Geraint Scales | UWTSD - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Geraint Scales
There are generally two schools of thought on how punishment can be justified; one is retributivi... more There are generally two schools of thought on how punishment can be justified; one is retributivist and justified in desert, and the other is utilitarian and justified by its consequences. Scepticism surrounding the efficacy of rehabilitative and deterrent forms of punishment, whether specific or general 1 , "…left, apparently, only two possible rational aims to pursue in the practice of punishment under law: Social defense through incarceration, and retributivism." 2 The primary difference between the two is that retributive punishments are issued based on the severity of the wrongdoing with no regard for any social good, whereas a utilitarian approach is grounded in the consideration of possible outcomes; this automatically considers the social good in weighing-up an appropriate punishment as it endeavours to bring about the greatest increase in overall happiness. I will outline the basis on which retributive and consequentialist theories justify punishment, criticise them for what I consider to be their shortcomings, and suggest a conflation of the two ideas with reference to H.L.A. Hart's compromise, as I do not see reasonable grounds to favour one school wholly over the other. Rather than acknowledging and accepting the dissonance of their juxtaposition, my view is that they are ultimately two halves of a whole, and only by drawing from both retributivist and utilitarian theories can we properly justify punishment.
A belief can be acquired by our experience of the world, and according to Hume's circularly epist... more A belief can be acquired by our experience of the world, and according to Hume's circularly epistemic position, this experience is how we gain knowledge of the world. As an atheist, his radical empirical investigation of the world was preceded by particular beliefs that did not conform with those of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Unfortunately, his attempt to denounce a belief in miracles directly contravenes his own epistemology and, following a brief outline of the fundamental positions on which it rests, I will illustrate how believing in miracles is conducive to scientific investigation-particularly in researching Quantum Physics. I will simplify Hume's definition of a miracle and remove the religious connotations based on his evidential claim that testimonies of religious experience differ between various faiths. The rationality in question indicates that the individual holding a belief in miracles may actually be far less dogmatic than would a strict empiricist; even Hume's own epistemology rests only on habitual belief with no logical recourse. There is therefore no reason, according to empiricism, to disbelieve an account of a miracle. Impressions are acquired from the world around us and dissolve the requirement for former philosophical divides, such as Locke's, between an object's primary and secondary qualities. Hume rather assumes that all qualities of an object contribute to the impression it gives us which is, in essence, the totality of our gathered sense-data. The immediacy and vivacity of our impressions far outweighs the lack of clarity and force held in our ideas; our ideas are mere copies of impressions1. Our ideas are less lively and less colourful sensations than our impressions-"the most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation" 2-and so for Hume there is a logical uncertainty in affirming anything about the external world by the power of reason alone. The only clear ideas (or relations of ideas) that we can properly endorse are those whose truths do not require experiential validity; Hume thereby warrants logical and mathematical approaches but holds that they have no existential implication-they simply properly relate to our experiences and are self-verifying. The truths of mathematics are known by the definitions of the terms used and so are analytic, or truths a priori. These, for Hume, constitute the only relations of ideas worthy of our attention.
Spinoza's idea of Freedom represents something that will require clarification. In his work, the ... more Spinoza's idea of Freedom represents something that will require clarification. In his work, the terms Freedom and Activity are distinct, and I will treat them as separate ideas for the purpose of this essay, and in my conclusion show how they are virtually synonymous; Freedom is a necessary effect of Activity, coupled with rational thinking. He did not believe that human beings had the capacity to live a totally free existence; Nature is all that there is and we are an integrated part of a system of necessary cause and effect. It is God alone that has absolute Freedom. Humans are only capable of Human Freedom, which is a degree of absolute freedom. This negates the idea of Free Will insomuch as Spinoza thought the limits of our choices were already constrained by pre-determined factors. Nevertheless, Spinoza sought Freedom beyond decision making, as it is paradoxical to identify ourselves with something that isn't bound by these laws (given that we identify ourselves with Nature). I will demonstrate how Spinoza treats Freedom as the ultimate virtue of human behaviour, and is the key to happiness. I will conclude with his ideas resulting in a Freedom from the Human Condition, and that this is itself a tripartite notion constituting Freedom from Illusion, Freedom from Choice, and Freedom from a Fear of God.
