stephanie lenz – Techdirt (original) (raw)

from the dancing-without-end dept

Sometimes I think purgatory must be filing a lawsuit over a wrongful DMCA takedown notice. I’m pretty sure that’s how Stephanie Lenz feels. After all, she’s been fighting against Universal Music issuing a bogus DMCA takedown against her dancing baby, and I’m pretty sure that “baby” will be graduating high school before too long. Last we’d checked in, the Supreme Court was debating hearing the appeal in the case, and had asked the White House to weigh in. The White House responded last month with a truly bizarre argument, agreeing that the 9th Circuit’s ruling contained a “significant legal error” but said that this case was “not a suitable vehicle for correcting that mistake.”

Whether it was for that reason or for no reason at all, the Supreme Court has now decided not to hear the appeal, meaning that the case is back (once again) in District Court, where it may actually go to trial to determine if Universal Music knew that the video was fair use when it issued the initial takedown.

As we’ve discussed time and time again, this particular case is an important one, if Section 512(f) of the DMCA — the part that says you cannot file bogus DMCA takedowns — is to have any teeth. The problem, right now is that there are piles upon piles of abusive DMCA takedowns, targeting all sorts of content that is perfectly legitimate and non-infringing. Yet, because there is basically no punishment for issuing such takedowns, they continue. Unfortunately, this particular case keeps coming out with “mixed bag” rulings that probably won’t help very much in the long term. While we may have hoped that the Supreme Court would clear things up and make sure 512(f) actually does its job, it appears that’s unlikely to happen any time soon.

Filed Under: 512f, copyright, dancing baby, dmca 512, fair use, scotus, stephanie lenz, supreme court
Companies: umg

Supreme Court Asks White House To Weigh In On Dancing Baby Fair Use Case

from the hmmm dept

The copyright case involving Stephanie Lenz and her dancing baby is one that may finally be nearing a conclusion after many, many years — but it’s not over yet. As you may recall, Lenz posted a very brief clip of her then toddler, dancing along to a few seconds of a barely audible Prince song. This was almost a decade ago.

Universal Music sent a DMCA takedown, and that kicked off a big fight over fair use, with the EFF representing Lenz and arguing that Universal Music needed to take fair use into account before issuing takedowns. The case then bounced around courts for nearly a decade with a variety of rulings, eventually getting a huge confusing mess of a ruling from the 9th Circuit last year, followed by an only marginally better mess earlier this year in an en banc decision replacing the original one.

Both EFF and Universal Music asked the Supreme Court to hear different questions about the messy 9th circuit ruling, and lots of other folks weighed in with amicus briefs, including internet companies and the RIAA (not on the same side, as you might imagine). The general consensus seemed to be that it was a long shot that the Supreme Court would bother with the case, even as it was kind of a mess, but the Supreme Court this morning kept things alive by asking the White House Solicitor General to weigh in (on page 2 of the document).

LENZ, STEPHANIE V. UNIVERSAL MUSIC CORP., ET AL.

The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.

So… now everyone gets to sit and wonder what the hell the Solicitor General is going to say. The fact that former MPAA lawyer Donald Verrilli is no longer the Solicitor General is at least mildly encouraging, since his views on copyright appeared to be positively draconian. But it’s anybody’s guess how the acting Solicitor General, Ian Gershengorn, and his staff will respond to the request. I don’t think Gershengorn has much experience with copyright issues, but prior to jumping into the Obama administration, he did work at Jenner & Block, which was where Verrilli worked as well. And others on the staff have been shown to have some wacky ideas about copyright in the past.

But, for now, we’ll have to wait and see — but it also means that the case is still alive. With any luck, it’ll be over before Lenz’s “dancing baby” graduates high school.

Filed Under: copyright, donald verrilli, fair use, ian gershengorn, solicitor general, stephanie lenz, supreme court
Companies: eff, universal music

New Decision In Dancing Baby DMCA Takedown Case — And Everything Is Still A Mess

from the didn't-really-fix-anything dept

I got very excited yesterday when I saw a court system alert that there was a new decision out in the appeal of Lenz v. Universal. This was the Dancing Baby case where a toddler rocking out to a Prince song was seen as such an affront to Prince’s exclusive rights in his songs that his agent Universal Music felt it necessary to send a DMCA takedown notice to YouTube to have the video removed. Heaven forbid people share videos of their babies dancing to unlicensed music.

