Ariel Zellman | Bar-Ilan University (original) (raw)
Publications by Ariel Zellman
Politics, Religion & Ideology, 2023
From the October 2018 mass shooting at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania to ... more From the October 2018 mass shooting at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania to the April 2022 bombing of the Sufi Khalifa Sahib mosque in Kabul, Afghanistan, religious minority sacred spaces are a conspicuous target of societal violence. While the potency of these attacks as instruments of symbolic and physical intimidation against vulnerable communities is well-recognized, comparatively little research has examined the larger societal and political forces that motivate them, particularly outside conflict zones. Employing data on individual religious minorities in 162 states from 1991-2014, we conduct quantitative analyses demonstrating that severe violence against religious minority sacred spaces is significantly correlated with increasing regime instability, particularly in more democratic states that strongly support religious institutions. Our findings suggest that the most violent outcomes tend to be diversionary, redirecting public anger toward internal 'enemy' others, rather than reactionary or retaliatory behavior toward already persecuted or genuinely threatening out-groups. On October 27, 2018, during Sabbath morning prayers, a gunman entered the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and murdered eleven worshipers and injured six others, before being shot and arrested on the scene. 1 As the single deadliest attack on the Jewish community in American history, it shocked people across the country and raised significant questions about the safety and security of minority communities within a presumably tolerant democratic society. Taking place during a significant rise in reported violent incidents against Jews and religious minorities in general, 2
Journal of Global Security Studies, 2024
How do religiously salient issues influence the peaceful resolution of interstate territorial dis... more How do religiously salient issues influence the peaceful resolution of interstate territorial disputes? Conflict scholars tend to represent “religious” disputes as uniquely resistant to compromise owing to their supposed symbolic indivisibility and the ideological inflexibility of the actors who pursue them. Rather, we argue that religious regimes’ preferred forums to advance peaceful resolution depend upon interactions between the breadth of a dispute’s religious salience and a claimant regime’s domestic religious legitimacy. Secular regimes lack both religious legitimacy and political motivation to engage. Thus, their dispute resolution forum preferences are unrelated to religious salience. Highly religious regimes command significant religious legitimacy and are therefore empowered to directly negotiate over broadly salient religious issues. Yet their political dependence upon religious constituencies causes them to strictly avoid legally binding conflict management over narrowly salient religious issues. By contrast, moderately religious regimes lack sufficient religious legitimacy to directly negotiate over both broadly and narrowly salient issues, rendering them particularly dispute-resolution avoidant. We test and generally confirm these propositions, utilizing new data measuring the religious salience of interstate territorial disputes in the post-Cold War era.
Terrorism and Political Violence, 2023
This article adds to a growing literature explaining driving forces behind Muslim foreign fighter... more This article adds to a growing literature explaining driving forces behind Muslim foreign fighters in Jihadist conflicts. Employing quantitative analyses, we examine counts of Muslim foreign fighters from non-Muslim majority countries in Iraq and Syria from 2011 to 2015. We find that greater numbers of foreign fighters come from countries where Muslim minorities are politically organized, excluded from policymaking processes, and engaged in peaceful mobilization than countries where these conditions are otherwise absent. These results contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms by which aggrieved individuals tend to be recruited in larger numbers to participate in foreign wars.
Journal of Peace Research, 2023
How and under what conditions do religious factors explain the militarization of interstate terri... more How and under what conditions do religious factors explain the militarization of interstate territorial disputes? We argue that inconclusive findings in previous studies partly stem from inadequate consideration of why secular versus religious challenger states initiate conflict over religiously salient territorial disputes. Secular regimes avoid escalation over narrowly-salient religious claims because they do not depend upon religious publics for support. They however lack the necessary religious legitimacy to manage outbidding challenges that frequently arise over more broadly-salient claims. Religious regimes, by contrast, enjoy high domestic religious legitimacy, enabling more peacefully engagement with broadly-salient religious claims. Yet their political dependence upon religious constituencies incentivizes conflict when disputes involve narrowly-salient religious claims. We test these propositions utilizing original data on the religious salience of interstate territorial disputes in the post-Cold War era, from 1990 to 2010. Results confirm these inferences and contribute to highly nuanced understandings of how state-religion policy and religious salience interact to influence patterns of interstate violence.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2022
Ideology may directly provide motive and indirectly capacity for collective violence, thus making... more Ideology may directly provide motive and indirectly capacity for collective violence, thus making armed conflicts longer and bloodier. We investigate these propositions by drawing on an innovative global dataset which codes ideological claims by rebel groups and governments in intrastate armed conflicts since 1946. Results demonstrate that although ideology increases conflict duration, these effects vary by type and timing. Whereas secular ideological conflicts tended to be more protracted during the Cold War, religious ideology has become increasingly important since. We, however, find little evidence that ideology increases conflict intensity. Rather, rebel criminality best accounts for intensity. So, while immaterial resources like ideology sustain willingness to fight, ideology’s influence upon conflict intensity is limited, especially after the Cold War. Future studies need to take ideology seriously and need to investigate its characteristics more in-depth and in conjunction with material, identity related and international variables.
Religions, 2022
The International Religious Freedom Act, passed by Congress in 1998, set international religious ... more The International Religious Freedom Act, passed by Congress in 1998, set international religious freedom promotion (IRF) as a core objective of American foreign policy. Although formally empowering the President to enact punitive sanctions in instances of extreme religious repression, IRF is primarily a soft power instrument, with the expressed intent to persuade rather than coerce states into greater respect for religious freedom. Nearly a quarter century since its enactment however, religious discrimination has markedly increased worldwide. This paper, therefore seeks to quantitatively evaluate the extent to which American soft power, measured via levels of popular approval for the United States in countries surveyed by various polling agencies from 2002 to 2014, has correlated with shifts in governmental religious discrimination (GRD) since 1998. We find that not only do higher levels of approval of the United States correlate with greater increases in GRD, but this effect is particularly robust in more democratic states, in which American soft power should presumably have greater influence. These findings should be deeply troubling for IRF advocates, empirically validating prevalent concerns regarding the efficacy, priority, and viability of IRF as a foreign policy instrument.
