sudan – Techdirt (original) (raw)

Court Won't Let FBI Dodge Lawsuit By Removing American Citizen From No-Fly List Shortly Shortly After Being Sued

from the nothing-prompts-the-government-into-action-like-litigation dept

The FBI uses the “no fly” list as leverage. What should be used to keep threats to national security off airplanes is being used to turn people into informants. If someone travels to a country the US government views with suspicion, citizens and legal residents are often approached by FBI agents who use the threat of revoking flying privileges to obtain new info sources.

DOJ policy expressly forbids this sort of behavior, but the FBI doesn’t care. It tells the CBP to keep an eye on travelers who visit or originate from certain countries, accost them in the airport, and subject them to invasive searches/interrogations with an eye on converting them to unofficial G-men.

Earlier this year, the Second Circuit Appeals Court said federal agents could be sued for tossing three men on the “no fly” list for refusing to become informants. The Ninth Circuit Appeals Court is saying the same thing. There are procedural differences between the two cases, but in both, the plaintiffs have been allowed to move forward with their lawsuits.

The case [PDF] from the Ninth Circuit deals with the FBI’s coercive tactics. An American citizen from Oregon dealt with this after flying to Sudan:

In April 2010, while still in Sudan, Fikre was approached by two FBI agents who questioned him about his association with the as-Saber Mosque in Portland and his commercial finances. The agents told Fikre that he had been placed on the No Fly List, which identifies individuals who are prohibited from flying into, out of, or over the United States and Canadian airspace by commercial airlines. The FBI agents offered to remove Fikre from the list if he became a government informant. Fikre refused.

Then things got a whole lot worse for Yonas Fikre. He went from Sudan to the United Arab Emirates later that year where he was seized, imprisoned, and tortured by UAE police. Questioning centered on the Portland mosque and his captors told him the FBI had requested his detention. Once released, Fikre was trapped overseas. Unable to return to the US because of his no fly list status, Fikre sought refuge in Sweden.

Fikre appealed his no fly status, but the DHS refused to confirm or deny his placement on the list. Following the government’s loss in another no fly list lawsuit, the DHS finally confirmed Fikre was on the list but refused to reinstate his flying privileges. The DHS claimed Fikre was a “threat to civil aviation or national security,” but refused to provide further details as to why the agency believed this. Sweden’s government ultimately expelled him from the country (presumably because the US government had pretty much declared Fikre a terrorist) and his wife left him while he spent a half-decade overseas trying to find a way to travel back home.

Fikre sued the FBI for a variety of Constitutional violations, asking for damages and an admission/declaration from the government that he should never have been placed on the no fly list. The government responded by trying to dodge the lawsuit altogether. It arbitrarily removed Fikre from the list and said that was enough to make all of his claims moot. The lower court agreed, deciding the attempt to dodge the lawsuit was the equivalent of making Fikre whole for the half-decade of overseas screwing he received because he refused to be an FBI informant.

The Appeals Court disagrees with this assessment of the government’s attempted mooting. As Fikre points out, there’s nothing preventing the FBI from putting him back on the no fly list once the lawsuit has been dismissed. The government points to no reason or underlying policy for Fikre’s removal, much less makes any declaration it no longer considers him a national security threat.

[T]he FBI’s decision to restore Fikre’s flying privileges is an individualized determination untethered to any explanation or change in policy, much less an abiding change in policy. The DHS re-evaluated Fikre’s presence on the No Fly List in 2013 and 2015 pursuant to its TRIP procedure and determined that no adjustments to his status were necessary. Indeed, the DHS affirmed as late as March 2015—after it had amended TRIP to conform to the decision in Latif—that Fikre posed “a threat to civil aviation or national security” and it refused to remove him from the No Fly List. Yet it did just that fourteen months later, without explanation or any announced change in policy. […] This record suggests that Fikre’s removal from the No Fly List was more likely an exercise of discretion than a decision arising from a broad change in agency policy or procedure.

The court grants the government some good faith it hasn’t earned by saying it doesn’t believe it removed Fikre from the list simply to moot the lawsuit, but notes it has done nothing to assure Fikre or the court that his removal will be permanent or has anything to do with the national security machinations used to strip his flying privileges.

The notice filed by the government averred only that “counsel recently was advised by the Terrorist Screening Center that [Fikre] has been removed from the No Fly List.” Absent an acknowledgment by the government that its investigation revealed Fikre did not belong on the list, and that he will not be returned to the list based on the currently available evidence, Fikre remains, in his own words, “stigmatiz[ed] . . . as a known or suspected terrorist and as an individual who represents a threat of engaging in or conducting a violent act of terrorism and who is operationally capable of doing so.” Because acquaintances, business associates, and perhaps even family members are likely to persist in shunning or avoiding him despite his renewed ability to travel, it is plain that vindication in this action would have actual and palpable consequences for Fikre.

