R vs. Sheffield Hallam Uni. 1994 (original) (raw)
Queen's Bench Division
R vs. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF SHEFFIELD HALLAM UNIVERSITY AND OTHERS EX PARTE R
[1995] ELR 267
HEARING DATE 25 May 1994
Expulsion from university - Trainee teacher on university training course expelled after hearing by committee of academic board - Expulsion procedures - Requirement of adequate prior warning - Ostensible bias of chairman of academic board committee - Adequacy of notice - Appeal to board of governors - Challenge on procedural grounds - Exercise of discretion to grant relief - Necessity of order of mandamus in addition to order of certiorari
HEADNOTE
R was a second-year student on a physical education teacher training course at Sheffield Hallam University. Her first year had been a troubled and unhappy one in her relations with other students. These problems continued into the second year and included R having to give evidence at a disciplinary proceeding against fellow-students. R was suspended along with others in the course of an investigation into drug-taking. R alleged that as a result of agreeing to be a witness at the hearing she was bullied and intimidated, and on one occasion was physically assaulted by a friend of one of the students involved. After the hearing, the university decided not to pursue any further investigation against R. However, R's suspension remained in force on a separate basis. This related to R's behaviour and her relationships with other students and members of staff.
According to the university's evidence, this included grossly misleading staff in relation to her mother's health, a threatened suicide attempt and aberrant behaviour. At the disciplinary hearing relating to the drug-taking, R's behaviour showed evidence of stress and upset. She had difficulty placing events in any logical or chronological order and exhibited fear of her alleged intimidators. Further to the hearing she was advised by the director of student guidance to see the university medical and counselling services. An initial contact was made but not sustained. The general practitioner referred R for clinical assessment but she failed to keep that appointment. The university was not seeking a diagnosis nor did it wish to know about treatment. Its aim was to obtain confirmation of ability to proceed with the course. At a subsequent interview, regarding her ability to continue with the course, she confirmed that her mother had died. She was then readmitted to the taught element of the course with the issue of future practice activity to be determined on the basis of her development during the summer term of 1993.
In May 1993 the university came to the view that R's mother was alive and that the student had been wholly untruthful. R contested much of the university's account of events. Under the university's 'Procedure for the Expulsion of Students for Academic Reasons', there was included the ground 'failure to adhere to the professional standards specified for training purposes'. A hearing was convened before a committee of the academic board. Under the university's procedures, 'Documented evidence of adequate prior warning and advice to students who might be in danger of being recommended for expulsion will always be required...' At the hearing the assistant principal, who presented the case, referred to a number of detailed reports from senior staff and course tutors which were then produced. The solicitor attending as R's friend sought a short adjournment in order to discuss with R the late production of this evidence.
The solicitor informed the committee that there were a number of issues which R did not accept and of which they sought clarification. The authors of the reports were identified and a number of clarifications given. R's friend commented that it would have been preferable for the documentation to have been provided for the meeting. The difficulty of receiving information and responding to it in the course of the meeting was emphasised. It was minuted that the procedures did not explicitly state that there should be an exchange of documentation prior to the meeting, and that equally there was no obligation on the student to provide written reports to the committee in advance. After the hearing, the committee of the academic board agreed to expel R from the course on the ground that she had failed to adhere to the professional standards specified for training purposes, and the university would not consider her for entry to any course until satisfactory psychiatric reports had been received. R was informed of her right to appeal to the board of governors on procedural grounds only. She exercised that right of appeal. The governing body decided that a reasonable procedure was followed with regard to the notice and advice given to R, and to the extent of the disclosure of information in advance of the meeting of the academic board committee. The advance disclosure of information had been adequate bearing in mind the student's requirement for confidentiality, the principal's duty to maintain professional standards, and the inability of the principal to obtain the medical assessment which in his judgment would have assisted him in the exercise of his duty, as R had refused to submit herself for assessment.
R argued that: (1) there was no documented evidence of adequate prior warning to the applicant, notwithstanding that she was in danger of being recommended for expulsion, so the chair of the academic board had no power under the procedure for expulsion to cause a committee of the academic board to be convened to consider expulsion; (2) the chairman of the meeting of the committee of the academic board, although he did not vote, had access to relevant and potentially prejudicial information and thereby vitiated the decision of the committee; (3) she was, in the course of the hearing, denied fair treatment by the production of a number of documents spelling out in considerable detail the factual matters alleged against her, giving her insufficient opportunity to deal with them. R sought an order of certiorari to quash the decisions taken by the officers or bodies of the university.
In relation to the exercise of discretion by the court, the university argued that the court should refuse relief because on the evidence the only conclusion possible was that R was fundamentally unable to adhere to the professional standards required of a teacher and also that the court should not act in vain by requiring a repeat hearing, of which only one outcome was ultimately possible.
Held
Granting the applications:
(1) The challenge on the ground of failure to hear what R had to say before initiating the further suspension would be rejected because it was not possible to see any way in which the fact of suspension, pending what followed, may have operated to R's detriment in the minds of those taking the material decisions.
(2) Adequate prior warning: the warning did not have to be in writing. So long as it had been given, all that was required was documented evidence of it. The phrase 'warning and advice' could not be construed disjunctively. However, it may very well be in one case that the same admonition will amount to both warning and advice, so that the two do not have to be separately administered. 'Adequate' does not mean no more than appropriate. The two words are not cognate and could not be treated as if one meant the other. What is adequate depends on the circumstances of the particular case. On the evidence, the university could not legitimately form the view at the relevant times that whatever the applicant's problem might be, no warning of its possible consequences could be of any use. Indeed, the very pressure upon R to see a psychiatrist and, it was hoped, to obtain an opinion that would enable her to continue, demonstrated a fair-minded recognition that R's condition might either be in remission or be treatable.
R was entitled to a clear statement not only of what she ought to do but, linked with it, of the possible consequences of her not doing it. The various letters from the university did not contain any such warning. The university argued that R nowhere deposed that she would have acted in any way different had she been warned. However, it was for a party seeking to escape the ordinary consequence of a breach of proper procedure to demonstrate that nothing has been lost by the breach. On the evidence, the university could not do that. R's reasons for not seeing the psychiatrist might or might not have prevailed had she had a clear warning of what would happen if she did not do so. Therefore, the failure of the university to comply with the requirements of adequate prior warning vitiated its decision to expel R.
(3) The ostensible bias of the chairman of the academic board committee: following the decision of the House of Lords in R v Gough (Robert), the test was whether there appeared to have been a real danger of bias in him. Only if it were so would the risk arise of infection of the other members of the committee. The court was satisfied that the content of the material which the chairman had seen was not capable of generating any hostility towards R. If anything, the reverse.