American Politics Research, 2022
To what extent do white nationalists influence Congressional representative conservatism? Althoug... more To what extent do white nationalists influence Congressional representative conservatism? Although ethnocentrism, out-group prejudice, and racial threats strongly predict American political attitudes and voter behavior, how social movements predicated on these beliefs shape political outcomes is rarely considered. We argue that white nationalist activities significantly contribute to the radicalization of Congressional representatives' policy agendas in a manner non-reducible to demographic or socioeconomic conditions. By mobilizing white voters against racial status threats, they indirectly compel politicians to adopt more radically conservative agendas. We quantitatively test these propositions by examining distributions of white nationalist groups in the American South against Congressional representative conservatism from 2010-2017. Analyses reveal that white nationalists indeed appear to significantly impact representative radical conservatism, even controlling for numerous factors commonly theorized to explain their rise. In doing so, we contribute to emerging insights on the political influence of the radical right on the contemporary American conservative "mainstream".
Security Studies, 2022
Although often argued that religion should significantly influence international conflict, the em... more Although often argued that religion should significantly influence international conflict, the empirical record is mixed. For every recurrent inter-religious conflict, there are numerous examples of sustained inter-religious cooperation. So too, conflict frequently mars the oft-assumed peaceful relations between shared-religion states. We argue that religion is an important intervening factor in interstate dispute militarization, especially between internally-threatened rivals. In mixed-religion dyads, conflict often follows oppression of cross-border coreligionists, while in shared-religion dyads, conflict occurs as one side disproportionately increases its official support for that religion. In both instances, dispute militarization is primarily an effort to undercut domestic competitors, whose challenge is augmented by external threats to leaders' religious legitimacy. We test these propositions using new, long-term data on religious demography and state-religion policy, identifying rivalries via antecedent interstate territorial disputes. Findings largely confirm our hypotheses, substantially clarifying the conditions under which religion contributes to international militarized conflict.
Politics and Religion, 2020
Interstate conflicts involving religion are commonly argued to be more severe and more protracted... more Interstate conflicts involving religion are commonly argued to be more severe and more protracted than other forms of conflict. Although various arguments have sought to explain religion's apparent contributions to global violence, few consider the foreign policy goals over which religious actors actually fight. This article does so by examining whether religiously-exclusive states tend to militarize interstate territorial disputes (MIDs) over issues of strategic-material or identity salience. Insofar as religiously-exclusive states seek to "defend the faith" against internal and external challengers, identity-salient disputes should be a particularly attractive target for militarization. We however find the opposite. Although religiously-exclusive states do initiate territorial MIDs more frequently than their secular counterparts, they are significantly more likely to do so owing to disputed territories' strategic rather than symbolic value. These results challenge accepted wisdom regarding religion's influence on international conflict and suggest critical new avenues for research. †
East European Politics, 2019
Does ethnopopulism increase domestic support for revisionist foreign policies? This question is e... more Does ethnopopulism increase domestic support for revisionist foreign policies? This question is especially relevant for former socialist bloc countries, where claims regarding cross-border kin and lost homelands imbue ethnopopulist discourse. Distinguishing between hawkish and irredentist publics, this article argues that irredentists’ ideological commitments actually limit their receptivity to ethnopopulists’ non-ideological claims. This proposition is tested via survey experiments in Serbia and Israel: two formal democracies with assertively nationalist publics and disputed international boundaries in dissimilar geopolitical contexts. Common findings suggest generalisable limits on ethnopopulists’ ability to mobilise popular support even among core constituencies, with critical implications for Eastern Europe and beyond.
Territory Politics Governance, 2020
Failure by democratic states to resolve protracted international territorial disputes has often b... more Failure by democratic states to resolve protracted international territorial disputes has often been traced to domestic politics. In seeking advantages at the bargaining table and to limit vulnerability versus domestic challengers, democratic leaders may assert hardline territorial demands to mobilize support from sympathetic publics. By staking their political credibility on such claims, they may become locked into extreme policy positions which render compromise untenable. To what extent, however, does expressed support by sympathetic publics actually imply audience costs for reneging? This paper argues that sympathetic publics' demands for policy follow-through on revisionist territorial claims depend upon how they are framed. Building on the existing audience cost literature, it demonstrates that tangibly salient frames highlighting national security threats are more likely to consistently move sympathetic publics to demand policy redress than intangibly salient frames asserting national rights to defend heritage or cross-border kin. It does so using comparative survey experiments in Israel and Serbia-two democratic states with disputed international boundaries and strong domestic nationalist sentiment, but whose geopolitical contexts are dissimilarly conducive to territorial revisionism. Results contribute to a refined understanding of how domestic attitudes toward nationalist claims impact international conflict processes.
Security Studies, 2018
When are domestic publics most sympathetic to nationalist territorial ambitions? Conflict scholar... more When are domestic publics most sympathetic to nationalist territorial ambitions? Conflict scholars commonly assume support should be greatest when territory is framed as being of intangible value to national identity over tangible importance to national security and economic prosperity. This should be especially true regarding lost homelands, territories wherein a state has previously exercised sovereignty and to which it has enduring ethnic ties. This article presents experimental evidence that directly challenges these assumptions, demonstrating the variability of Serbian popular attachments to three lost territories: Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro. It finds that intangible framings do not necessarily engender stronger assertions that such territories belong to the homeland than tangible framings do. Nor do they necessarily motivate greater support for nationalist territorial agendas. These findings cast doubt on conventional wisdom regarding domestic publics' contributions to territorial conflict and offer refined insights regarding in which instances intangible claims are most conflict-prone.
