Nondual awareness: Consciousness-as-such as non-representational reflexivity (original) (raw)

One of the major impasses in advancing scientific understanding of consciousness stems from focusing exclusively on phenomenal contents and global states of arousal, instead of also on consciousness itself, or consciousness-as-such (Josipovic, 2014; Josipovic and Baars, 2015).

Whereas consciousness in general can be seen as the capacity for experience and knowledge, consisting of global states and phenomenal contents, consciousness-as-such is its foundational aspect, a non-conceptual nondual awareness, in itself empty of all other phenomenal content, yet reflexively self-aware (Dunne, 2015; Josipovic, 2014; Rabjam, 2007).

The central idea proposed here is that consciousness-as-such knows itself to be conscious or aware, directly, unmediated by conceptual or symbolic representations or re-representations, and without needing to structure this knowing as subject-object duality. This non-representational reflexivity is the essential property of consciousness-as-such that makes it what it is. It is this that fundamentally differentiates consciousness-as-such from all other perceptual, affective and cognitive processes. It makes consciousness-as-such a unique kind, sui generis, and irreducible.

On the other hand, consciousness as ordinarily experienced is based on mental representations, such as concepts and symbols, that operate within the dualistic structure of subject vs. object (Josipovic, 2014). Its reflexivity operates via conceptual representations as well, and can be regarded as an indirect reflexivity, a reflection of the inherent non-conceptual reflexivity of consciousness-as-such in the conceptual processes. This conceptual reflexivity is, likewise, the main property of ordinary consciousness (Peters, 2013).

The idea presented here is related to both the reflexivity theories as applied to ordinary representational consciousness, and the scientifically informed theories of consciousness-as-such (Metzinger, 2018; Peters, 2013). It thus differs from the theories of consciousness as qualia, or as metacognition (Block, 2007; Kriegel and Williford, 2006; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011). Reflexivity theories are well known in the science of consciousness and philosophy of mind, but consciousness-as-such is not, and the implications of its non-representational reflexivity have not yet been explored (Peters, 2013). Conversely, there are recent scientific theories of consciousness-as-such that recognize its non-conceptual nature, but do not understand that reflexivity is its essential property (Metzinger, 2018).

Consciousness as a general term refers in this chapter to the capacity for experience and knowledge, consisting of phenomenal contents, functions that create them, global states of arousal, the unconscious substrate and consciousness-as-such. This expanded map of consciousness is discussed in the section on phenomenology.

Consciousness-as-such, or nondual awareness, is the foundational aspect of consciousness, consciousness itself alone without any other phenomenal content, an empty awareness that is non-conceptual and without subject-object structuring, hence nondual. Numerous terms have been used to point to it by both traditional and contemporary sources, such as: pure consciousness, pure awareness, open awareness, clear light, Atman, Buddha nature, etc. (Dunne, 2015; Josipovic, 2014; Rabjam, 2007; Radhakrishnan and Moore, 1967). The terms nondual awareness and consciousness-as-such are here used interchangeably to point to this foundational consciousness when without other phenomenal contents. The term nondual awareness is also used when discussing its being present with other phenomenal contents, in which case this will be explicitly stated.

Consciousness-as-such can be said to be a minimal phenomenal experience since there is something it is like for one to experience it (Metzinger, 2018). However, it is non-intentional as it is not about some content other than itself (Forman, 1998).

Reflexivity refers to the property of consciousness to know itself to be conscious. Reflexivity can be conceptual representational as in case of ordinary consciousness, or non-conceptual non-representational as in case of consciousness-as-such. The terms self-awareness, self-knowing and self-recognition are here used to refer to reflexivity, unlike their common use in psychology and neuroscience, where they indicate a meta-cognition of one's self.

Representation here means mental representation, such as categorizations, concepts, schemas and various semantic, iconic and numeric symbols (Hubbard, 2007). All concepts are mental representations whether concrete or abstract. Re-representations, metacognitions, and representations of representational capacity are likewise mental representations.

Non-representational processes are more direct ways of knowing and experiencing that do not rely on representations (Freeman and Skarda, 1990; Gallese, 2005; Searle, 1992; Varela et al., 1991). Here, this refers specifically to processes that do not use categorization and the subsequent conceptualizations, including the subject-object structuring (Thompson, 2017). Importantly, the non-representational reflexivity perspective presented here is not an anti-representational theory (Chemero, 2000; Kirchhoff, 2011). Concepts and conceptual-symbolic constructed processes do occur, and are necessary for normal functioning, but while one can mistake consciousness-as-such for such processes, they do not fundamentally affect it, nor do they obscure it once its non-representational reflexivity is activated (Blackstone, 2007; Guenther, 1977; Ricard and Singer, 2017).

The term neural correlate is used broadly to avoid arguments about different meanings of causation.

The term network is used both in its narrow meaning given by informatics, and in the broader meaning as a dynamic system.

Synchronization among neurons and neuronal populations is here used in a broad sense without implying any specific mechanism, such as synchronization of spiking activity, an emergent phase synchronization or coherence in post-synaptic dendritic field potentials, or dynamics of traveling waves.

This chapter is organized into two main sections, the first one on phenomenology and philosophy, and the second one on neural correlates. It discusses consciousness without other phenomenal contents, consciousness-as-such, the isolated nondual awareness. Our previous research has been focused on nondual awareness with phenomenal contents during regular wakefulness (Josipovic, 2014; Josipovic et al., 2012). I will leave the further discussion of that aspect of nondual awareness for a later date, except in a few places where necessary for more precise understanding.

The present chapter focuses on phenomenology and neuroscience of consciousness-as-such, and will not explore epistemic, ontological and metaphysical issues. Likewise, it will not dwell on the soteriology or on the pedagogy of realizing nondual awareness. Considerable confusion can arise when conflating these different levels of discourse. This issue has been extensively explored elsewhere and will not be addressed here (Josipovic, 2016; Lutz et al., 2015; Metzinger, 2018). For the record, the underlying view here is two-in-one nonduality, the brain and consciousness are two sides of the same one reality, like two sides of a coin, both same in being one, and different in being non-reducible to one another.

Language is necessarily linear with dualistic subject-object structuring, while nondual awareness is inherently holistic, so some descriptions will unavoidably sound paradoxical. For example, language demands for a statement to be expressed as “one experiences nondual awareness without other phenomenal contents,” but during such events there is no separate subject experiencing nondual awareness as if it were an object, there is only nondual awareness which knows itself inherently. Furthermore, the labeling of various features and processes of consciousness in general is descriptive and does not imply ontological reification.