Rebecca Ring | York University (original) (raw)

Papers by Rebecca Ring

Mark Rowlands argues some non-human animals can be moral subjects that can act for moral reasons,... more Mark Rowlands argues some non-human animals can be moral subjects that can act for moral reasons, but cannot be moral agents because they lack sufficient understanding for responsibility. I argue Rowlands' mere moral subjects are responding to, not acting for, moral reasons. Action for moral reasons is necessarily normative and the actor must be able to track the moral reason. I argue Rowlands' conflation of moral agency and moral autonomy results in falsely denying responsibility to animals. Moral autonomy is an ideal to which some humans can aim. Responsibility is not contingent on this ability, but on the cognitive and volitional capacities of the individual and her normative social practices. Some animals can be moral agents in virtue of their normative social practices that involve harm to others and sharing resources. Moral agency and responsibility can be ascribed to some animals in terms of their intentional agency within such practices. I am most grateful for all the support, patience, encouragement and invaluable advice of my supervisor, Dr. Kristin Andrews, and my second reader, Dr. Robert Myers. I am also grateful for the equally invaluable input of Dr. Alice MacLachlan and Dr. Joni Sasaki, and for the inspiring and thought provoking discussion of my thesis topic with fellow students, especially Imola Ilyes, Michelle Ciurria, Josh Mugg and Èric Arnau. And I could not have done any of this without the loving support of my partner, Rich Lee, and my parents, Bob and Carol Ring. I would be remiss if I did not express my undying gratitude for the wonderful non-human beings in my life, past and present, who have given me so much love, joy and food for thought. Wondering what goes on in those furry heads is how it all starts. The list could go on, as many others have supported, helped and inspired me along the way, so to all of you, thank you.

The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology, 2018

Mark Rowlands argues some non-human animals can be moral subjects that can act for moral reasons,... more Mark Rowlands argues some non-human animals can be moral subjects that can act for moral reasons, but cannot be moral agents because they lack sufficient understanding for responsibility. I argue Rowlands' mere moral subjects are responding to, not acting for, moral reasons. Action for moral reasons is necessarily normative and the actor must be able to track the moral reason. I argue Rowlands' conflation of moral agency and moral autonomy results in falsely denying responsibility to animals. Moral autonomy is an ideal to which some humans can aim. Responsibility is not contingent on this ability, but on the cognitive and volitional capacities of the individual and her normative social practices. Some animals can be moral agents in virtue of their normative social practices that involve harm to others and sharing resources. Moral agency and responsibility can be ascribed to some animals in terms of their intentional agency within such practices. I am most grateful for all the support, patience, encouragement and invaluable advice of my supervisor, Dr. Kristin Andrews, and my second reader, Dr. Robert Myers. I am also grateful for the equally invaluable input of Dr. Alice MacLachlan and Dr. Joni Sasaki, and for the inspiring and thought provoking discussion of my thesis topic with fellow students, especially Imola Ilyes, Michelle Ciurria, Josh Mugg and Èric Arnau. And I could not have done any of this without the loving support of my partner, Rich Lee, and my parents, Bob and Carol Ring. I would be remiss if I did not express my undying gratitude for the wonderful non-human beings in my life, past and present, who have given me so much love, joy and food for thought. Wondering what goes on in those furry heads is how it all starts. The list could go on, as many others have supported, helped and inspired me along the way, so to all of you, thank you.

The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology, 2018