Of course, they shouldn’t need licenses, because videos like this one clearly make fair use of the music at issue. So Stephanie Lenz, whose video this was, through her lawyers at the EFF, sued Universal under Section 512(f) of the DMCA for having wrongfully caused her video to be taken down.

Last year, the Ninth Circuit heard the case on appeal and then in September issued a decision that generally pleased no one. Both Universal and Lenz petitioned for the Ninth Circuit to reconsider the decision en banc. En banc review was particularly important because the decision suggested that the panel felt hamstrung by the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision in Rossi v. MPAA, a decision which had the effect of making it functionally impossible for people whose content had been wrongfully taken down to ever successfully sue the parties who had caused that to happen.

Although the updated language exorcises some unhelpful, under-litigated ideas that suggested automated takedown systems could be a “valid and good faith” way of processing takedowns while considering fair use, the new, amended decision does little to remediate any of the more serious underlying problems from the last version. The one bright spot from before fortunately remains: the Ninth Circuit has now made clear that fair use is something that takedown notice senders must consider before sending them. But as for what happens when they don’t, or what happens when they get it wrong, that part is still a confusing mess. The reissued decision doubles-down on the contention from Rossi that a takedown notice sender must have just a subjectively reasonable belief ? not an objectively reasonable one ? that the content in question is infringing. And, according to the majority of the three-judge panel (there was a dissent), it is for a jury to decide whether that belief was reasonable.

The fear from September remains that there is no real deterrent to people sending wrongful takedown notices that cause legitimate, non-infringing speech to be removed from the Internet. It is expensive and impractical to sue to be compensated for the harm this censorship causes, and having to do it before a jury, with an extremely high subjective standard, makes doing so even more unrealistic.

It’s possible that the Ninth Circuit may actually see the plaintiff as having been vindicated here; after all, she may still go to a jury and be awarded damages to compensate her, potentially even for the attorneys’ fees expended in fighting this fight. But note that the issue of whether she is due anything, and, if so, how much, has not yet been fully litigated, despite this case having been going on since 2007! Not everyone whose content is removed is as tenacious as Ms. Lenz or her EFF counsel, and not everyone can even begin to fight the fight when their content is unjustly removed.

Furthermore, sometimes the value in having speech posted on the Internet comes from having it posted *then*. No amount of compensation can truly make up for the effect of the censorship on a speaker’s right to be heard when he or she wanted to be heard. Consider, as we are in the thick of election season, what happens when election-related speech is taken down shortly before a vote. As was pointed out in several amicus briefs in support of the en banc rehearing, including one I filed on behalf of the Organization of Transformative Works and Public Knowledge, such DMCA-enabled censorship has happened before.

Suing won’t solve that problem, but at least the threat of a lawsuit might make someone think twice before sending a wrongful takedown notice. But if a lawsuit isn’t a realistic possibility then that deterrence won’t happen. What the parties supporting the plaintiff have been worried about is that the DMCA allows for an unprecedented form of censorship we would not normally allow. Think about it: if there were no DMCA then people who wanted content removed from the Internet would have to file well-pleaded and well-substantiated lawsuits articulating why the content in question was so wrongful that an injunction compelling its removal was justified in the face of any defense. In other words, without the DMCA, the question of fair use would get considered, and it would get considered by a judge.

But thanks to the DMCA would-be censors can save the time, cost, and burden of having to make sure they got the fair use question right before causing content to be removed ? and very likely with a complete lack of judicial oversight to hold them to account if they didn’t. No judge may ever scrutinize their decision to ensure that they didn’t abuse the shortcut to censorship to the DMCA affords them. Instead, Thursday’s decision only further ensures that this sort of abuse will continue unabated.