Journal of Peace Research, Jul 2015
International territorial conflicts are frequently characterized by political recourse to narrati... more International territorial conflicts are frequently characterized by political recourse to narratives of nationalist entitlement, stifling conflict resolution by raising domestic audience costs and discursively limiting bargaining flexibility. Conflict incentivizes elite employment of such claims precisely because security threats and fear of violence heighten popular resonance of adversarial collective identity frames. This article argues, however, that consensus mobilization behind nationalist territorial claims is highly dependent upon the particular narratives elites select to justify them. Employing controlled individual-level experiments administered to diverse populations in Israel, it demonstrates how exposure to competing narratives of homeland, security, economic prosperity, and settlement impacts support for control of East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. Although indivisible claims to ‘United Jerusalem’, the Golan, and West Bank settlement blocs and strategic highlands are generally considered popular consensus issues in Israel, only particular narratives trigger consensus mobilization behind each. Some narratives even encourage conciliatory policy attitudes against such appeals. As a democracy embroiled in multiple enduring territorial disputes, analysis of the Israeli case contributes to understanding of the limits and political consequences of elite rhetoric. Demonstrating the affinity between narrative frames and popular policy preferences, this article also lends insight into the intersubjective beliefs that drive mass support for nationalist territorial claims.
Political Science Quarterly, 2014
Andrew Mumford’s volume explores a long‐prevalent yet under‐theorized element of modern military ... more Andrew Mumford’s volume explores a long‐prevalent yet under‐theorized element of modern military conflict, proxy warfare. By including state employment of state or non‐state proxies against non‐state actors, as well as non‐state reliance on other non‐state actors, the definitional scope of proxy warfare is broadened well beyond its traditional bounds of paramilitary violence guided from afar by states against rival states. Rich with micro case studies spanning from the Cold War to the present...
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2011
In Evolving Nationalism, Nadav Shelef provides an in-depth account of the development of major st... more In Evolving Nationalism, Nadav Shelef provides an in-depth account of the development of major streams of Israeli nationalism from the early days of Zionism to the present. He argues that nationalism is not a static or predetermined ideology but rather is subject to change over time. Presenting a hard test of this hypothesis, Shelef contends that even Israeli nationalisms, "whose territory and membership appear to be written in stone, the first biblically defined and the second ethnically circumscribed," have undergone tremendous transformations regarding their perceptions of the extent of the homeland, its rightful membership, and what principles should guide the state (p. 2). Although his argument is a familiar one, his approach challenges intentional mechanisms of ideological change, namely rational adaptation and elite imposition, with an evolutionary dynamic highlighting unintended consequences as critical catalysts for sustained ideological change...
Nuclear Cooperation with India: New Challenges, New Opportunities, 2006
On 26 September 2005, the Canadian government issued a statement signalling its intention to for... more On 26 September 2005, the Canadian government issued a statement signalling its intention to formally abandon its seven-year self-imposed moratorium on nuclear cooperation with India. The statement expressed Canada’s willingness to resume trade in dual-use nuclear technologies (those which have both civilian and military applications). This is a radical departure from Canadian nuclear non-proliferation policy established following the nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan in 1998. As aparty to the NPT, Canada’s offer to resume nuclear cooperation stands in contrast to its stated commitment to prevent the spread of nuclear technology to states in which there is an unacceptable risk that it may used to develop weapons. It is the goal of this paper to lay out how the Canadian decision came about, the basics of the NPT regime as they apply to this case, and the ramifications of new nuclear cooperation withIndia for the NPT and the broader norm of nuclear non-proliferation.
Conference Presentations by Ariel Zellman
Recent studies in international territorial conflict have emphasized how fragmented democratic in... more Recent studies in international territorial conflict have emphasized how fragmented democratic institutions empower hardliners opposed to concessions. Frequently, they reference Israeli settlement lobby manipulation of Israel's unstable coalition governance and fractious domestic politics to spoil regional peace efforts. Yet even as settlers have consistently campaigned against territorial retrenchment, they have failed to prevent many significant withdrawals. Unimpeded settlement in the Golan Heights and expansion of settlement blocs in the West Bank, often taken as evidence of the lobby's power, contrast markedly with full evacuations from both the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. This paper challenges extant scholarship which frequently treats such variations as epiphenominal exceptions to proposed general models of settler behavior. As diverse outcomes are neither entirely reducible to popular attitudes regarding disputed spaces nor settlers' political demographic profile, the success of settler appeals and consequent “spoiler” behaviors is proposed to stem from the nature of their public appeals. Even as campaigns promoting solidarity with settlers targeted for expulsion successfully mobilize like-minded activist to public protest they too appear to incite counter-protest by opponents and fail to prevent retrenchment. By contrast, campaigns emphasizing national identity and values shared by settlers and the general public alike generate less popular debate but anecdotally seem to more often succeed in thwarting withdrawal. This framework thus offers a new model to explore the contentious politics that shape settler lobbying and the conditions under which their appeals are effectual.
Politics, Religion & Ideology, 2023
From the October 2018 mass shooting at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania to ... more From the October 2018 mass shooting at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania to the April 2022 bombing of the Sufi Khalifa Sahib mosque in Kabul, Afghanistan, religious minority sacred spaces are a conspicuous target of societal violence. While the potency of these attacks as instruments of symbolic and physical intimidation against vulnerable communities is well-recognized, comparatively little research has examined the larger societal and political forces that motivate them, particularly outside conflict zones. Employing data on individual religious minorities in 162 states from 1991-2014, we conduct quantitative analyses demonstrating that severe violence against religious minority sacred spaces is significantly correlated with increasing regime instability, particularly in more democratic states that strongly support religious institutions. Our findings suggest that the most violent outcomes tend to be diversionary, redirecting public anger toward internal 'enemy' others, rather than reactionary or retaliatory behavior toward already persecuted or genuinely threatening out-groups. On October 27, 2018, during Sabbath morning prayers, a gunman entered the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and murdered eleven worshipers and injured six others, before being shot and arrested on the scene. 1 As the single deadliest attack on the Jewish community in American history, it shocked people across the country and raised significant questions about the safety and security of minority communities within a presumably tolerant democratic society. Taking place during a significant rise in reported violent incidents against Jews and religious minorities in general, 2
Journal of Global Security Studies, 2024
How do religiously salient issues influence the peaceful resolution of interstate territorial dis... more How do religiously salient issues influence the peaceful resolution of interstate territorial disputes? Conflict scholars tend to represent “religious” disputes as uniquely resistant to compromise owing to their supposed symbolic indivisibility and the ideological inflexibility of the actors who pursue them. Rather, we argue that religious regimes’ preferred forums to advance peaceful resolution depend upon interactions between the breadth of a dispute’s religious salience and a claimant regime’s domestic religious legitimacy. Secular regimes lack both religious legitimacy and political motivation to engage. Thus, their dispute resolution forum preferences are unrelated to religious salience. Highly religious regimes command significant religious legitimacy and are therefore empowered to directly negotiate over broadly salient religious issues. Yet their political dependence upon religious constituencies causes them to strictly avoid legally binding conflict management over narrowly salient religious issues. By contrast, moderately religious regimes lack sufficient religious legitimacy to directly negotiate over both broadly and narrowly salient issues, rendering them particularly dispute-resolution avoidant. We test and generally confirm these propositions, utilizing new data measuring the religious salience of interstate territorial disputes in the post-Cold War era.
