Natalja Deng | Yonsei University (original) (raw)

Papers by Natalja Deng

Metaphysica, 2023

Craig Callender's What Makes Time Special? (OUP 2017) advocates and practices an innovative, thor... more Craig Callender's What Makes Time Special? (OUP 2017) advocates and practices an innovative, thoroughly interdisciplinary approach to philosophical questions about time and temporal features of our lives. Grappling with it is of intrinsic philosophical interest; it is also part of responding to the methodological invitation the book issues to philosophers of time. This paper is motivated by the wish to clarify WMTS's philosophical underpinnings. The main claim of the paper is that WMTS relies on an ambiguity between rejecting the A-theory versus B-theory debate, and endorsing a position within that debate. This ambiguity leads to a somewhat unstable position on how a key feature of manifest time, namely our sense of time as flowing, arises from physical time. The paper ends with a suggestion for how to resolve the ambiguity, in a way that is in line with the gist of Callender's overall vision for the field.

The Monist, 2023

This paper is about the relation between naturalistically motivated and other critiques of ground... more This paper is about the relation between naturalistically motivated and other critiques of grounding on the one hand, and similar critiques of the contrast between A- and B-theoretic views of time on the other hand. I start by considering the non-unity objection to grounding and corresponding objections to the A/B contrast, arguing that even the combined dialectical upshot of these in the case of time would not be quite what it is in the case of grounding. I then sympathetically discuss the objection that grounding, especially as a primitive notion, is not intelligible and part of ‘esoteric’ metaphysics; this objection turns out to be just as serious in the case of the A/B contrast. The question then arises whether grounding may be needed to draw the A/B contrast in the first place, so that the esotericism of the latter is simply due the esotericism of the former. I answer this question in the negative. Finally, I comment on the costs of esotericism in both cases and indicate directions in which philosophy of time might profitably look for responses to the challenge.

Disputatio, 2021

Fabrice Correia’s and Sven Rosenkranz’s book Nothing to come: a defence of the growing block theo... more Fabrice Correia’s and Sven Rosenkranz’s book Nothing to come: a defence of the growing block theory of time offers an incredibly rich and skillful defense of the growing block theory (GBT), a view of time that arguably has much intuitive appeal, and which has been under attack from many sides. Nonetheless, I have to report that the book’s tense-logical course of treatment has not worked for me; I still struggle with making sense of the GBT. This article begins by drawing out some implications of the book’s set up. First, the notion of existence in play here is not interpretable on the basis of ordinary usage. Second, it would be a mistake to take the tense-logical framework to have any metaphysical significance. I then articulate two main worries about their version of the GBT. The first worry takes a familiar shape: it is just hard to see how their view is dynamic in the relevant sense. The second worry is that the topic seems to have been changed. C&R’s logical system helps itself to key notions whose intended interpretation includes a solution to every metaphysical puzzle about the GBT, so that these puzzles are not so much addressed as enshrined in a formal system. That is, their view seems to answer the question of how language should behave, if the GBT were (somehow) true.

Manuscrito, 2016

This article is a response to 'Fear of death and the symmetry argument', in this issue. In that a... more This article is a response to 'Fear of death and the symmetry argument', in this issue. In that article, the author discusses the above Lucretian symmetry argument, and proposes a view that justifies the existing asymmetry in our attitudes towards birth and death. I begin by distinguishing this symmetry argument from a different one, also loosely inspired by Lucretius, which also plays a role in the article. I then describe what I take to be the author's solution to the original symmetry argument (i.e. the one above) and explain why I am unpersuaded by it. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Studies in Christian Ethics

I respond to Jeffrey Bishop's article 'Arts of Dying and the Statecraft of Killing', in this issu... more I respond to Jeffrey Bishop's article 'Arts of Dying and the Statecraft of Killing', in this issue, and in particular to his remarks in support of the claim that assisted death should not be legalised.

International Studies in Philosophy of Science

This book is unusual in its breadth. It's a collection of original essays by metaphysicians, phil... more This book is unusual in its breadth. It's a collection of original essays by metaphysicians, philosophers of mind, and philosophers of religion, loosely grouped into three parts: 'Metaphysics and time', 'Consciousness and time', and 'God, time, and human freedom'.

Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience

This chapter discusses some aspects of the relation between temporal experience and the A versus ... more This chapter discusses some aspects of the relation between temporal experience and the A versus B debate. To begin with, I provide an overview of the A versus B debate and, following Baron et al. (2015), distinguish between two B-theoretic responses to the A-theoretic argument from experience, veridicalism and illusionism. I then argue for veridicalism over illusionism, by examining our (putative) experiences as of presentness and as of time passing. I close with some remarks on the relation between veridicalism and a deflationary view of the A versus B debate. I suggest that the deflationary view can provide further support for veridicalism.

Journal of Analytic Theology

Does time seem to us to pass, even though it doesn’t, really? Many philosophers think the answer ... more Does time seem to us to pass, even though it doesn’t, really? Many philosophers think the answer is ‘Yes’ – at least when ‘time’s (really) passing’ is understood in a particular way. They take time’s passing to be a process by which each time in turn acquires a special status, such as the status of being the only time that exists, or being the only time that is present (where that means more than just being simultaneous with oneself). This chapter suggests that on the contrary, all we perceive is temporal succession, one thing after another, a notion to which modern physics is not inhospitable. The contents of perception are best described in terms of ‘before’ and ‘after’, rather than ‘past’, ‘present, and ‘future’.