(4) Adequacy of notice: a student who stood at risk of expulsion should have adequate notice of the substance of what was to be alleged against her, and nothing in the procedures inhibited the university in this regard. The relevant letters from the university were both laconic in the extreme. It was only at the hearing that R learned the full ambit and substance of what was being alleged against her. The court was prepared to accept that a situation may arise where the decision-making body itself, at least where the individual is unrepresented, may have a duty of fairness which requires it of its own motion to offer an adjournment. However, this was not such a case. It was clear that R's friend had watched R's interests and presented her case conscientiously and with thoroughness, and in the exercise of her professional judgment had not considered it necessary to seek a further adjournment when the, undoubtedly, substantial further documents were produced. Despite misgivings, this ground of challenge was rejected.
(5) The governing body's decision: with regard to the notice and advice given to R and to the extent of disclosure of information in advance of the meeting of the academic board committee, an adequate warning had not been given (see point (2) above). None of the three grounds given for holding that the advance disclosure of information had been adequate had any bearing whatever on the elementary requirement that a person facing a domestic disciplinary tribunal on a charge capable of putting an end to her chosen career should have sufficient advance notice of the matter to be relied on against her to be able to respond adequately to it. In relation to confidentiality, disclosure would only have been to R herself and her representative. The maintenance of professional standards and the want of a medical assessment were precisely the issues of substance. They did not bear on the question of how the proceedings ought fairly to have been conducted. If the proceedings of the academic board had been in order, the decision of the governing body on appeal would have been struck down on the grounds that the panel asked itself the wrong question in one respect, and in the other respect addressed irrelevant issues in coming to its conclusion.
(6) Discretion: it would be a denial of justice to decline to grant R the relief which was otherwise her due on the basis of the court's appraisal of her chances.
CASES REFERRED TO
Glynn v Keele University [1971] 1 WLR 487, [1971] 2 All ER 89
James v Waltham Holy Cross UDC [1973] ICR 398, NIRC
Littlewoods Organisation v Egenti [1976] ICR 516, EAT
R v Gough (Robert) [1993] AC 646, [1993] 2 WLR 883, [1993] 2 All ER 724, CA
R v Thames Magistrates' Court ex parte Polemis [1974] 1 WLR 1371, [1974] 2 All ER 1219, DC
Winterhalter Gastronom v Webb [1973] ICR 245, NIRC
COUNSEL:
Manjit Gill for the applicant
David Bean for the respondent
PANEL: Sedley J
JUDGMENT BY SEDLEY J:
Pursuant to leave granted on 19 January 1994 by Auld J, who also ordered expedition, Mr Manjit Gill now moves for certiorari to quash three decisions taken by officers or bodies of Sheffield Hallam University, the outcome of which has been the expulsion of the applicant from the physical education teachers' training course on which she was at the material time a second-year student. It is not necessary or appropriate for the purposes of this judgment to embark in detail upon the applicant's history at the university. Some of it will emerge in the course of my findings, but it is sufficient for the present to record that her first year (the academic year 1991/92) had been a troubled and unhappy one in her relations with other students. On the academic side, however, which included teaching practice, it had evidently been a successful year. The problems of the first year spilled over into the second, when the applicant found herself giving evidence at a disciplinary proceeding against fellow students one of whom, she said, had persuaded her to try LSD on one occasion, with the result that she had thereafter been harassed. In the early part of 1993 she had the distressing experience of giving evidence against her fellow-students at a disciplinary hearing, following which they suffered minor penalties which did not interrupt their education, while the applicant's behaviour led to inquiries which ultimately culminated in her expulsion. I am not concerned in this case, however, with these differential outcomes, but solely with what happened to the applicant.
On 9 February 1993, the applicant was suspended together with others in the course of the investigation into drug-taking. On 10 March 1993 she gave evidence against the others in circumstances described by her in her affidavit as follows:
'On 9 February 1993, during the second year of my course, I was suspended following allegations regarding drugs. There is now produced and shown to me marked "DR1" a copy of a letter from J. P. Toomey, Director of Student Guidance dated 9 February 1993 advising me of this suspension and a copy of a further letter of 18 February 1993. Mr Toomey subsequently advised me that if I was prepared to give evidence against the others involved at a disciplinary hearing and obtain some counselling, no proceedings would be taken against me and I would be allowed back on the course. As a result, I visited the university GP, Dr Robertson, who seemed satisfied with my health and did not advise any further treatment. I also attended two counselling sessions at the university counselling service but was advised on the second session that there was no need to continue. I duly attended the hearing on 10 March 1993. Of the three other students involved, one was reprimanded and formally readmitted to the course, the second reinstated after a month's suspension and the third cleared.
As a result of agreeing to be a witness at the hearing, I was bullied and intimidated and was on one occasion physically assaulted by a friend of one of the students involved. I reported these matters to the university.
On 11 March 1993 I received two letters. One from the principal and one from the university secretary. They are now produced and shown to me marked "DR2". The letter from the principal advised me that a formal investigation had been lodged regarding my allegations of intimidation and harassment. The letter from the university secretary, Sally Neocosmos, advised that it had been decided not to pursue any further investigation against me on the drugs issue but that my suspension remained in force "with respect to your present capacity to engage in a course of professional study".'
Mr Gill takes as his first point the failure to hear what the applicant had to say before initiating this further suspension. For the university, Mr Bean submits that suspension is not in the class of decision which calls for any form of prior hearing: it is a routine precautionary measure which prejudges nothing. Mr Gill says that it was capable of having adversely influenced the view of those who later had to sit in judgment on the applicant, and it ought therefore not to have been arbitrarily undertaken. I am not persuaded that Mr Bean's proposition of law is necessarily right, but on the evidence in this case I cannot see any way in which the fact of suspension, pending what followed, may have operated to the applicant's detriment in the minds of those taking the material decisions. I therefore put this ground of challenge on one side.
The university's Director of Student Guidance, Mr J. P. Toomey, next arranged an appointment with the university doctor, Dr Robertson, on 16 March 1993. The applicant had already seen Dr Robertson on an earlier occasion, recounted in the passage which I have read from her affidavit. Of this later appointment the applicant deposes:
'When I visited the doctor, he had information about the disciplinary hearing and written notes to which he referred to and I understood that he had discussed the case with Mr Toomey. He implied that unless I saw a psychiatrist I would not be able to return to the course and made me an appointment. I was extremely concerned that the confidentiality of the disciplinary hearing appeared to have been breached and did not wish to have psychiatric help in these circumstances. I had already been to see Dr Robertson before the hearing and had been advised by him that I did not need any further treatment. I therefore declined to keep the appointment with the psychiatrist.'