Filed Under: 512f, 9th circuit, automated takedowns, copyright, dancing baby, dmca, fair use, stephanie lenz, takedowns
Companies: universal music, youtube

Big, Confusing Mess Of A Fair Use Decision Over DMCA Takedowns

from the wait,-what? dept

Some potentially good news this morning — which may be undermined by the fine print. After many years of back and forth, the 9th Circuit appeals court has ruled that Universal Music may have violated the DMCA in not taking fair use into account before issuing a DMCA takedown request on a now famous YouTube video of Stephanie Lenz’s infant dancing to less than 30 seconds of a Prince song playing in the background. Because of this, there can now be a trial over whether or not Universal actually had a good faith belief that the video was not fair use.

This case has been going on forever, and if you’ve watched the video, it’s kind of amazing that a key case on fair use should be focused on that particular video, where you can barely even make out the music. The key question was whether or not Universal abused the DMCA in not first considering fair use before sending the takedown. This is fairly important, because, of course, DMCA takedowns suppress speech and if fair use is supposed to be the “pressure valve” that stops copyright from violating the First Amendment, it has to actually mean something. Section 512(f) of the DMCA says that the filer of a DMCA notice may be liable for damages for “misrepresentations,” but historically that has been an almost entirely toothless part of the law (in part because of earlier rulings in the Lenz case). People hoped that would change with this ruling, and while the beginning of the ruling suggests 512(f) is getting teeth, the end yanks them all away.

The ruling in the 9th Circuit starts out great, but starts getting iffy pretty fast.

Her claim boils down to a question of whether copyright holders have been abusing the extrajudicial takedown procedures provided for in the DMCA by declining to first evaluate whether the content qualifies as fair use. We hold that the statute requires copyright holders to consider fair use before sending a takedown notification, and that failure to do so raises a triable issue as to whether the copyright holder formed a subjective good faith belief that the use was not authorized by law.

Sounds good, right? Anyone sending a DMCA notice needs to take fair use into account before sending a takedown. That may be trouble for all of those automated takedown filing systems out there, many of which we’ve written about. The court also reiterates that fair use is not “allowed infringement,” but rather it’s not infringement at all. This is also important (even though it says that directly in the law, many people pretend that it’s just an “allowed” infringement). The court is not impressed by Universal Music’s defense in the case, in which it argues that fair use is “not authorized by law” because, as Universal falsely claims, it is merely a “defense” to infringement. The court says that’s wrong:

Universal?s interpretation is incorrect as it conflates two different concepts: an affirmative defense that is labeled as such due to the procedural posture of the case, and an affirmative defense that excuses impermissible conduct. Supreme Court precedent squarely supports the conclusion that fair use does not fall into the latter camp: ?[A]nyone who . . . makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of the copyright with respect to such use.?

So, that’s all good. But… the details matter, and from that point on… they’re weird. The court points to the earlier ruling, saying that the copyright holder “need only form a subjective good faith belief that a use is not authorized.” Thus, as long as the issuer can come up with some sort of argument for why they didn’t think it was fair use, they’re probably safe.

As a result, Lenz?s request to impose a subjective standard only with respect to factual beliefs and an objective standard with respect to legal determinations is untenable.

And because of that, the court leaves a big out for just about any copyright holder. It says the court has no place in questioning how the copyright holder decided whether the use was authorized or not:

To be clear, if a copyright holder ignores or neglects our unequivocal holding that it must consider fair use before sending a takedown notification, it is liable for damages under § 512(f). If, however, a copyright holder forms a subjective good faith belief the allegedly infringing material does not constitute fair use, we are in no position to dispute the copyright holder?s belief even if we would have reached the opposite conclusion.

The court says a copyright holder can’t just “pay lip service” to the idea that it checked on fair use, but in the same paragraph admits that, well, it basically can. Even worse, it says that forming a “good faith belief” doesn’t require actually investigating the details:

In order to comply with the strictures of § 512(c)(3)(A)(v), a copyright holder?s consideration of fair use need not be searching or intensive. We follow Rossi?s guidance that formation of a subjective good faith belief does not require investigation of the allegedly infringing content.

So…. huh? (1) You need to take into account if it’s fair use or not and you need to show a “good faith belief” that it’s fair use, but… (2) you don’t actually have to investigate anything, and the court cannot review your reasons for having a good faith belief. That’s not a loophole. It’s a blackhole that collapses 512(f) in on itself.

