excolo law – Techdirt (original) (raw)
Ninth Circuit Dumps Three More ‘Sue Twitter Because Terrorism’ Lawsuits
from the when-exploitation-compounds-tragedy dept
While it’s understandable to desire someone be held responsible for brutal acts of terrorism, the responsibility for those actions lies with those who committed them. That’s hardly satisfying because it can be almost impossible to extract anything from the terrorists themselves, other than the limited recompense of seeing them arrested and jailed.
And that’s something that rarely happens. Many terrorist acts are suicidal, allowing perpetrators to exit the world as self-proclaimed martyrs, rather than the abhorrent murderers they actually are.
So, I understand the desire to sue social media companies whose platforms have been used by terrorist groups to recruit members and spread propaganda. The thing is, social media services aren’t complicit with these actions and, in most cases, are doing what they can to prevent this sort of content from being posted and shared.
What I can’t understand is the motivation of law firms like Excolo Law and (yes, this is its name) 1-800-LAW-FIRM to bring further misery to victims of terrorism by pretending there’s an actionable claim to be made in court against companies like Twitter and Facebook. This pretense — that has yet to hold up in court — allows these questionable legal firms to pretend they’re the Davids going up against these Goliaths, exploiting people that now have to relive these horrible experiences by becoming plaintiffs in lawsuits that cannot realistically expect to win.
The losses just keep mounting. The legal theories pushed by these firms have yet to secure a single win. And in just four pages, the Ninth Circuit Appeals Court has handed [PDF] these plaintiffs and their legal reps another three losses. (via Courthouse News Service)
This decision consolidates three appeals all stemming from dismissals with prejudice by lower courts. All three plaintiffs (all represented by the same two law firms listed above) sued Google, Twitter, and Facebook under the theory that the mere appearance of terrorist content on their platforms amounts to material support for terrorism or, at the very least, were negligent in their moderation efforts.
None of that works. It didn’t work at the lower level and the appeals court sees no reason to expend any more words than necessary to affirm these dismissals. This single paragraph is half the decision (not including footnotes) and it makes it extremely clear these arguments will never work in this circuit, or indeed, anywhere else in the federal judiciary, thanks to its brief citation of two overriding Supreme Court decisions.
The court concludes de novo that amending the operative complaints would be futile. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs-Appellants fail to allege the third element for aiding and abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d), that Defendants-Appellees “gave such knowing and substantial assistance to ISIS that they culpably participated” in the terrorist acts, Taamneh, 598 U.S. at 497 (applying the legal framework set forth in Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Each district court properly considered this dispositive third element. See id. at 503–07. Plaintiffs-Appellants proffer no arguments that any of the district courts either erred in dismissing claims or abused its discretion in denying leave to amend.
The law firms behind these lawsuits are exploiting tragedies and the people who survived them to extend the distance between the victims and closure. And it has happened over and over and over again. Mandy Palmucci is one of the plaintiffs affected by this decision. Here’s what the lower court said when it dismissed her case:
Following the Fields decisions, materially similar direct liability claims have been rejected by numerous judges in this District and elsewhere. See Clayborn v. Twitter, Inc., 17-CV-06894- LB, 2018 WL 6839754 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2018); Copeland v. Twitter, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 3d 965, 17-CV-5851-WHO (N.D. Cal. 2018); Taamneh v. Twitter, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 904, 17-CV04107-EMC (N.D. Cal. 2018); Cain v. Twitter Inc., 17-CV-02506-JD, 2018 WL 4657275 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2018); Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 16-CV-03282-DMR (N.D. Cal. 2018) (Gonzalez II); Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2017) (Gonzalez I); Pennie v. Twitter, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 874, 17-CV-00230-JCS (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2017); see also Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 3d 564 (E.D. Mich. March 30, 2018).
The lawyers handling these cases know these are losing causes. But they keep doing the same thing over and over again when they should be telling these clients these are cases that can’t be won. These firms present themselves as crusaders against Big Tech but all they’re really doing is taking advantage of people who’ve already been subjected to the worst things this world has to offer. This track record would be inexcusable if it were the result of hallucinating AI. There’s not even a word that capably describes what this is when there’s actual living, breathing, law license-holding humans behind it.
