Rina Tzinman | Bilkent University (original) (raw)

Papers by Rina Tzinman

Research paper thumbnail of Against the Brainstem View of the Persistence of Human Animals

Research paper thumbnail of Is Romeo dead? On the persistence of organisms

Synthese, 2017

According to a prominent view of organism persistence ("vitalicism"), organisms cease to exist at... more According to a prominent view of organism persistence ("vitalicism"), organisms cease to exist at death. According to a rival view ("somaticism"), organisms can continue to exist as dead organisms. Most of the arguments in favor of the latter view rely on linguistic and common sense intuitions. I propose a new argument for somaticism by appealing to two other sources that have thus far not figured in the debate: the concept of naturalness, and biological descriptions of organisms, in particular in ethology and ecology. I show that if we hone in on the relevant notion of naturalness, we can show that organisms can (and often do) continue to instantiate the natural property being an organism after death.

Research paper thumbnail of Reviving the Body

of a dissertation at the University of Miami. Dissertation supervised by Professor Mark Rowlands ... more of a dissertation at the University of Miami. Dissertation supervised by Professor Mark Rowlands and Associate Professor Simon Evnine. No. of pages in text. (214) What are we? According to the two most common answers we are either psychological beings or biological organisms. In my dissertation I develop a novel account, which combines the advantages of these views while avoiding their main pitfalls. I start by arguing against the most developed theory of organism persistence, according to which human organisms persist in virtue of their brainstems persisting. Next, by drawing on the literature on natural properties and biological laws, I argue that biological organisms can persist through death. While organisms don’t necessarily cease to exist when they die, we normally do: according to my New Bodily View we are bodies that are bundles of physical and mental tropes, whereas organisms are bundles of exclusively physical tropes. This account not only solves various metaphysical probl...

Research paper thumbnail of Thinking Parts and Embodiment

The Philosophical Quarterly

According to the thinking parts problem, any part sufficient for thought—e.g. a head—is a good ca... more According to the thinking parts problem, any part sufficient for thought—e.g. a head—is a good candidate for being a thinker, and therefore being us. So we can’t assume that we—thinkers—are (or are constituted by) human beings rather than their proper parts. Many solutions to this problem have been proposed. However, I will show that the views currently on the market all face serious problems. I will then offer a new solution that avoids these problems. The thinking parts problem arises from considerations that seem to be empirically substantiated. One virtue of my solution is that in addition to its theoretical apparatus it appeals to empirically substantiated considerations.

Research paper thumbnail of Being of Two Minds (or of One in Two Ways): A New Puzzle for Constitution Views of Personal Identity

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Research paper thumbnail of Thinking Parts and Embodiment

The Philosophical Quarterly

According to the thinking parts problem, any part sufficient for thought—e.g. a head—is a good ca... more According to the thinking parts problem, any part sufficient for thought—e.g. a head—is a good candidate for being a thinker, and therefore being us. So we can’t assume that we—thinkers—are (or are constituted by) human beings rather than their proper parts. Many solutions to this problem have been proposed. However, I will show that the views currently on the market all face serious problems. I will then offer a new solution that avoids these problems. The thinking parts problem arises from considerations that seem to be empirically substantiated. One virtue of my solution is that in addition to its theoretical apparatus it appeals to empirically substantiated considerations.

Research paper thumbnail of Is Romeo Dead? On the Persistence of Organisms

According to a prominent view of organism persistence (" vitalicism "), organisms cease to exist ... more According to a prominent view of organism persistence (" vitalicism "), organisms cease to exist at death. According to a rival view (" somaticism "), organisms can continue to exist as dead organisms. Most of the arguments in favor of the latter view rely on linguistic and common sense intuitions. I propose a new argument for somaticism by appealing to two other sources that have thus far not figured in the debate: the concept of naturalness, and biological descriptions of organisms, in particular in ethology and ecology. I show that if we hone in on the relevant notion of naturalness, we can show that organisms can (and often do) continue to instantiate the natural property being an organism after death.

Research paper thumbnail of Against the Brainstem View of the Persistence of Human Animals

In this paper I will discuss Eric Olson's account of the persistence of human animals.

