Moral universalizability (original) (raw)
The general concept or principle of moral universalizability is that moral principles, maxims, norms, facts, predicates, rules, etc., are universally true; that is, if they are true as applied to some particular case (an action, person, etc.) then they are true of all other cases of this sort. Some philosophers, like Immanuel Kant, Richard Hare, and Alan Gewirth, have argued that moral universalizability is the foundation of all moral facts. Others have argued that moral universalizability is a necessary, but not a sufficient, test of morality. A few philosophers have also argued that morality is not constrained by universalizability at all.
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| dbo:abstract | The general concept or principle of moral universalizability is that moral principles, maxims, norms, facts, predicates, rules, etc., are universally true; that is, if they are true as applied to some particular case (an action, person, etc.) then they are true of all other cases of this sort. Some philosophers, like Immanuel Kant, Richard Hare, and Alan Gewirth, have argued that moral universalizability is the foundation of all moral facts. Others have argued that moral universalizability is a necessary, but not a sufficient, test of morality. A few philosophers have also argued that morality is not constrained by universalizability at all. (en) |
| dbo:wikiPageExternalLink | https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.188587 https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.222124 https://archive.org/details/moralitywithinli00hard_0 https://archive.org/details/practicalethics00sing_0 https://archive.org/details/utilitarianismfo00smar/page/3 |
| dbo:wikiPageID | 54213951 (xsd:integer) |
| dbo:wikiPageLength | 22701 (xsd:nonNegativeInteger) |
| dbo:wikiPageRevisionID | 1077496270 (xsd:integer) |
| dbo:wikiPageWikiLink | dbr:Meta-ethics dbr:Moral_supervenience dbr:Utilitarianism dbc:Philosophy_articles_needing_expert_attention dbr:Germany dbr:Consequentialism dbr:Supervenience dbc:Concepts_in_ethics dbr:Immanuel_Kant dbr:Categorical_imperative dbr:Maxim_(philosophy) dbr:Performative_contradiction dbr:J.S._Mill dbr:Rule_consequentialism |
| dbp:wikiPageUsesTemplate | dbt:Cite_book dbt:Cite_journal dbt:Distinguish dbt:Refbegin dbt:Refend dbt:Reflist dbt:Cite_wikisource dbt:Universalism_footer |
| dct:subject | dbc:Philosophy_articles_needing_expert_attention dbc:Concepts_in_ethics |
| rdf:type | owl:Thing |
| rdfs:comment | The general concept or principle of moral universalizability is that moral principles, maxims, norms, facts, predicates, rules, etc., are universally true; that is, if they are true as applied to some particular case (an action, person, etc.) then they are true of all other cases of this sort. Some philosophers, like Immanuel Kant, Richard Hare, and Alan Gewirth, have argued that moral universalizability is the foundation of all moral facts. Others have argued that moral universalizability is a necessary, but not a sufficient, test of morality. A few philosophers have also argued that morality is not constrained by universalizability at all. (en) |
| rdfs:label | Moral universalizability (en) |
| owl:differentFrom | dbr:Universalism dbr:Universalization |
| owl:sameAs | wikidata:Moral universalizability https://global.dbpedia.org/id/2ovmU |
| prov:wasDerivedFrom | wikipedia-en:Moral_universalizability?oldid=1077496270&ns=0 |
| foaf:isPrimaryTopicOf | wikipedia-en:Moral_universalizability |
| is dbo:wikiPageWikiLink of | dbr:Moral_supervenience |
| is foaf:primaryTopic of | wikipedia-en:Moral_universalizability |