Filed Under: 9th circuit, blame, social media, terrorism
Companies: 1-800-law-firm, excolo law, twitter, x
Appeals Court Tosses Cop's Attempt To Hold Twitter Responsible For Him Being Shot By A Gunman
from the law-firms-must-be-hoping-for-a-first-round-draft-pick dept
The 1-800-LAW-FIRM/Excolo Law losing streak continues. The lawyers at those firms have been preying on the victims of terrorist attacks for a few years now, presumably promising them some form of justice that can only be obtained by filing futile, flawed, completely doomed lawsuits that attempt to hold social media companies directly responsible for the criminal acts of terrorists.
This lawsuit — facing its second rejection in a row — was one of the stupidest filed by these law firms. Jesus Retana, a Dallas police officer, was wounded during a mass shooting perpetrated by Micah Johnson. The lawsuit attempted to use the AITA (Anti-International Terrorism Act) to hold Twitter responsible for the alleged “radicalization” of Johnson by Hamas, an entity the US government has declared a terrorist organization.
The Fifth Circuit Appeals Court finds this attempt to tie Twitter to Micah Johnson and his shooting of Dallas police officers as legally unbelievable as the lower court did. There’s no discussion of Section 230 immunity, which would shield Twitter from this litigation, because the rest of the allegations are so baseless there’s no reason to bring it up. (h/t Eric Goldman)
The court says [PDF] not only is there no link between Hamas, Twitter, and Micah Johnson, there’s also no link between Hamas and the shooting in Dallas. And there’s certainly no international terrorism justifying the accusations of Twitter’s supposed violation of international terrorism laws.
An act of international terrorism is one that “occur[s] primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend[s] national boundaries.” We cannot conclude that the Dallas shooting transcended national boundaries. We sympathize with Plaintiffs, but this shooting was committed by a lone shooter entirely within the United States. He might have been radicalized in part by Hamas, but Hamas did not plan the shooting or even take credit for it.
There’s also no connection between Johnson and Hamas in the 96 pages of the original lawsuit, nor in its current amended state. Linking Johnson to Hamas is crucial, especially if the plaintiffs want to claim Twitter helped Hamas radicalize the shooter. That link simply isn’t there.
Johnson was a self-radicalized shooter who merely “liked” the Facebook pages of “black separatist hate groups” that had communicated with Hamas. And, while Johnson met with Ms. X and indicated that he sympathized with Hamas’s objectives, that occurred two years prior to the Dallas shooting.
It was a shooting perpetrated by a US citizen on US soil with no solid ties to any international terrorist group. No international terrorist group took credit for the attack. There was no international terrorism. The AITA claim fails. Again.
So does the allegation of secondary liability.
We also hold that Defendants did not “knowingly” and “substantial[ly]” assist Hamas in the Dallas shooting, again because the shooting was committed by Johnson alone and not by Hamas either alone or in conjunction with Johnson. The district court was correct in concluding that Defendants are not secondarily liable under the ATA.
This case was dismissed by the district court in December 2019. At that point, it was these law firms’ TWELFTH straight loss in federal courts. That win-loss record hasn’t improved since then. Unfortunately, these firms seem to have no problem finding new victims of terrorist acts to use as fodder for DOA lawsuits.
Filed Under: blame, intermediary liability, jesus retana, micha johnson, responsibility, terrorism
Companies: 1-800-lawfirm, excolo law, twitter
Former US Ambassador Sues Apple Because Telegram Users Are Making Him Feel Scared [Update]
from the yeah-i-don't-know-either dept
Here’s an interesting lawsuit, brought to you by some familiar names. And by “interesting,” I mean “exceedingly stupid.”
The lawsuit [PDF] was filed by “Ambassador Marc Ginsberg.” Ginsberg last served as an ambassador in 1998. And yet, that title is being used to name him as the plaintiff. The defendant is Apple. In the mix (but not a defendant) is Telegram, a popular and often controversial messaging app that has served as a mouthpiece for alt-right personalities and others who have been banned from more mainstream social media services.
Ginsberg also runs the Coalition for A Safer Web (the co-plaintiff in this lawsuit), a non-profit whose mission is “inter alia, to promote new public/private partnerships to facilitate the expeditious removal of extremist and terrorist incitement and instruction content from social media platforms.” The executive team at CSW includes Dr. Demetrick Pennie, a former Dallas Police sergeant and, according to the site, “leading CDA 230 expert.”
