black lives matter – Techdirt (original) (raw)
7 Years And A Supreme Court Visit Later, Court (Again) Rules Cop Can’t Sue Activist Over Violent Acts Committed By Others
from the back-to-what-it-always-should-have-been dept
I can’t even imagine what it must be like to fight an obviously bogus lawsuit for most of a decade. That’s what activist DeRay Mckesson has been dealing with since 2017.
Mckesson participated in a protest in Baton Rouge, Louisiana all the way back in July 2016. At that protest, Officer John Ford (previously known as “John Doe”) was struck by a chunk of cement thrown by a protester. In response to this, the officer not only sued Mckesson but also a Twitter hashtag (#blacklivesmatter) and a social movement (Black Lives Matter).
Almost immediately, his lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice by a Louisiana federal court, which ruled he couldn’t sue hashtags, social movements, or even the person who organized the protest wherein the officer had been injured by someone other than the person he was suing.
That should have been the end of it. But the officer apparently had plenty of money to burn. Decisions were appealed and re-appealed and, unfortunately, the next court in line to handle the officer’s (clearly deficient) complaint was the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
If any appellate court can find a way to keep a cop happy, it’s the Fifth. And so it did that very specific job, reviving the lawsuit in 2019 by reasoning that Mckesson’s decision to lead the protest onto a freeway was a negligent enough action it justified suing him over an injury caused by another protester, even if it didn’t occur during this particular bit of highway blocking.
This went to the Supreme Court, which rejected the Fifth’s (third) attempt to get this right, sending it back to the Fifth, which sent it back down to the federal court in Louisiana with the massive amounts of often-contradictory notes it had compiled during its multiple takes on the lawsuit.
Finally, after seven years of litigation, four visits to the Fifth Circuit Appeals Court, and one trip to the nation’s top court, the district court in Louisiana has issued a ruling [PDF] that brings everything full circle: this lawsuit is bullshit and always has been. (h/t Short Circuit)
Plaintiff John Ford, a Baton Rouge Police Department officer, was on duty at a demonstration in Baton Rouge on July 9, 2016, when he was struck by a heavy object thrown by an unidentified demonstrator. Ford sued Defendant DeRay Mckesson, now the sole remaining Defendant, alleging that Mckesson negligently organized and led the protest and was therefore liable under Louisiana tort law for Ford’s injuries. Now before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, which argues that Plaintiff’s action must be dismissed because the summary judgment evidence shows that Defendant did not organize the protest, breached no duty to Plaintiff, and was not the cause-in-fact of Plaintiff s injuries. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion will be granted, and Plaintiffs action will be dismissed with prejudice.
Even if the court was inclined to read the state tort law as capable of covering acts performed by someone other than the person being sued, it would need a whole lot more connective tissue in terms of the defendant’s involvement in the act that injured the officer.
In this case, there’s not even evidence that Mckesson organized the protest, much less led it, and… much less committed any illegal act himself or encouraged others to do so.
That section, entitled “Mckesson organized and led the protest, references a “tweet of the location and time of the protest” that Defendant acknowledged “re-tweet[ing].” The section also cites deposition testimony about the organizing of the protest, in which Defendant said that he did not know the organizers personally, and only met them on the night of the protest.
As for Plaintiff’s own recollection of the protest, he testified that he did not “hear” Defendant giving any orders during the protest, although he heard Defendant “[tell protesters] to come out into the road.” Finally, Plaintiff submitted a video filmed in part by Defendant during the protest. In the five minutes of the video before Defendant’s arrest, Defendant in no way blocks traffic, engages in violence, or gives orders to anyone. Indeed, Defendant appears to be walking in the middle of the protest rather than at the head of it.
Given this, it’s impossible to allow the lawsuit to proceed. Doing so would mean anyone in the general vicinity of any incident or occurrence that might involve (at some point) criminal activity could be sued simply for being near the protest (or whatever) where criminal activity occurred. (All emphasis in the original.)
Although Defendant may have participated in similar protests in other places, none of the specific allegations regarding his role in this protest are supported by the evidence. In other words, Plaintiffs case for causation rests solely on Defendant’s possible presence at other protests and his possible direction of some protestors into the road. The Court will not impose liability on a protest participant for the actions of an unidentified individual under these circumstances.
Hopefully, that’s the end of it. I would have to assume (although IANAL) all appeal options have been exhausted. But this cop has been particularly tenacious in this case, determined to hold perhaps the most recognizable person in this protest at least indirectly responsible for the injury he sustained while policing the protest. But the law doesn’t work that way. It never has. But somehow this lawsuit managed to be reviewed by higher courts five times before ending the way it should have ended years ago.
Filed Under: #blacklivesmatter, 5th circuit, baton rouge, black lives matter, deray mckesson, free speech, louisiana, suing a hash tag, supreme court
Fifth Circuit’s Fourth Pass At Same Case Ends Just As Stupidly: Cop Can Sue One Person Because Someone Else Injured Him
from the I-guess-just-don't-organize-protests-in-the-Fifth dept
An anonymous Louisiana cop who sued, in this order:
- Activist DeRay Mckesson, who spoke at the Baton Rouge demonstrations.
- Black Lives Matters — a name used by several concurrent movements to protest police violence against blacks
- A Twitter hashtag
still manages to have a viable lawsuit seven years later.
It boggles the mind. Officer John Doe was policing an anti-police violence protest allegedly organized by activist Deray Mckesson. This demonstration resulted in the blocking of a freeway, resulting in a significant police presence. Someone in the crowd threw a chunk of concrete that managed to hit Officer Doe, leading directly to this lawsuit.
The first pass was handled by the district court, which declared the officer’s case dead in the water. You can’t sue a social movement, a Twitter hashtag, or someone who organized a protest just because you were injured at that protest. It refused to extend the negligence count to cover the biggest target the injured cop could find.
That’s the last of the good news. This case has gone up and down and sideways on the judicial ladder following the officer’s appeal. In April 2019, the Fifth Circuit said there was enough of a claim under state law to allow the lawsuit to proceed, reasoning that Mckesson’s leading of protesters onto a busy highway created enough potentially culpable negligence to keep the case alive.
It took another look at this case roughly six months later. Judge Don Willett said plenty of protected speech is far more negligent but not actually criminal. But he was in the minority. The Fifth Circuit again ruled the state law negligence claims were enough to keep the case afloat.