Drafts by Rina Tzinman

Research paper thumbnail of Memory organisms circle of life_web draft.pdf

Research paper thumbnail of Against the Brainstem View of the Persistence of Human Animals

Research paper thumbnail of Is Romeo dead? On the persistence of organisms

Synthese, 2017

According to a prominent view of organism persistence ("vitalicism"), organisms cease to exist at... more According to a prominent view of organism persistence ("vitalicism"), organisms cease to exist at death. According to a rival view ("somaticism"), organisms can continue to exist as dead organisms. Most of the arguments in favor of the latter view rely on linguistic and common sense intuitions. I propose a new argument for somaticism by appealing to two other sources that have thus far not figured in the debate: the concept of naturalness, and biological descriptions of organisms, in particular in ethology and ecology. I show that if we hone in on the relevant notion of naturalness, we can show that organisms can (and often do) continue to instantiate the natural property being an organism after death.

Research paper thumbnail of Reviving the Body

of a dissertation at the University of Miami. Dissertation supervised by Professor Mark Rowlands ... more of a dissertation at the University of Miami. Dissertation supervised by Professor Mark Rowlands and Associate Professor Simon Evnine. No. of pages in text. (214) What are we? According to the two most common answers we are either psychological beings or biological organisms. In my dissertation I develop a novel account, which combines the advantages of these views while avoiding their main pitfalls. I start by arguing against the most developed theory of organism persistence, according to which human organisms persist in virtue of their brainstems persisting. Next, by drawing on the literature on natural properties and biological laws, I argue that biological organisms can persist through death. While organisms don’t necessarily cease to exist when they die, we normally do: according to my New Bodily View we are bodies that are bundles of physical and mental tropes, whereas organisms are bundles of exclusively physical tropes. This account not only solves various metaphysical probl...

Research paper thumbnail of Thinking Parts and Embodiment

The Philosophical Quarterly

According to the thinking parts problem, any part sufficient for thought—e.g. a head—is a good ca... more According to the thinking parts problem, any part sufficient for thought—e.g. a head—is a good candidate for being a thinker, and therefore being us. So we can’t assume that we—thinkers—are (or are constituted by) human beings rather than their proper parts. Many solutions to this problem have been proposed. However, I will show that the views currently on the market all face serious problems. I will then offer a new solution that avoids these problems. The thinking parts problem arises from considerations that seem to be empirically substantiated. One virtue of my solution is that in addition to its theoretical apparatus it appeals to empirically substantiated considerations.

Research paper thumbnail of Being of Two Minds (or of One in Two Ways): A New Puzzle for Constitution Views of Personal Identity

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Research paper thumbnail of Thinking Parts and Embodiment

The Philosophical Quarterly

According to the thinking parts problem, any part sufficient for thought—e.g. a head—is a good ca... more According to the thinking parts problem, any part sufficient for thought—e.g. a head—is a good candidate for being a thinker, and therefore being us. So we can’t assume that we—thinkers—are (or are constituted by) human beings rather than their proper parts. Many solutions to this problem have been proposed. However, I will show that the views currently on the market all face serious problems. I will then offer a new solution that avoids these problems. The thinking parts problem arises from considerations that seem to be empirically substantiated. One virtue of my solution is that in addition to its theoretical apparatus it appeals to empirically substantiated considerations.

Research paper thumbnail of Is Romeo Dead? On the Persistence of Organisms

According to a prominent view of organism persistence (" vitalicism "), organisms cease to exist ... more According to a prominent view of organism persistence (" vitalicism "), organisms cease to exist at death. According to a rival view (" somaticism "), organisms can continue to exist as dead organisms. Most of the arguments in favor of the latter view rely on linguistic and common sense intuitions. I propose a new argument for somaticism by appealing to two other sources that have thus far not figured in the debate: the concept of naturalness, and biological descriptions of organisms, in particular in ethology and ecology. I show that if we hone in on the relevant notion of naturalness, we can show that organisms can (and often do) continue to instantiate the natural property being an organism after death.

Research paper thumbnail of Against the Brainstem View of the Persistence of Human Animals

In this paper I will discuss Eric Olson's account of the persistence of human animals.