Nothing will be mooted. Fikre can continue suing the government for violating his rights and hopefully obtain a full — and honest — declaration that he was never a threat and will not pose one in the future. Short of a big win by Fikre, it’s tough to see this litigation resulting in the FBI dropping its informal policy of pressuring people into becoming informants by threatening to strand them in foreign countries. The DOJ’s policies aren’t worth the paper they’re printed on — not if the FBI continues to use the no fly list as leverage.

Filed Under: 9th circuit, american citizen, cbp, fbi, informants, no fly list, sudan, yonas fikre

Hacking Team Hacked: Documents Show Company Sold Exploits And Spyware To UN-Blacklisted Governments

from the I-would-imagine-there-are-plenty-of-new-openings-on-its-appointment-calendar dept

Hacking Team — purveyor of exploits and spyware to a variety of government agencies all over the world — has been hacked. Late Sunday night, its Twitter account name was changed to “Hacked Team” and its bio to read:

Developing ineffective, easy-to-pwn offensive technology to compromise the operations of the worldwide law enforcement and intelligence communities.

Whoever’s behind this (no group has claimed responsibility yet) has repurposed the official Hacking Team Twitter feed to send out screenshots of incriminating information it/they have uncovered. For those who want to take a look themselves, the liberated documents can be torrented. Here are two places the torrent file can be picked up. (CAUTION: Actual file is 400 GB, so use a robust client and check your drive[s] for free space…) [And, if those go down, I’ve also stashed the torrent file here.]

What has been exposed so far shows Hacking Team has been lying about its business partners. It claims to only sell to NATO partners and blacklists oppressive governments. But its “Customer” Wiki appears to show that it counts such countries as Kazakhstan, Sudan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Malaysia as partners.

Screenshots of emails accessed by Hacking Team’s hackers show the company circumventing local regulations and restrictions on the export of exploits and spyware by using third-party resellers.

If you can’t see/read the screenshot, here’s the pertinent information. The email subject is “Remote Control Davinci System Into Nigeria.” Underneath that is the proposed third-party process for sneaking Hacking Team’s “Davinci” past import/export restrictions:

Commissions and meeting:

Being an Italian company, we are following the guidelines of our exterior ministry.

Understanding that this is an uncommon circumstance, this is what we are proposing:

HackingTeam will sell directly to your company and then TunsmosPetroleum will add its own mark up. The price you will purchase from us will include a discount on the list price as a compensation for the 1st meeting/demo in Milan and the training (in Milan as well) after the sale.

Other screenshots further confirm Hacking Team’s efforts in forbidden markets. One shows the company dealing with a “Sudan Citizen Lab request,” suggesting its end user(s) are uncomfortable with the investigative activities CL is performing.

ACLU technologist Chris Soghoian has taken a look at the files and uncovered even more incriminating information, including Hacking Team’s stonewalling of a UN investigation into its sales in Sudan. This investigation is the direct result of Citizen Lab’s investigative work. According to the files viewed by Soghoian, Hacking Team has denied any “current sales relationship” with Sudan, at least in terms of selling the sort of weaponized software forbidden by multiple treaties and UN resolutions. It claimed the software isn’t weaponized tech. The UN disagreed.

Your letter 1029 of 13 March 2015 also stated that the company did not consider the Remote Control Software to be a weapon, and therefore fell outside the parameters of the sanctions regime. The view of the Panel is that as such software is ideally suited to support military electronic intelligence (ELINT) operations it may potentially fall under the category of “military… equipment” or “assistance” related to prohibited items…

There’s still plenty more to be uncovered in the document dump. Soghoian has already uncovered a spreadsheet listing every government customer, along with revenue to date.

Whatever happens from here on out should prove very interesting. Hacking Team is in for the longest Monday ever.

Filed Under: citizen lab, governments, hacking team, hacking tools, sudan, un
Companies: hacking team

US Tech Sanctions In Sudan Are Empowering The Regime, Tamping Down Opposition

from the policy-in-reverse dept

We’ve already talked somewhat about how the United States’ sanction policy, with regard to a couple regimes whom we designate as bad actors, can be best described as having the opposite of the intended effect. While we can have a separate argument over whether or not American should be using sanctions at all as a method for shaping global politics, any discussion about the current use of sanctions should be based around their merits or lack there of. That groundwork laid, when we move beyond the more general analysis of our technology sanctions against several regimes and the impact on online educational systems like Coursera, and dive a bit more into the specific impacts of tech sanctions on a single nation, the failure of our policy is laid bare.