Terrorism and Political Violence, 2023
This article adds to a growing literature explaining driving forces behind Muslim foreign fighter... more This article adds to a growing literature explaining driving forces behind Muslim foreign fighters in Jihadist conflicts. Employing quantitative analyses, we examine counts of Muslim foreign fighters from non-Muslim majority countries in Iraq and Syria from 2011 to 2015. We find that greater numbers of foreign fighters come from countries where Muslim minorities are politically organized, excluded from policymaking processes, and engaged in peaceful mobilization than countries where these conditions are otherwise absent. These results contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms by which aggrieved individuals tend to be recruited in larger numbers to participate in foreign wars.
Journal of Peace Research, 2023
How and under what conditions do religious factors explain the militarization of interstate terri... more How and under what conditions do religious factors explain the militarization of interstate territorial disputes? We argue that inconclusive findings in previous studies partly stem from inadequate consideration of why secular versus religious challenger states initiate conflict over religiously salient territorial disputes. Secular regimes avoid escalation over narrowly-salient religious claims because they do not depend upon religious publics for support. They however lack the necessary religious legitimacy to manage outbidding challenges that frequently arise over more broadly-salient claims. Religious regimes, by contrast, enjoy high domestic religious legitimacy, enabling more peacefully engagement with broadly-salient religious claims. Yet their political dependence upon religious constituencies incentivizes conflict when disputes involve narrowly-salient religious claims. We test these propositions utilizing original data on the religious salience of interstate territorial disputes in the post-Cold War era, from 1990 to 2010. Results confirm these inferences and contribute to highly nuanced understandings of how state-religion policy and religious salience interact to influence patterns of interstate violence.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2022
Ideology may directly provide motive and indirectly capacity for collective violence, thus making... more Ideology may directly provide motive and indirectly capacity for collective violence, thus making armed conflicts longer and bloodier. We investigate these propositions by drawing on an innovative global dataset which codes ideological claims by rebel groups and governments in intrastate armed conflicts since 1946. Results demonstrate that although ideology increases conflict duration, these effects vary by type and timing. Whereas secular ideological conflicts tended to be more protracted during the Cold War, religious ideology has become increasingly important since. We, however, find little evidence that ideology increases conflict intensity. Rather, rebel criminality best accounts for intensity. So, while immaterial resources like ideology sustain willingness to fight, ideology’s influence upon conflict intensity is limited, especially after the Cold War. Future studies need to take ideology seriously and need to investigate its characteristics more in-depth and in conjunction with material, identity related and international variables.
Religions, 2022
The International Religious Freedom Act, passed by Congress in 1998, set international religious ... more The International Religious Freedom Act, passed by Congress in 1998, set international religious freedom promotion (IRF) as a core objective of American foreign policy. Although formally empowering the President to enact punitive sanctions in instances of extreme religious repression, IRF is primarily a soft power instrument, with the expressed intent to persuade rather than coerce states into greater respect for religious freedom. Nearly a quarter century since its enactment however, religious discrimination has markedly increased worldwide. This paper, therefore seeks to quantitatively evaluate the extent to which American soft power, measured via levels of popular approval for the United States in countries surveyed by various polling agencies from 2002 to 2014, has correlated with shifts in governmental religious discrimination (GRD) since 1998. We find that not only do higher levels of approval of the United States correlate with greater increases in GRD, but this effect is particularly robust in more democratic states, in which American soft power should presumably have greater influence. These findings should be deeply troubling for IRF advocates, empirically validating prevalent concerns regarding the efficacy, priority, and viability of IRF as a foreign policy instrument.
American Politics Research, 2022
To what extent do white nationalists influence Congressional representative conservatism? Althoug... more To what extent do white nationalists influence Congressional representative conservatism? Although ethnocentrism, out-group prejudice, and racial threats strongly predict American political attitudes and voter behavior, how social movements predicated on these beliefs shape political outcomes is rarely considered. We argue that white nationalist activities significantly contribute to the radicalization of Congressional representatives' policy agendas in a manner non-reducible to demographic or socioeconomic conditions. By mobilizing white voters against racial status threats, they indirectly compel politicians to adopt more radically conservative agendas. We quantitatively test these propositions by examining distributions of white nationalist groups in the American South against Congressional representative conservatism from 2010-2017. Analyses reveal that white nationalists indeed appear to significantly impact representative radical conservatism, even controlling for numerous factors commonly theorized to explain their rise. In doing so, we contribute to emerging insights on the political influence of the radical right on the contemporary American conservative "mainstream".
Security Studies, 2022
Although often argued that religion should significantly influence international conflict, the em... more Although often argued that religion should significantly influence international conflict, the empirical record is mixed. For every recurrent inter-religious conflict, there are numerous examples of sustained inter-religious cooperation. So too, conflict frequently mars the oft-assumed peaceful relations between shared-religion states. We argue that religion is an important intervening factor in interstate dispute militarization, especially between internally-threatened rivals. In mixed-religion dyads, conflict often follows oppression of cross-border coreligionists, while in shared-religion dyads, conflict occurs as one side disproportionately increases its official support for that religion. In both instances, dispute militarization is primarily an effort to undercut domestic competitors, whose challenge is augmented by external threats to leaders' religious legitimacy. We test these propositions using new, long-term data on religious demography and state-religion policy, identifying rivalries via antecedent interstate territorial disputes. Findings largely confirm our hypotheses, substantially clarifying the conditions under which religion contributes to international militarized conflict.
