building from collapsing. We love the party, and we love this country.

China is a one party system. The party doesn’t’ have any real competition. If the CPC [Communist Party of China] regime collapses one day it will be a great tragedy, it will be the ordinary people who suffer greatly. High-ranking officials would flee this country. They’ve got green cards and air tickets, deposits in foreign banks at hand. Only ordinary people would suffer the aftermath.

On the need for political reform:

I had this discussion with Zhao. Our Communist Party should cultivate another very strong opposing party. The opposing party would have a shadow cabinet, like the Conservative and Labour parties in Great Britain. But judging from the current situation, it is impossible. Independent organizations scare the government to death, not to mention an opposing party. It is much easier for a highly centralized power to control the ordinary people, because when they’re not organized they’re like a pile of loose sand.

The communist party is really afraid of any civil organization, like labor union in the US. But if we want to realize democratization in china we must allow people to organize themselves. We should grant people freedom of speech, the right of assembly. It’s written in the constitution. But whatever organization forms, you may be dismissed or denounced as an illegal organization or they will assimilate you into the official body.

We are at this crucial moment. We must have the political reform. It is a dangerous step but we have to take risks. It is difficult, it is dangerous, but we have no choice. It is the only way out, otherwise china will be in great trouble. If communist party refuses to take political reform, there must be some other force that rises up to carry out the political reform. History is marching on, and will not be stopped or reversed by any single person. You may hold on for many years. You may crack down many times. Those are all simply temporary historic phenomena. The Chinese nation is a great nation, but it is simply a temporary historic phenomenon. CPC’s existence is also a temporary phenomenon. The communist party will not last forever. You may exist for 50 or 60 years, but not eternally in Chinese history. Even the Chinese nation is not eternal, nor is the United States. Human beings may finally move to another planet. The cosmos will last for ever, but Earth will meet its doom.

On what kind of multi-party reform he advocates:

This magazine is my burden, so must pay attention to my rhetoric...I still believe that the Chinese party system should be “cooperative multi-party system under the CPC’s leadership.” The Communist party’s wish to maintain the leadership should depends on making the right decisions, on having the right platform to win support from others. It shouldn’t be like the Communist Party imposes its leadership over other parties. Currently other parties are subordinate to the Communist Party. It is not what is written in the Constitution. It shouldn’t be like, ‘We are the acting party, you must listen to me no matter whether we are right or wrong.’. The current situation is that the appointment of all the top leaders of the consulting parties must be approved by the CPC. It shouldn’t be like this.

In China parties are financed by the government. The United States is not like this. Party should be funded by itself. It cannot spend the government’s money, the taxpayers’ money. I hope, in the future, there will be great diversity politically, economically and culturally. That is china’s future. This is the progressive direction of human society. People will support whoever is reasonable, whoever is right. Just be patient.

Translation by Zhang Jing

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