MoD and armed forces shakeup – in detail (original) (raw)

Lord Levene's 84-page report starts with a letter from him to the defence secretary, Liam Fox, in which he sets out, with lavish understatement, one of the great problems that has bedevilled the Ministry of Defence: the tension between its civilian and military sides.

"When they combine well together they are able to achieve some pretty remarkable and successful results. However, what we used to call 'creative tension' can sometimes lead to internal disputes with the two groups appearing to be at odds with each other."

In his executive summary, he then explains that he has made 53 recommendations, and highlights eight core changes. They include:

Creating a new joint forces command structure

Creating a new and smaller defence board, to be chaired by the defence secretary, with the heads of the three services no longer members

Clarification of the responsibilities of senior leaders, including commanders and civil servants, to strengthen individual accountablility

Making the MoD head office in Whitehall smaller, more focused and more strategic

Focusing the service chiefs on running their own services, with greater freedom to manage, but also making them more accountable for mistakes.

Stopping the carousel of appointments in the MoD every two years by making sure people stay in post for longer.

Behind these rather prosaic and bureaucratic sounding reforms lies a wholesale revamp of a department whose spending has occasionally seemed completely out of control over the last decade, and whose three armed services – the army, the Royal Navy and the RAF – have behaved like squabbling siblings. It is that culture that Levene says must be addressed, which is why the creating of a new joint forces command structure is so important.

"Our changes will be unwelcome to some," he says in his introduction to the report. "But change is needed."

Before coming to his solutions, Levene sets out 30 key problems in defence, and they are pretty comprehensive.

Among them are "an inability to take tough, timely decisions in the defence interest; the political pain of taking such decisions; the 'conspiracy of optimism' between industry, the military, officials and ministers; and a lack of clarity over who is responsible for and accountable for taking decisions."

Most damningly of all, Levene says that "finance and the need for affordability are not regarded as sufficiently important throughout the organisation."

He says that the "lack of trust" which pervades the MoD has led to a tendency for those at the top to try to micromanage, while the individual services look out for themselves rather than thinking of defence as a whole.

This has led to a "predisposition to overcomplicate ... and a culture of reinventing the wheel".

Top-level decision-making

Levene says that the new defence board "should be the primary decision-making body for non-operational matters", and should meet 10 times a year.

It will have nine members, but only one will be from the military, the chief of the defence staff, currently General Sir David Richards.

The board will be responsible for setting the broad direction of travel for defence, leaving the day-to-day operational side of things to the individual service chiefs, who will be removed from the committee.

Levene says that the department must stop the "current culture of consensual, committee-based decision-making" because it means that "no single individual can be reasonably held to account for a decision."

He also argues for a review of the "number and responsibilities" of MoD ministers because there is "often a lack of clarity over which minister is taking the lead on particular issues".

The role of the chief of the defence staff should also be enhanced so that "he alone will be responsible for representing the military voice."

The armed services

Levene says that the three service chiefs should remain responsible "for the overall leadership and custodianship of their service" but that their direct role in departmental strategy should be reduced.

This means that "the service chiefs will no longer need a four-star commander-in-chief" to have alongside them. Levene says that because service chiefs will be less involved in strategy, there is also no need for them to be based at the MoD headquarters in Whitehall. Instead, they should relocate to their individual service headquarters.

They will be represented at the MoD by more junior officers. Levene says the service chiefs may still be able to lobby the prime minister directly, as has been the case since the 1980s, but he underlines the need for them to adhere to the chain of command – recognition that they must work to the chief of the defence staff as a priority.

Managing the budget

Levene hopes that by making individual service chiefs ultimately responsible for their budgets should ensure that costs do not overrun.

He says that some "projects have been accepted into the department's equipment and financial plan without consideration of their requirement, affordability and sequencing." That, he says, has to stop.

"We are quite clear that that, unlike in the department today, budget holders must be held to account. If their performance does not meet requirements they should be removed from their post ... we are in no doubt that mechanisms should be put in place to allow this to happen."

Joint forces command

This is one of Levene's core recommendations: that a new JFC should be created and headed by a "military four-star" – the second highest rank possible – who reports directly to the chief of the defence staff.

Levene says that the independence of the three services has made joined-up thinking more difficult, saying that the "operational glue" between them, in areas such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and command systems are not as coherent or effective as they could be. He states that in the modern world, the need for synergy is greater, and that the JFC should be given considerable powers.

He concedes that the three services should retain capabilities that are "core" but says that "the future character of conflict will increase yet further the demand for integrated capability and joint enablers."

He adds: "We believe that the creation of a joint forces command is a necessary and significant step in ensuring that the MoD responds to the increasingly joined-up nature of the operating environment."

People

Levene says it is time for the MoD to "reduce the size of the senior cadre of defence and management below it". He does not say by how much, or by when.

He says that the days of senior personnel being in post for a short period must end – recommending that a four-year to five-year posting is appropriate, rather than a two-year one.

And staff should be more rigorously appraised.

"The department should manage senior individuals' performance robustly and must be willing to replace those whose performance falls short," he says.

He calls for better career management under a "joint assured model" that rewards the most able, whichever service they come from.