Antoni Macierewicz Report on liquidation of the Polish Military Information Services (original) (raw)
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Antoni Macierewicz report on lustration / vetting of the Polish Military Intelligence that was completely infiltrated by russian / soviet intelligence and mafia In July 2006, Antoni Macier…
Antoni Macierewicz Report On Liquidation of The Polish Military Information Services
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Antoni Macierewicz report on lustration / vetting of the Polish Military Intelligence that was completely infiltrated by russian / soviet intelligence and mafia In July 2006, Antoni Macierewicz has been the lead liquidator of the Polish Military Information Services, while from October 2006 he has been the chief of the new restructured military counter-intelligence service. THE PRESIDENT OF VERIFICATION COMMISSION Antoni MACIEREWICZ ABSTRACT OF THE REPORT On the actions of soldiers and employees of the former Military Intelligence Services (WSI) performing military intelligence and counter-intelligence activity and other actions going beyond the issues of the State defense and safety of the Polish Army. Introduction The Report comprises information about the activity of soldiers and employees of special services (and the persons co-operating with them) concerning: • disclosure or use of the information making by the State secret or; • omission to notify the prosecution agencies of criminal acts; • obstruction and disconcerting penal proceedings; • use of violence and illegal threats; • exerting illegal affect on decisions made by the public authorities; • keeping secret cooperation with entrepreneurs and persons acting in (public) media; • falsifying information in order to exercise or extend penal proceedings against specific persons; • taking financial or personal benefits from the above mentioned actions; • and any other actions going beyond the matters of State defense and safety of the Polish Army. The Report also discloses the information about the persons occupying leading state positions who did not undertake any actions aiming at discontinuation of the activities of the military special services going beyond the prevailing regulations of the law. Military Intelligence Services (the WSI) and their legal predecessors – the entities executing the military intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks, constituted and were integral part of the Polish Army.
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Antoni Macierewicz Report on liquidation of the Polish Military Information Services
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Antoni Macierewicz Report On Liquidation of The Polish Military Information Services
Antoni Macierewicz report on lustration / vetting of the Polish Military Intelligence that was completely infiltrated by russian / soviet intelligence and mafia In July 2006, Antoni Macier…
THE PRESIDENT OF VERIFICATION COMMISSION Antoni MACIEREWICZ
ABSTRACT OF THE REPORT
On the actions of soldiers and employees of the former Military Intelligence Services (WSI) performing military intelligence and counter-intelligence activity and other actions going beyond the issues of the State defense and safety of the Polish Army.
Introduction
The Report comprises information about the activity of soldiers and employees of special services (and the persons co-operating with them) concerning: • disclosure or use of the information making by the State secret or; • omission to notify the prosecution agencies of criminal acts; • obstruction and disconcerting penal proceedings; • use of violence and illegal threats; • exerting illegal affect on decisions made by the public authorities; • keeping secret cooperation with entrepreneurs and persons acting in (public) media; • falsifying information in order to exercise or extend penal proceedings against specific persons; • taking financial or personal benefits from the above mentioned actions; • and any other actions going beyond the matters of State defense and safety of the Polish Army. The Report also discloses the information about the persons occupying leading state positions who did not undertake any actions aiming at discontinuation of the activities of the military special services going beyond the prevailing regulations of the law. Military Intelligence Services (the WSI) and their legal predecessors – the entities executing the military intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks, constituted and were integral part of the Polish Army. As part of the Polish Army, the military special services could act exclusively within the scope of State defense and safety. The strictly determined obligations of Military Intelligence Services (the WSI) included only the tasks relating to identification and counteracting the threats being detrimental to State defense and breach of the State secret relating to defense. In connection with liquidation of the Military Information Services – the WSI [the process begin on the summer of 2006 by three Acts of Parliament, issued on the 9th of June], the Verification Commission was appointed. The Commission was collecting and analyzing materials originating from the hearings of the soldiers of the WSI and third persons, from the archive files, being at the disposal of the WSI (Military Information Services).