Why Did McTaggart Think That Change is Only Possible in the A Series?, 2018
believes that change is only possible in time's A-Series due to the distinctions he makes between... more believes that change is only possible in time's A-Series due to the distinctions he makes between the A and B series', coupled with the fact that he believes explaining change through time is a necessary element of explaining time itself: "It would, I suppose, be universally admitted that time involves change…there could be no time if nothing changed" 1 . The distinction he makes between the A and B series' is really just a distinction in the way we talk about time; the A-Series represents tensed statements, such as 'John is drinking now' or 'I will submit my paper'. They seem to acknowledge a fluidity and flexibility to time in the way that we describe events and their temporal relations -that flexibility is in how representative of the truth they are. It is not always true that John is drinking now, and it is not always true that I will submit my paper. The truth of these statements is apparently dependant on a subjective perspective of time, and the relation of that subjective perspective to time when such a statement is made. McTaggart paraphrases Russell's objection to the A-Series in saying: "…past, present, and future do not belong to time per se, but only in relation to a knowing subject" 2 . Nonetheless, McTaggart holds that the A-Series accounts for change, even by the temporal characteristics that are true of an event: "It was once an event in the far future. It became every moment an event in the nearer future. At last it was present. Then it became past, and will always remain past, though every moment it becomes further and further past" 3 . Thus, we have the flexible or dynamic quality of change inherent in the A-Series, which for McTaggart is in the temporal characteristics of the events themselves, but for Russell is in the relation of those statements to the truth depending on a subjective position within time. McTaggart's argument only strengthens when he describes an event as being a collection of simultaneous contents at a single position in time. He then acknowledges that the contents of a single position are constructed from a plurality of events themselves. If we are able to group together events and call them 'other events', i.e. events A, B, and C form the entire event D, and events W, X, and Y form the entire event Z, then we can argue that time is an event in and of itself, constructed from groups of smaller events. If time is an event constructed from smaller events, it would too need to be treated as having the qualities of past, present, and future, and not just containing other events of which this would be true. Does this then mean that the entirety of time as a single event would also be required to exist with dynamic past, present, and future characteristics? If so, and the 'present-ness' of our time does become a past event, and was once in the future, what then would we then hold as a relational viewpoint from which to judge these temporal characteristics? It would have to be from a temporal dimension that is not the one that we are currently experiencing, and therefore beg the question as to how many layers or dimensions of temporal measurability there are, yet this argument would lead to an infinite regress of time (as a single event) existing within a higher-order of time, and for that to exist within another higher-order of time, and so forth. McTaggart's theory regarding the Unreality of Time could then have been founded on this basis alone it seems. The A-Series seems to be the more problematic of the two, as it is posited as being necessary to explain change yet is an identification riddled with contradiction as outlined above, and as McTaggart states: "the
A review of: Robinson, W. (2006). Knowing Epiphenomena. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(1-2), 85-100, 2019
Here I attack Robinson's argument against objections to epiphenomenalism in order to show that he... more Here I attack Robinson's argument against objections to epiphenomenalism in order to show that he presents a confused argument that stands to strengthen his opponent's argument more than his own.
Does the Existence of Evil Provide Compelling Evidence to Support the Claim that God Does Not Exist?, 2019
I consider the problem of Evil, and show that once a belief in God is established, the existence ... more I consider the problem of Evil, and show that once a belief in God is established, the existence of evil (albeit necessary) is certainly not enough to dispel the theist's investment.
Commonality Between Heraclitus and Parmenides, 2018
I describe the ways in which Parmenides' metaphysical monism and Heraclitus' doctrine of flux, am... more I describe the ways in which Parmenides' metaphysical monism and Heraclitus' doctrine of flux, among his other ideas, are compatible with each other, more so the they may initially appear. this is more apparent still when it seems as though their thoughts and ideas are echoed in the findings of contemporary quantum physicists. These ancient Greek philosophers may have just grappled with polar opposite ends of a very complicated spectrum, that today makes up the description of our reality at a fundamental level.
Are Nonhuman Beings Deserving of Justice?, 2018
Here I consider the application of Rawls's conception of a system of justice and combine it with ... more Here I consider the application of Rawls's conception of a system of justice and combine it with Singer's views regarding non-human beings' entitlement to such a system. I conclude with an adaptation of the Rawlsian concept, which shows that according to my unique conception of justice, non-human beings can without doubt be privy to such a beneficial system, and their biological status, in fact, demands it.