Another appeal (this one by Mckesson) brought it to the top court in the land. The Supreme Court — usually extremely willing to give cops whatever they want — rejected this one. It sent the case back down to the Fifth Circuit with instructions to send this case to the top court in Louisiana to better explore the negligence claims. The Fifth Circuit forwarded the case to state Supreme Court, but not before noting the negligence claim might be invalid because a certain amount of danger is expected when performing police work, so getting injured may just be part of the job, rather than an actionable claim.
Five years after the lawsuit’s initial rejection in federal court, Louisiana’s top court decided the Fifth Circuit had been right all along: the cop could sue someone over injuries caused by someone else.
That decision ended up affirming all the things the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had been saying at regular intervals over the past two years: it’s perfectly fine for cops to sue activists because they were injured while performing government work at the site of demonstrations.
The latest decision [PDF] is mostly more of the same. The running time of the decisions continue to increase because that’s the expected side effect of extended litigation and this court’s fourth attempt to resolve the lawsuit.
The Fifth Circuit notes the Louisiana Supreme Court’s responses to the two questions it posed. First, does state law impose a burden of duty on protest organizers? And, second, is this burden (if it exists) still imposed if the person injured is subject to the state’s Professional Rescuer Doctrine, which notes first responders (including police officers) are expected to realize being injured is just part of the job?
The answers were yes and no. Yes, there’s a legal burden under state law. No, cops can sue if they’re injured while performing their first responder duties.
Working from there, the Fifth Circuit says (yet again) this stupid lawsuit can continue to move forward.
Following the guidance of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, we therefore must conclude that Louisiana tort law recognizes a negligence claim in these circumstances and that Doe has plausibly alleged such a claim. However, we reiterate that Doe’s pleading a negligence claim in no way guarantees that he will prove that claim. Doe will be required to present specific evidence satisfying each of the five elements listed above, and Mckesson will of course be entitled to introduce evidence supporting his contention that he did not breach his duty to organize and lead the protest with reasonable care. The only question before us is whether Doe is entitled to proceed to discovery on his negligence claim. We are compelled to conclude that he is.
So, the farce — now into its sixth year — will continue. And maybe all of these legal conclusions are correct instead of just ridiculous. Maybe it’s the laws that are ridiculous. But whatever the case, the findings so far have been highly problematic. Courts seem willing, if not actually compelled, to allow these sorts of suits to continue, especially if they’re filed in Louisiana. The chilling effect is apparent, but multiple decisions (other than the initial decision by the federal court) have all managed to talk around the very obvious First Amendment implications in favor of discussing how far a state negligence claim can be stretched to allow someone to sue someone else because they were injured by someone else entirely.
Filed Under: 1st amendment, 5th circuit, baton rouge, black lives matter, deray mckesson, free speech, liability, louisiana, suing a hashtag
Adidas Opposes ‘Black Lives Matter’ Trademark Application, Then Quickly Runs Away
from the retreat! dept
Adidas is not exactly unknown in the seven circles of trademark insanity hell. The company most famously is a jealous defender of its vaunted “3 slanted stripes” branding. It takes that protective stance to ridiculous extremes, including going after an eSports league for having the “E” in question be three stripes, or suing to hell other brands that have dared to sell apparel or shoes with a number of stripes that doesn’t equal 3.
It was only a few years ago that Adidas was actually looking to expand its trademark rights on its very, very creative 3 parallel lines branding such that it would hold the mark for them if “applied to the product in whichever direction.” And most recently, the company made the very masochistic decision to oppose a trademark application for the Black Lives Matter Global Network Foundation, despite that group’s proposed mark being nothing like Adidas’.
Adidas had told the trademark office in a Monday filing that the Black Lives Matter Global Network Foundation’s yellow-stripe design so closely resembles its own famous three-stripe mark that it is “likely to cause confusion”.
It sought to block the group’s application to use the design on goods that the German sportswear maker also sells, such as shirts, hats and bags.
Now, lest you think Adidas has some super valid reason to be this concerned about a trademark application for an organization that in no way competes with it commercially, well, here is the proposed mark from the BLM organization.
Those three stripes you see at the bottom of that logo are what Adidas said was so similar to its own trademarks that it would cause confusion in the public. Now, if you can look at that logo and tell me you think it has anything at all to do with Adidas, then see me after class because it’s high time you saw a therapist.
Which is why it is entirely unsurprising that Adidas dropped the entire thing and ran away at the slightest bit of pushback.
A source close to the company said the rapid about-turn was triggered by concern that people could misinterpret Adidas’ trademark objection as criticism of Black Lives Matter’s mission.
I mean, maybe? But only because, again, the trademark claim was so completely weak to begin with. If the BLM movement had put together a trademark application that essentially mimicked the Adidas logo, the company would be well within its rights, and I would cheer it on, in defending its trademarks through an opposition.
But in this case, it appears that the company was being fairly over-protective of those same rights and then decided to blame fear of the BLM movement for its retreat. Which is cowardice, in my view.
Filed Under: black lives matter, three stripes, trademark
Companies: adidas
US Postal Service Sued For Seizing ‘Defund Police’ Facemasks
from the 'we-thought-we-would-get-away-with-it'-is-not-a-valid-defense dept
Two years ago, just as the COVID pandemic was beginning to radically transform day-to-day life for nearly everyone on the planet, the United States Postal Service decided to protect cops from passive criticism. One month after Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin personified America’s omnipresent racism by kneeling on the neck of unarmed black man George Floyd until he was dead, the USPS stepped in to seize a shipment of face masks containing phrases like “Stop killing Black people” and “Defund police.”
Facemask suppliers were in short supply during the early months of the pandemic. Oakland screenprinter Movement Ink stepped up to fill the void, sending out functional masks featuring social justice-related slogans. The small business run by Oakland resident Rene Quinonez had never had any problems with the US Postal Service prior to the shipment of these masks. But the USPS suddenly decided it had a problem with his latest products and inexplicably decided to treat the First and Fourth Amendments as disposable.
The masks, ordered by activist group Movement for Black Lives (M4BL), ran the group nearly $10,000. The initial shipment of 500 masks somehow came to the attention of the US Postal Service’s investigative wing, which decided they could travel no further than the postal depot. The recipients and the sender were given no reason for the seizure. The only information they received was a notification on their tracking info that the packages had been “Seized by Law Enforcement.”