Then after WSI was disbanded on the date of the 30th of September 2006, files were at the disposal of new services: SKW (Military Counter-intelligence Service), SWW (Military Intelligence Service), IPN (Institute of National Remembrance), CAW (Central Military Archives). The transformations performed in the Army after 1989 left intact the basic structures and the old cadre of the special forces and subordinated them to the management of the officers originating from the 2nd Directorate of the Staff General. The files of former military services or files produced by individual WSI units on an on-going basis, were systematically destroyed and hidden. In turn, the process of establishing of a new system aimed at hiding material information before the vetting-related legislation coming into force was initiated. For instance, an attempt at destroying the personal data by deleting them with the use of a marker in the register of agents from ‘Wybrze
!
e Gda
"
skie’ [Three-Cities: Gda
"
sk-Sopot-Gdynia Region] from the 70’ies and 80’ies was proved. The Report contains 24 documentary annexes, in which the problems referred to above are discussed in more detail comparing to the Report itself.
The WSI - origins
In the 1980s two structures composed the military services of the People's Republic of Poland. These were: the 2nd Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish People's Army and the Military Internal Services (WSW) established from the former Military Information, acting simultaneously as C.I. as well as military police but in reality being merely a kind of military political police. In the autumn of 1991, the structure was named the Military Intelligence Services. In 2006 the Parliament’s Act dissolved the WSI and established two separated services: the Military Counter Intelligence Service - MCIS and the Military Intelligence Service - MIS (SKW and SWW [in Polish: S
u
!
ba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego and S
u
!
ba Wywiadu Wojskowego]). Organizational changes made in the end of eighties and in the beginning of nineties did not have a crucial impact. [Military] Service(s) have played a function of political apparatus continuously: amongst almost 10 thousand collaborators of the military services acting inside the country as well as abroad in the year 1990, at least 2500 (roughly 25%) consisted of people being very well-placed in central administrative and economic institutions of the country. This problem is illustrated below presenting a list encompassing of as
many as 2457 WSI (WSW) collaborators being placed in as WSI 'assets' in civil institutions of the [so-called] People's Republic of Poland [before 1989]. Inter alia they were placed in: • National Level Administration: 204 (including 108 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone). • Political and social organizations: 24 • Academies and Universities: 207 university teachers, 342 students, 38 members of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 41 employees of Research Institutes. • Schools: 25 in high-school, technical, professional and elementary schools. • Journalists in TV, Radio and Press: 67 • Artistic and cultural institutions, publishers and printing offices: 21 • Hospitals and medical institutions: 34 • Banks and insurance companies: 18 • ‘International Commerce ‘Centrala’s’ - foreign trade companies and chambers: 471 • Military Production Companies: 19 • Fuel & Energy Companies: 32 • Transportation companies: 272 • Maritime sector companies [besides the mentioned above transportation ones]: 101 • Other business branches: 407 • R&D centers for industry, project bureaus, etc.: 49 • Cooperatives including dwelling-cooperatives: 38 Single collaborators were placed also in inter alia: arrests, labor offices, ‘Treasury Printing-house’, taxi-cab companies, ‘Institute of Meteorology’, sport clubs, ‘Folk Riding Team’ (‘Ludowy Zespó
Je
$
dziecki’), ‘State Mint’, and many other institutions. WSI established also a network of companies on the territory of the neutral countries (from Scandinavia to Mediterranean countries), working legally as regular commercial establishments. Several sources of military intelligence were identified: • smuggling and illegal trade of computer parts; • foreign bank transaction from the funds of the state-owned ‘Foreign Trade Central’; • repurchase of Polish debt through ‘Foreign Debt Administration Fund’ (FOZZ); • taking over inheritances of former Polish citizens deceased abroad; • arms trade with (especially Arab) terrorists; • establishing common ventures (called even in Polish: 'joint venture') with Polish companies through secret collaborators. • the Foreign Intelligence of the WSI tried also very hard to start with its own TV company. Original reason for such activities was to make easy to place secret collaborators on the West. Russian penetration: the threats for internal and external safety of the State The Soviet special services (KGB and GRU) fully controlled (also, if not especially
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