There are generally two schools of thought on how punishment can be justified; one is retributivi... more There are generally two schools of thought on how punishment can be justified; one is retributivist and justified in desert, and the other is utilitarian and justified by its consequences. Scepticism surrounding the efficacy of rehabilitative and deterrent forms of punishment, whether specific or general 1 , "…left, apparently, only two possible rational aims to pursue in the practice of punishment under law: Social defense through incarceration, and retributivism." 2 The primary difference between the two is that retributive punishments are issued based on the severity of the wrongdoing with no regard for any social good, whereas a utilitarian approach is grounded in the consideration of possible outcomes; this automatically considers the social good in weighing-up an appropriate punishment as it endeavours to bring about the greatest increase in overall happiness. I will outline the basis on which retributive and consequentialist theories justify punishment, criticise them for what I consider to be their shortcomings, and suggest a conflation of the two ideas with reference to H.L.A. Hart's compromise, as I do not see reasonable grounds to favour one school wholly over the other. Rather than acknowledging and accepting the dissonance of their juxtaposition, my view is that they are ultimately two halves of a whole, and only by drawing from both retributivist and utilitarian theories can we properly justify punishment.
A belief can be acquired by our experience of the world, and according to Hume's circularly epist... more A belief can be acquired by our experience of the world, and according to Hume's circularly epistemic position, this experience is how we gain knowledge of the world. As an atheist, his radical empirical investigation of the world was preceded by particular beliefs that did not conform with those of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Unfortunately, his attempt to denounce a belief in miracles directly contravenes his own epistemology and, following a brief outline of the fundamental positions on which it rests, I will illustrate how believing in miracles is conducive to scientific investigation-particularly in researching Quantum Physics. I will simplify Hume's definition of a miracle and remove the religious connotations based on his evidential claim that testimonies of religious experience differ between various faiths. The rationality in question indicates that the individual holding a belief in miracles may actually be far less dogmatic than would a strict empiricist; even Hume's own epistemology rests only on habitual belief with no logical recourse. There is therefore no reason, according to empiricism, to disbelieve an account of a miracle. Impressions are acquired from the world around us and dissolve the requirement for former philosophical divides, such as Locke's, between an object's primary and secondary qualities. Hume rather assumes that all qualities of an object contribute to the impression it gives us which is, in essence, the totality of our gathered sense-data. The immediacy and vivacity of our impressions far outweighs the lack of clarity and force held in our ideas; our ideas are mere copies of impressions1. Our ideas are less lively and less colourful sensations than our impressions-"the most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation" 2-and so for Hume there is a logical uncertainty in affirming anything about the external world by the power of reason alone. The only clear ideas (or relations of ideas) that we can properly endorse are those whose truths do not require experiential validity; Hume thereby warrants logical and mathematical approaches but holds that they have no existential implication-they simply properly relate to our experiences and are self-verifying. The truths of mathematics are known by the definitions of the terms used and so are analytic, or truths a priori. These, for Hume, constitute the only relations of ideas worthy of our attention.
Spinoza's idea of Freedom represents something that will require clarification. In his work, the ... more Spinoza's idea of Freedom represents something that will require clarification. In his work, the terms Freedom and Activity are distinct, and I will treat them as separate ideas for the purpose of this essay, and in my conclusion show how they are virtually synonymous; Freedom is a necessary effect of Activity, coupled with rational thinking. He did not believe that human beings had the capacity to live a totally free existence; Nature is all that there is and we are an integrated part of a system of necessary cause and effect. It is God alone that has absolute Freedom. Humans are only capable of Human Freedom, which is a degree of absolute freedom. This negates the idea of Free Will insomuch as Spinoza thought the limits of our choices were already constrained by pre-determined factors. Nevertheless, Spinoza sought Freedom beyond decision making, as it is paradoxical to identify ourselves with something that isn't bound by these laws (given that we identify ourselves with Nature). I will demonstrate how Spinoza treats Freedom as the ultimate virtue of human behaviour, and is the key to happiness. I will conclude with his ideas resulting in a Freedom from the Human Condition, and that this is itself a tripartite notion constituting Freedom from Illusion, Freedom from Choice, and Freedom from a Fear of God.