Here’s some of Dr. Pennie’s 230 expertise at work:
In January, Dallas Police Sergeant Demetrick Pennie sued [PDF] Twitter, Google, and Facebook, claiming they were directly responsible for “radicalizing” Micah Johnson, who shot and killed five police officers in Dallas, Texas. According to Pennie, the social media companies actively allowed and encouraged terrorist use of their platforms to spread their message and attract participants.
Pennie’s lawsuit was tossed because the court could find nothing linking terrorist organization Hamas to the Dallas shooter, despite Pennie’s baseless proclamations otherwise. And his lawsuit was so off-base — suing social media companies over the shooting of cops by a Dallas resident — the court couldn’t even be bothered to address the Section 230 ramifications. Pennie was represented in this case by Keith Altman of Excolo Law (often in conjunction with 1-800-LAW-FIRM), who has filed dozens of similarly stupid lawsuits trying to hold social media companies directly responsible for the violent acts of terrorists.
“Ambassador” Marc Ginsberg is suing Apple because of content Telegram users post. I’m not even kidding. And he’s being represented by ex-Excolo litigator Keith Altman, who has moved on to Lento Law Group. But he’s apparently still doing the same kind of litigation: suing the wrong parties over things other people are doing or have done.
The lawsuit features two plaintiffs (Ginsberg, Coalition for a Safer Web) because CSW employs Ginsberg and provides him with an iPhone. Apple is the defendant because it has refused to remove Telegram from its app store. The lawsuit is full of relevant facts and evidence, like this:
Currently, Defendant Apple sells the iPad Mini 5 for 399+,the2020iPadis399+, the 2020 iPad is 399+,the2020iPadis329+, the 2020 iPad Air is 599+,the12.9−inchiPadProis599+, the 12.9-inch iPad Pro is 599+,the12.9−inchiPadProis999+, the 11- inch iPad Pro is 799+,the12.9−inchiPadProis799+, the 12.9-inch iPad Pro is 799+,the12.9−inchiPadProis799, and the 11-inch iPad Pro is $649+.
And this:
Defendant Apple sells the Series 3 Apple Watch for a starting price of 199,theAppleWatchSES5forastartingpriceof199, the Apple Watch SE S5 for a starting price of 199,theAppleWatchSES5forastartingpriceof279, and an Apple Watch Series 6 for a starting price of $399.
Ginsberg claims the Telegram app violates Apple’s developer guidelines and California’s hate speech law and should be removed from the app store. Because Apple hasn’t removed the app, it has been downloaded and used by people who engage in anti-Semitic speech. (Ginsberg is Jewish.) Because Telegram refuses to remove this content, it somehow leaks into Ginsberg’s life through the app store — even if Ginsberg has never downloaded the app or engaged with its users.
Defendant breached their duty by continuing to host Telegram on the App Store despite Defendant’s knowledge that Telegram was being used to incite violence including violence against African Americans and Jews.
Ambassador Ginsberg is a Jewish person whose professional work requires he maintain a presence in the public eye.
As a result of this Anti-Semitic campaign that was coordinated on the Telegram app, Ambassador Ginsberg is forced to live in apprehension of religiously motivated violence being perpetrated against him.
Ambassador Ginsberg’s fear of religious violence has caused him substantial emotional harm including depression and anxiety.
All of this may be true. But suing Apple over distressing content carried on Telegram isn’t going to work. Apple doesn’t have a duty to remove anything from its app store that may cause distress to anyone. If anyone’s responsible for the racist content being spread on Telegram, it’s the people posting it. That targeted harassment is possibly being aided by a chat app is concerning, but Apple isn’t culpable for the actions of users of an app it allows customers to download and use.
And conclusory arguments like this aren’t going to convince a judge otherwise.
If was foreseeable to Apple that by allowing Telegram to continue to be available on the App Store that Apple’s conduct could lead to fear of violence by individuals, such as Ambassador Ginsberg.
By failing to remove Telegram from the Apple App Store, Defendant has proximately caused Ambassador Ginsberg’s emotional distress.
Plaintiff Ambassador Ginsberg has suffered injuries in an amount that exceeds $75,000.
The arguments get even worse. Ginsberg claims Apple deceived him into purchasing an iPhone by promising to enforce its app store restrictions — restrictions Ginsberg claims are violated by Telegram remaining available. But Telegram appears to comply with Apple’s rules for apps relying on third-party content because Telegram allows users to block accounts/content, report violations/abusive accounts, and provides contact info for users seeking to have questions and concerns addressed.