From there, it actually notes that automated takedowns… may be fine:

We note, without passing judgment, that the implementation of computer algorithms appears to be a valid and good faith middle ground for processing a plethora of content while still meeting the DMCA?s requirements to somehow consider fair use. Cf. Hotfile, 2013 WL 6336286, at *47 (?The Court . . . is unaware of any decision to date that actually addressed the need for human review, and the statute does not specify how belief of infringement may be formed or what knowledge may be chargeable to the notifying entity.?). For example, consideration of fair use may be sufficient if copyright holders utilize computer programs that automatically identify for takedown notifications content where: ?(1) the video track matches the video track of a copyrighted work submitted by a content owner; (2) the audio track matches the audio track of that same copyrighted work; and (3) nearly the entirety . . . is comprised of a single copyrighted work.?

So, uh, what? Automated takedowns may be fine because that’s sort of a way to consider fair use because… no reason given. That is not at all helpful.

On a separate note, the court confirms that the trial cannot move forward by arguing that Universal had “willful blindness” about the likelihood of fair use in the case, because Lenz didn’t really show that Universal had willful blindness. So that’s another dead end.

Finally, the court rejected Universal Music’s claim that Lenz had to show monetary damages in order to recover damages under 512(f). The court says 512(f) spans more than just monetary damages. Of course, that’s almost entirely meaningless in a world in which everyone has an out through “subjective good faith” that doesn’t even require investigating anything.

So this is a ruling that looks good up top, but gets bad as you read the details. There is a dissent, from Judge Milan Smith, pointing out some of the problems with the majority ruling, and the loophole that it creates. As the dissent notes, stating that something is infringing when you haven’t done any fair use analysis is a misrepresentation, and 512(f) covers misrepresentations. So, in the end, a possibly important ruling is undermined with a massive loophole, which likely will lead to a continuing barrage of DMCA takedowns, including automated takedowns that suppress speech. That seems… wrong.

Filed Under: 512f, 9th circuit, automated takedowns, copyright, dancing baby, dmca, fair use, free speech, good faith belief, stephanie lenz, takedowns

Dancing Babies, The DMCA, Fair Use And Whether Companies Should Pay For Bogus Takedowns

from the still-in-court dept

Earlier this week the Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments in the appeal of Lenz v. Universal. This was the case where Stephanie Lenz sued Universalbecause Universal had sent YouTube a takedown notice demanding it delete the home movie she had posted of her toddler dancing, simply because music by Prince was audible in the background. It’s a case whose resolution has been pending since 2007, despite the fact that it involves the interpretation of a fundamental part of the DMCA’s operation.

The portion of the DMCA at issue in this case is Section 512 of the copyright statute, which the DMCA added in 1998 along with Section 1201. As with Section 1201, Section 512 reflects a certain naivete by Congress in thinking any part of the DMCA was a good idea, rather than the innovation-choking and speech- chilling mess it has turned out to be. But looking at the statutory language you can kind of see how Congress thought it was all going to work, what with the internal checks and balances they put into the DMCA to prevent it from being abused. Unfortunately, while even as intended there are some severe shortcomings to how this balance was conceptualized, what’s worse is how it has not even been working as designed.

One such problem is with the content takedown system incorporated into Section 512. The point of Section 512 is to make it possible for intermediaries to host the rich universe of online content users depend on intermediaries to host. It does this by shifting the burden of having to police users’ content for potential copyright infringement from these intermediaries to copyright owners, who are better positioned to do it. Without this shift more online speech would likely be chilled, either because the fear of being held liable for hosting users’ infringing content would prompt intermediaries to over-censor legitimate content, or because the possibility of being held liable for user content would make being an Internet intermediary hosting it too crushingly high a risk to attempt at all.

Copyright owners often grumble about having the policing be their responsibility, but these complaints ignore the awesome power they get in return: by merely sending a takedown notice they are able, without any litigation or court order or third-party review, to cause online speech to be removed from the Internet. It is an awesome power, and it is one that Congress required them to use responsibly. That’s why the DMCA includes Section 512(f), as a mechanism to hold wayward parties accountable when they wield this powered unjustifiably.