The US Postal Inspection Service never explained why it had seized these clearly not-illegal masks. The following morning, the USPS released the items — again without explanation — and refunded Movement Ink’s shipping fees. That release appeared to have been motivated solely by the bad press the USPS was racking up, and followed two days of the USPS sitting on the shipments while refusing to explain why it had flagged the products and prevented them from being received by the group that had purchased them.
This seizure may have been the move of a single dumbass employee who thought telling cops to stop killing black people was some sort of threat. More likely, it was a government agency inserting itself into a proxy discussion on police activity by deciding it should protect the powerful from criticism. And it’s likely going to cost the entire Postal Service a bit of cash. As Ryan Reilly reports for NBC News, the government is being sued for violating the Fourth Amendment by searching and seizing this shipment, as well as violating the First Amendment for trying to prevent the messages printed on the masks from being distributed.
The lawsuit, filed on Wednesday and shared first with NBC News, accuses U.S. Postal Service and U.S. Postal Inspection Service officials of violating constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment by improperly seizing the boxes without probable cause, a warrant, or even reasonable suspicion. The lawsuit also raises the possibility that officials violated the First Amendment by seizing the masks because of their political messaging.
Movement Ink owner René Quiñonez, who owns the screen-printing business in Oakland, California, that manufactured the masks, told NBC News that his small family business had been impacted by the seizure.
“For us as an organization, as a company, and as part of our community, our intent was to support the many activities that were going on across the country,” Quiñonez told NBC News.
As the lawsuit [PDF] notes, the USPS knew what was contained in the packages. And because it knew what words were contained in the boxes, its actions were highly suspect and most likely illegal.
As confirmed by the postal official Defendants’ internal notes memorializing the seizures and searches of those boxes, millions of packages shipped every year share the unexceptional characteristics of René’s and Movement Ink’s packages that Defendants relied on to justify their suspicionless, warrantless seizures and searches. And those same internal notes make clear that Defendants knew the packages coming from Movement Ink contained—in Defendants’ words—“BLM MASKS.” So Defendants appear to have violated not just the Fourth Amendment, but also the First Amendment, while committing several common law torts in the process.
This unexplained seizure — which followed three uneventful shipments of other masks containing similar slogans — negatively affected the small company’s business.
René and Movement Ink suffered severe reputational harm because of Defendants’ baseless seizures and searches of René’s and Movement Ink’s political mask shipments.Talks for future orders were terminated, and René could not even get a call back from many of his partners—including not only his new partners, but preexisting ones too.
For example, in addition to the recipients of the political mask shipments at issue in this case, who terminated talks for future orders, at least three other groups who had regularly ordered from and collaborated with René and Movement Ink ceased their partnerships and cut off all ties with René and Movement Ink.
According to the USPS, the packages were detained and searched for non-political reasons. Instead, they were searched for ridiculous reasons.
Defendants’ notes contend that the shipments were suspicious because of (1) “bulging contents,” (2) “frequently mailed parcels from the same sender/address,” (3) “parcel destination is a known drug trafficking area,” (4) “taped or glued on all seams,” and (5) “parcel mailed from a known drug source area.”
In other words, the packages looked like packages — sealed to prevent loss of merchandise and being sent from one area of the country to another. This justification is clearly specious. And even that belated justification is undercut by the USPS’s notes, which indicate inspectors had already determined the packages contained (in the USPS’s own words) “BLM masks.”
If the USPS moved forward with a search and seizure after determining the contents were masks with “political” slogans, it violated the First Amendment along with the Fourth Amendment. The Post Office’s “well maybe it was drugs” excuse is probably going to carry a bit of weight in the counterarguments because that’s just how the justice system works, but the rest of the allegations certainly make it appear the Post Office blocked this shipment because it didn’t like what was in the packages, not because it truly suspected what was in the packages was illegal.
Even if the Postal Service wins this lawsuit, it will still lose. The optics aren’t going to improve if the USPS can talk a judge into believing its vague statements about drug shipments add up to reasonable suspicion to investigate further, or actual probable cause for a seizure and search. What it will always look like — thanks in large part to the USPS’s own notes about “BLM masks” — is a politically motivated action that was supposed to keep people the government didn’t like from criticizing the government.
Filed Under: 1st amendment, 4th amendment, black lives matter, free speech, masks, movement for black lives, protests, seizure, usps
Louisiana Supreme Court Says Anonymous Cop Can Continue To Sue Activist Over Injuries Caused Another Protester
from the bad-laws-applied-stupidly dept
Well, this is a mess.
A lawsuit prompted by the actions of a protester at a demonstration held in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on July 9, 2016 still isn’t resolved. During that Black Lives Matter protest, some person in attendance threw a “rock-like substance” at a Baton Rouge police officer known only as “Officer Doe.”
In response, this officer sued activist DeRay Mckesson, the organizer of the protest. He also sued a movement (Black Lives Matter) and its associated hashtag. The district court tossed the lawsuit with prejudice back in October 2017, finding (quite reasonably) that none of the sued parties could be held directly responsible for the actions of a single person attending the protest. That should have been the end of it.
It wasn’t. The anonymous cop appealed. And, for some reason, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the lawsuit could continue. The Appeals Court reasoned that because the protest blocked a road, a showdown with law enforcement should have been seen as an imminent possibility, if not a certainty.
Given the intentional lawlessness of this aspect of the demonstration, Mckesson should have known that leading the demonstrators onto a busy highway was most nearly certain to provoke a confrontation between police and the mass of demonstrators, yet he ignored the foreseeable danger to officers, bystanders, and demonstrators, and notwithstanding, did so anyway. By ignoring the foreseeable risk of violence that his actions created, Mckesson failed to exercise reasonable care in conducting his demonstration.
Because it reached this conclusion in reference to state law, the Appeals Court decided it didn’t need to address the far more concerning First Amendment implications of its decision.
Five months later, the Fifth Circuit had a change of heart, prompted by Judge Don Willett’s admission he had gotten it wrong the first time around. But this en banc reconsideration changed nothing. A majority of judges decided the first opinion was correct but banged the table a little harder during the second opinion. The dissent offered good arguments but could change nothing about the irrational decision to allow an anonymous cop to sue one person for injuries caused by another. The First Amendment issues, again, went unaddressed.
Mckesson appealed, bringing this case to the attention of the top court in the land. The Supreme Court said the Fifth Circuit had asked good questions but arrived at the wrong answers. It remanded the case to the Appeals Court for it to determine whether or not state law could be applied to the officer’s allegations — and whether those allegations could actually be sustained given the facts of the incident.
The Fifth Circuit’s third pass mostly involved crafting questions to be answered by the state’s top court regarding state law and the allegations of the suit. But it did at least ask some very good questions about state law and the duties required of public servants in the public safety business.
In the meantime our attention has been drawn to a separate aspect of Louisiana law, the Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine, that could be dispositive. That doctrine, put succinctly, is **a judge-made rule that “essentially states that a professional rescuer, such as a fireman or a policeman, who is injured in the performance of his duties, assumes the risk of such an injury and is not entitled to damages.**” Gann v. Matthews, 873 So. 2d 701, 705 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2004) […] We have found limited guidance from the opinions of the Supreme Court of Louisiana on how this doctrine might apply to the particular facts of this case. Because we find this to be a close question of law, which also raises a significant issue of state policy, we further take this opportunity to respectfully elicit guidance on this issue from the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
The state supreme court has reviewed the case. And it has answered both of the Fifth Circuit’s question in a way that will allow this cop to continue their seemingly quixotic quest to hold a protest organizer personally responsible for injuries sustained during the course of their normal duties at the hands of another person entirely. (h/t Michael Vario)
Black Lives Matter organizer and activist DeRay Mckesson can be sued by a Baton Rouge police officer injured during a 2016 protest, Louisiana’s state supreme court has determined.
The announcement published Friday, March 25, was meant to answer questions raised by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Those questions centered on whether the officer can sue the organizer of an event that ends in a crime.
That’s the extremely succinct summary of the court’s decision [PDF]. Had the state supreme court ruled the other way on either of the two questions, the Fifth Circuit could have dismissed the lawsuit. Instead, it has provided the cop and their stupid lawsuit two ways to continue suing someone for someone else’s act of violence.
We accepted the certified questions presented to this court by the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in Doe v. Mckesson, 2 F.4th 502 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). The questions posed by the Fifth Circuit are: (1) Whether Louisiana law recognizes a duty, under the facts alleged in the complaint, or otherwise, not to negligently precipitate the crime of a third party? (2) Assuming Mckesson could otherwise be held liable for a breach of duty owed to Officer Doe, whether Louisiana’s Professional Rescuer’s Doctrine bars recovery under the facts alleged in the complaint? We answer the former, under the facts alleged in the complaint, in the affirmative and the latter in the negative…
But the law doesn’t really seem to say what the state supreme court says it does. State law appears to be less expansive than this reading by the judges handling this case. (And I’ll leave the emphasis from the original which appears to show only the person committing the act can be held responsible.)
Under the allegations of fact set forth in the plaintiff’s federal district court petition, it could be found that Mr. Mckesson’s actions, in provoking a confrontation with Baton Rouge police officers through the commission of a crime (the blocking of a heavily traveled highway, thereby posing a hazard to public safety), directly in front of police headquarters, with full knowledge that the result of similar actions taken by BLM in other parts of the country resulted in violence and injury not only to citizens but to police, would render Mr. Mckesson liable for damages for injuries, resulting from these activities, to a police officer compelled to attempt to clear the highway of the obstruction. Louisiana’s Civil Code Article 2315 requires that “[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.” (Emphasis added.)
Provoking a confrontation does not guarantee violence, even if similar confrontations elsewhere in the nation (sometimes) resulted in violent acts against police officers. “Whatever” is doing most the heavy lifting here and, despite the language quoted by the court, it cannot be assumed Mckesson is even vicariously responsible for another protester’s decision to assault a police officer. This allegation would still need to be proven, as the state court admits. But by being willing to read the law this way means any protester could be sued by anyone harmed (physically or otherwise) during a protest simply because they participated in the organization of the protest or presented themselves as a figurehead of the social cause from which the protests sprung. That is a dangerous interpretation of the law.
As to the second question about whether the professional rescuer’s doctrine applies (one that assumes risk to those paid to handle risky situations), the court says state law has pretty much eliminated this doctrine in favor of allowing cops to sue people who’ve injured them. The concurring opinions disagree with this assessment. So do the dissenting opinions. But the majority says this doctrine no longer exists and the cop can continue to sue.
This heads back to the Fifth Circuit which will get yet another chance to end this buffoonery. But it’s unlikely to do so given the interpretations the Appeals Court has been given to work with by the Louisiana Supreme Court. It will likely take yet another trip to the Supreme Court to sort this all out. Meanwhile, the anonymous cop who decided to sue someone who didn’t injure them will continue to bleed Mckesson dry. And, until it’s resolved, protected First Amendment activity will have less protection in the state of Louisiana.
Filed Under: 1st amendment, 5th circuit, baton rouge, black lives matter, deray mckesson, free speech, louisiana, louisiana supreme court, police
Terrible Vermont Harassment Law Being Challenged After Cops Use It To Punish A Black Lives Matter Supporter Over Her Facebook Posts
from the we-need-better-laws-because-we-can't-count-on-justified-applications dept
In June 2020, in Brattleboro, Vermont, something extremely ordinary happened. Two residents of the community interacted on Facebook. It was not a friendly interaction, which made it perhaps even more ordinary.
Here’s the ordinariness in all of its mundane detail, as recounted in Brattleboro resident Isabel Vinson’s lawsuit [PDF] seeking to have one of the state’s laws found unconstitutional.
In June 2020, Christian Antoniello, a Brattleboro resident and the owner of a local business called the Harmony Underground, criticized the Black Lives Matter movement on his personal Facebook page, stating, “How about all lives matter. Not black lives, not white lives. Get over yourself no one’s life is more important than the next. Put your race card away and grow up.”
On June 6, Ms. Vinson posted on her own Facebook page and tagged the Harmony Underground’s business page. Ms. Vinson’s post stated: “Disgusting. The owner of the Harmony Underground here in Brattleboro thinks this is okay and no matter how many people try and tell him it’s wrong he doesn’t seem to care.” In the comments on her post, Ms. Vinson recommended that everyone “leave a review on his page so [Antoniello] can never forget to be honest,” and also tagged a Facebook group called “Exposing Every Racist.”
In response to Ms. Vinson’s Facebook post, a conversation thread ensued among several people, including Ms. Vinson, about her post, Mr. Antoniello, and other complaints about the business.
That’s when things stopped being normal, and started becoming increasingly more bizarre.
Several weeks later, Antoniello and his wife reported to the Brattleboro Police Department that they were being harassed on Facebook and that Ms. Vinson’s Facebook activity caused them to fear for their safety.
This is kind of a normal reaction. Kind of. Not everyone subjected to online pitchforks will choose to make it a police matter, but this couple did.
If you’re wondering where the criminal activity is, the Brattleboro police department has an answer for you.
On July 7, the Brattleboro Police Department cited Ms. Vinson under § 1027 based on her Facebook activity.
Here’s what the state law (Section 1027) says:
A person who, with intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, or annoy makes contact by means of a telephonic or other electronic communication with another and makes any request, suggestion, or proposal that is obscene, lewd, lascivious, or indecent; threatens to inflict injury or physical harm to the person or property of any person; or disturbs, or attempts to disturb, by repeated telephone calls or other electronic communications, whether or not conversation ensues, the peace, quiet, or right of privacy of any person at the place where the communication or communications are received shall be fined not more than $250.00 or be imprisoned not more than three months, or both.
It’s an amazingly broad law that criminalizes all sorts of speech since it can be stretched to fit nearly any speech a complainant doesn’t care for. “Harass” is a pretty non-specific term. “Annoy” is even more vague.
That’s the law being challenged by Vinson and the ACLU. It’s a vague, unconstitutional law. And it’s a law the PD obviously didn’t sincerely believe applied to Vinson’s Facebook post because it ditched everything about this highly questionable case the moment questions started being asked.
Two weeks later — following an ACLU public records request for all documents related to Vinson’s charge and prosecution — the Brattleboro PD approached Vinson and offered to drop the charges in exchange for her entering a diversion program that could be completed in lieu of criminal charges. Vinson refused to enter the diversion program and said she was seeking legal representation. Here’s what happened next:
Two days later, the Brattleboro police informed Ms. Vinson that she would not be charged.
All’s well that ends abruptly in the face of the slightest resistance. But the law is still on the books. If the Brattleboro cops may decide not to take a second swing at Isabel Vinson with this law, law enforcement officers in the state are still free to misuse the law to punish people for saying things other people didn’t like. And, needless to say, the vague law presents a perfect crime of opportunity for cops if a state resident says something cops don’t like. That’s why the state is being sued and the Vermont federal court being asked to declare the law unconstitutional. As it stands, the law presents an existential threat to free speech in the state. And Isabel Vinson’s experience in Brattleboro shows what can happen when the threat goes from theoretical to fully-realized.
Filed Under: 1st amendment, black lives matter, brattleboro, christian antoniello, debate, free speech, harassment, isabel vinson, social media, vermont
Companies: aclu, harmony underground
Federal Court Blocks Enforcement Of Florida's New Anti-Riot Law
from the looks-like-some-old-school-racism-from-here dept
Earlier this year, the Florida state legislature passed a law that turned protesting into a crime by expanding the definition of “riot” to make peaceful protesters culpable for the actions of those actually engaged in rioting. It refused bail to those arrested at protests and the term “aggravated rioting” was expanded enough to cover any gathering of more than nine people that blocked any road.
As soon as the law went into effect, it was deployed against protesters. But only certain protesters. Those involved in Black Lives Matter/anti-police brutality protests were targeted, but Cuban solidarity protesters were not only allowed to block traffic without being arrested, they were actually allowed onto freeway access ramps by police officers.
The law was immediately challenged by a number of groups when it went into effect. The Florida NAACP, Black Lives Matter Alliance Broward, and Dream Defenders sued to have the law blocked and declared unconstitutional. Thanks to a Florida federal court, they have obtained the injunction they were seeking.
The injunction order [PDF], written by Judge Mark Walker, opens with a brief recounting of how riot laws have historically been deployed to assist the government in enforcing segregation and other racists policies.
On May 27, 1956, Wilhelmina Jakes and Carrie Patterson, two Black students from Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University in Tallahassee, boarded a local city bus. They sat in the only available seats, which were in the “whites-only” section. The two women refused to move when ordered to do so, and the bus driver called in the police. Three police cars arrived at the scene and Ms. Jakes and Ms. Patterson were arrested. Their charge—“inciting a riot.” The rest is history.
Five years after the FAMU students’ arrests, nine clergymen arrived at the Tallahassee Airport to test the state’s Jim Crow laws as part of the Freedom Rides of 1961. The clergymen were Black and White men of various faiths, including two rabbis and ordained ministers from several Protestant denominations. Over the course of about 24 hours, they repeatedly rescheduled their outbound flights in an apparent attempt to see if the Tallahassee Airport’s restaurant would serve them as a group. The clergymen had previously been “given protection against violence or other disorder from groups or individuals who resented [their] activities,” but after a day of rescheduled flights, the City had enough of their efforts “to goad the municipality and its restaurant lessee to open the restaurant,” and serve the Black and White men together. Accordingly, the city attorney approached the clergymen at the airport and proclaimed that their assembly “at the municipal Airport of Tallahassee will tend to create a disturbance or incite a riot or disorderly conduct within the City of Tallahassee at its Municipal Airport over which the city had jurisdiction.” The city attorney ordered the clergymen to disperse, but after about ninety seconds and their failure to do so, the city attorney directed the chief of police to arrest them.
While Governor Ron DeSantis and his allies in the state legislature will never admit it, this law was passed to quell protests that largely concern black people and their interests — one of which is the understandable desire to not be disproportionately targeted by police violence. The law was written as George Floyd-related protests occurred all over the nation. The fact that the new law was not deployed to arrest Cuban solidarity protesters whose actions met the new definition of “aggravated rioting,” confirmed the law would only be used to target protesters DeSantis doesn’t like.
The court says the plaintiffs have standing to sue. The order spends several pages detailing how these activist groups have curtailed their protest activity by cancelling planned events. The groups have also seen a noticeable drop in participation during the few protests they have engaged in since the law took effect, with many members of these groups stating the fear of being arrested for peaceful protesting has deterred them from attending events.
The only party to respond to the injunction request was the Governor himself. The court notes his submissions of evidence that speech isn’t being chilled (which largely consists of printouts of social media posts about upcoming protests) isn’t particularly persuasive. And one submission in particular by DeSantis all but confirms this statute was written to target black residents and protesters.
Specifically, Governor DeSantis points to a screenshot of Plaintiff Chainless Change, Inc.’s Facebook post showing a flyer for a “Juneteenth Black Joy Celebration” at Coleman Community Park in West Palm Beach on June 19, 2021. The post notes that “There will be . . . Music, Food, Games, Rental Assistance, Performers, Giveaways, Community Resources, and More,” and includes a photograph of several joyful Black children…
[…]
This Court is perplexed by the Governor’s decision to include this specific Facebook post as evidence that Plaintiffs’ speech is not actually chilled in the manner they assert in their motion. To start, this year marked the first official recognition of Juneteenth National Independence Day as a federal holiday. 5 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (2021). This Court—along with other courts across the country—was closed for the occasion. The Facebook post advertises a community celebration on a federal holiday commemorating the end of slavery in America…
[…]
Here, the Governor has conflated a community celebration of a federal holiday commemorating the end of slavery with a protest. He does so to argue that Plaintiff Chainless Change’s claimed injury of chilled speech and self-censorship is not to be believed. It should go without saying that a public gathering of Black people celebrating “Black joy” and release from bondage does not automatically equate to a protest—or something that the Governor apparently implies should be chilled by the new riot law if Plaintiff Chainless Change’s claimed injury is to be believed.
Yeah… that looks pretty bad. So does this, which follows a discussion of the plaintiffs’ assertions that they have already been targeted by police violence and intimidation during protests prior to the passage of the law.
Not one of the Defendant Sheriffs filed any evidence to dispute Plaintiffs’ version of the facts.
Governor DeSantis argued the court was getting ahead of itself by not allowing state courts to make the first call on the constitutionality of the law and/or its overbreadth. The federal court says this argument is nonsense when crucial civil rights and liberties are on the line.
Here, the chilling effect is particularly pronounced given that the law not only creates a risk of prosecution, but also subjects the person to mandatory time in custody until first appearance. § 870.01(6), Fla. Stat. Given that a vague law does not give a would-be protestor any notice about what the law criminalizes, and that the person may be punished for constitutionally protected activity given the law’s potentially overbroad scope, a reasonable person, as the declarations in this case make clear, would censor his own speech rather than risk arrest and time in jail.
As for the definition of “riot,” the court says it’s way too vague to be constitutional. It’s not that rioting can’t be clearly defined. It’s that this law has the potential to make peaceful protesters culpable for the actions of rioters in the immediate area. The court starts with this…
This Court… acknowledges the obvious up front; some conduct clearly falls within the definition’s scope. Tossing Molotov cocktails at the police station with 10 of your best friends is clearly rioting. But the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the argument that “a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision’s grasp.”
Before heading on to tell the state of Florida why this law doesn’t work.
This is where things fall apart. Although both Governor DeSantis and Sheriff Williams argue that the phrase “willfully participate” is commonly understood, neither party offers an actual definition. Is it enough to stand passively near violence? What if you continue protesting when violence erupts? What if that protest merely involves standing with a sign while others fight around you? Does it depend on whether your sign expresses a message that is pro- or anti-law enforcement? What about filming the violence? What if you are in the process of leaving the disturbance and give a rioter a bottle of water to wash tear gas from their eyes?
Other phrases in the law only add to the confusion:
A “violent public disturbance” raises similar questions. Is a violent public disturbance a peaceful protest that later turns violent? Is it a protest that creates an imminent risk of violence? Do the violent actions of three people render an otherwise peaceful protest of 300 people a violent public disturbance? Does a rowdy group of Proud Boys or anarchists have veto power over peaceful protests under this definition?
A long semantic discussion follows, interrupted by some truly amazing sentence diagrams and the court drily noting the statute appears to be impervious “to any reasonable reading,” before the court brings the hammer down.
The problem for Defendants is that, although they repeatedly claim that their preferred reading is crystal clear, they never truly explain why. Simply put, Defendants argue that one can tell that the statute embraces their reading because of the way it is. And it should come as no surprise that Defendants refuse to engage meaningfully with the statute’s text. As demonstrated above, the moment one does, Defendants’ interpretation crumbles.
Defendants’ proposed interpretation strains the rules of construction, grammar, and logic beyond their breaking points, and requires this Court to ignore the plain text of the statute and blithely proclaim that “everyone knows what a riot means,” notwithstanding this new definition that the Florida Legislature enacted.
[…]
In short, Defendants’ preferred construction is neither reasonable nor readily apparent given the plain language of the statute. Instead, it reduces much of the verbiage to surplusage and invites this Court to fill in the blanks that the Florida Legislature left behind.
This part of the law is unconstitutionally vague, the court says. Therefore, the law cannot be enforced, at least under this unreasonable quasi-definition of the term “riot.” That being said, the court points out law enforcement can still arrest and prosecute rioters, listing 19 applicable criminal statutes and noting that this list of possible enforcement options does not encompass the entirety of applicable laws.
The state is appealing the injunction, of course. But the injunction remains in place while the appeals process plays out. Governor DeSantis appears to believe the vague, overly-broad law will be enforceable again when this is all over.
DeSantis said during an appearance in New Port Richey that the state will take its case to the Atlanta-based 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The governor called the ruling by Walker a “foreordained conclusion” and has said he frequently prevails when appealing Tallahassee judges’ orders.
“I guarantee you we’ll win that on appeal,” DeSantis said.
I’d like to put some money on that. This decision cited plenty of Eleventh Circuit precedent while handing DeSantis a loss, none of which appears to favor the state government and its attempt to revive the state’s long tradition of punishing black people for pushing back against racist policies.
Filed Under: 1st amendment, anti-riot laws, black lives matter, florida, free speech, protests, riots, ron desantis
Report Shows DOJ Engaged In Selective Prosecution To Maximize Punishment For 'Black Lives Matter' Protesters
from the once-again,-DOJ-showing-it-really-should-have-the-word-'justice'-in-its dept
Under Trump, the DOJ did all it could to break the spirit of the Black Lives Matter movement that took on renewed vigor last spring following yet another killing of an unarmed black person by a white cop. That’s according to a report [PDF] by The Movement for Black Lives, which examined BLM-related prosecutions headed by federal prosecutors.
The federal government deliberately targeted Black Lives Matter protesters via heavy-handed criminal prosecutions in an attempt to disrupt and discourage the global movement that swept the nation last summer in the wake of the Minneapolis police killing of George Floyd, according to a new report released Wednesday by The Movement for Black Lives.
[…]
The report also points to the stark difference in how the government handled the COVID-19 protests against local government shutdowns and mask mandates amid the pandemic during the same period. It analyzes 326 criminal cases initiated by U.S. federal prosecutors over alleged conduct related to protests in the wake of Floyd’s murder and the police killings of other Black Americans, from May 31, 2020, to Oct. 25, 2020.
The report’s most damning conclusions point to a DOJ headed by Bill Barr — one that swiftly aligned itself with President Trump and his assertions the social justice protests were largely composed of criminals and anarchists, rather than peaceful protesters seeking to change an unjust justice system.
The report points out the federal government needlessly took control of prosecutions, exploiting loosely-defined “interstate commerce” statutes to bring federal charges against arrested protesters — charges that carried steeper sentences than similar state-level charges.
For example, the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844, has subsections which not only vest federal jurisdiction over offenses against any property which belongs to an entity which receives any federal funding but against any property which simply affects interstate commerce. This report found that the broad parameters of the statute were heavily utilized against defendants who had allegedly damaged or attempted to damage local police vehicles, police precincts, or government buildings and/or property. Unfortunately, because federal courts have accepted such arguments in the past, the government’s argument to support a finding of federal jurisdiction in these cases on interstate commerce grounds was to simply assert that these local governmental entities affect interstate commerce. Where the government attempted to establish federal jurisdiction because the entity received some federal funding, criminal complaints would simply assert, often without any reference to government funding data, that the local government or police department received some form of federal financial assistance—as nearly all local governments and police departments do.
Federal prosecutors also used super-thin assertions about an interstate nexus to stack charges.
Prosecutors are charging Lore-Elisabeth Blumenthal with four counts of arson for allegedly attempting to burn two police vehicles. Prosecutors are bringing multiple counts for each attempted arson by relying on separate provisions of the federal arson statute, claiming that the police vehicles belonged to a police department which received federal funding, which implicates 18 U.S.C. § 844(f), and because the same police vehicles affected interstate commerce, which implicates 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). As a result, Blumenthal now faces the possibility of being convicted on four separate counts, each of which carries a minimum sentence of five and a maximum of twenty years in federal prison.
Even the damage of local businesses by rioters was taken over by federal prosecutors, who used flimsy pretexts like the purchase of supplies from out-of-state suppliers to satisfy the interstate commerce requirements.
And, in one case detailed in the report, a man is facing felon-in-possession charges for carrying supplies capable of creating a Molotov cocktail. According to federal prosecutors, a Molotov cocktail (even in an unassembled state) qualifies as a “firearm.” And the interstate nexus was satisfied because the empty bottle was made by an out-of-state manufacturer.
Hoping to deter future protests by making ongoing protests as painful as possible for those arrested, federal prosecutors let their imaginations run wild.
Prosecutors are charging Tia Deyon for civil disorder for allegedly breaking the window of a city police vehicle in Mobile, Alabama. In order to argue that federal jurisdiction exists, the government used an unusually specious basis, even among the more egregious charges here. The government argued that her actions impacted interstate commerce because the larger group of protesters Pugh was a part of was moving in the direction of an interstate highway. The group never reached the highway, because local police preemptively shut down the on-ramps providing access to the highway. The government claims its own preemptive shut down of the on-ramps caused traffic delays and therefore impacted interstate commerce.
While the DOJ and the president said things about “violent protesters” (and unintelligible, unsupportable things about “dangerous antifa“), this was the reality of the situation. Even non-violent quasi-crimes were being exaggerated by federal prosecutors to ensure maximum punishment for minimal infractions.
Unsurprisingly, the data does not support the government’s claims of violence and intimidation. There are numerous cases where the federal government filed charges against people for conduct as minor as failing to obey an order from a federal agent, or for pointing a laser pointer in the direction of the police (not at a particular officer). In one Department of Justice press release characterizing the movement as hijacked by “violent agitators” based on 74 federalized criminal cases, 37 cases were for assaulting an officer—a misnomer when considering the offending conduct included things like pointing lasers at law enforcement or using, as federal agents themselves described, “flimsy” plastic shields in encounters with law enforcement; 17 cases were for failing to obey a lawful order, a nonviolent (in)action; and 11 of those cases involved charges for conduct so minor, the defendants were issued citation violations.
Predictably, most of these prosecutions originated in Portland, Oregon, the first place Donald Trump sent his federal strikebreakers police force to handle protests in the so-called “anarchist jurisdiction.” And it wasn’t just about putting people who believe black lives matter back in their place. The DOJ’s selective prosecutions were also apparently politically-motivated, resulting in a different kind of overrepresentation in federal cases.
Of the 326 federal cases reviewed, 271 (83%) were brought in states with Democratic governors, with only 56 (17%) brought in states with Republican governors. […] This disparity is even more stark when considering that, at the time of the uprising, the proportion of states with Republican leadership (54%) exceeded that of states with Democratic leadership (46%).
The DOJ barely bothered to disguise its desire to disrupt the Black Lives Matter movement and quell dissent targeting law enforcement agencies. The man running the country made no attempt at all to disguise his contempt for everyone who questioned law enforcement agencies or the tactics of their officers. The stats compiled here make it clear the DOJ engaged in targeted prosecutions meant to deliver maximum pain to those the former president considered to be political or ideological enemies.
Filed Under: anarchist jurisdictions, antifa, bill barr, black lives matter, doj, protests, selective prosecution
Florida's New Law Against Blocking Roads During Protests Already Being Ignored By Cops Policing Protests The Governor Supports
from the behold-the-discretion-being-exercised-by-law-enforcement dept
Just a few months ago, Florida governor Ron DeSantis signed a broadly-written anti-protest bill that, among other things, criminalized the act of participating in a protest if other protesters did illegal things. It also criminalized the blocking of traffic and roadways by protesters, something that was already illegal but now was super-illegal with enhanced punishments that made this act a felony.
This was the Florida legislature’s response to anti-police violence and Black Lives Matters protests in the state — protests that became far more frequent and intense following the killing of Minnesota resident George Floyd by Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin.
Failing (perhaps deliberately) to recognize a lighter law enforcement touch was needed to regain the trust of the public, DeSantis and likeminded legislators doubled down, making the very act of protesting police violence an opportunity to be hit with felony charges.
The new law is in the news because it very much appears it won’t be enforced equitably. Miami’s Local 10 wants to know why the new law wasn’t deployed to stop Cuban solidarity protesters from blocking highways during recent demonstrations.
“All of a sudden you have people out there shutting down a highway. They start to do that, there needs to be swift penalties.”
Those were Gov. Ron DeSantis’ words back in April when he signed a controversial anti-riot bill.
On Tuesday?
“I think people understand the difference between going out and peacefully assembling, which is obviously people’s constitutional right,” DeSantis said on a day when South Floridians stood in solidarity with Cuban citizens’ protests by taking to the Palmetto Expressway and closing it down for hours.
The Associated Press also amplified questions about this apparent divergence from a law supposedly desperately needed to keep protests from shutting down cities.
Demonstrators on Tuesday in Miami, Tampa and Orlando temporarily blocked busy roads, chanting support for the Cubans who had taken to the streets in the communist nation Sunday to air grievances about poor economic conditions and other issues.
“When they protest for regime change, which aligns with the governor’s political viewpoint … you see no enforcement from law enforcement,” said Michael Sampson, who co-founded the Jacksonville Community Action Committee, one of many groups that sprung up under the banner of the Black Lives Matter movement.
The governor had no real explanation for why officers were not only not arresting people for blocking roads, but waving people through police lines so they could head up ramps to access the highways they would soon be blocking. The only comment DeSantis offered was that this protest wasn’t the kind of protest he felt needed to be shut down.
During a visit to Miami on Tuesday, DeSantis said the demonstrations in South Florida were “fundamentally different than what we saw last summer.”
The statement made by Christina Pushaw, the governor’s spokesperson, wasn’t any better.
“The legislation protects First Amendment freedoms, while ensuring that law enforcement professionals are empowered to use their discretion to maintain public safety,” Pushaw said. “The Governor has always urged all Floridians exercising their right to protest, to make their voices heard peacefully and lawfully.”
Well, ok then. I guess we’ll see what happens the next time BLM protesters take to the streets and block a few of them off. If DeSantis doesn’t want to look like he only respects the rights of people he agrees with, he’ll need to keep cops from exercising their discretion and arresting people protesting against unequal treatment by law enforcement.
Filed Under: 1st amendment, black lives matter, cuba, different standards, florida, free speech, protests, ron desantis
Five Palo Alto Cops Sue The City And Their PD, Claiming A Black Lives Matter Mural Harassed Them
from the must-have-hired-the-first-attorney-who-didn't-immediately-start-laughing dept
A group of California police officers has decided other people’s expressive rights end where their personal offense begins. Five Palo Alto police officers are suing the city, along with their own police department, for somehow discriminating against them by allowing artists to create a street-long Black Lives Matter mural these officers passed on their way to work. (Well, at least up until the mural was removed by the city in November 2020, less than six months after it was first painted.)
The complaint contends harassment begins with the letter “E.” From the lawsuit [PDF]:
The iconography at issue in the letter “E” of the mural is an image of Joanne Chesimard, better known as Assata Shakur, who was convicted in 1977 for the murder of New Jersey State Trooper Wermer Foerster, a white police officer. In 1979, while serving life sentence for the murder, Shakur escaped from prison and ended up in Cuba where she now has refuge and where the Cuban government refuses to extradite her to the United States. As result of her conviction and subsequent prison escape, Shakur was placed on the FBI’s Top Ten List 0f Most Wanted Domestic Terrorists.
The cops also have a problem with a “portion of a logo” that has been attributed to the New Black Panthers, an organization designated a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center.
It’s these two elements of the city-ordained mural that seem to be triggering (yes, and in that form of the word as well) the harassment allegations. That and the fact that the officers were somehow forced to pass the mural on their way to work despite — as the Palo Alto Daily Post points out — the officers having to go out of their way to subject themselves to it.
The police department is located at 275 Forest Ave., on the opposite side of City Hall from the mural. The two vehicle entrances to the department are in the 600 block of Ramona and Bryant streets, a half block from where the mural had been located.
Here’s a little visual aid that shows how impossible it was for these officers to avoid being confronted by a controversial E:
Somehow the existence of this mural on a street a block away from the police department resulted in host of discrimination and harassment targeting this “protected” group of police officers.
Plaintiffs’ careers have been materially and adversely affected, and irreparably harmed and damaged by the conduct of the Defendants. Defendants, and each of them, created and allowed to exist harassing, discriminatory, and retaliatory work environment and failed to eliminate the illegal conduct complained of by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were discriminated against and harassed on the basis of their race, national origin, and/or color and retaliated against for exercising their rights to be free from harassing and discriminatory conduct in the workplace.
Moreover, Plaintiffs spoke out about and reported misconduct, retaliation, discrimination, and harassment in violation of state and federal law and reported such conduct to people above them in the chain of command. As direct and proximate consequence of reporting such misconduct—which constitutes protected activity under state and federal law—Defendants, and each of them, retaliated against, discriminated against, and harassed Plaintiffs and subjected them to adverse employment actions.Those adverse employment actions include, but are not limited to, refusing to eliminate the harassing and discriminatory conduct, and failing or refusing to investigate Plaintiffs’ complaints.
So, while the city did allow the mural to occupy the street and gave its blessing to the sixteen artists involved, it did not direct or supervise the content of the mural. And it’s not really “retaliation” for the PD and the City to not remove a mural just because five cops seem super angry about it. Nor is it “retaliation” to refuse to investigate claims that are facially idiotic.
The complaints aren’t any less specious just because a law firm signed off on it. The plaintiffs fail to indicate which protected group they believe they’re in, which makes it appear the officers believe “police officer” ranks right up there with race, national origin, and skin color.
They also believe the mural bullied them in horrible but nonspecific ways.
As a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of Defendants’ harassing conduct and failure to act, Plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety, mental anguish, and emotional distress. Plaintiffs were required to and did employ, and will in the future employ, physicians and health care providers to examine, treat, and care for Plaintiffs, and did, and will in the future, incur medical and incidental expenses.
Welp, this lawsuit isn’t going to help much on the humiliation and embarrassment fronts. Without more factual assertions about the mural’s harassment of protected individuals who happened to pass by it on their way to work as public servants, it’s probably not going to survive the first motion to dismiss.
The plaintiffs should be wary of trying to push this too far, because it really looks like the plaintiffs are trying to make the case that saying “Black Lives Matter” somehow means the lives of people who aren’t black somehow don’t. Their incorrect assumptions about the meaning of this phrase — as well as their innate ability to be personally offended by certain elements of the street mural — isn’t even remotely in the ballpark of any legally actionable claims.
Filed Under: black lives matter, mural, palo alto, palo alto police department