Somehow, Telegram’s continued presence in the app store has rendered Ginsberg’s phone nearly useless.
Defendant’s failure to enforce their own guidelines against Telegram has caused Ambassador Ginsberg and CSW to suffer economic loss by being deprived of a key benefit of the purchase and use of the Apple iPhone XR.
I don’t see how this makes it past a motion to dismiss. Ginsberg has a problem with Telegram users’ content. So he’s suing… Apple. Even assuming Apple is wrong to allow Telegram in its app store, Telegram is multi-platform. It has an Android app and a desktop version. The racist conspiracies Ginsberg believes are targeting him and causing him verifiable, recoupable harm could have originated on other platforms. Suing Apple into submission isn’t going to stop the behavior that’s bothering Ginsberg. It’s only going to enrich Ginsberg.
And that appears to be the whole point of this lawsuit: to hit the biggest target with the broadest allegations and hope for a quick settlement. There’s nothing in here that carries any legal weight or explains why Apple should be held responsible for the racist content that has (allegedly) caused Ginsberg distress.
UPDATE: Ginsberg has now sued Google for the same thing, claiming Google isn’t protecting him from Telegram users’ content by allowing it to remain in the Google Play store. That covers another outlet for Telegram, but once again, suing Google isn’t going to stop Telegram users from posting anti-Semitic content or otherwise making Ginsberg feel unsafe.
Filed Under: 1st amendment, demetrick pennie, hate speech, intermediary liability, keith altman, liability, marc ginsberg, section 230
Companies: a safer web, apple, excolo law, google, lento law group, telegram
Losing Streak Continues For Litigants Suing Social Media Companies Over Violence Committed By Terrorists
from the twelve-straight-losses-to-open-the-season dept
According to Eric Goldman’s count (and he would know), this is the 12th ridiculous “blame Twitter for terrorism” lawsuit to be tossed by a federal court. The dubious legal theory — one so dubious it has yet to find any judicial takers — is that Twitter and other social media platforms “allow” terrorists to converse and radicalize and do other terrorist things. What no one has successfully alleged is that Twitter, Facebook, etc. are directly or indirectly responsible for terrorist attacks.
This lawsuit was one of the dumbest. The brain geniuses at Excolo Law convinced a client this would be a winning strategy: claim the shooting of some cops by a shooter in Dallas was Twitter’s fault because possibly the shooter thought terrorist group Hamas was pretty cool. 96 pages of lawsuit and this was the tenuous allegation plaintiffs Jesus Retana and Andrew Moss thought might finally prove social media companies are providing material support to terrorists.
Micah Johnson was radicalized by HAMAS’ use of social media. This was the stated goal of HAMAS. Johnson then carried out the deadly attacks in Dallas. Conducting terrorist acts in the United States via radicalized individuals is a stated goal of HAMAS.
Not only did the lawsuit fail to include anything linking Twitter to the killing of Dallas police officers, it failed to include anything linking the shooter to Hamas. That didn’t stop Excolo Law from claiming that the only thing propelling the shooter to start killing Dallas police officers was Hamas’ social media presence, aided and abetted by Twitter.
As Goldman points out, the court “expressly does not reach the Section 230 defense.” That’s not because it’s not a good defense. It’s because the lawsuit — and the law firm shoveling as many of these into federal courts as possible — is so awful.
The court opens its dismissal [PDF] by noting the string of courtroom failures Excolo Law (and 1-800-LAW-FIRM) doesn’t seem to be interested in discussing when pursuing another lost cause in a federal court.
This case is the latest in a string of lawsuits that Plaintiffs’ lawyers have brought in an attempt to hold social media platforms responsible for tragic shootings and attacks across this country—by alleging that the platforms enabled international terrorist organizations to radicalize the attacks’ perpetrators. In fact, Plaintiffs’ lawyers brought a suit in the Northern District of California, Pennie v. Twitter, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 874 (N.D. Cal. 2017), concerning the same Dallas shooting this Court is confronted with here, albeit with different plaintiffs. The court in that case dismissed the claims with prejudice, finding that there was no connection between the shooting and Hamas, the terrorist organization at issue. Id. at 892. Yet, Plaintiffs’ counsel made no mention of that case in their briefing; counsel discussed the case only after the Court questioned about it at oral argument.
The court then notes it can do its own research if the law firm isn’t willing to discuss past work that hews super-closely to the case at hand. GTFO, says the Texas federal court.