Why Did McTaggart Think That Change is Only Possible in the A Series?, 2018
believes that change is only possible in time's A-Series due to the distinctions he makes between... more believes that change is only possible in time's A-Series due to the distinctions he makes between the A and B series', coupled with the fact that he believes explaining change through time is a necessary element of explaining time itself: "It would, I suppose, be universally admitted that time involves change…there could be no time if nothing changed" 1 . The distinction he makes between the A and B series' is really just a distinction in the way we talk about time; the A-Series represents tensed statements, such as 'John is drinking now' or 'I will submit my paper'. They seem to acknowledge a fluidity and flexibility to time in the way that we describe events and their temporal relations -that flexibility is in how representative of the truth they are. It is not always true that John is drinking now, and it is not always true that I will submit my paper. The truth of these statements is apparently dependant on a subjective perspective of time, and the relation of that subjective perspective to time when such a statement is made. McTaggart paraphrases Russell's objection to the A-Series in saying: "…past, present, and future do not belong to time per se, but only in relation to a knowing subject" 2 . Nonetheless, McTaggart holds that the A-Series accounts for change, even by the temporal characteristics that are true of an event: "It was once an event in the far future. It became every moment an event in the nearer future. At last it was present. Then it became past, and will always remain past, though every moment it becomes further and further past" 3 . Thus, we have the flexible or dynamic quality of change inherent in the A-Series, which for McTaggart is in the temporal characteristics of the events themselves, but for Russell is in the relation of those statements to the truth depending on a subjective position within time. McTaggart's argument only strengthens when he describes an event as being a collection of simultaneous contents at a single position in time. He then acknowledges that the contents of a single position are constructed from a plurality of events themselves. If we are able to group together events and call them 'other events', i.e. events A, B, and C form the entire event D, and events W, X, and Y form the entire event Z, then we can argue that time is an event in and of itself, constructed from groups of smaller events. If time is an event constructed from smaller events, it would too need to be treated as having the qualities of past, present, and future, and not just containing other events of which this would be true. Does this then mean that the entirety of time as a single event would also be required to exist with dynamic past, present, and future characteristics? If so, and the 'present-ness' of our time does become a past event, and was once in the future, what then would we then hold as a relational viewpoint from which to judge these temporal characteristics? It would have to be from a temporal dimension that is not the one that we are currently experiencing, and therefore beg the question as to how many layers or dimensions of temporal measurability there are, yet this argument would lead to an infinite regress of time (as a single event) existing within a higher-order of time, and for that to exist within another higher-order of time, and so forth. McTaggart's theory regarding the Unreality of Time could then have been founded on this basis alone it seems. The A-Series seems to be the more problematic of the two, as it is posited as being necessary to explain change yet is an identification riddled with contradiction as outlined above, and as McTaggart states: "the
A review of: Robinson, W. (2006). Knowing Epiphenomena. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(1-2), 85-100, 2019
Here I attack Robinson's argument against objections to epiphenomenalism in order to show that he... more Here I attack Robinson's argument against objections to epiphenomenalism in order to show that he presents a confused argument that stands to strengthen his opponent's argument more than his own.
Does the Existence of Evil Provide Compelling Evidence to Support the Claim that God Does Not Exist?, 2019
I consider the problem of Evil, and show that once a belief in God is established, the existence ... more I consider the problem of Evil, and show that once a belief in God is established, the existence of evil (albeit necessary) is certainly not enough to dispel the theist's investment.
Commonality Between Heraclitus and Parmenides, 2018
I describe the ways in which Parmenides' metaphysical monism and Heraclitus' doctrine of flux, am... more I describe the ways in which Parmenides' metaphysical monism and Heraclitus' doctrine of flux, among his other ideas, are compatible with each other, more so the they may initially appear. this is more apparent still when it seems as though their thoughts and ideas are echoed in the findings of contemporary quantum physicists. These ancient Greek philosophers may have just grappled with polar opposite ends of a very complicated spectrum, that today makes up the description of our reality at a fundamental level.
Are Nonhuman Beings Deserving of Justice?, 2018
Here I consider the application of Rawls's conception of a system of justice and combine it with ... more Here I consider the application of Rawls's conception of a system of justice and combine it with Singer's views regarding non-human beings' entitlement to such a system. I conclude with an adaptation of the Rawlsian concept, which shows that according to my unique conception of justice, non-human beings can without doubt be privy to such a beneficial system, and their biological status, in fact, demands it.