[Python-Dev] Hash collision security issue (now public) (original) (raw)
Terry Reedy tjreedy at udel.edu
Sun Jan 1 19:46:51 CET 2012
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On 1/1/2012 12:28 PM, Christian Heimes wrote:
Am 01.01.2012 17:54, schrieb Antoine Pitrou:
I don't understand. FNV-1 multiplies the current running result with a prime and then xors it with the following byte. This is also what we do. (I'm assuming 1000003 is prime) There must be a major difference somewhere inside the algorithm. The talk at the CCC conference in Berlin mentions that Ruby 1.9 is not vulnerable to meet-in-the-middle attacks and Ruby 1.9 uses FNV. The C code of FNV is more complex than our code, too.
I understood Alexander Klink and Julian Wälde, hashDoS at alech.de, as saying that they consider that using a random non-zero start value is sufficient to make the hash non-vulnerable.
-- Terry Jan Reedy
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