The Court dismisses this lawsuit with prejudice. Although the complaint here alleges additional facts not found in Pennie, the complaint nonetheless suffers from many of the same deficiencies discussed in Pennie. Plaintiffs here have not and after multiple attempts, clearly cannot connect Hamas to the Dallas shooting.
Need more? No link between the cop killer and Hamas:
Simply put, the SAC does not allege any facts that show that Hamas radicalized Johnson to commit the Dallas attack, not to mention by using Defendants’ websites. Plaintiffs’ injuries,therefore, were not “by reason of” Hamas, or Defendants’ alleged support of Hamas.
No link between the claimed violation of the ATA (Anti-Terrorism Act) and the Dallas shooting, either:
Plaintiffs’ secondary liability claims fail for an additional, yet similar, reason: Plaintiffs do not allege that the Dallas shooting was an act of international terrorism.
[…]
[T]he SAC is devoid of allegations connecting Hamas to the shooting, even after it occurred. There is no transnational component to Johnson’s planning and execution of the shooting. Instead, this tragic shooting appears to be an act of domestic terrorism.
The case is dismissed with prejudice, continuing Excolo Law’s losing streak. This obviously won’t keep the firm from trying again, not as long as it can convince victims of violence they have a shot at extracting a large settlement from social media companies. Sure, it hasn’t worked yet. But that can only mean Excolo, et al are due for a win! Right?
Filed Under: andrew moss, intermediary liability, jesus retana, material support, section 230, social media, terrorists
Companies: 1-800-lawfirm, excolo law, twitter
Another Attempt To Tie Twitter To Terrorist Acts And Another Dismissal With Prejudice
from the Definition-Of-Insanity,-PLLC dept
“A series of lawsuits,” the court calls it. This is the ongoing work of 1-800-LAW-FIRM and Excolo Law — two firms that specialize in bringing losing lawsuits to federal courts. It’s a series of lawsuits and a series of losses. An unbroken string of dismissals at both the district and appellate levels — all in response to the firms’ attempts to hold social media companies responsible for the acts of terrorists.
Mandy Palmucci — a victim of the terrorist attacks in Paris, France — filed an incredibly long lawsuit (121 pages!) last year with the assistance of these two law firms. She needn’t have bothered. This one joins the pile of rejected complaints passing through the federal court system. (h/t John Roddy)
The only thing notable about this latest loss is how irritated Judge William H. Orrick seems to be with these lawsuits that keep landing in his court. Handling one of these lawsuits twice appears to have dug deep into Judge Orrick’s reserves of patience. From the decision [PDF]:
In two decisions – Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2016) and Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 3d 964 (N.D. Cal. 2016) – I concluded that surviving family members of government contractors killed by an ISIS-identified terrorist could not pursue claims for direct liability under the ATA (or related state law claims) because there was no proximate cause “between Twitter’s provision of accounts to ISIS and the deaths of” plaintiffs’ family members. Id. at 1127. I also held that Twitter was immune from liability for its provision of services to users (even terrorist users) under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)).
The judge points out the Appeals Court reached the same conclusions, but more expeditiously. It decided the plaintiffs’ “proximate cause” claims were so weak it didn’t even need to discuss Section 230 immunity.
Then the judge sends a not-too-subtle message to the law firms pushing these baseless lawsuits
Following the Fields decisions, materially similar direct liability claims have been rejected by numerous judges in this District and elsewhere. See Clayborn v. Twitter, Inc., 17-CV-06894- LB, 2018 WL 6839754 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2018); Copeland v. Twitter, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 3d 965, 17-CV-5851-WHO (N.D. Cal. 2018); Taamneh v. Twitter, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 904, 17-CV04107-EMC (N.D. Cal. 2018); Cain v. Twitter Inc., 17-CV-02506-JD, 2018 WL 4657275 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2018); Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 16-CV-03282-DMR (N.D. Cal. 2018) (Gonzalez II); Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2017) (Gonzalez I); Pennie v. Twitter, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 874, 17-CV-00230-JCS (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2017); see also Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 3d 564 (E.D. Mich. March 30, 2018).
Given the short and whatever’s the opposite of “illustrious” history of these lawsuits, the judge asked the plaintiff why he should be bothered to allow the case to proceed.