Unfortunately this is a section of the statute that has lost much of its bite. A 2004 decision by the Ninth Circuit, Rossi v. MPAA, read into the statute a certain degree of equivocation about what the “good faith” requirement of a takedown notice actually demanded. Nonetheless, the statute on its face still requires that a valid takedown notice include a statement that the party sending it has “a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.” (emphasis added)

The big question in this case is what the “or the law” part means in terms of making a takedown notice legitimate. No one is disputing that the notice that took down the dancing baby video was authorized by the agent in charge of administering the rights to Prince’s music (at the hearing we learned that this is no longer Universal Music, but it was back then). But copyright is always contextual. In other words, just because someone uses (e.g., by posting to the Internet) a copyrighted work does not mean they have automatically infringed that work’s copyright. There may well be circumstances enabling that use, like a license (including a statutory or compulsory license), or fair use.

Whether the “or the law” part included authorization pursuant to fair use is what a significant part of the hearing addressed. Universal said that it didn’t, arguing that fair use was only an affirmative defense. By “affirmative defense” Universal meant that fair use was just something you could argue as a defense to being accused of copyright infringement in a lawsuit but not something that existed more integrally as part of copyright law itself. As such, Universal argued, it was not necessary to consider it when sending a takedown notice claiming that the use in question was not authorized.

EFF, arguing for Lenz, disagreed, however, arguing that the articulation of fair use in the statute, at 17 U.S.C. § 107, made fair use more than just a defense; rather, it is a statutory limitation constraining the scope of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights and just as much a part of the law as the parts enumerating those rights. As a result, the EFF argued, a copyright owner sending a takedown notice always has to consider whether the rights the notice is seeking to vindicate are at all constrained by the sort of use being made of the work. If the copyright owner doesn’t do that then it could be subject to the sanctions of 512(f).

Although one can never read the tea leaves from an oral argument, the judges did not seem to buy Universal’s argument that fair use was just an affirmative defense. They seemed more persuaded by the EFF’s position that it was enough a part of the copyright statute for at least some consideration of it to be required for a takedown notice to be valid. But then the court became concerned with the question of how much consideration was needed. After all, as Universal suggested (and EFF disagreed with), there may even be some question about whether the use of Prince’s music in the dancing baby video was itself fair. Fair use is a very squishy thing always dependent on the particular context of a particular use of a copyrighted work. Often it takes massive amounts of litigation to determine whether a use was fair, so the judges spent a lot of time questioning both parties about what a copyright owner (or its agent), if the statute requires them to consider fair use, must actually do on that front in order to not run afoul of the law’s requirements when sending takedown notices.

Universal argued that because it (and other similarly situated copyright holders) needed to send millions of takedown notices it would simply be too burdensome to have to consider fair use for each and every one of them. To this the EFF suggested that tools may be available to help triage the likely contenders needing closer analysis, but something else the EFF said I think drives the point home more aptly.

The DMCA also includes a “put back” process, at Section 512(g), so that Internet users’ whose content has wrongfully been removed can have it replaced. Universal argued that this process should be enough to deal with any wrongful takedowns, as it allows for wrongfully removed content to be replaced. (Universal also argued that this “put back” notice was also necessary to give the copyright holder notice that fair use might be an issue to consider.) But if this were the case then why have a Section 512(f) in the statute at all? There is nothing in the statute that suggests that a “put back” notice needs to happen for Section 512(f) to be able to operate. Furthermore, although the record in this case was unfortunately poor as to what percentage of removed content was ever put back pursuant to 512(g) put back notices, as the EFF noted, even if it were a very small percentage of removed content, a small percentage of millions of instances suggests that quite a bit of non-infringing content is still getting removed.

Moreover, there is no reason to suspect that the content that has been restored in response to these put back notices represents the entire universe of wrongfully removed content. There is little basis to presume that everyone else who had their content removed simply shrugged it off as a fair cop. Because a put back notice can conspicuously put a user in the line of fire of a copyright owner many users might not have wanted to tempt the trouble. Also, as the EFF observed, the DMCA takedown system is fairly labyrinth and often needs the assistance of counsel to help navigate it. This form of support is likely not available to most, and even in the case of Ms. Lenz it did not readily result in her home video of her kid dancing being restored.

Ultimately Universal is arguing that this outcome is ok: despite this harm to legitimate speech, copyright owners should nonetheless be entitled to cause millions and millions of instances of user-generated content to disappear from the Internet with very little effort, inconvenience, or oversight on their part. But it’s an argument that fails to recognize just what a privilege the takedown system represents. It is a huge shortcut, giving private parties the extraordinary power to be censors over Internet content without the trouble and expense of a lawsuit to first determine whether their rights have truly been infringed. With the DMCA copyright owners become judge, jury, and executioner over other people’s speech all on their own, and when they decide to sentence content for disappearance they get to use the takedown notice as the gun to the head of the intermediary to force it do the deed.

Universal spent a lot of time arguing that the DMCA was intended to be this sort of shortcut in order to be a “rapid response” system to online infringements. But the “rapid response” the DMCA offers is that copyright owners don’t first have to go to court. Nothing in statute suggests copyright owners are entitled to a response so rapid that they are excused from exercising the appropriate care a valid takedown notice requires ? or that even a lawsuit would require. As Universal would have it, they get to be censors over other people’s speech without any of the risk normally involved if they had to use the courts to vindicate their rights. Note that nothing in the DMCA precludes a copyright owner from suing an Internet user who has infringed its copyright. But with a lawsuit comes the risk that a copyright owner might have to pay the fees and costs of the defendant should their claims of infringement found unmeritorious (including because the targeted use was fair). According to Universal, however, copyright owners should face no similar consequence should the claims underpinning their takedown notices be similarly specious. Copyright owners should simply be able to cause content to be deleted at will, with no risk of any penalty to them for being wrong.

But that’s not what the statute says. As was also argued at the hearing, Section 512(f) creates the

penalty necessary to deter wrongful takedowns because without there being one, all the risk of the

takedown system would be borne by those whose free speech rights (both to speak freely and to freely

consume what others have said) are undermined by copyright owners’ glib censorship. As the saying

goes, with great power comes great responsibility, and it hardly misconstrues Congress’s intent, or the

express language of the statute, to demand copyright owners to carefully exercise that responsibility

before letting their takedown notices fly, and to sanction them when they don’t.

Filed Under: 512f, abuse, copyright, dancing baby, dmca, fair use, stephanie lenz, takedowns
Companies: eff, universal music

Court Says Trial Needed To Determine If Universal Music Violated DMCA With Dancing Baby Takedown

from the can-you-punish-false-takedowns dept

We’ve covered the Stephanie Lenz / dancing baby / fair use case for years — but now it looks like there’s finally going to be a trial to consider if Universal Music can be punished for sending a DMCA takedown notice on a video of Lenz’s infant son dancing to 29 seconds of a song by Prince, which Lenz asserts was clearly fair use. If you haven’t followed the case, it’s been argued back and forth for years. At one point, the court ruled that a copyright holder does need to take fair use into account before sending a DMCA takedown, but that there needs to be “subjective bad faith” by Universal Music in sending the takedown. In other words, Lenz (and the EFF, who is representing her) needs to show, effectively, that Universal knew that it was sending bogus takedowns. The EFF has argued that willful blindness by Universal meant that it had knowledge (amusingly, using precedents in copyright cases in the other direction, where copyright holders argue that willful blindness can be infringement).

There are a few other issues being fought over — including Universal Music’s contention that the DMCA doesn’t apply at all here (both because it insists it wasn’t really sending a DMCA takedown, even as YouTube required a DMCA takedown, and because it’s arguing that YouTube itself doesn’t qualify for the DMCA because it helps process videos — an argument courts have rejected repeatedly). However, Universal also sought summary judgment on the fair use issue in the other direction, arguing that it is clear that Universal did not have “subjective bad faith” in issuing the takedown, since it believed the takedown to be legit (and still does…). The judge has rejected both arguments for summary judgment, saying that there are disputed facts that need to have a full trial — in part because Lenz failed to show any evidence that Universal had reason to believe that there was a high probability that some of the videos it was taking down would be covered by fair use. This point is necessary if Lenz is going to demonstrate willful blindness.

Lenz does not present evidence suggesting that Universal subjectively believed either that there was a high probability that any given video might make fair use of a Prince composition or that her video in particular made fair use of Prince’s song “Let’s Go Crazy.” Lenz argues that her video was “self-evident” fair use and that Universal must have known it constituted fair use when it sent the Takedown Notice. However, as the Ninth Circuit recently has observed, the process of making a fair use determination “is neither a mechanistic exercise nor a gestalt undertaking, but a considered legal judgment.” …. A legal conclusion that fair use was “self-evident” necessarily would rest upon an objective measure rather than the subjective standard required by Rossi. Indeed, Universal presents evidence that Lenz herself initially did not view her claim as involving fair use….

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Lenz is not entitled to summary judgment based on the theory that Universal willfully blinded itself to the possibility that her video constituted fair use of Prince’s song. Nor is Universal entitled to summary judgment, as it has not shown that it lacked a subjective belief that there was a high probability that any given video might make fair use of a Prince composition. Lenz is free to argue that a reasonable actor in Universal’s position would have understood that fair use was “self-evident,” and that this circumstance is evidence of Universal’s alleged willful blindness. Universal likewise is free to argue that whatever the alleged shortcomings of its review process might have been, it did not act with the subjective intent required by §512(f).

In other words, this case, which has gone on for years, is going to continue for even more time as a full trial is about to happen.

Filed Under: dancing baby, dmca, lenz, stephanie lenz, takedowns
Companies: universal music

Why It's Almost Impossible To Get Punished For A Bogus DMCA Takedown

from the not-going-to-happen dept

Yesterday, we wrote about the latest in the long running saga that is Stephanie Lenz’s battle (with the help of the EFF) over whether or not Universal Music was right to issue a DMCA takedown for her 29 second video of her toddler son dancing to a (barely audible) Prince song. Once again, here’s the video.

As we noted in the story, it seemed unlikely that Lenz and the EFF would prevail in getting Universal Music to pay up for the bogus takedown. Joe Mullin, who was in the courtroom during the latest hearing provides some additional details that highlight just why this is going to be difficult for them. The problem isn’t necessarily the case or the situation, but the fact that the parts of the DMCA used to push back against bogus takedowns are ridiculously weak. It has been determined that only in cases of “_subjective bad faith_” would there be fees awarded. That means EFF has to show that Universal knew that this was fair use, and then decided to issue the takedown anyway.

[District Court Judge Jeremy] Fogel said that it isn’t clear that EFF has met the high burden of showing that Universal exhibited “subjective bad faith.”

EFF would have to show that there’s no way the video was not fair use, first of all. In addition, EFF lawyers would have to show “there was some concerted activity on Universal’s part to blind itself to that fact—that even knowing they had nothing to stand on with regards to fair use, they put out a takedown.” Even if EFF could show that Universal Music acted recklessly or with negligence—that wouldn’t be enough.

That’s a pretty tall order, and a clear weakness in the DMCA in preventing bogus takedowns (an all too common phenomenon). While the EFF properly points out that Universal’s employee who sent the DMCA “had no idea what to look for,” that still might not be enough to show subjective bad faith — just laziness.

Additionally, there is some skepticism about if it’s worth fighting this through, since the amount of money at stake is minimal:

The amount of damages EFF is fighting for is tiny, in the grand scheme of things. And Fogel also expressed skepticism that EFF could ask for much in damages. He has already limited the amount they can ask for. EFF is asking for compensation for 10 hours of Lenz’s time, spent dealing with the takedown notice before she contacted EFF, based on the Pennsylvania minimum wage at the time of 6.25perhour.They’realsoaskingforcompensation6.25 per hour. They’re also asking for compensation 6.25perhour.They’realsoaskingforcompensation1,275 for the time that EFF attorneys spent advising her pre-suit.

Despite the fact that not much money can be won, in an interview with Ars, [EFF’s Corynne] McSherry said that the principle is still important, so that content owners will pause before they shoot out takedown requests.

I understand the principle argument — but courts often aren’t that interested in spending time on such cases, which they believe are wasting time from cases that are more important. At the very least, Judge Fogel appears willing to let a jury weigh in on this one, and has noted that despite all of the hurdles EFF and Lenz face, it’s not a complete slam dunk for Universal: “A reasonable fact-finder could conclude, that this is an action taken in subjective bad faith.”

And so the case moves on. I’m still betting that Universal Music will be happy with the end result, and I worry that the resulting precedent will be used to justify more broad and bogus takedowns. Hopefully, I’m proven wrong.

Filed Under: bogus takedown, dancing baby, dmca, fair use, stephanie lenz
Companies: eff, universal music

Dancing Baby Video Fight Heads Back To Court: Will A Bogus Takedown Finally Get Punished?

from the that-would-be-quite-a-thing dept

Yesterday, our most popular post involved a story of a questionable DMCA takedown notice leading to the shutdown of 1.5 million sites. This was not a first. We’ve written numerous times about bogus DMCA notices and the damage they can cause by censoring works without an adversarial hearing first. And one thing that always comes up is the question of whether or not there’s punishment for bogus DMCA takedowns. In general, the answer has been no. There may be a few very specific circumstances under which whoever signed off on a bogus DMCA notice could be charged with perjury, but the specifics there are quite limited.

Now, one of the more famous cases concerning bogus DMCA takedowns — which started all the way back in 2007 — is heading back to court today, to see if Universal Music can be punished for issuing a bogus takedown on a woman, Stephanie Lenz, for posting a 30-second video of her toddler son dancing to Prince’s “Let’s Go Crazy.” If you haven’t seen the video, the song is barely audible, and the whole thing is a 29-second clip. There is a strong fair use argument.

The case has been taking the slow route through the court system, with Lenz (and the EFF) suing Universal Music for taking down the video without considering the possibility of fair use. Universal claimed that fair use is merely a defense, and thus there is no obligation to consider fair use first. The court, thankfully, disagreed, and said that damages were available, but quite limited.

And now… the arguments are kicking off over whether or not Universal Music should get in trouble for its actions. UMG, for its part, argues that it shouldn’t have to run everything through a fair use filter first, and that even if it was required to do so, it probably couldn’t. EFF points out the ridiculousness of saying there are no consequences to bogus tweets.

“Parents are allowed to document and share moments of their children’s lives on a forum like YouTube, and they shouldn’t have to worry if those moments happen to include some background music,” said [EFF IP Director Corynne] McSherry. “Content companies need to be held accountable when their heavy-handed tactics squash fair use rights. We hope the judge gives Ms. Lenz the closure she deserves, and shows content owners they can’t trample over users’ rights.”

My guess is that the court won’t punish UMG, arguing that it did all it needed to do. But it would be nice to actually put some teeth into rules that prevent abusing the DMCA to silence others’ speech illegally.

Filed Under: dmca, fair use, prince, stephanie lenz, takedown
Companies: universal music

Did Lenz Waive Attorney-Client Privelege In Talking About Her Dancing Baby Case?

from the that-seems-unfortunate dept

We just recently spoke about the latest filings in Stephanie Lenz’s lawsuit against Universal Music for issuing a takedown for her video of her toddler dancing to 29-seconds of a Prince song. A court has already declared that Universal Music should take fair use into account, but Universal Music is now claiming that it did take fair use into account, and it did not believe that the use of the music in this video was fair use:

Part of Universal’s argument is that even Lenz and her lawyers at the EFF didn’t think it was fair use. Some of this is based on public statements by Lenz. What I had missed at the time was that a magistrate judge had already decided that Lenz had waived her attorney-client privileges by talking about the communications with others. Lenz had discussed what the lawyers had said over emails, in Google Talk chats and on her blog. Because of that, the judge felt that she had given up attorney-client privilege and ordered the EFF to turn over communications it had previously refused to under a claim of attorney-client privilege. I can see how the information she revealed publicly on her blog may be admissible, but private emails and chats seem a bit extreme. Beyond that, just because she talked about some things they said, doesn’t mean that the rest should be revealed.

The EFF, in response, is asking the court to overturn that ruling, stating that Lenz’s public comments covered public information and did not amount to a waiver of attorney-client privilege. You can see the EFF’s full response after the jump. No matter which side of the case you support, this is a separate and important issue. Talking about some aspects of your case online should not mean you waive your attorney-client privileges on communications. We should encourage public discussion of important aspects of legal cases, not totally scare off participants by thinking they could lose such important protections as attorney-client privilege if they talk too much.

Filed Under: attorney client privelege, stephanie lenz
Companies: eff, universal music