The university secretary, Sally Neocosmos, wrote to the applicant on 29 March 1993:
'I was sorry to learn from Mr Toomey that on two occasions you have failed to present yourself at appointments with a psychiatrist which have been made for you by Dr Robertson. As you know we are keen for you to take advantage of this medical referral with a view to the specialist issuing a statement to confirm that there is no clinical reason why you should not pursue your course, or a particular part of it.
For your information, I enclose a copy of Professor Willcocks' note, recorded after your meeting on 23 March 1993.
Please contact me if you have any further queries.'
The applicant went to solicitors, Messrs Watson, Esam & Co, who on 2 April 1993 wrote a full letter on her behalf complaining of the circumstances of her suspension and the alleged breach of confidentiality involved in the discussion of her case by Mr Toomey with Dr Robertson. The principal of the university, Mr Stoddart, wrote back on 7 April 1993:
'Thank you for your letter of 2 April 1993. I welcome this opportunity to clarify the matter of Sheffield Hallam University's dealings with Ms [R].
The present position is that stated to Ms [R] during her meeting of 23 March 1993 with Professor Willcocks. The university is concerned that she has been adversely affected by recent experiences and that this may have affected her ability to function effectively with respect to the social and educational demands of her course. We advised her - initially through our Director of Student Guidance, Mr Toomey, and subsequently through the assistant principal, Professor Willcocks - that she should seek professional clinical advice. Moreover, we asked for reassurance from an authorised clinician that there was no reason why she should not be readmitted to the course.
In this respect we are carrying out our pastoral responsibilities for student welfare - offering support and guidance to a student whom we believe to be in need. I reject utterly the charge that the university's treatment of Ms [R] represents a breach of disciplinary procedures and of the code of conduct; also, that this treatment is unreasonable and against the laws of natural justice. The matter of the original suspension has been clarified by Professor Willcocks to Ms [R].'
The reference in the last sentence which I have quoted is to a meeting which had taken place on 23 March 1993 between the applicant, with the students' union welfare officer to assist her, Professor Diane Willcocks and Mr Toomey. According to the note of the meeting (of which the applicant had earlier been sent a copy) Professor Willcocks:
'put the case that as a caring and responsible institution we had a duty to take an interest in the health and welfare of students. Our judgement is based on (a) reports from staff about her disturbed behaviour; (b) evidence of confusion at the hearing; and (c) the GP's decision that she would benefit from further clinical assessment. We have taken the view that in her present health state she could be vulnerable if she returned to the taught elements of her course or to teaching practice where the pressures might exacerbate any behavioural difficulties.
...
The nature of the medical referral was clarified. It was stated that SHU requires a statement from the specialist that there is no clinical reason why she should not pursue her course (or a particular part of the course). It is not our business to inquire about any conditions that may be diagnosed nor any treatment that might be recommended or given (even if ongoing) provided we have a statement as indicated above.'
It is now necessary to relate in more detail the case, as it was eventually to emerge, concerning the applicant's fitness to continue to train to be a teacher. I take the account from the summary in para 4.1 of the minutes of the eventual meeting of a committee of the academic board, recording the history given by Professor Willcocks of events from February 1992 to the date of the hearing, 28 June 1993.
'(iii) During this period the student saw a number of tutors on an individual basis in relation to her personal circumstances who each concurred with her wish that the matter be treated in strict confidence. Some six tutors plus one of the university chaplains were involved in responding to the issue raised by Ms [R] concerning her mother's health. At different times between February 1992 and April 1993 Mrs [R] was reported to be seriously ill; having an operation that day; getting better; dead; then (to different tutors) seriously ill again. The different tutors describe intense and frequent interactions with the student; as a result of severe concern, home telephone numbers were made available and contacts late at night are recorded. There were discussions of suicide; Ms [R] was referred to a staff member with experience in grief counselling who described aberrant behaviour in terms of body language, withdrawal of eye contact, mood changes commensurate with extreme grief reaction. On 24 June 1992 an actual threatened suicide attempt led to a GP call by a staff member at midnight.
Tutors dealt with the student in a pastoral role, displaying a sympathetic and understanding manner and on several occasions advised the student to contact or return home. This she refused to do saying that she did not want home to be contacted. She talked about a deteriorating relationship with her father who she said blamed her for her mother's death. She also spoke of an Aunt [J] moving into the family home. She said to tutors she felt guilty about not attending the funeral. Tutors also advised the student to seek medical/professional counselling help. She was unwilling to do so. Three separate memos were circulated to staff around the issue of supporting Ms [R] in her personal difficulties and the possible impact on her work. In May 1993 it was concluded that since February 1992 the student had grossly misled staff in relation to her mother's health.
(iv) In February 1993 the student was temporarily suspended from the course in relation to alleged drug-taking offences. The student, who was a key witness at the subsequent disciplinary committee hearing held on 10 March 1993, admitted to taking drugs induced by other students and gave evidence of intimidation and harassment by those students supplying the drugs. As a consequence of these allegations the principal established a formal internal inquiry, chaired by a member of SMG, with clear terms of reference and an undertaking that the outcome of the investigation would be made known. Nineteen students and nine members of staff were interviewed. However, the claims of intimidation and harassment were not substantiated - only hearsay evidence and the evidence of the student was available - and it was therefore concluded that it would not be helpful to proceed further with the investigation.
(v) At the disciplinary hearing Ms [R]'s behaviour showed evidence of stress and upset. She had difficulty placing events that she described in any logical or chronological order and she exhibited fear of her alleged intimidators. Further to the hearing she was advised by the director of student guidance to see the university medical and counselling services. The initial contact made with counselling was not sustained. The GP referred Ms [R] for clinical assessment - the cost to be borne by the university to obtain an urgent appointment. She failed to keep this appointment.
Subsequently, in March 1993 Professor Willcocks and the director of student guidance met with the student to clarify the purpose of the clinical assessment. A record of the meeting shows that the university was not seeking a diagnosis nor did it wish to know about treatment. The aim was to obtain confirmation of ability to proceed with the course - the student refused. At this stage, it was clarified that suspension on disciplinary grounds had terminated; the outstanding issue was Ms [R]'s state of health.