In light of the similarities between Palmucci’s theories of liability and factual allegations here and those in Copeland et al v. Twitter, Inc. et al., No. 17-CV-05851-WHO and Fields v. Twitter, No. 16-CV-0213-WHO, I issued an Order on November 30, 2018, requiring plaintiff to “file a supplemental brief not exceeding five pages identifying what material facts differentiate this case from the facts pleaded in Copeland, Fields” and two other decisions from this District, Cain v. Twitter Inc., No. 17-CV-02506-JD and Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 16-CV-03282-DMR.
And received, “Ummmmmm… because?” for a reply:
Palmucci was given an opportunity to explain why – in light of the caselaw identified above – her case should continue. She declined, essentially admitting that no additional facts could be alleged that might state her claims under the ATA or state law.
Dismissed with prejudice. That means there will be no re-filing of this lawsuit. Just the inevitable appeal — one that will be headed to an appeals court that’s already found these lawsuits baseless. Another rejection awaits, and a bit more of the courts’ time will be wasted by a couple of opportunistic law firms that have discovered a way to make money without actually being of any use to their clients.
Filed Under: mandy palmucci, material support, section 230, william orrick
Companies: 1-800-law-firm, excolo law, twitter
Sixth Circuit Court Dumps Lawsuit Seeking To Hold Twitter Responsible For The Pulse Nightclub Shooting
from the another-attack-victim-taken-for-a-ride dept
Another one of 1-800-LAW-FIRM’s lawsuits has been tossed for a second time. After being shut down at the district level for attempting to hold social media companies responsible for the Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, Florida, the law firm asked the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to take another look at its dubious legal theories.
The Appeals Court has taken another look and it doesn’t like what it sees any more than the district court did. The violent act committed inside the nightclub was horrible, but the court cannot provide a remedy for every wrong — especially not in a case where the plaintiffs are trying to hold a third party responsible for violent acts they neither encouraged nor committed.
Social media platforms may make it easier for terrorists to spread their message, but that does not add up to material support for terrorism. That’s the legal theory 1-800-LAW-FIRM and Excolo Law have been using to push these lawsuits in order to dodge the obvious Section 230 implications. It has yet to find support in any court. It doesn’t find any here either. From the decision [PDF]:
We sympathize with Plaintiffs—they suffered through one of the worst terrorist attacks in American history. “But not everything is redressable in a court.” Kemper v. Deutsche Bank AG, 911 F.3d 383, 386 (7th Cir. 2018). And terrorist attacks present unique difficulties for those injured because the terrorists “directly responsible may be beyond the reach of the court.” Id. This is one such case. But the absence of Mateen and the inability to hold ISIS responsible cannot create liability elsewhere. Plaintiffs’ complaint includes no allegations that Twitter, Facebook, or Google had any direct connection to Mateen or his heinous act. And Plaintiffs do not suggest that Defendants provided “material support” to Mateen. Without these connections, Plaintiffs cannot state a viable claim under the ATA. As a result, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims.
The Appeals Court also agrees with the lower court’s finding that the nightclub shooting had almost nothing to do with the international terrorism the plaintiffs claim Twitter and others are helping support. The shooter was “self-radicalized” and nothing in the plaintiffs’ 51-page complaint is able to conclusively tie a domestic shooting by a US citizen to ISIS or its online recruitment efforts.
The plaintiffs want the court to apply a completely ridiculous “proximate cause” standard that has never been applied before and will never be applied in the future. There’s no legal basis for it and it would pretty much allow almost anyone to sue almost anyone else for almost anything.
With the “highly interconnected” nature of social media, the internet, and “modern economic and social life”—we expect Defendants’ websites to cause some “ripples of harm” that would “flow far beyond the defendant’s misconduct.” Fields, 881 F.3d at 749. But without more, Defendants do not proximately cause all these potential ripples. The content did not compel Mateen’s actions.
Indeed, if we accepted Plaintiffs’ argument, Defendants would become liable for seemingly endless acts of modern violence simply because the individual viewed relevant social media content before deciding to commit the violence.
With nothing to hang on Twitter, there’s nothing left of this lawsuit. The state law claims follow the federal claims into a dismissal with prejudice. 1-800-LAW-FIRM wants another chance to amend its lawsuit but the Appeals Court says it should have tried that earlier at the district level. This lawsuit is dead, just like so many others filed by this law firm.