Take Sudan, for instance, where President Omar al-Bashir’s NCP party is largely run by conservative Wahhabi Muslims, whereas the opposition parties in Darfur and elsewhere tend to be more liberal and of less-strict forms of Islam. Al-Bashir and the NCP have long been the target of human rights groups and the American government, leading to a sanctions policy against Sudan that’s as strict as could be imagined. The goal is to either get the government in Sudan to change, which is unlikely to happen as a result of the sanctions, or to get the Sudanese people to change their government entirely. Unfortunately, our sanctions policy appears to be having the opposite effect, empowering the government and creating barriers for any popular resistance.

Caught in the middle are U.S. sanctions. Initially designed to put pressure on the government, these technology restrictions have become outdated, and some of the provisions inadvertently aid the regime by blocking access to critical personal communications tools—to the detriment of the Sudanese people. Companies like Yahoo and Samsung, unsure whether they can legally make their products available and afraid of the risk, often err on the side of overcompliance when blocking their products in Sudan and other sanctioned countries.

“The U.S. sanctions have empowered the government security agencies against the activists online, because there [are] few anonymity tools available for them, and many of them are not tech savvy. Not being able to update your software makes you an easy catch for the highly trained security officers,” Anwar Dafa-alla, a Sudanese activist and founder of Nafeer IT, told us in an email. And Helena Puig Larrauri, who works on peace-building initiatives in Sudan, writes, “The embargo has a particular effect on anyone trying to use technology for the social good.”

The lesson to learn is that censoring basic internet services as a method for sanctions does not achieve the goal of those sanctions and in fact puts us squarely in line with the dictatorial regimes we attempt to alter, who of course are also censoring the internet amongst their own populations. Beyond that, whatever your opinion might be on sanctions in general, preventing methods of communication and dialogue within other countries, and indeed between our countries, is about as perfect a negation of the democratic method as I can imagine. Meanwhile, the trodden upon are kept uninformed, unarmed, and unable to unify, all due in part to our sanctions, while the government that oppresses them goes about their business as usual.

Now, it should be noted that the United States hasn’t been ignoring this problem entirely. Our government has done sanctions reform before, most notably in the 1990’s, where the aim was reducing the unintended negative consequences of sanctions. Also, in 2010, the Treasury Department announced relaxed restrictions on certain forms of internet services. But, as seems to have happened too many times in the past, efforts to be clear on what’s allowed and what isn’t in nations like Iran haven’t been duplicated for Sudan.

The U.S. government has updated policies toward Iran several times since 2010. The most recent, General License D, authorized U.S. companies to export software, services, and hardware for personal communications purposes. But there haven’t been changes to the treatment of personal communications tools in the Sudanese sanctions. Sudanese civil society groups launched a campaign last week calling for the United States to change its policies.

And so al-Bashir’s regime continues on, despised as a matter of American policy, but also empowered by it.

Filed Under: sanctions, sudan, united states

United States Sanctions On Exporting Open Online Learning Courses Are Completely Backwards

from the aiding-the-enemy dept

Between Syria, Cuba, Iran and Sudan, Americans bothering to pay attention to the world around them are becoming increasingly familiar with how we sanction other countries and the intricacies of those sanctions. The intersection of sanctions and technology tend to revolve around the export of hardware, software, and services to nations with regimes we don’t particularly care for. All of these sanctions are typically designed to achieve one or both of the following goals: altering the behavior of the regime in question and/or encouraging the people of that nation to rise up against the regime by making everyone completely miserable.

With that in mind, we can now conclusively say that at least some of the tech sanctions levied against some countries are completely useless and should be done away with, namely those that intermittently punish the people of Syria, Iran, Cuba and Sudan, preventing their people from accessing open education platforms.

Coursera, which according to its site aims “to change the world by educating millions of people by offering classes from top universities and professors online for free,” is now subjected to a recent directive from the US federal government that has forced some MOOC (Massive Online Open Course) providers to block access for users in sanctioned countries such as Iran and Cuba. Coursera explains the change in its student support center:

“The interpretation of export control regulations as they related to MOOCs was unclear for a period of time, and Coursera had been operating under one interpretation of the law. Recently, Coursera received a clear answer indicating that certain aspects of the Coursera MOOC experience are considered ‘services’ (and all services are highly restricted by export controls). While many students from these countries were previously able to access Coursera, this change means that we will no longer be able to provide students in sanctioned countries with access to Coursera moving forward.”

While updates to this post suggest that connectivity to Syrians has been reestablished, that isn’t so with regard to countries like Iran, Cuba or Sudan. Examine for a moment the practical application of this kind of sanctioning. The US has identified a regime we do not like, which will almost by definition be relatively well-educated, affluent, and powerful. That regime oppresses its people. To combat this, part of our sanctions policy is designed to prevent the oppressed people from accessing educational services that would offer a ladder towards the educational standards enjoyed by the offending regime. Knowledge is power, of course, and the ability to learn about the world outside of the pens in which these countries have placed their own people is a tool that could be used to encourage change in these countries. Don’t take that from me, take it from the governments in those nations which are quite busy censoring the internet out of fear of their people becoming more educated. And now the US is essentially joining the censoring party, too.

In September 2011, the Electronic Frontier Foundation called on the US to lift all restrictions “that deny citizens access to vital communications tools.” But the US has continued its piecemeal approach, going back and forth between blocking new ranges of transactions to allowing the export of certain services.

“These sorts of export restrictions are overbroad and contain elements which have no effect on the Syrian regime, while preventing Syrian citizens from accessing a wealth of tools that are available to their activist counterparts in neighboring countries and around the world,” EFF stated.

Likewise in Iran, Cuba, and Sudan. A common complaint one sometimes gets from peace activists is that sanctions should be lifted because they don’t hurt the regime, only the innocent civilians. That complaint is usually moot, because often times the entire point is to hurt the citizens to breed unrest building towards revolution. But in this case, the harm is repressing the capacity for change, and therefore serves no purpose. Even beyond the humanist concept of exporting information and education as a simple matter of human rights, these sanctions can only have the opposite effect of their intention.

Fortunately, Coursera appears to have a genuine interest in spreading education and, as they did with the Syrian issue, appear to want to work with the US government to get around these outdated sanctions.

Coursera ended the announcement of the changes that prevent access to their courses in sanctioned countries with the following note: “We value our global community of users and sincerely regret the need to take this action. Please know that Coursera is currently working very closely with the U.S. Department of State and Office of Foreign Asset Control to secure the necessary permissions to reinstate site access for users in sanctioned countries.”

If the US government has any interest in their sanctioning policies beyond using them as some kind of penis-measuring contest, they’ll act quickly to give Coursera the ability to export education to the nations of oppressed people, otherwise known as the places where it is most sorely needed.

Filed Under: cuba, iran, moocs, online learning, sanctions, sudan, syria, us
Companies: coursera

DailyDirt: Get Your Own Satellite

from the urls-we-dig-up dept

Private space technology is becoming ever more affordable. Not too long ago, only large governments were able to send stuff into space. Now, large companies can do it, and even some wealthy individuals can control their own satellite (or their own part of one). Here are just a few (more) interesting projects that suggest satellites will be ever more accessible to regular folks (and not just for satellite TV or internet access).

If you’d like to read more awesome and interesting stuff, check out this unrelated (but not entirely random!) Techdirt post via StumbleUpon.

Filed Under: arkyd, caltech, esa, galex, george clooney, inexpensive space projects, micro-satellite, nasa, satellite, satellite sentinel project, science, space, sudan
Companies: esa, kickstarter, nasa, planetary resources

Syria & Sudan Hoping That Greater Social Network Use Will Keep Regimes In Power

from the interesting-reaction dept

With the protests leading to political change in Tunisia and Egypt getting so much attention (including for the role played by social media as a part of that), there have been questions about what country is “next.” So it’s interesting to see that the governments in both Syria and Sudan appear to think that social media tools may work more in their favor than against them. Wired reports that Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, an indicted war criminal, has announced that he wants to extend computer and internet usage among the youth, in the belief that young, connected people will “combat opposition” to the regime, rather than enhance it.

Meanwhile over in Syria, the government has lifted (widely ignored) bans on Facebook, YouTube and Twitter as part of an attempt to create a “new era” in the Middle East.

Whether or not either of these strategies will work for the regimes in charge remains to be seen — but it’s yet another reminder that technology does not inherently favor any particular party, but can be put to use for very different purposes by different groups.

Filed Under: internet, social networks, sudan, syria

US Eases Sanctions On Communications Software For Cuba, Iran And Sudan

from the communication-is-good dept

Realizing that better communications tools would probably help spread important ideas and efforts against totalitarian regimes, the US has finally eased sanctions against providing communications software in Cuba, Iran and Sudan. In the past, economic sanctions against those countries were supposed to create pressure for the regimes to change — but in practice that’s been a pretty big failure. Now, it appears, folks in the administration are finally realizing that more open communication allows for much greater efforts and organization, as well as more information from elsewhere. This is a good move — just many years too late.

Filed Under: communications, cuba, iran, sanctions, software, sudan