(vi) At the beginning of the summer term 1993, when her suspension in respect of the disciplinary case was no longer in force, the student was again interviewed regarding her ability to continue with the course. On 26 April 1993 the student confirmed to Mrs Rees that her mother had died. She was readmitted to the taught element of the course with the issue of future practice activity to be determined on the basis of her development during the summer term. In May 1993 the university came to a view that Mrs [R] was alive and that the student had been wholly untruthful.
(vii) In May 1993 it was concluded that the student had grossly misled staff regarding her personal circumstances with the consequence that staff goodwill had been seriously affected. It was decided that the matter of her mother's alleged death should be confronted.'
It is right to say at once that much of this account is contested by the applicant. For the present, however, its significance is that it was the view of events upon which the university proceeded, and it is not suggested on the applicant's behalf that it was a baseless view. In consequence of it, the university's head of teacher training, Angela Rees, in a confidential memorandum to Professor Willcocks dated 11 May 1993, said:
'It is our view that [R] should not be allowed to proceed at this stage to an award which offers qualified teacher status. We recommend that she is required to withdraw from the 4-year BEd Hons secondary course as soon as possible and only be offered the opportunity to rejoin the course at such time as we have a medical statement that assures us of her fitness to continue with a professional training.
This recommendation is based on the following. In the light of your statement yesterday that [R]'s mother is alive it is clear that [R] has consistently misled a large number of people for nearly a year. This has led to gross misuse and abuse of staff time and energy. It has resulted in a disruption of the year group which continues to cause unwarranted distress and ill-feeling. We cannot risk an extension of such behaviour into a school situation. We feel it is essential to act well before the end of this semester in order to restore normality within the second-year PE cohort.
In our view it is important that a senior member of the university, preferably the principal, confronts [R] with the issues outlined above. Clearly [R] needs yet again to be offered whatever support is deemed appropriate.'
Professor Willcocks replied to Ms Rees on 28 May 1993:
'I have now had the opportunity to discuss the issues you raise with the principal and with the university secretary. It is our view that action should be taken to exclude [R] from the university unless she is able to demonstrate that your concerns are ill-founded.'
The university's 'Procedure for the Expulsion of Students for Academic Reasons' at the material time included the following provisions:
'2. Directors of school, in consultation with course leaders/ programme co-ordinators, may recommend to the chair of the academic board that a student should be expelled from the university on the following academic grounds:
(a) an unsatisfactory standard of work;
(b) failure to meet specified levels of attendance;
(c) failure to submit work and meet course deadlines;
(d) failure to fulfil a specified contract of studentship in a course;
(e) failure to adhere to the professional standards specified for training purposes.
These grounds must relate to clear and persistent breach of the requirements specified in definitive course documents, course study guides or the general regulations of the university, external validating bodies and grant-awarding authorities. Documented evidence of adequate prior warning and advice to students who might be in danger of being recommended for expulsion will always be required and any extenuating circumstances must have been taken into account.
3. If the chair of the academic board considers, after considering a fully documented case submitted by the Director of School, that there is a prima facie case for expulsion, he/she shall instruct the secretary of the academic board to convene a committee of the academic board or may require the board of examiners to meet if that is more appropriate to consider the case.'
On 7 June 1993 the applicant was handed a letter dated 29 May 1993 from the principal and vice-chancellor of the university, Mr Stoddart, which included the following:
'Notwithstanding your participation in the taught element of your BEd course over the past 4 weeks, I remain concerned about your preparedness for the responsibilities of engaging with professional teaching practice. My concerns are those expressed fully to you in the meeting with Professor Willcocks and Mr Toomey on 23 March 1993. You have a formal note about that meeting.
I have now received a formal complaint concerning your disruptive relationships with staff and with students which we believe may be the result of an underlying health and/or emotional difficulty. Anxieties about your health and well-being shall remain unresolved whilst you refuse to provide us with the evidence we have requested.
Given the responsibility I bear for the well-being of students, I have decided to raise these matters formally with your father and to seek his observations. Mrs Angela Rees will write to him requesting a meeting.
I understand that a school placement teaching practice has been created for you and that this can be mobilised if I am satisfied with the further inquiries carried out by Mrs Rees.
I will write to you again on this matter when I have received the additional information that I need to inform my decision. If I discover that you have been misleading staff and students in accordance with the allegations that I have received then I will have no option other than to deem you unfit to pursue your professional studies and to exclude you from the university.'
The 'formal complaint' was the confidential memorandum of 11 May 1993 to which I have referred. There is nothing to controvert the applicant's statement in her affidavit that this letter contained the first mention to her of the possibility of expulsion.
It is not disputed by Mr Gill that failure to adhere to the professional standards specified for training purposes is capable of including behaviour indicative of unfitness to become a teacher, nor that, unexplained, the applicant's behaviour might well be so construed. But he contends that what followed had three fatal flaws: there was no documented evidence of adequate prior warning to the applicant, notwithstanding that she was in danger of being recommended for expulsion, so that the chair of the academic board had no power under the rules to cause a committee of the academic board to be convened to consider expulsion; that Professor Brooks, who took the chair at the meeting of the committee of the academic board, though he did not vote, had access to relevant and potentially prejudicial information which thereby vitiated the eventual decision of the committee; and that the applicant was in the course of the hearing denied fair treatment by the production of a number of documents spelling out in considerable detail the factual matters alleged against her, giving her insufficient opportunity to deal with them.
These contentions arise in the following way. The first that the applicant knew of the actual proposal to expel her was when she received a letter dated 11 June 1993 from the principal and vice-chancellor, Mr Stoddart, in the following terms:
'In my letter to you of 29 May 1993 I informed you of my serious concerns about your fitness to continue as a student of this university, or to follow a course of teacher training. I have now received a further report from Professor Willcocks and from your tutors in the School of Education and this letter is to confirm my decision regarding your future here.
Given that my concerns have not been allayed by the further investigations and given the nature and depth of your disruptive behaviour, I must now inform you that acting in my capacity as chairman of the academic board under the regulations for expulsion of students for academic reasons (copy attached), I believe there exists a prima facie case for your expulsion from the university.
In my judgment you have failed to adhere to the professional standards specified for training purposes and you are therefore suspended from your course and the university with immediate effect pending a hearing of a committee of the academic board to consider my recommendation that you be expelled from the university. The teaching practice arranged for you later this term has been cancelled.
I have instructed the secretary to the academic board to convene a hearing by an academic board committee. This will take place on Tuesday, 15 June 1993 at 10 am in the Private Dining Room, Howard Suite, City Campus.