Filed Under: 6th circuit, cda 230, intermediary liability, liability, pulse nightclub shooting, section 230, social media
Companies: 1-800-law-firm, excolo law, twitter
Latest Garbage Twitter/Terrorism Lawsuit Is The Stupidest Twitter/Terrorism Lawsuit
from the keep-your-receipts,-plaintiffs dept
Because there’s no shortage of people willing to pay money for the thrill ride that is losing a lawsuit in federal court, 1-800-LAW-FIRM and Excolo Law remain viable entities. The lawsuits they bring aren’t viable, but presumably retainers have been collected before the inevitable process of dismissal-appeal-dismissal begins.
These two firms are behind most of the lawsuits we’ve covered featuring plaintiffs attempting to hold a number of social media platforms responsible for acts of terrorism. The underlying events are tragic, but these lawsuits aren’t the answer. They’re ridiculous. Despite not having racked up a win at any level of the court system, the lawsuits continue to be filed. This doesn’t reflect well on the law firms specializing in taking money from victims of terrorist attacks while offering them false hope of closure, if not actual compensation.
The latest lawsuit filed by these firms is only novel in the respect that it features a Dallas transit officer as a plaintiff, rather than someone from the private sector. Retana was wounded in the ambush of Dallas law enforcement officers back in 2016. This is where the Twitter+terrorists boilerplate — which fills most of the lawsuit’s 96 pages [PDF] — gets really weird. (h/t Eric Goldman)
To get around the obvious Section 230 roadblock, these lawsuits invoke the US Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). The filings tend to spend numerous pages detailing the history of whatever terrorist organization is relevant to the case, followed by a bunch of screenshots of supposed members of these groups utilizing Twitter, Facebook, et al. With this, the plaintiffs hope to convince a judge that the mere existence of terrorists on social media networks is “material support for terrorism” — a violation of multiple anti-terrorism laws.
So far, this hasn’t worked. Courts have found social media companies are not directly or indirectly responsible for terrorist acts. This lawsuit deploys the same tactic, spending a great deal of time discussing terrorist organization Hamas. After 77 pages discussing Hamas and its use of social media, the lawsuit tries to tie anti-terrorism laws to social media companies and the Dallas shooter with this single, conclusory (in the legal sense, not the literal sense) sentence.
Micah Johnson was radicalized, in part, by these organizations calling for the murders of police officers.
The suit then spends another several pages stating that the shooter’s “liking” of certain social media pages and accounts calling for police officers to be killed is evidence of his radicalization by Hamas. Why? Well, apparently it’s because some of these online groups have also expressed support for Hamas.
There’s no solid connective tissue in this lawsuit. There are a bunch of inferences, but they’re spectacularly weak. Nothing prior to this paragraph makes any explicit connection between the shooter’s actions and the terrorist organization the lawsuit needs to convert a clear Section 230 case into an ATA case. Here’s the law firms’ embarrassing attempt to tie this unrelated mess together.
Micah Johnson was radicalized by HAMAS’ use of social media. This was the stated goal of HAMAS. Johnson then carried out the deadly attacks in Dallas. Conducting terrorist acts in the United States via radicalized individuals is a stated goal of HAMAS.
This follow-up is particularly bold, considering the lawsuit cannot make a strong case for this sentence, much less lawsuit itself.
But for HAMAS’ postings using Defendants’ social media platforms, Johnson would not have engaged in his attack on the Dallas Police.
That’s an argument no one has made — not even those who investigated the shooter and the shooting. Here’s what the shooter himself had to say about his motivations:
The suspect said he was upset about Black Lives Matter. He said he was upset about the recent police shootings. The suspect said he was upset at white people. The suspect stated he wanted to kill white people, especially white officers. …The suspect stated that he was not affiliated with any groups, and he did this alone.
If you don’t consider the shooter to be a credible source, here’s the conclusions law enforcement investigators arrived at:
Two law enforcement officials told NPR’s Dina Temple-Raston that they believe the suspect had been planning an attack for some time and acted on his own. They added that they have not identified a connection between the suspect and any international terrorism or domestic extremist groups.
The shooter left behind a “manifesto.” Nothing in it declared any support for any terrorist groups. It spoke only of groups like Black Lives Matter and an urge to kill police officers for killing black Americans.
This makes the extraordinarily weak lawsuit even weaker. The law firms’ reliance on a “material support for terrorism” theory has yet to find a judge willing to grant these arguments any credence. This one manages to be even worse than the weak lawsuits they’ve filed to this point. They can’t even show a credible connection between the gunman and a terrorist group, much less how this is all social media’s fault. Until the law firms manage to somehow top this, this is the bottom of the law firms’ barrel of barrel-bottom scrapings.
