Iowa v. Tovar (original) (raw)
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004), was a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that clarified how well-informed a defendant had to be to waive their right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The defendant in this case had waived his right to counsel and pled guilty to drunk driving, and then had been convicted of drunk driving twice more, with sentences increasing as his convictions piled up. He argued that the judge in the first case had not explained that multiple drunk driving convictions would lead to more severe sentences, so his waiver of counsel had been invalid. The Supreme Court disagreed, saying that the judge's warnings had been adequate, and the defendants' waiver was "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent."
| Property | Value |
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| dbo:abstract | Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004), was a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that clarified how well-informed a defendant had to be to waive their right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The defendant in this case had waived his right to counsel and pled guilty to drunk driving, and then had been convicted of drunk driving twice more, with sentences increasing as his convictions piled up. He argued that the judge in the first case had not explained that multiple drunk driving convictions would lead to more severe sentences, so his waiver of counsel had been invalid. The Supreme Court disagreed, saying that the judge's warnings had been adequate, and the defendants' waiver was "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent." (en) |
| dbo:wikiPageExternalLink | https://www.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1541 https://casetext.com/case/state-v-tovar-2 |
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| dbp:arguedate | 0001-01-21 (xsd:gMonthDay) |
| dbp:argueyear | 2004 (xsd:integer) |
| dbp:decidedate | 0001-03-08 (xsd:gMonthDay) |
| dbp:decideyear | 2004 (xsd:integer) |
| dbp:docket | 2 (xsd:integer) |
| dbp:holding | 1 (xsd:integer) 2 (xsd:integer) taking into account (en) A guilty plea by a pro se defendant may be accepted, and their right to counsel validly waived, if (en) |
| dbp:lawsapplied | dbr:Sixth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution |
| dbp:litigants | Iowa v. Tovar (en) |
| dbp:majority | Ginsburg (en) |
| dbp:oralargument | https://www.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1541 |
| dbp:parallelcitations | 124 (xsd:integer) |
| dbp:prior | 17280.0 first OWI conviction: 1996 (en) second OWI: 1998 (en) |
| dbp:source | 17280.0 Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 93 (en) |
| dbp:text | In a case so straightforward, the United States as amicus curiae suggests, the admonitions at issue might confuse or mislead a defendant more than they would inform him: The warnings the Iowa Supreme Court declared mandatory might be misconstrued as a veiled suggestion that a meritorious defense exists or that the defendant could plead to a lesser charge, when neither prospect is a realistic one. (en) Not only was there an absence of any dialogue concerning the value of having an attorney when pleading guilty, there was no colloquy with Tovar that alerted him to the dangers and disadvantages of entering a guilty plea without the advice of counsel. Importantly, the court did not warn Tovar that he might have legal defenses to the charge that he, as a layperson, would not recognize. (en) |
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| rdfs:comment | Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004), was a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that clarified how well-informed a defendant had to be to waive their right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The defendant in this case had waived his right to counsel and pled guilty to drunk driving, and then had been convicted of drunk driving twice more, with sentences increasing as his convictions piled up. He argued that the judge in the first case had not explained that multiple drunk driving convictions would lead to more severe sentences, so his waiver of counsel had been invalid. The Supreme Court disagreed, saying that the judge's warnings had been adequate, and the defendants' waiver was "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent." (en) |
| rdfs:label | Iowa v. Tovar (en) |
| rdfs:seeAlso | dbr:Assistance_of_Counsel_Clause |
| owl:sameAs | wikidata:Iowa v. Tovar https://global.dbpedia.org/id/FmSZy |
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