Notwithstanding your current suspension you may complete any further pieces of assessment scheduled for this term and if successful you will receive appropriate credit.
You have the right, accompanied if desired by a friend, to appear before the committee. Please inform Ms Sally Neocosmos, secretary to the academic board, if you intend to appear before the committee and if you will be accompanied, by whom.'
On 14 June 1993, and again in a letter dated 8 June 1993, but probably written on 18 June 1993, the applicant's solicitors asked for full details of the grounds on which it was alleged that the applicant had failed to adhere to the professional standards specified for training purposes. On 24 June 1993 the university secretary replied as follows:
'You requested further details of the grounds underlying this case. The grounds for the principal's recommendations that Ms [R] be expelled from her course and from the university are that her behaviour over a period of several months has been seriously erratic and disruptive such as to cause the principal to reach the judgment that she has failed to adhere to the professional standards specified for training purposes.
The full extent of [R]'s apparent behavioural difficulties came to the attention of the principal (having previously been noted by individual members of staff having regular contact with [R]) following a disciplinary hearing on 10 March 1993 into a series of disturbing experiences. After this she was advised to seek help from (a) the university counsellors and (b) the university-linked general practitioner. The GP referred her for clinical assessment by a psychiatrist but she failed to keep the appointments made for her. Following this because of persisting doubts as to her capacity at that time to pursue her studies [R] was required to withdraw from her course pending medical assessment with a view to confirmation that there was no clinical reason why she should not pursue her course (or a particular part of the course). The judgment which led to this requirement was based on (a) reports from staff of [R]'s disturbed behaviour; (b) evidence of confusion at the earlier disciplinary hearing; and (c) the GP's decision that she would benefit from further clinical assessment.
Since that time [R] has consistently refused to avail herself of the professional support and advice which in the principal's judgment he requires if he is to reconsider whether to allow [R] to continue her studies, and her disruptive behaviour has continued.'
It was with this much warning and this much particularly of charges that the applicant came before a committee of the academic board on 28 June 1993. The constitution and proceedings of the committee were laid down as follows in the 'Procedure for the Expulsion of Students for Academic Reasons':
'The committee shall consist of five members of the academic board, together with the secretary of the academic board. The deputy chair of the academic board shall chair the committee, and a Director of School plus three other members shall be chosen by the secretary of the academic board. The chair of the academic board shall not be eligible to serve on such a committee, nor shall any member who has participated in consideration of the case at an earlier age. The student shall have the right, accompanied if desired by a friend or representative, to appear before the committee.'
The evidence is that the presiding member, although not denied a vote by the regulation, did not customarily vote, and that Professor Brooks did not vote on this occasion.
I have set out earlier the substance of the case presented by Professor Willcocks. It is further minuted that:
'During her presentation Professor Willcocks referred to a number of detailed reports, with dates, from senior staff and course tutors (who were not referred to by name but as Tutor A etc) which catalogued a series of events which occurred in the period February 1992 to date.'
It is common ground that Professor Willcocks physically produced these reports. Ms Jordan, the solicitor attending as the applicant's friend, sought a short adjournment in order to discuss with the applicant this late production of evidential material. She made the point that the hearing which had originally been set for 15 June 1993 had been postponed in order to allow the student more time to prepare, but that there had been no indication that reference would be made to events going as far back as February 1992. The minutes then record:
'The committee agreed to the request.
(ii) On their return to the room Ms Jordan informed the committee that there were a number of issues which Ms [R] did not accept and for which they sought clarification.
(iii) The student had been unable to distinguish lecturers as these had not been referred to by name. With the committee's agreement Professor Willcocks identified the individual lecturers referred to in her presentation.
(iv) A number of points of clarification were raised and responded to by Professor Willcocks and Ms [R].
(v) The student's representative commented that it would have been preferable for documentation to have been provided in advance of the meeting. The difficulty of receiving information and responding to this in the course of the meeting was emphasised.
The chair responded that the procedures did not explicitly state that there should be an exchange of documentation prior to the meeting and that equally there was no obligation on the student to provide written reports to the committee in advance. It was confirmed that all statements made by Professor Willcocks could be substantiated with written reports.
(vi) In response to the chair Ms [R], with the exception of the specific points raised, accepted the case put forward by Professor Willcocks.'
The case put forward on behalf of the applicant, as minuted, deserves to be quoted in full:
'Presentation on behalf of Ms [R]
(i) The student accepted that she misled staff with regard to her mother's health and she confirmed that she
suffered from periods of depression in terms 1 and 2 of year 1;
contacted one particular lecturer on a number of occasions after Christmas seeking help for her depression;
received counselling from the university chaplain;
was extremely concerned that her father should not be contacted as she felt she should deal with the situation on her own and her relationship with him was not a good one;
admitted taking drugs.
(ii) In Ms [R]'s opinion the problems which had arisen during the past academic year were largely as a result of the disciplinary committee hearing, the lack of any counselling prior to this, the bullying and intimidation incidents and the university's failure to recognise her position. On several occasions recently she had considered the matter of her suspension from the course to be resolved.
(iii) Concern was expressed regarding an apparent breach of confidence whereby the university doctor appeared to have received information relating to the student's involvement in the disciplinary committee.
(iv) No clear written warnings had been received regarding her possible expulsion from the university and concern was expressed that she had received no prior warning that her father had been contacted.
(v) Accompanied by her parents she had seen the family GP who had commented that there was "no reason for concern".
(vi) Earlier letters from the principal had been worded in a "concerning tone". However, this had changed recently with the mention of disruptive behaviour. She felt that this related to her earlier allegations on bullying and harassment and that the university was "covering up".
(vii) Allegations that she was under stress and unable to cope with university life were unsubstantiated given that she sat all examinations during this period.'
Let me now turn to the difficult problem of the further matter known to Professor Brooks but to no other member of the committee. It had in fact been obliquely referred to by Professor Willcocks in the course of her presentation, and had been minuted as follows:
'A serious allegation had been made by the student in confidence, which she had requested not to be divulged, which might explain difficulties being experienced by her but which, in Professor Willcocks' view, did not justify her behaviour on the course or unwillingness to seek help. It was stressed that the gross deception was not a minor misdemeanour but a major disruption and evidence of serious behavioural difficulties.'
On the appeal to the board of governors, which lay on procedural grounds only, the following is minuted:
'31. Professor Brooks confirmed that he had had sight of the complete confidential file prior to the meeting and that he had been the only member of the committee to have such access. He confirmed that the file contained difficult and sensitive material which in his view had implications which extended beyond the expulsion from the BEd course. He recognised the sensitive nature of the material and also its critical importance to Ms [R]'s case. He concluded that oral presentation would be the best way to handle the meeting and an open process similar to that currently being pursued was agreed by all parties at the time.'
Although the immediate relevance of this material is to the question of potential bias in the chairman, it has a bearing, albeit less direct, upon the issue of the want of a warning, to which I shall return.
In the course of the hearing Mr Bean has taken further instructions and in consequence has put before me a short draft affidavit of Professor Brooks (which Mr Gill has helpfully accepted as having the status of sworn evidence) in which he says:
'3. The only significant information that I can recall having seen which was not made available to the applicant and her solicitor and the academic board committee at the hearing on 28 June 1993 was a memorandum of 14 June 1993 from Angela Rees with enclosures, a copy of which is now produced and shown to me marked "JSB 1". The matters which I referred to as "difficult and sensitive material" (para 31 of the note of the appeal hearing) were those raised in Mrs Rees' notes on the first page relating to Monday, 7 June 1993. They were not referred to by anyone at the hearing, nor in the deliberations of the academic board committee.'
It has not been necessary for the content of the memorandum to be read out in open court and I do not propose to quote from it now. It is sufficient to say that it records a painful discussion on 7 June 1993 when Angela Rees handed the applicant the letter of 29 May 1993 to which I have earlier referred. It involved the disclosure by the applicant of serious matters of a personal nature involving others, which if true might both have helped to explain her conduct and have afforded a basis for treatment.
The outcome of the hearing was a letter dated 29 June 1993, the material part of which read:
'The committee agreed:
(i) that you be expelled from the BEd(Hons) course on the grounds that you have failed to adhere to the professional standards specified for training purposes;
(ii) that your record will show that you were expelled on the grounds of being unsuitable to enter the teaching profession;
(iii) that the university would not consider you for entry to any Sheffield Hallam University course until satisfactory psychiatric reports have been received.'
The letter also gave the applicant notice of her right to appeal to the board of governors 'only on the grounds that proper procedures were not followed in consideration of this matter'. Her solicitors lodged an appeal on two grounds: that there had not been sufficient prior written warning, and that there had not been sufficient prior disclosure to enable the applicant to prepare her case. A panel of three members of the governing body met on 10 September 1993 and, after a very thorough hearing, recorded the following conclusion:
'The panel believes that a reasonable procedure was followed both with regard to the notice and advice given to Ms[R] and to the extent of disclosure of information in advance of the meeting of the academic board committee, the latter having regard to the following particular circumstances:
Ms [R]'s requirement for confidentiality;
the principal's duty to maintain professional standards;
the inability of the principal to obtain the medical assessment which in his judgment would have assisted him in exercising his duty,
Ms [R] having refused to submit herself for assessment.'
Adequate prior warning
It is clear, in my judgment, from the written 'Procedure for Expulsion of Students for Academic Reasons' that documented proof of 'adequate prior warning and advice' is a prerequisite certainly of any decision to expel and probably too of any prima facie case sent by the chair of the academic board for hearing. Mr Bean accepts - in my judgment correctly - that in its absence no expulsion can stand. In this situation two questions arise: what is the meaning of 'documented evidence of adequate prior warning and advice to students who might be in danger of being recommended for expulsion'; and was such warning documented as having been given in the present case? The warning does not have to be in writing: so long as it has been given, all that is required is 'documented evidence' of it.
Mr Bean's major contention is that a discrete warning is not necessary: the phrase 'warning and advice', he submits, should be construed disjunctively so as to mean 'warning or advice'. Such a mode of construction is familiar enough to lawyers grappling with statutes, but it would take a lot to persuade me that in a procedure drafted in commendably straightforward lay language the word 'and' was intended to mean 'or'. It may very well be in any one case that the same admonition will amount to both warning and advice, so that the two do not have to be separately administered; but the university's rule is in my view plain in requiring both.
Mr Bean then submits, rightly in my view, that what is 'adequate' depends on the circumstances of the particular case. But he deduces from this, wrongly in my view, that 'adequate' means no more than 'appropriate'. Again, there will in many cases be no practical difference between the two, but I do not accept that the words are cognate or that the university or this court may legitimately treat the one as if it meant the other.
On the foundation of his proffered construction, Mr Bean says that appropriate advice was given to the applicant - for example by Professor Willcocks at the meeting on 23 March 1993 in the minuted passage which I have earlier quoted, Mr Gill does not dispute that advice was given, and I do not doubt that, as advice, it was appropriate. But in my judgment this was not all that the rule required: it required 'adequate prior warning' to be given to a student at risk of expulsion.
Against the eventuality of my so finding, Mr Bean submits that what amounts to adequate warning is constrained by practical and commonsense considerations, so that the courts will not insist on a warning when it would have been futile to give one. From the field of employment law he cites James v Waltham Holy Cross UDC [1973] ICR 398 and Littlewoods Organisation v Egenti [1976] ICR 516. These cases and others (for example Winterhalter Gastronom v Webb [1973] ICR 245) relate to the reasonableness and fairness of a decision to dismiss an employee in the light of a code commending the use of warnings. It is not, I think, necessary to cite passages from them, because counsel agree that they show the relevance of giving a warning to be a function of the fairness and the utility of doing so.
Where the situation is such that no warning could reasonably make any difference, it will not be held unfair or unreasonable not to have given one. But, as Griffiths J said in Winterhalter Gastronom v Webb [1973] ICR 245 at p 249 in relation to apparent incompetence, many do not know that they are capable of jumping the five-barred gate until the bull is close behind them: in other words, warnings should not lightly be dispensed with, because it is surprising what effect they can produce. Nevertheless, Mr Bean says, where the failure to adhere to professional standards arises from deep-seated and apparently compulsive behaviour, arising either from psychiatric disturbance or from personality disorder, so that a warning is patently useless, then in such a case no warning is adequate warning. I do not dismiss this possibility, but I observe that the five academic grounds for expulsion are all of a kind which, in the ordinary way, would be likely to manifest themselves so as to make a warning feasible and fair before they had run on for too long to be remediable.
A case like the present, I do not doubt, could constitute an exception; but on the evidence I do not accept that the university could legitimately form the view in and before June 1993, or that I can now fairly find, that whatever the applicant's problem might be, no warning of its possible consequences could be of any use. Indeed the very pressure upon her to see a psychiatrist and (it was hoped) obtain an opinion that would enable her to continue demonstrates a fair-minded recognition that the applicant's condition might either be in remission or be treatable.