Politics and Religion, 2020
Interstate conflicts involving religion are commonly argued to be more severe and more protracted... more Interstate conflicts involving religion are commonly argued to be more severe and more protracted than other forms of conflict. Although various arguments have sought to explain religion's apparent contributions to global violence, few consider the foreign policy goals over which religious actors actually fight. This article does so by examining whether religiously-exclusive states tend to militarize interstate territorial disputes (MIDs) over issues of strategic-material or identity salience. Insofar as religiously-exclusive states seek to "defend the faith" against internal and external challengers, identity-salient disputes should be a particularly attractive target for militarization. We however find the opposite. Although religiously-exclusive states do initiate territorial MIDs more frequently than their secular counterparts, they are significantly more likely to do so owing to disputed territories' strategic rather than symbolic value. These results challenge accepted wisdom regarding religion's influence on international conflict and suggest critical new avenues for research. †
East European Politics, 2019
Does ethnopopulism increase domestic support for revisionist foreign policies? This question is e... more Does ethnopopulism increase domestic support for revisionist foreign policies? This question is especially relevant for former socialist bloc countries, where claims regarding cross-border kin and lost homelands imbue ethnopopulist discourse. Distinguishing between hawkish and irredentist publics, this article argues that irredentists’ ideological commitments actually limit their receptivity to ethnopopulists’ non-ideological claims. This proposition is tested via survey experiments in Serbia and Israel: two formal democracies with assertively nationalist publics and disputed international boundaries in dissimilar geopolitical contexts. Common findings suggest generalisable limits on ethnopopulists’ ability to mobilise popular support even among core constituencies, with critical implications for Eastern Europe and beyond.
Territory Politics Governance, 2020
Failure by democratic states to resolve protracted international territorial disputes has often b... more Failure by democratic states to resolve protracted international territorial disputes has often been traced to domestic politics. In seeking advantages at the bargaining table and to limit vulnerability versus domestic challengers, democratic leaders may assert hardline territorial demands to mobilize support from sympathetic publics. By staking their political credibility on such claims, they may become locked into extreme policy positions which render compromise untenable. To what extent, however, does expressed support by sympathetic publics actually imply audience costs for reneging? This paper argues that sympathetic publics' demands for policy follow-through on revisionist territorial claims depend upon how they are framed. Building on the existing audience cost literature, it demonstrates that tangibly salient frames highlighting national security threats are more likely to consistently move sympathetic publics to demand policy redress than intangibly salient frames asserting national rights to defend heritage or cross-border kin. It does so using comparative survey experiments in Israel and Serbia-two democratic states with disputed international boundaries and strong domestic nationalist sentiment, but whose geopolitical contexts are dissimilarly conducive to territorial revisionism. Results contribute to a refined understanding of how domestic attitudes toward nationalist claims impact international conflict processes.
Security Studies, 2018
When are domestic publics most sympathetic to nationalist territorial ambitions? Conflict scholar... more When are domestic publics most sympathetic to nationalist territorial ambitions? Conflict scholars commonly assume support should be greatest when territory is framed as being of intangible value to national identity over tangible importance to national security and economic prosperity. This should be especially true regarding lost homelands, territories wherein a state has previously exercised sovereignty and to which it has enduring ethnic ties. This article presents experimental evidence that directly challenges these assumptions, demonstrating the variability of Serbian popular attachments to three lost territories: Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro. It finds that intangible framings do not necessarily engender stronger assertions that such territories belong to the homeland than tangible framings do. Nor do they necessarily motivate greater support for nationalist territorial agendas. These findings cast doubt on conventional wisdom regarding domestic publics' contributions to territorial conflict and offer refined insights regarding in which instances intangible claims are most conflict-prone.
Journal of Peace Research, Jul 2015
International territorial conflicts are frequently characterized by political recourse to narrati... more International territorial conflicts are frequently characterized by political recourse to narratives of nationalist entitlement, stifling conflict resolution by raising domestic audience costs and discursively limiting bargaining flexibility. Conflict incentivizes elite employment of such claims precisely because security threats and fear of violence heighten popular resonance of adversarial collective identity frames. This article argues, however, that consensus mobilization behind nationalist territorial claims is highly dependent upon the particular narratives elites select to justify them. Employing controlled individual-level experiments administered to diverse populations in Israel, it demonstrates how exposure to competing narratives of homeland, security, economic prosperity, and settlement impacts support for control of East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. Although indivisible claims to ‘United Jerusalem’, the Golan, and West Bank settlement blocs and strategic highlands are generally considered popular consensus issues in Israel, only particular narratives trigger consensus mobilization behind each. Some narratives even encourage conciliatory policy attitudes against such appeals. As a democracy embroiled in multiple enduring territorial disputes, analysis of the Israeli case contributes to understanding of the limits and political consequences of elite rhetoric. Demonstrating the affinity between narrative frames and popular policy preferences, this article also lends insight into the intersubjective beliefs that drive mass support for nationalist territorial claims.
Political Science Quarterly, 2014
Andrew Mumford’s volume explores a long‐prevalent yet under‐theorized element of modern military ... more Andrew Mumford’s volume explores a long‐prevalent yet under‐theorized element of modern military conflict, proxy warfare. By including state employment of state or non‐state proxies against non‐state actors, as well as non‐state reliance on other non‐state actors, the definitional scope of proxy warfare is broadened well beyond its traditional bounds of paramilitary violence guided from afar by states against rival states. Rich with micro case studies spanning from the Cold War to the present...
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2011
In Evolving Nationalism, Nadav Shelef provides an in-depth account of the development of major st... more In Evolving Nationalism, Nadav Shelef provides an in-depth account of the development of major streams of Israeli nationalism from the early days of Zionism to the present. He argues that nationalism is not a static or predetermined ideology but rather is subject to change over time. Presenting a hard test of this hypothesis, Shelef contends that even Israeli nationalisms, "whose territory and membership appear to be written in stone, the first biblically defined and the second ethnically circumscribed," have undergone tremendous transformations regarding their perceptions of the extent of the homeland, its rightful membership, and what principles should guide the state (p. 2). Although his argument is a familiar one, his approach challenges intentional mechanisms of ideological change, namely rational adaptation and elite imposition, with an evolutionary dynamic highlighting unintended consequences as critical catalysts for sustained ideological change...
Nuclear Cooperation with India: New Challenges, New Opportunities, 2006
On 26 September 2005, the Canadian government issued a statement signalling its intention to for... more On 26 September 2005, the Canadian government issued a statement signalling its intention to formally abandon its seven-year self-imposed moratorium on nuclear cooperation with India. The statement expressed Canada’s willingness to resume trade in dual-use nuclear technologies (those which have both civilian and military applications). This is a radical departure from Canadian nuclear non-proliferation policy established following the nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan in 1998. As aparty to the NPT, Canada’s offer to resume nuclear cooperation stands in contrast to its stated commitment to prevent the spread of nuclear technology to states in which there is an unacceptable risk that it may used to develop weapons. It is the goal of this paper to lay out how the Canadian decision came about, the basics of the NPT regime as they apply to this case, and the ramifications of new nuclear cooperation withIndia for the NPT and the broader norm of nuclear non-proliferation.
Recent studies in international territorial conflict have emphasized how fragmented democratic in... more Recent studies in international territorial conflict have emphasized how fragmented democratic institutions empower hardliners opposed to concessions. Frequently, they reference Israeli settlement lobby manipulation of Israel's unstable coalition governance and fractious domestic politics to spoil regional peace efforts. Yet even as settlers have consistently campaigned against territorial retrenchment, they have failed to prevent many significant withdrawals. Unimpeded settlement in the Golan Heights and expansion of settlement blocs in the West Bank, often taken as evidence of the lobby's power, contrast markedly with full evacuations from both the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. This paper challenges extant scholarship which frequently treats such variations as epiphenominal exceptions to proposed general models of settler behavior. As diverse outcomes are neither entirely reducible to popular attitudes regarding disputed spaces nor settlers' political demographic profile, the success of settler appeals and consequent “spoiler” behaviors is proposed to stem from the nature of their public appeals. Even as campaigns promoting solidarity with settlers targeted for expulsion successfully mobilize like-minded activist to public protest they too appear to incite counter-protest by opponents and fail to prevent retrenchment. By contrast, campaigns emphasizing national identity and values shared by settlers and the general public alike generate less popular debate but anecdotally seem to more often succeed in thwarting withdrawal. This framework thus offers a new model to explore the contentious politics that shape settler lobbying and the conditions under which their appeals are effectual.
In the two decades following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia has slowly reconciled itself to th... more In the two decades following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia has slowly reconciled itself to the new Balkan political map in every substantive instance save one: Kosovo. Serbia‘s intransigence has weathered regime change from dictatorship to democracy and political incumbency from ultranationalists to liberal continentalists. This outcome stands in stark contrast to Serbia‘s eventual renunciation of claims to Bosnia in 1995 and its calm acquiescence to Montenegro‘s secession in 2006. Both territories boast significantly larger populations of Serbs than Kosovo, both are economically more productive, and Montenegro with its Adriatic coastline is more strategically valuable. This behavior is not explained by conventional approaches to international territorial conflict. Rather this paper examines the integral role of Kosovo in the Serbian national imagination. As Serbia‘s medieval capital, claims center not on its material assets or ethnic demographics but on the meanings that popular national narratives draw from the territory itself. Homeland claims of this nature assign worth to territory neither dependent on nor perfectly substituted by strategic, economic, or political prerogatives. The value-laden nature of these spaces contributes to the sense that they are integral to the identity of the state and nation making compromise highly unlikely.
The decrease in interstate warfare since WWII demonstrates that sovereignty norms have acquired a... more The decrease in interstate warfare since WWII demonstrates that sovereignty norms have acquired a durable, institutional embeddedness insofar as they constrain state behavior. Yet states circumvent these norms through proxy warfare to project power across their borders and achieve a favorable outcome related to domestic security, regional hegemony, or ideological territorial claims. Non-violation of sovereignty occurs because states understand both the material and normative costs of behaving otherwise. Alternatively, varying configurations of sovereignty create a permissive environment for different types of proxy warfare. We examine three contrasting cases. Sudan and Chad’s involvement in each other’s affairs is restricted by the sovereignty norms on which both countries rely and is driven by regime security imperatives. Pakistan’s proxy war in Kashmir is rooted in contested sovereignty claims constrained by India’s empirical control of an unsettled territorial boundary. Syria and Iran’s support of Hezbollah is driven by ideological opposition to Israel and instrumental interests in establishing regional hegemony, seizing on the juridical ambiguity and empirical interstitiality of Lebanese territory.
In an era of increasingly credible international commitments to the inviolability of existing bor... more In an era of increasingly credible international commitments to the inviolability of existing borders and markedly decreasing material and strategic returns to territorial conquest, the objective costs of engaging in territorial revisionism are, in many respects, at an all-time high. While the initial wartime acquisition of territory can be explained by any number of factors, the real puzzle is why some states remain resistant to withdrawal. Often facing threats of international isolation or even military intervention and active resistance to rule by preexisting populations, instrumentally rationalist explanations cannot readily account for instances of foreign occupation in the contemporary international environment. Examining the cases of Israel, Serbia, and Armenia, this paper asserts that where a territory is seen as being imbued with culturally-informed historical meanings, conflict is significantly more likely to be intractable. Claims of this nature assign meaning to territory neither dependent on nor perfectly substituted by more conventional concerns of security, economic growth, strategic political positioning, or regime survival. The value-laden nature of these spaces further contributes to the sense that they are integral to the identity of the state and nation making the prospect of withdrawal increasingly unlikely.
Given the character of federalism as a political system of shared sovereignty and divided autonom... more Given the character of federalism as a political system of shared sovereignty and divided autonomy between a central government and territorially defined constituent units, it is altogether unsurprising that federalism is often proposed as an institutional basis for political reconstruction in countries emerging from violent intrastate ethnic conflict. While the origins of federalism in each case do not entirely determine performative outcomes, it does seem likely that the conditions under which federalism is selected will have some explanatory influence on its persistence. It is the contention of this paper that while the literature has explored and developed in great detail the functions of federalism and the domestic political origins of its institutions, it has largely neglected the analysis of international factors conditioning its selection. Accounting for these pressures is important not only because domestically negotiated institutional arrangements have been found to persist and perform better on the whole than those which are externally imposed, but because the external environment may actually constrain the range of policy options open to political actors forcing them to select potentially suboptimal governing structures that fail to address root causes of domestic conflict. With a focus on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, and Sudan, this paper finds that although factors such as ethnic demography, territorial distribution of populations, and the on-the-ground political realities post-conflict make federalism a seemingly logical point for negotiation, it is international norms regarding human rights and state territorial integrity coupled with the depth of international involvement in the particular conflict which pushes other options off the table.
This paper examines state recourse to paramilitary force and its consequences for the security ap... more This paper examines state recourse to paramilitary force and its consequences for the security apparatus using the case of the janjaweed militias in the Darfur region of the Sudan. Advancing a model of weak and failed state behaviour, it is suggested that a threatened regime wishing to maintain its hold on power may turn to paramilitary groups to shore up domestic influence and conduct counterinsurgency operations thus neglecting or shutting out state security forces. This approach, while often successful in suppressing domestic insurrection where the regular military has failed, is also used as a means to sideline internal opposition and prevent the rise of competing elites within the government structure. Having committed to such a strategy, however, the regime is forced into its perpetual use in order to keep newly promoted client militias as well as internal and external opponents weak and unable to challenge its authority. This condition of chronic paramilitarism therefore leads to the disintegration of state institutions, traditional patronage networks, and domestic human security as government accountability falls to the wayside and the remnants of the state function only to perpetuate the power of the regime. The evidence shows that regimes become locked into path-dependencies when they forsake traditional security mechanisms for a more diffuse system of support in the form of largely unaccountable semi-autonomous militias. Effective resolution of this problem, therefore, must not only aim to halt violence, but also seek substantial change ranging from security sector reforms to regime transition.
Doctoral Dissertation, 2012
This dissertation explores how popular domestic beliefs regarding the meaning and value of disput... more This dissertation explores how popular domestic beliefs regarding the meaning and value of disputed lands contribute to the protraction and resolution of international territorial conflict. Using comparative historical analysis and artefactual field experiments, I find in Israel and Serbia that persistent popular unwillingness to relinquish claims to a "United Jerusalem" and "Kosovo and Metohija" have resulted from the extraordinary position of these territories in their respective national homeland narratives. These outcomes stand in stark contrast to Israel's largely popular withdrawals from the Sinai Peninsula, Southern Lebanon, and Gaza Strip, dominantly valued as strategic rather than cultural assets. They also contrast with Serbia's acquiescence to the political independence of both Bosnia and Montenegro, spaces of high concern for Serb political self-determination but relatively low territorial-cultural priority. The Golan Heights and the West Bank are also analyzed as disputed spaces wherein strategic and cultural narratives continue to contribute to conflict protraction. In doing so, I demonstrate how particular strategic and cultural narratives come to dominate public discourse over disputed spaces and, in turn, how these narratives constrain the policies states can legitimately pursue in these spaces. Ultimately, I find that popular perceptions of national identity can be as powerful a force in determining government policy as state security prerogatives.
Masters Thesis, 2006
This paper analyzes the impact of the international community’s failure to punish Sudan as a mean... more This paper analyzes the impact of the international community’s failure to punish Sudan as a means to bring an end to ongoing conflict in its western region of Darfur. Focusing on the actions and rhetoric of the United Nations Security Council with respect to its recent adoption of the "responsibility to protect" doctrine, it is claimed that the Council has emphasized the importance of its collective responsibility to protect innocents to the detriment of holding failed states accountable for their role in fermenting and/or exacerbating intrastate violence. While recognizing as legitimate the multiple factors responsible for the shift in international practice from imposing punitive measures against norm violating states to international and individual accountability, it is argued that all have resulted in the unintended consequence of vastly expanding an environment of impunity in which individual conflicts may eventually be arrested but the conditions allowing the outbreak of such violence remain unaffected. Moreover, this deferral of state-targeted punishment by the Security Council has ramifications beyond the individual case’s borders such that failed states may no longer be held to account for their actions. This has resulted in the reinforcement of orthodox normative understandings and practical respect of sovereignty inappropriate to post-Cold War security realities further impairing the ability of the Council to ensure the preservation of international peace and security. As such, it is critical that the international community re-recognize the importance of state-targeted coercion as an instrument of multilateral diplomacy and as a legitimate means to maintain international order.
Bar-Ilan University, 2019
מטרת הקורס היא לסייע לסטודנטים לתואר שני להבין, לנתח וליישם מחקר כמותני ואיכותני, תוך שימת דגש על... more מטרת הקורס היא לסייע לסטודנטים לתואר שני להבין, לנתח וליישם מחקר כמותני ואיכותני, תוך שימת דגש על שיטות איכותניות. מכיוון ששיטות מחקר איכותניות הן רבות ושונות, מטרת הקורס אינה להקיף את כל שיטות המחקר הנמצאות בספרות, אלא לספק לסטודנט כלים מספקים לביצוע מחקר איכותני נאות, תוך מודעות להנחות התאורטיות של המתודה בה בחר, למגבלות המתודה ויתרונותיה, והכרות מספקת עם הספרות הרלוונטית. יושם דגש על שיטות מחקר ומחקרים מתחום מדע המדינה, מתוך הבנה שמחקרים במדע המדינה נוטים להדגיש אספקטים שונים מאלו של תחומים אחרים. בסוף השנה הסטודנט יכיר את הספרות הרלוונטית, יהיה מסוגל להעריך באופן ביקורתי מחקר כמותני ואיכותני ולכתוב מערך מחקר במתודולוגיה איכותנית.
Bar-Ilan University, 2020
(1) הקניית היסודות להבנת השימוש בסטטיסטיקה לשם ניתוח נתונים במדעי החברה. (2) הבנת עקרונות תיאורט... more (1) הקניית היסודות להבנת השימוש בסטטיסטיקה לשם ניתוח נתונים במדעי החברה.