In his recent book 'Experiencing time' (OUP), Simon Prosser discusses a wide variety of topics re... more In his recent book 'Experiencing time' (OUP), Simon Prosser discusses a wide variety of topics relating to temporal experience, in a way that is accessible both to those steeped in the philosophy of mind, and to those more familiar with the philosophy of time. He forcefully argues for the conclusion that the B-theorist of time can account for the temporal appearances. In this article, I offer a chapter by chapter response.

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2019

This is a review of David Ingram's 'Thisness Presentism: An Essay on Time, Truth, and Ontology'.

(forthcoming in Quine, Structure, and Ontology, Oxford University Press, ed. by Frederique Jansse... more (forthcoming in Quine, Structure, and Ontology, Oxford University Press, ed. by Frederique Janssen-Lauret) This chapter explores some of the relations between Quine's and Carnap's metaontological stances on the one hand, and contemporary work in the metaphysics of time, on the other. Contemporary metaphysics of time, like analytic metaphysics in general, grew out of the revival of the discipline that Quine's critique of the logical empiricists (such as Carnap) made possible. At the same time, the metaphysics of time has, in some respects, strayed far from its Quinean roots. This chapter examines some likely Quinean and Carnapian reactions to elements of the contemporary scene.

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

This article relates the philosophical discussion on naturalistic religious practice to Tim Crane... more This article relates the philosophical discussion on naturalistic religious practice to Tim Crane’s 'The Meaning of Belief: Religion from an Atheist’s Point of View', in which he claims that atheists can derive no genuine solace from religion. I argue that Crane’s claim is a little too strong. There is a sense in which atheists can derive solace from religion and that fact is worth acknowledging (whether or not this counts as ‘genuine’ solace).

Philosophical Studies, 2015

We offer a new answer to the paradox of tragedy. We explain part of the appeal of tragic art in t... more We offer a new answer to the paradox of tragedy. We explain part of the appeal of tragic art in terms of its acknowledgement of sad aspects of life and offer a tentative explanation of why acknowledgement is a source of pleasure.

Frontiers in Psychology, 2023

This is an invited commentary on "Physical Time within Human Time" (Gruber, Block, & Montemayor, ... more This is an invited commentary on "Physical Time within Human Time" (Gruber, Block, & Montemayor, 2022) and "Bridging the Neuroscience and Physics of Time" (Buonomano & Rovelli, 2021). I’m very sympathetic to aspects of each proposal. In this article, I offer some comments, starting with (Buonomano & Rovelli, 2021).

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018

Metaphysics is the part of philosophy that asks questions about the nature of reality – about wha... more Metaphysics is the part of philosophy that asks questions about the nature of reality – about what there is, and what it is like. The metaphysics of time is the part of the philosophy of time that asks questions about the nature of temporal reality. One central such question is that of whether time passes or flows, or whether it has a dynamic aspect.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018

This entry provides an overview of some key positions on God and time and discusses arguments for... more This entry provides an overview of some key positions on God and time and discusses arguments for and against divine timelessness. The final section outlines some other philosophical contexts in which the concept of eternity can play a role.

Philosophia

In this paper, I try to make sense of the growing block view using Kit Fine's threefold classific... more In this paper, I try to make sense of the growing block view using Kit Fine's threefold classification of A-theoretic views of time. I begin by motivating the endeavor of making sense of the growing block view by examining John Earman's project in 'Reassessing the prospects for a growing block model of the universe' (section 1). Next, I review Fine's reconstruction of McTaggart's argument and its accompanying threefold classification of A-theoretic views (section 2). I then consider three interpretations of Earman's growing block model: the hybrid growing block (section 3), the purely tensed growing block (section 4), and Michael Tooley's growing block (section 5). I argue for three claims. First, Finean 'standard' versions of these views are less congenial to the growing blocker than 'non-standard' ones. Second, the hybrid view is problematic on either version. And third, 'non-standard' versions are not fully intelligible. I provide further support for the first and third of these claims and explain why I take them to support a minimal account of passage as succession, which undercuts some of the motivation for Earman's project (section 6). Lastly, I answer three objections (section 7).

Philosophical Studies

Temporal ontology is the part of ontology involving the rival positions of presentism, eternalism... more Temporal ontology is the part of ontology involving the rival positions of presentism, eternalism, and the growing block theory. While this much is clear, it's surprisingly difficult to elucidate the substance of the disagreement between presentists and eternalists (to focus on the most widespread positions). Certain events happened that are not happening now; what is it to disagree about whether these events exist (simpliciter, or else tenselessly)? In spite of widespread suspicion concerning the status and methods of analytic metaphysics, skeptics' doubts about this debate have not generally been heeded, neither by metaphysicians, nor by philosophers of physics. This paper revisits the question in the light of prominent elucidation attempts from both camps (by Ted Sider, Christian Wüthrich, and Tom Stoneham). The upshot is that skeptics were right to be puzzled. The paper then explores a possible re-interpretation of positions in temporal ontology that links it to normative views about how we should live as temporal beings.