Filed Under: cda 230, intermediary liability, material support for terrorism, section 230, terrorism
Companies: 1800 law firm, excolo law, twitter
Federal Court Dumps Another Lawsuit Against Twitter For Contributing To Worldwide Terrorism
from the legal-definition-of-insanity dept
The lawsuits against social media companies brought by victims of terrorist attacks continue to pile up. So far, though, no one has racked up a win. Certain law firms (1-800-LAW-FIRM and Excolo Law) appear to be making a decent living filing lawsuits they’ll never have a chance of winning, but it’s not doing much for victims and their families.
The lawsuits attempt to route around Section 230 immunity by positing the existence of terrorists on social media platform is exactly the same thing as providing material support for terrorism. But this argument doesn’t provide better legal footing. No matter what approach is taken, it’s still plaintiffs seeking to hold social media companies directly responsible for violent acts committed by others.
Eric Goldman has written about another losing effort involving one of the major players in the Twitter terrorism lawsuit field, Excolo Law. Once again, the plaintiffs don’t present any winning arguments. The California federal court doesn’t even have to address Section 230 immunity to toss the case. The Anti-Terrorism Act allegations are bad enough to warrant dismissal.
Here’s what the court has to say about the direct liability arguments:
The FAC [First Amended Complaint] plausibly alleges that ISIS used Twitter to reach new followers, raise funds, and incite violence. It also adequately alleges that Twitter knew ISIS-affiliated users were posting these communications, and that it made only minimal efforts to control them.
Nevertheless, the direct relationship link is missing. Most of the allegations are about ISIS’s use of Twitter in general. The relatively few allegations involving Twitter that are specific to the attacks that killed plaintiffs’ family members also provide little more than generic statements that some of alleged perpetrators of the attacks were “active” Twitter users who used the platform to follow “ISIS-affiliated Twitter accounts” and otherwise “communicate with others.” Nothing in the FAC rises to the level of plausibly alleging that plaintiffs were injured “by reason of” Twitter’s conduct. Consequently, the direct ATA claims are dismissed.
The indirect liability route doesn’t fare any better:
The FAC does not allege that Twitter was “aware” that it was “assuming a role in” the terrorists’ attacks in Europe. See id. It does not allege that Twitter encouraged ISIS to carry out these attacks or even knew about them before they occurred. At most, the FAC alleges that Twitter should have known ISIS was planning an attack and that it ignored the possible consequences of letting terrorists operate on its platform. That is in effect an allegation of recklessness, but JASTA [Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act] requires more. Although plaintiffs are correct that Congress referred in its statement of findings and purpose to those who “knowingly or recklessly contribute material support or resources” to terrorists, JASTA § 2(a)(6) (emphasis added), the plain language of Section 2333 reaches only those “knowingly providing substantial assistance.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). This clear statutory text controls.
There’s no plausible conspiracy claim either. If this argument was given credence by the court, Twitter would be a co-conspirator in any criminal activity carried out by its users.
Nothing in the FAC establishes an agreement, express or otherwise, between Twitter and ISIS to commit terrorist attacks. Plaintiffs point to Twitter’s terms of service that every user is subject to, but while that clearly is an “agreement,” it is hardly relevant to a terrorist conspiracy. No other plausible agreement is mentioned in the FAC.
The plaintiffs are given one more chance to amend their complaint, but these are allegations that can’t be massaged into victorious arguments. The problem that continues to be talked around in these lawsuits is that you cannot hold a social media platform responsible for the actions of its users. If the plaintiffs drop the ATA arguments, they’re just going to run into Section 230 immunity. While the acts of terrorism were horrific and drastically affected the lives of the families of those killed, suing Twitter, Facebook, et al over these acts doesn’t do anything for the plaintiffs but take time and money away from those who’ve already lost loved ones.
I’m not suggesting the law firms engaging in these lawsuits are lying to plaintiffs about their chances or encouraging futile litigation. I certainly would hope they aren’t engaged in any of the above because that would mean they’re preying on hurting people to earn income. But this steady stream of lawsuits — much of it emanating from two law firms — seems to suggest a level of intellectual dishonesty that’s especially unseemly given the underlying circumstances.
Filed Under: blame, cda 230, intermediary liability, lawsuits, material support, social media, terrorism
Companies: excolo law, twitter