In this situation Mr Gill submits that a warning would have been realistic: not a warning that unless the applicant pulled herself together she might be expelled, but a warning that the consequence of her failing to see a psychiatrist so as to enable the university to be advised on her prognosis might be to leave the university with no option but to expel her on the ground that she was either mentally ill or disordered as a personality or (if it be a distinct condition) a deliberate liar, in none of which cases could she be fit to teach children. Even if a hopeful psychiatric opinion had been obtained, it is far from certain that it would have been sufficient to reassure the university that the applicant was capable of adhering to the professional standards required of a teacher; but she was in my judgment entitled to a clear statement not only of what she ought to do but, linked with it, of the possible consequences of her not doing it. The letter from the principal and vice-chancellor dated 29 May 1993, which was handed to the applicant on 7 June 1993, does not in my judgment contain any such warning. It rightly and fairly says:
'Anxieties about your health and well-being shall remain unresolved whilst you refuse to provide us with the evidence we have requested.'
But the final paragraph of the letter does no more than warn that Mr Stoddart 'will have no option other than to deem you unfit to pursue your professional studies and to exclude you from the university' if it should turn out that the applicant had been simply lying to staff and students. There is nothing else in the correspondence capable of amounting to an adequate warning, and no evidence of any oral warning of the kind required. The supportive and helpful advice given by Professor Willcocks was for understandable reasons not associated with any threatened consequences should the applicant not comply with the advice.
Mr Bean takes the point, lastly, that the applicant nowhere deposes that she would have acted in any different way had she been warned. Mr Gill accepts that there is no affirmative assertion from the applicant about this, but he points to her evidence in reply as to why she did not go, as she had been advised to do, to see a psychiatrist. I have already quoted para 7 of the applicant's initial affidavit. In para 5 of her affidavit in reply she adds this:
'With reference to the appointment with the psychiatrist, I did not keep the appointment partly as a result of what I felt was a breach of confidentiality between Mr Toomey and Dr Robertson (see para 7 of my first affidavit) but also, because I had been advised by the student union and the mother of a friend who was a teacher that I was not obliged to submit to psychiatric assessment and that it was in breach of my civil liberties.'
On principle it seems to me that if a party in breach of proper procedure is to escape the ordinary consequence by asserting that nothing has been lost by the breach, it is for that party to demonstrate it, and this I do not think Mr Bean can do on the evidence. The applicant's given reasons for not seeing a psychiatrist might or might not have prevailed had she had a clear warning of what could happen if she did not do so - a question not of civil liberty but of informed choice.
I hold, therefore, that the failure of the university to comply with the requirement of adequate prior warning vitiates its decision to expel the applicant.
The once-vexed question of the standard of ostensible bias (Mr Gill makes no suggestion of conscious bias) and the circumstances in which it will vitiate the decisions of various kinds of body has now been resolved in clear and unitary form by the decision of the House of Lords in R v Gough (Robert) [1993] AC 646. From the passage in Lord Goff's speech at p 670 one can today derive a straightforward test: whether in the view of the court upon the facts now known to it, there appears to have been a real danger of bias. Counsel have not been able to find any authority which touches the situation of a non-voting chairperson but Mr Bean points to the reasoning of Lord Goff about the situation of a justices' clerk (p 670G): the test here is whether on the facts, assuming him to be tainted with ostensible bias, there was a real possibility of 'infection' of the justices' decision by his participation in their deliberations. This, I accept, provides a useful analogy with the situation of the non-voting chairperson. But the analogy is inexact. A competent chairperson who has formed a view as to the right outcome will generally steer his or her colleagues unobtrusively towards that outcome without the need of either a deciding or a casting vote. Since the conclusion of argument I have looked at Shackleton on Law and Practice of Meetings (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th edn). It does not cite any decision on the point, but it is worth quoting from the introductory passage to chapter 10, 'The Chairman':
'As the representative of the meeting itself, chosen or appointed to preside over its deliberations, while he must be ready to guide it into decisions that will make for a successful termination of its deliberations, he must at the same time be careful to subordinate his own views to those of the meeting, both of the majority and the minority.'
Such a role places a competent chairperson in a rather different situation from what ought, at least, to be that of a justices' clerk. If, for example, the chairperson of a meeting were disqualified by pecuniary interest (the classic case of incontestable disqualification) one would expect the court to be ready to strike down a decision arrived at under his or her guidance whether or not he or she had a vote. The risk of 'infection' would be too strong.
I turn therefore to the question whether what was known privately to Professor Brooks was such as to create a real danger of bias in him; for only if it were so would the risk of infection arise. Without reciting any further than I have done the content of the material which he had seen, I am satisfied that it was not capable of generating any hostility in a reader towards the applicant; if anything, the reverse. In my view the evidence discloses no real danger of bias in Professor Brooks, making the question of 'infection' of the committee otiose.
Adequacy of notice
I have recounted what happened at the hearing. In my view it was unfortunate, and the more so because it was avoidable, that material of some complexity which was the basis of much that was asserted by Professor Willcocks and which could readily be made available, was not made available sufficiently long in advance for the applicant to be able to give instructions about it and respond to it without pressure or haste. It will be recalled that the chairperson is minuted as having:
'responded that the procedures did not explicitly state that there should be an exchange of documentation prior to the meeting and that equally there was no obligation on the student to provide written reports to the committee in advance.'
This was hardly the point. The point was that the student who stood at risk of expulsion should have had adequate notice of the substance of what was to be alleged against her, and that nothing in the procedures inhibited the university in this regard. The 'charge' in the letter of 11 June 1993 and the 'particulars' of it in the letter of 24 June 1993 were both laconic in the extreme. It was only at the hearing that the applicant learned the full ambit and substance of what was being alleged against her.
But, as Mr Bean points out, the applicant was competently represented by a solicitor who sought a short adjournment and, on return, sought clarification of certain points but did not seek any further time in which to deal with the matters raised. In her affidavit in reply the applicant now indicates a great many points of disagreement with the statements that had been produced; but the fact is that neither she nor her advocate either sought a substantial adjournment or continued only under protest.
Mr Gill relies in this connection upon the decision of a Divisional Court, R v Thames Magistrates' Court ex parte Polemis [1974] 1 WLR 1371, in which the court quashed the conviction of the skipper of a foreign vessel on a summons issued at 10.30 am on the day of conviction itself. The justices had refused an adjournment at 2.30 pm, and although when at 4 pm the case was transferred to a stipendiary no further application for an adjournment was made, the court held this to be a distinction without a difference. It is not clear from the decision whether the haste with which the proceedings were conducted was such that, even in the absence of an application for an adjournment, the court would have intervened; and I am prepared to accept that a situation may arise where the decision-making body itself, at least where the individual is unrepresented, may have a duty of fairness which requires it of its own motion to offer an adjournment in such circumstances. But this is not such a case. It is clear from the papers that Ms Jordan and her firm had watched the applicant's interests and presented her case conscientiously and with thoroughness, and the respondent is entitled to set store by the fact that Ms Jordan in the exercise of her professional judgment did not consider it necessary to seek a further adjournment when the undoubtedly substantial further documents were produced.
Although I do so with the misgivings which I have expressed, I reject this ground of challenge to the academic board's proceedings.
The governing body's decision
Since I have held that the decision of the academic board must fall for the want of adequate warning, I can deal very briefly with what subsequently happened on the appeal - confined, it will be recalled, to procedural grounds - to the governing body. Its panel's conclusion, as I have recounted, was 'that a reasonable procedure was followed both with regard to the notice and advice given to Ms [R] and to the extent of disclosure of information in advance to the meeting of the academic board committee'. Pausing there, the word 'notice' does not appear in the regulations - the word is 'warning', and I have given my reasons for holding that adequate warning was not given.
The panel went on to tabulate, as I have also recorded, three particular grounds for holding that the advance disclosure of information had been adequate: the student's requirement for confidentiality; the principal's duty to maintain professional standards; and 'the inability of the principal to obtain the medical assessment which in his judgment would have assisted him in the exercise of his duty, Miss [R] having refused to submit herself for assessment'. I regret to say that none of these seem to me to have any bearing whatever on the elementary requirement that a person facing a domestic disciplinary tribunal on a charge capable of putting an end to her chosen career should have sufficient advance notice of the matter to be relied on against her to be able to respond adequately to it. As to confidentiality, disclosure would have been only to Ms [R] herself and her representative. The maintenance of professional standards and the want of a medical assessment were precisely what had brought the issue to a head and led to the proceedings before the academic board. They bear not at all on the question how those proceedings ought fairly to have been conducted.
If therefore the proceedings of the academic board had been in order, I would have been prepared to strike down the decision of the governing body on appeal on the grounds that its appellate panel asked itself the wrong question in one respect and in the other respect addressed irrelevant issues in coming to its conclusion. As to the latter, it would have been open to the appellate panel to come to a conclusion different from mine on the question of prior disclosure had it addressed its mind to the right questions.
Discretion
If all else fails, Mr Bean submits that I ought to refuse the applicant relief on two grounds: that on the evidence the only conclusion possible was that the applicant was fundamentally unable to adhere to the professional standards required of a teacher; and that the court should not act in vain by requiring a repeat hearing of which only one outcome is ultimately possible. He cites in support of this course the decision of Pennycuick V-C in Glynn v Keele University [1971] 1 WLR 487, a case which arose from an outbreak of nudism on the campus of a university. The plaintiff's participation in it had been reported to the university's vice-chancellor who rusticated him without a hearing. The facts were uncontested on either side. The court held that there had been a clear breach of natural justice, but declined to grant interim relief in the exercise of its discretion on the ground there was uncontested evidence of conduct which on any view called for condign punishment.
Here, likewise, Mr Bean submits that in spite of any failures of due process no other outcome was ultimately possible, and the court should accordingly withhold relief. I do not accept, however, that the present case lies parallel in principle with the case of Glynn v Keele University. There it was not possible to show the court that, given the accepted facts, a hearing could have made any significant difference to the outcome. In the present case I have held that the entire purpose of the warning which should have been but was not given was to bring home to the applicant the risk she now faced and what she might yet do to meet it. If I had been persuaded that she was so manifestly and permanently unfit to teach that no warning could have done any good, I would have acceded to Mr Bean's earlier submission that this was a special case in which no warning was adequate warning. My reasons for not doing so, which I have given, must mean that it would be a denial of justice to decline instead to grant the applicant the relief which is otherwise her due on the basis of my own appraisal of her chances. To do so would be, precisely, to substitute the court for the university as the decision-making body.
Having said this, I want to say one further thing. The applicant is entitled to the proper application of the procedures put in place for her protection. But in a teacher training establishment such procedures exist equally - indeed perhaps principally - for the protection of children whom the student hopes one day to teach. No training body with the responsibilities of the respondent can properly be anything less than vigilant to ensure that, whatever sympathy they deserve as individuals, students do not undertake teaching practice or qualify if there are in the university's professional judgment sufficient grounds for doubting whether they can safely be given the responsibility for the well-being of children which teaching entails.
The applicant, I suspect, needs all the advice and assistance she can get, not in confronting the university in a fresh accusatory hearing, but in comprehending and responding so far as she can to the warning which will now, I have no doubt, be properly given to her. On the evidence before me, she is on any view a deeply troubled individual. Any psychiatrist or other specialist who is to diagnose her condition and to advise on her prognosis must have a full account of all that has given rise to the present concerns. Whether the applicant is able to give the candid information which will be required from her may itself be a function of the degree of insight which she possesses as well as of her conscious willingness to co-operate. (I note in particular that after the adverse decision of the academic board, the applicant did obtain a psychiatric opinion. It ran to just over one page and was based, quite clearly, on an almost total absence of disclosure of the matters which this court knows are central to the issue of the applicant's fitness to teach. It was rightly described by Mr Bean as useless.)
It may be, too, that the applicant can benefit from counselling. Whether, following this judgment, she seeks to resume her studies, and if she does, whether she does so in the immediate or more distant future, is a matter for her alone; but I express the hope that she will have the benefit of the advice and support which she plainly needs, and that she will not be encouraged to engage in a fresh and painful confrontation with the university without some realistic basis upon which to answer the university's concerns.
Conclusion
The applicant is accordingly entitled in my judgment to an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the committee of the respondent's academic board dated 28 June 1993, on the ground that neither the chair nor the committee were in possession of documented evidence of adequate prior warning given to the applicant. With the striking down of this decision, that of the governing body falls without further order.
DISPOSITION
Certiorari granted to quash the decision of the committee of the academic board of 28 June 1993. With that striking down, the decision of the governing body fell without further order. R's counsel accepted that an order of mandamus did not seem to be necessary at that stage, but was granted liberty to apply. Legal aid taxation granted.
SOLICITORS
Watson, Esam & Co for the applicant
Lawford & Co for the respondent
DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, BARRISTER
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