(2) הבנת עקרונות תיאורטיים ויישומיים של סטטיסטיקה במחקר במדעי החברה.
(3) פיתוח חשיבה ביקורתית בעת קריאת מחקרים מדעיים, תוצאותיהם ומסקנותיהם.
(4) מתן כלים לביצוע עבודת מחקר.
(5) שליטה בסיסית בתוכנת STATA לביצוע סטטיסטיקה תיאורית והסקה סטטיסטית.
Bar-Ilan University, 2020
מטרת הקורס היא להציג בפני הסטודנטים מושגים בסיסיים ושיטות ניתוח, המיושמים במחקר בתחום מדעי-המדינה... more מטרת הקורס היא להציג בפני הסטודנטים מושגים בסיסיים ושיטות ניתוח, המיושמים במחקר בתחום מדעי-המדינה. במסגרת ההרצאות ייערך דיון פעיל בהשתתפות הסטודנטים. הקורס כולל כמה מטלות בית, אשר יוגשו במהלך הסמסטר. מטלות אלה יפתחו את השיעורים הנלמדים בכתה, לכדי יכולות אנליטיות יישומיות (פרטים יינתנו בכתה). בסיום הסמסטר תהיה בחינה סופית, אשר תכלול תשובות אנליטיות קצרות לשאלות מתודולוגיות רלוונטיות.
Bar-Ilan University, 2020
מטרות הקורס: 1) היכרות עם הגישות השונות העוסקות בממשל טריטוריאלי וסכסוך טריטוריאלי כפי שהן באות ל... more מטרות הקורס: 1) היכרות עם הגישות השונות העוסקות בממשל טריטוריאלי וסכסוך טריטוריאלי כפי שהן באות לידי ביטוי בספרות היחב"ל והפוליטיקה השוואתית. הקורס יצג דגש מיוחד לגורמים המסבירים את תפקידיהם המצטלבים של אינטרסים, מוסדות, וזהויות בעיצוב העבר, הווה, ועתיד. כמו כן, הקורס ידון בהתפתחותה של המדינה ושל המערכת הבינלאומית. 2) הכנה לחשיבה לביקורת ולכתיבה מחקרית. 3) הכרת החוקרים וכתבי העת המרכזיים ביחב"ל ובמדע המדינה העוסקים בפוליטיקה טריטוריאלית.
Bar-Ilan University, 2018
קורס זה נועד להציג בפני התלמידים מתודולוגיות כמותיות וסטטיסטיות במחקר בתחום מדעי המדינה ואת הדרכי... more קורס זה נועד להציג בפני התלמידים מתודולוגיות כמותיות וסטטיסטיות במחקר בתחום מדעי המדינה ואת הדרכים ליישמן. במסגרת זו, תלמד תוכנה סטטיסטית פופולרית (STATA) והאופן שבו ניתן להעריך תכנות מחקר כמותיות. בסמסטר א' יושם הדגש על מתודולוגיות סטטיסטיות ועיצוב מחקרי כמותי ובסיומו יינתן מבחן סופי. בסמסטר ב' יידונו מגוון שיטות מחקריות והדרכים להשתמש בהן בצורה נכונה. במסגרת הקורס יבקרו מרצים אורחים אשר יציגו את מחקריהם והסטודנטים יקראו את מאמריהם במטרה לכתוב שתי סקירות ביקורתיות. סקירות אלה יציגו יישום של הערכת טיעונים, מתודולוגיות, תוצאות, ומסקנות תאורטיות משני מאמרים אלה.
Bar-Ilan University, 2020
קורס זה נועד להכיר לתלמידים את התאוריות המרכזיות בנוגע למקורות, הפיתח, והרלוונטיות הפוליטית של לא... more קורס זה נועד להכיר לתלמידים את התאוריות המרכזיות בנוגע למקורות, הפיתח, והרלוונטיות הפוליטית של לאומים ולאומיות, כמו גם גישות ביקורתיות יותר לנושאים אלה. לאחר מכן נבחן כיצד רעיונות אלה יחולו על שאלות בפוליטיקה בינלאומית ובכלל זה ממשל דמוקרטי, ואלימות אתנית. התלמידים יחשפו למגוון רחב של זרמים בספרות ויחולו הדגמים חקרו בשיעור לחידות עכשוויות של לאומיות ובניין-אומה בדיונים בשיעור ובעבודת סמינר.
Hebrew University, 2014
Perhaps the most familiar trope in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is Israel's insistence on "se... more Perhaps the most familiar trope in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is Israel's insistence on "secure and recognized borders" in any final settlement. Although a consistent theme of Zionist politics and diplomacy even before the founding of the State of Israel, there has always been an internal debate as to which borders would provide Israel with security and which boundaries must ultimately be recognized by the Arab world. Often overshadowed in the international arena but no less important in Israeli domestic discourse is the relationship between Israeli national identity and the Land of Israel. This course will the explore the evolution of and conflict between these two concepts in Israeli domestic discourse and their respective impact on Israel's territorial policies and international boundaries. To do so, we will consider various thematic approaches including Zionism, security, settlement, and homeland as they have been expressed in the Sinai Peninsula, Southern Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, and the West Bank. To accomplish this goal, this course will incorporate a range of scholarly historical and political readings on Israel as well as discussions on relevant current events.
University of Haifa, 2014
One of the most characteristic themes in Israeli politics is that of Israel's uniqueness, in its ... more One of the most characteristic themes in Israeli politics is that of Israel's uniqueness, in its security needs, in its cultural and political identity, and in its relationship to the international community. This widespread perception of separateness readily contributes to and is at least partially constituted by the state's history of strategic insecurity and political isolation in the Middle East as well as its characteristic form of democratic governance. So too, the United States is often characterized as an "exceptional" country, unique both in its political development and presumed global mission of democracy promotion. The objective of this class is to critically examine the assumption of these two countries as "cases apart" and the degree to which their "unique" characteristics may be understood as "normal" politics both in reference to each other and in the world at large. To do so, students will engage with a range of academic and popular readings on a diversity of major subjects related to each state's politics and the American-Israel relationship.
The Spokesman-Review, