senate intelligence committee – Techdirt (original) (raw)

Stories filed under: "senate intelligence committee"

Richard Burr Steps Down From Intel Committee Following FBI Warrant; Feinstein Talks To FBI, While Loeffler Won't Say

from the insider-trading dept

Following the news that the FBI got a warrant and seized Senator Richard Burr’s phone as part of its investigation into his alleged insider trading, Burr has announced that he’s stepping down from being the chair of the powerful Senate Intelligence Committee, where he’s long been one of the biggest boosters of the surveillance state.

Of course, some are now wondering if that’s part of the reason why the Trumpian wing of the GOP have come out against Burr. Because the Senate Intel Committee has released a report confirming that Russia tried to help Trump win in 2016. The report is not particularly surprising, highlighting many widely known points. However, in Trumpland, no one seems to be able to handle the nuanced differences between the campaign directly “colluding” with Russia (for which the evidence is more limited) with the idea that Russia independently sought to boost Trump (for which the evidence is overwhelming). So, Trump supporters have been clamoring for Burr’s head on a platter for merely stating facts, which are not allowed in this world where pointing out that The Emperor is Naked is somehow deemed to be heresy.

Given Attorney General Barr’s recent decisions to more fully weaponize and politicize the Justice Department, it can’t be dismissed out of hand that there are political reasons for the FBI’s sudden interest in Burr, but it still seems like a stretch. Sooner or later it’s likely that there will be some fallout from which one can better assess the validity of the warrant, and whether or not Burr was engaged in insider trading.

One point that a few people have raised is to look at whether or not the FBI is looking into any of the other Senators who sold notable chunks of stock just before the pandemic hit, though as we explained in that original story, the situations and fact patterns with each of the other Senators is at least somewhat different than Burr’s case. For what it’s worth, there are reports that the FBI questioned Senator Dianne Feinstein, who also sold some stock during this period. However, as we pointed out in the original post, there’s little indication that her sales were COVID-19 related, especially since it was mostly selling off biotech stocks (exactly the kind of stocks you’d think would go up in a pandemic).

The other Senator’s selloff behavior that looked at least somewhat sketchy was Senator Kelly Loeffler, whose actions look worse and worse, as she denies things more vociferously. Just recently, she went on Fox News (natch) to claim that “this is 100% a political attack.” Huh? What? You’re the one who sold the stock. She also (get this) tried to blame socialism because why not?

This gets at the very heart of why I came to Washington, to defend free enterprise, to defend capitalism. This is a socialist attack.

Who knew that insider trading was “free enterprise”?

Either way, while Burr has had to hand over his phone and Feinstein had to answer questions from the FBI… Loeffler simply refuses to say whether or not the FBI has reached out to her. If it does turn out that the FBI has investigated the others, but left Loeffler entirely alone (whether or not her sales were aboveboard), that’s certainly going to be some evidence to add to the pile that the focus on Burr was just as much political as it was about the legal issues at play.

Update: After this story was completed, Loeffler’s office announced that she had handed documents over to the SEC and DOJ along with the Senate Ethics Committee. It’s unclear if the DOJ/FBI asked for anything or if she just did this proactively. Just a few days ago, there was a report saying that her team was considering doing exactly this as a “hail mary” to try to get out ahead of this story that she can’t seem to get rid of, and which appears to be having an impact on her campaign to retain the office that she was gifted a few months ago.

Filed Under: dianne feinstein, doj, fbi, insider trading, intelligence community, investigations, kelly loeffler, politics, richard burr, russia, russian election interference, senate intelligence committee

AT&T, Huawei Phone Partnership Killed At Last Second By More Unproven Accusations Of Huawei Spying

from the not-so-free-markets dept

Wed, Jan 10th 2018 06:27am - Karl Bode

If you remember a few years ago, there was ample hysteria and hand-wringing in Congress regarding Huawei’s plan to compete in the American cell phone and network hardware business. But despite near-constant claims by certain lawmakers that Huawei was an intelligence proxy for the Chinese government, numerous, multi-year investigations found absolutely no evidence to support this conclusion. That of course didn’t stop certain parties from repeatedly insisting that Huawei was a Chinese government spy, since we all know that in the post-truth era, what your gut tells you is more important than empirical evidence.

Never mind that almost all U.S. network gear is made in (or comprised of parts made in) China. Never mind that obviously NSA allegations show the United States spies on almost everyone, constantly. Never mind that reports have emerged that a lot of the spy allegations originate with Huawei competitor Cisco, which was simply concerned with the added competition. Huawei is a spy. We’re sure of it. And covert network snooping is bad. When China does it.

Fast forward to this week. A new report in the Wall Street Journal indicates that AT&T and Huawei were about to announce a new cellphone sales partnership at CES. While Huawei phones are available unlocked in the States (and Huawei has helped Google build its own smartphones already), the deal would have marked the first major partnership between the company and a major cellular provider. But the deal was scrapped at the last second for reasons neither company wanted to disclose to the Journal:

“It was unclear why AT&T, the country?s No. 2 carrier by subscribers, changed its mind. An AT&T spokesman declined to comment. A Huawei spokesman declined to comment on conversations with AT&T, saying only that ?Huawei has proven itself by delivering premium devices with integrity globally and in the U.S. market.”

A paywalled report over at the Information appears to offer the real reason for the last-minute scuttling of the partnership: namely a letter sent to the Trump FCC by members of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees again claiming that Huawei is a spy for the Chinese government:

While it’s certainly not impossible that Huawei is aiding Chinese government surveillance, the fact remains that there have been numerous, lengthy investigations into this claim (one of which was eighteen months long), none of which have actually resulted in the slightest bit of evidence proving the allegations. And again, what has been proven so far is that lobbyists for companies like Cisco have spent ample time pouring fire on these concerns in the minds of cash-compromised lawmakers, simply because they don’t want to have to face another deep-pocketed competitor in the US hardware market.

That is, as some guy named Mike Masnick noted on Twitter, something we’ve long enjoyed criticizing China for:

And then American companies complain when China blocks competition from American firms… And just watch as China points to this case as evidence for why America does the same thing. https://t.co/e7pRlacZf7

— Mike Masnick (@mmasnick) January 9, 2018

AT&T, no stranger to domestic spying (bone grafted as it is to the United States own intelligence-gathering aparatus) may have been willing to kill the deal out of blind “patriotism” or the belief it could help gain regulatory approval for the company’s $86 billion acquisition of Time Warner (currently being challenged by the DOJ in court). Nobody in this chain has much in the way of integrity or a history of truth-telling, and until evidence emerges that Huawei is the nefarious spymaster allegations have long alleged, a dash of skepticism seems warranted.

Filed Under: china, competition, congress, fcc, phones, senate intelligence committee, spying
Companies: cisco, huawei

Most Senate Intelligence Committee Members Are Fine With Domestic Surveillance By The NSA

from the 13-of-15-Senators-agree-to-ignore-the-Fourth-Amendment dept

The Senate Intelligence Committee has released its report [PDF] on its Section 702 reauthorization plan. Rather than adopt any serious reforms — like those proposed by Sen. Ron Wyden — the SIC plans to move ahead with its non-reform bill, one that’s actually weaker than the watered-down offering from the House.

The bill remains pretty much as bad as it was when it was first introduced. It still allows the NSA to start up its “about” collection again, although it does require approval from the FISA court first and contains a safety valve for introduction of legislation forbidding this collection. (I guess Wyden’s reform bill doesn’t count.)

Other than that, it’s still just bad news, especially on the Fourth Amendment front, as it allows both the collection of wholly domestic communications and backdoor searches of NSA data stores. The upshot of the report is this: eleven senators are perfectly fine with domestic surveillance.

As the bill report lays out, Senators Burr, Risch, Rubio, Collins, Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Cornyn, Warner, King, and Manchin are all cool using a foreign surveillance program to spy on their constituents, especially given that Burr has hidden precisely the impact of that spying in this report.

Any bets on whether they might have voted differently if we all got to know what kind of spying on us this bill authorized.

That, of course, is only eleven senators who are cool with treating their constituents (or at least those using location obscuring techniques) like foreigners.

There are two more you can add to this list: Sens. Feinstein and Harris. Although they voted against allowing the NSA to collect wholly domestic communications, they did vote against Wyden’s amendment, which would have limited the use of domestic communications by US government agencies to only a few national security-related crimes.

Their vote against this means Feinstein and Harris are no better than the other eleven when it comes to domestic use of supposedly foreign-facing dragnets if there’s any evidence of domestic criminal activity caught in the net. That includes a longer list of crimes which really aren’t the sort of thing we should be using dragnets to investigate: “serious bodily injury,” CFAA violations and human trafficking — the latter of which could be nothing more than US citizens helping stranded foreigners.

On top of that, there’s no judicial review involved when the government makes a determination that something “affects, involves or is related to” national security. As Marcy Wheeler has pointed out, this allows the DOJ to decide what it can or can’t collect on US persons using NSA surveillance programs.

Attorney General Jeff Sessions could decide tomorrow that it can collect the Tor traffic of BLM or BDS activists, and no judge can rule that’s an inappropriate use of a foreign intelligence program.

So, the Senate version is way worse than the House version, which wasn’t all that great to begin with. The fact that it’s now mid-November and these bills are now just taking the next step towards a floor vote pretty much guarantees these non-reform efforts will be stapled to the backend of a must pass appropriations bill, where they’re less likely to rejected on their own merits.

Filed Under: 702 reform, domestic surveillance, ron wyden, senate intelligence committee, surveillance

Senator Burr Pitches 702 'Reform' That Would Give NSA Back Its Most Abused Collection Program

from the word-is-pretty-much-meaningless dept

The Senate Intelligence Committee has released its Section 702 reauthorization bill [PDF]. Rather than fix anything, it makes pretty much everything worse. This is largely due to Sen. Burr’s influence, who probably felt he had to bring something to the debate, but couldn’t bear to part completely with his “clean, forever reauthorization” dreams.

Senator Burr is somehow claiming this is a “reform” bill. Marcy Wheeler has written an excellent post describing all the ways in which it isn’t, especially the tail end of the bill which pretends to limit US law enforcement access to NSA collections.

It does so in Section 5, in what is cynically called “End Use Restriction,” but which is in reality a vast expansion of the uses to which Section 702 data may be used (affirmatively codifying, effectively, a move the IC made in 2015). It permits the use of 702 data in a criminal proceeding for any criminal proceeding that “Affects, involves, or is related to” the national security of the United States (which will include proceedings used to flip informants on top of whatever terrorism, proliferation, or espionage and hacking crimes that would more directly fall under national security) or involves,

Death

Kidnapping

Serious bodily injury

Specified offense against a minor

Incapacitation or destruction of critical infrastructure (critical infrastructure can include even campgrounds!)

Cybersecurity, including violations of CFAA

Transnational crime, including transnational narcotics trafficking

Human trafficking (which, especially dissociated from transnational crime, is often used as a ploy to prosecute prostitution; the government also includes assisting undocumented migration to be human trafficking)

So, just the “serious” crimes. This is how agencies like the FBI are using 702 collections already. All Burr’s bill would do is codify the use of foreign-facing national security agency to collect and retain communications related to domestic criminal activity — some of it potentially rather minor.

Beyond that, the bill looks to give the NSA back its “about” program. This is the program the NSA abandoned after pushback from the FISA court and (perhaps) as a way to dodge uncomfortable questions about the continued collection of domestic communications. This was a voluntary move by the NSA and it was already asking to have its collection back a couple of months later.

Burr’s 702 bill would hand the NSA back its program with a 30-day waiting period during which the House or Senate could introduce a bill forbidding the reinstatement of the program. Should no bill be introduced within the notice period, the NSA could pick up where it left off and go back to abusing a collection program it has never not abused since its inception.

It also allows the NSA to make “emergency” claims about its “about” program to bypass legislative attempts to block it. This wouldn’t automatically nullify legislative efforts to end the about collection permanently, but it would allow the NSA to continue collecting while the issue is being debated.

So, it’s basically what one would expect from one of top hardline supporters of the NSA. Good thing Burr is one of the top men in the “oversight” committee. He’s willing to give the NSA what it wants — along with the stuff it gave up — and for more years than the House Judiciary Committee’s tepid reform option. Burr’s bill would push the next renewal fight off until 2025, two years more than the 2023 sunset in the House bill. Fortunately, there may be a third option in play soon. Ron Wyden has announced he’s preparing a 702 bill and is pushing the Senate Intelligence Committee to make renewal hearings public.

Filed Under: about collection, fisa, fisa amendments act, mass surveillance, nsa, richard burr, section 702, senate intelligence committee, surveillance

Intelligence Oversight Committees Are Being Stocked With Former Intelligence Agency Employees

from the circle-of-life dept

RESOLVED: this nation’s intelligence oversight is indisputably useless. It’s about 99% joke and 1% Ron Wyden dog-whistle questions that go unanswered for months or years. Committees on both sides of the legislature are composed mostly of surveillance cheerleaders and flak catchers profoundly uninterested in performing actual oversight. Reform efforts tend to take place despite the intelligence committees, rather than because of them. Every so often, positive changes are made for purely partisan reasons.

Super-friendly “oversight” committees aren’t helping hold our nation’s multiple intelligence agencies accountable. But it goes deeper than lawmaking fanboys/girls holding prominent positions in intelligence committees. The desire to limit accountability traces back further than the front-mouths lobbing softballs to IC leaders at Congressional hearings. As Tim Johnson and Ben Wieder report for McClatchy News, the intelligence community has been stocking committees with home teamers for years.

Lawmakers assigned to oversee the sprawling U.S. intelligence apparatus rely strongly on a staff that in recent years has included scores of onetime spooks, analysts and lawyers who previously worked at the spy agencies under scrutiny.

According to a comprehensive analysis by McClatchy, at least one-third, and perhaps far more, of the professional staff members who carry out the work of the House and Senate intelligence committees are themselves veterans of the agencies that the two panels oversee.

Really not a problem, I suppose, if the other two-thirds are staunch civil rights defenders and privacy advocates. But of course they’re not. They’re just more government employees, many of whom find defending the status quo to be a more sensible career path, one that starts with idealism (sometimes) and ends with a pension, with very little forward momentum during the intervening years.

The “intelligence community” term attempts to humanize a hulking behemoth bristling with surveillance apparati, currently hoovering up $80 billion every year. And that estimate is likely on the low end, as these agencies have another, entirely-opaque budget to utilize on top of this.

The other low estimate at work here is McClatchy’s guess at the number of former agency employees currently working for the intelligence oversight committees. It’s not always easy to sniff out the origins of staffers, especially if they’ve possibly spent some time engaged in clandestine activities.

McClatchy’s analysis determined the staffers’ backgrounds based on searches of LinkedIn profiles, congressional records, executive profiles and in a handful of cases, press reports, obituaries or personal interviews in which the former or current committee staff members publicly acknowledged their own intelligence background.

In dozens of cases, McClatchy could not determine whether a given staff member had worked in intelligence. Some have left almost no trace on the internet, itself perhaps a telling sign of a sensitive prior professional life.

According to staffers who spoke to McClatchy, the one-third estimate is way, way off. One said “all but a couple” of staffers he worked with came from intelligence agencies. Others estimated IC oversight market saturation to be 50-75%.

Obviously, a dearth of intelligence experience would be less than useful for oversight committees. Experience is extremely useful but in cases where oversight is already severely lacking, stuffing the roster with IC picks is guaranteed to result in the sort of non-oversight we’ve become accustomed to. Not only are staffers likely to advise against additional accountability and lobby against reform efforts, they’re also likely to know how to ensure any reform efforts are shot full of exploitable holes by the time they hit the president’s desk.

And there’s no good way of fixing this that won’t leave other government committees tied up in policies that prevent them from hiring anyone with subject matter expertise. Pretty much the only thing that can be done is sitting back and marveling at the breadth of the intelligence community’s regulatory capture.

Filed Under: house intelligence committee, intelligence committees, oversight, senate intelligence committee, surveillance state

Intelligence Committee Pins A 'Surveil Me' Sign On Wikileaks' Back In Latest Authorization Bill

from the mood-affiliation-legislation dept

President Trump seemed to think Wikileaks was a fine establishment while on the campaign trail. As long as Wikileaks kept serving up DNC documents, it could do nothing wrong. Since his election, however, things have changed. The administration is plagued by leaks. Even though Wikileaks hasn’t played a part in those leaks, it has continued to dump CIA documents — something the White House isn’t thrilled with.

Back in April, the new DOJ — under the leadership of 80s throwback AG Sessions — announced it had prepared charges to arrest Julian Assange. This was something Obama’s administration talked about, but never actually got around to doing. Pursuing Assange and Wikileaks for publishing leaked documents would set a dangerous precedent, paving the way for domestic prosecutions of news agencies.

Fortunately, nothing has moved forward on that front yet. But it appears at least a few Senators would like to further distance Wikileaks from any definition of journalism. As Spencer Ackerman reports for The Daily Beast, the Senate Intelligence Community wants to redefine Wikileaks as a hostile entity.

The committee… wants Congress to declare WikiLeaks a “non-state hostile intelligence service,” which would open Julian Assange and the pro-transparency organization – which most of the U.S. government considers a handmaiden of Russian intelligence – to new levels of surveillance.

On Friday, the committee quietly published its annual intelligence authorization, a bill that blesses the next year’s worth of intelligence operations. The bill passed the committee late last month on a 14-1 vote, with Democrat Ron Wyden of Oregon as the lone dissenter, owing to what he calls the “legal, constitutional and policy implications” that the WikiLeaks provision may entail.

The latest intelligence authorization bill runs nearly 60 pages. Perhaps the committee members adding this toxic little pill thought no one would read it all the way to the end. The very last section of the bill (Section 623 to be precise) is titled “Sense of Congress on Wikileaks.” It asks for legislators to take an official stance on the group.

It is the sense of Congress that WikiLeaks and the senior leadership of WikiLeaks resemble a non-state hostile intelligence service often abetted by state actors and should be treated as such a service by the United States.

As Ackerman points out, the language in the bill channels CIA head Mike Pompeo, who is understandably (and continually) incensed by Wikileaks’ publication of documents pertaining to CIA surveillance tools. Pompeo himself is a fair-weather friend of transparency, having tweeted his praise for Wikileaks while it was still dumping DNC documents.

This could put Wikileaks under (even more) surveillance and would likely allow site visitors, donors, and correspondents to become surveillance targets themselves.

“It would allow the intelligence community to collect against them the same way they collect against al-Qaeda,” [former House Intelligence Committee staffer Mieke] Eoyang said. “If you think you’re helping WikiLeaks to aid a transparency organization, the US government fundamentally disagrees with you and you could find yourself on other end of NSA scrutiny.”

As is usually the case when the Senate Intelligence Committee offers up questionable or terrible proposals, Senator Ron Wyden was the sole committee member to vote against the authorization bill.

Filed Under: hostile intelligence service, intelligence authorization, julian assange, mike pompeo, ron wyden, senate intelligence committee, surveillance
Companies: wikileaks

Lead Investigator For CIA 'Torture Report' Explains Why It Was Necessary To Hijack A Copy Of The 'Panetta Review'

from the keeping-the-CIA-(slightly-less-dis)honest dept

The Guardian has published a long report detailing Senate staffer Daniel Jones’ experience with the CIA while acting as the Senate Committee’s chief investigator during the compilation of the “Torture Report.” While much has already been written about the CIA’s actions during this time, the Guardian’s multi-part piece gives the public an insider’s look at the effort the agency went through to disrupt the preparation of the report.

The process started off on the wrong foot. It was the New York Times, not the agency itself, that initiated the Senate’s examination of the CIA’s counterterrorism efforts.

In November 2005, a senior CIA official named Jose Rodriguez destroyed 92 videotapes depicting the brutal 2002 interrogations of two detainees, Abu Zubaydah and Abdel Rahim Nashiri. Rodriguez’s tapes destruction remained a secret to his congressional overseers for two years, until a 6 December 2007 New York Times article revealed it; they barely even knew the CIA taped interrogations at all.

Daniel Jones spent the next five years digging through any documentation he could pry from the CIA’s hands and slowly came to the conclusion the agency had lied to everyone — including two consecutive presidents — about its interrogation practices.

One document contained crucial information that proved Jones’ conclusion: the Panetta Review. But the CIA didn’t want to hand it over. The Senate’s agreement with the CIA meant that the agency controlled access to the documents in its possession — documents it provided extremely limited access to. Jones worked in a single room set up by the CIA for examination of documents and it only dropped files into the shared drive Jones could access if it felt like it. It also removed files periodically without warning or explanation.

In March 2010 Jones and his colleagues started noticing that they had difficulty accessing documents they knew they already had. Simple search terms weren’t retrieving certain records anymore.

“We noticed they were gone right away,” Jones said.

It would have been easy to disappear documents, even in substantial amounts. The agency had provided millions of pages. The only way it could have happened was for the agency to have removed the information from a computer network the CIA set up for the Senate that Jones did not know the agency could access

When asked about this, the CIA first blamed the tech team it had hired to set up the system used by the CIA to provide access to Senate staffers. Then it blamed the White House. Finally, it took a look at itself in a closed, opaque investigation and managed to come to the conclusion that the CIA itself was to blame for the missing documents.

This was still early on in the process and was on top of other pre-existing headaches. The DOJ’s decision to open its own investigation of torture allegations should have been good news, but instead, it just created more problems for Jones and the Senate Subcommittee.

Typically, when the justice department and congressional inquiries coincide, the two will communicate in order to deconflict their tasks and their access. In the case of the dual torture investigations, it should have been easy: Durham’s team accessed CIA documents in the exact same building that Jones’s team did.

But every effort Jones made to talk with Durham failed. “Even later, he refused to meet with us,” Jones said.

[…]

The lack of communication had serious consequences. Without Durham specifying who at CIA he did and did not need to interview, Jones could interview no one, as the CIA would not make available for congressional interview people potentially subject to criminal penalty. Jones could not even get Durham to confirm which agency officials prosecutors had no interest in interviewing.

The 6,700-page report was finished by the end of 2012. By mid-2013, the CIA was already disputing the content and the conclusions reached by the Senate investigation while still stonewalling on declassification. Jones, who had uncovered a wealth of lies delivered to the Bush administration, was somewhat surprised to see the current head of the CIA (John Brennan) continuing the CIA tradition with President Obama, delivering briefings to him that contradicted the contents of the Senate report, but agreed with the CIA’s internal investigation: the so-called “Panetta Review.”

Having observed this, Jones decided to break the rules the CIA had set down for Senate staffers.

Inside the small room in Virginia the CIA had set up for the Senate investigators, Jones reached for his canvas messenger bag. He slipped crucial printed-out passages of what he called the Panetta Review into the bag and secured its lock. Sometime after 1am, Jones walked out, carrying his bag as he always did, and neglecting to tell the agency security personnel what it contained. After years of working together, no one asked him to open the bag.

Jones didn’t leak the document. Nor did he just hand it over to the Senate Subcommittee. Instead, he placed it in the Subcommittee’s safe to ensure the CIA didn’t control the only copies of the Panetta Review. It was a move that needed to be made. The CIA had zero interest in releasing the documents and, shortly after the Torture Report’s release, it somehow managed to “accidentally” destroy the agency’s only copy of it.

Jones’ removal of the review led to the CIA and Senate demanding criminal investigations of the other party and the eventual punishment of one person involved in the investigation: staffer Alissa Strazak, the other lead investigator during the compilation of the report. She found her promotion to General Counsel of the US Army blocked by senators critical of the report’s findings. The DOJ never filed any charges. The FBI won’t even read the report. And the CIA has emerged pretty much unscathed and possibly looking forward to having a new president to lie to in 2017. (Although if it’s Trump, it may not have to lie quite as frequently…)

Filed Under: cia, classified info, daniel jones, panetta review, senate intelligence committee, torture report

Why Are The Congressional Intelligence Committees So Quiet On The NSA Malware Leaks?

from the speak-up,-feinstein,-we-can't-hear-you dept

Last week, we wrote about the leak of various NSA hacking tools, that showed it had zero-day exploits for a bunch of hardware, including some from Cisco. This has raised some concerns about how long the NSA sat on these vulnerabilities without telling companies — along with reaffirming what many people already suspected: that the supposed “Vulnerabilities Equities Program” (VEP), in which the NSA is supposed to disclose the vulnerabilities it finds to the companies to patch, is a complete joke.

But Marcy Wheeler has another important point about all of this. When the Snowden documents originally leaked three plus years ago, the various top members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees — the so-called Gang of Four — were quick to speak out (and condemn) the leak. But, oddly, this time they’re staying pretty quiet.

Within hours of the first Snowden leak, Dianne Feinstein and Mike Rogers had issued statements about the phone dragnet. As far as I?ve seen, Adam Schiff is the only Gang of Four member who has weighed in on this

> U.S. Rep. Adam Schiff, the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, also spoke with Mary Louise. He said he couldn?t comment on the accuracy of any reports about the leak. > > But he said, ?If these allegations were true, I?d be very concerned about the impact on the intelligence community. I?d also obviously want to know who the responsible parties were. ? If this were a Russian actor ? and again, this is multiple ?ifs? here ? we?d have to ask what is causing this escalation.?

Say, Congressman Schiff. Aren?t you the ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee and couldn?t you hold some hearings to get to the bottom of this?

Meanwhile, both Feinstein (who is the only Gang of Four member not campaigning for reelection right now) and Richard Burr have been weighing in on recent events, but not the Shadow Brokers release.

If the House and Senate Intelligence Committees were really about “oversight” of the NSA, then shouldn’t they have jumped on this immediately? Shouldn’t they be looking into how the NSA manages the VEP? Shouldn’t they be looking into how these tools got out? Why are they just staying silent or giving meaningless statements like Schiff’s?

Filed Under: 0days, adam schiff, devin nunes, dianne feinstein, house intelligence committee, leak, malware, nsa, richard burr, senate intelligence committee, vep, vulnerabilities

Senate Intelligence Committee Expands FBI NSL Powers With Secret Amendment To Secret Intelligence Bill

from the you'll-find-out-about-the-additions-when-you're-told-you-can't-talk dept

The annual intelligence authorization is under way, with the Senate deciding how much money the nation’s spy agencies will receive next year, along with anything else they can slip in while no one’s looking. The entire discussion takes place behind closed doors, so there’s very little stopping the Intelligence Committee’s many surveillance fans from amending the bill to increase intelligence agencies’ powers.

Fortunately, there’s still one person on the inside who continues to perform his oversight duties.

A provision snuck into the still-secret text of the Senate’s annual intelligence authorization would give the FBI the ability to demand individuals’ email data and possibly web-surfing history from their service providers without a warrant and in complete secrecy.

If passed, the change would expand the reach of the FBI’s already highly controversial national security letters.

[…]

The spy bill passed the Senate Intelligence Committee on Tuesday, with the provision in it. The lone no vote came from Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., who wrote in a statement that one of the bill’s provisions “would allow any FBI field office to demand email records without a court order, a major expansion of federal surveillance powers.”

Wyden did not disclose exactly what the provision would allow, but his spokesperson suggested it might go beyond email records to things like web-surfing histories and other information about online behavior. “Senator Wyden is concerned it could be read that way,” Keith Chu said.

The FBI’s history of abusing NSLs is well-documented. These letters allow the agency to route around judicial oversight by chanting “national security” while composing their requests. (Bonus feature: recipients are forbidden from talking about them… indefinitely.) Increasing the FBI’s access with no corresponding increase in oversight is definitely not a good idea, considering it has never shown interest in self-restraint.

The FBI historically has not had access to email records via NSLs, although it did spend several years doing exactly that before being shut down by the DOJ. It obviously wants that access again and FBI Director James Comey claims the only thing standing between it and the access it always thought it had is a “typo.”

If this secret amendment passes along with the authorization bill, it would weaken attempts to reform the ECPA — the 1986 law that gives the government warrantless access to emails and other online documents more than 180 days old. But rather than fix the Senate intelligence authorization bill, legislators are looking to carve a hole in the recently (and unanimously) passed Email Privacy Act.

Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, is expected to offer an amendment that would mirror the provision in the intelligence bill.

Privacy advocates warn that adding it to the broadly supported reform effort would backfire.

“If [the provision] is added to ECPA, it’ll kill the bill,” Gabe Rottman, deputy director of the Center for Democracy and Technology’s freedom, security, and technology project, wrote in an email to The Intercept. “If it passes independently, it’ll create a gaping loophole. Either way, it’s a big problem and a massive expansion of government surveillance authority.”

The FBI should be sending out fruit baskets to the Senate Intelligence Committee for both expanding its surveillance reach and undercutting a much-needed reform effort. Secret laws made by secretive committees during closed-doors sessions doesn’t seem very “American,” but much like the super-secretive NSLs the FBI loves so much, the routine invocation of “national security” tends to ward off the scrutiny this process desperately needs.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, appropriations, ecpa, ecpa reform, fbi, national security letters, nsls, senate intelligence committee, surveillance, warrants

If The CIA Apologizes For Lying About Torture, But Doesn't Tell Anyone About The Apology, Does It Really Count?

from the 14-months-later... dept

Remember the Senate Intelligence Committee’s massive CIA torture report, that details how the CIA conducted a vast program of torturing people, which had no actual benefit, and then lied to Congress (repeatedly) about it? The same report that, when the heavily redacted executive summary was released, ex-CIA officials insisted would result in attacks on America that never actually happened?

This was also the same CIA torture report that the CIA vehemently disagreed with. Even prior to the (again, heavily redacted) executive summary being released, CIA Director John Brennan had responded to the report, insisting that it was full of lies and misleading claims. That initial response, which happened in the summer of 2013 took issue with many of the claims in the report. When the redacted executive summary of the report was finally released, the CIA apparently publicly posted a “correction” about its claims concerning the report, in which it noted that many of the statements the CIA had made in attacking the torture report were actually… not true.

And here’s the real kicker: while the CIA “released” this “correction” on its website as a “note to readers” it didn’t actually tell anyone about it. Instead, just as everyone was talking about the release of the executive summary of the terror report, and claiming that the CIA was contesting a bunch of key findings in the report, the CIA had actually posted a document on its own website detailing how its own denials were basically wrong. And some of them were big denials — including about the effectiveness of the torture program on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM). A key part of the Senate’s report was that KSM was repeatedly tortured, but didn’t cough up anything particularly useful. The CIA vehemently denied this and insisted that what KSM gave them was useful. But in this “note to readers” (again, which was never revealed to anyone), the CIA admits that it clearly overstated the value of KSM:

Rather than “the individual managing the plot,” we should have written “the individual who was in a position to advance the plot.” This terrorist had raised Canary Wharf as a potential target and was tasked by KSM to conduct surveillance of Heathrow Airport’s security, but the plot was shelved after KSM’s arrest….

… Instead of “KSM provided information on an ai-Qa’ida operative named Zubair. .. ,” we should have written that “KSM provided information that led us to understand the significance of a Jemaah lslamiya operative named Zubair.” We acknowledge that in various representations, including President Bush’s 2006 speech, CIA introduced a sequencing error regarding Majid Khan’s arrest/debriefings, and KSM’s arrest/debriefings. We repeated that error here and on page 26 of Tab C (see next erratum). However, despite that error, our description of the impact of the information acquired from KSM in the Hambali case remains accurate. It was the combination of information from both terrorists that caused us to focus on Zubair as an inroad to Hambali….

… In our review of this case, we correctly acknowledged that CIA allowed a mistaken claim that KSM played a role in Majid Khan’s capture to appear in the Inspector General’s 2004 Special Review, and we correctly wrote that this claim was a one-time error. However, our effort to provide an example of a more accurate “typical representation” of the relationship between KSM’s information and Khan ran afoul of the sequencing error noted in the previous erratum. Although information from KSM was used to elicit further details from Khan, by then Khan already had provided the information that, together with what we learned from KSM, enabled us to advance our search for Hambali….

…We incorrectly stated that KSM’s information preceded Majid Khan’s information. We stand by our overall conclusion regarding the value of KSM’s information.

In other words, a bunch of things the CIA insisted were inaccurate in the Senates Torture Report were actually quite accurate, and it was the CIA that was being inaccurate. And, sure, the CIA “admitted” this in its “note to readers” but then failed to actually tell anyone about this “note to readers.” In fact, while the document was available on the CIA website no one even seemed to notice it until a few days ago. And that includes the Senate Intelligence Committee.

The document, entitled ?Note to Readers,? was not formally provided or flagged separately for the Senate Intelligence Committee, which only became aware of its existence in the last week ? more than a year since the document was publicly posted.

The ?Note? was also noticeably absent from the CIA website?s swath of December 2014 releases related to the Intelligence Committee study, and was not mentioned in either of the agency?s archived press releases on the subject.

Not surprisingly, Senator Ron Wyden, who has been one of the leading voices in getting this report out to the public, was not at all pleased to find out about all of this:

?The CIA justified this program by claiming that it produced otherwise unobtainable information. CIA officials have now admitted their go-to example was wrong,? Sen. Ron Wyden, a prominent Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, told BuzzFeed News.

?These are significant admissions by the CIA that should not have been hidden in an obscure endnote,? Wyden said. ?Director Brennan has tried to insist that the CIA did not provide policymakers with false information about torture, but these corrections seem to be an admission that they did so, and did so repeatedly.?

It still seems worth asking why President Obama continues to allow CIA Director John Brennan to retain that role. He appears to have no problem letting him get away with lying and purposeful obfuscation over activities of the CIA to the Senate Committee that is in charge of overseeing the CIA.

Filed Under: apology, cia, lies, note to reader, senate intelligence committee, torture, torture report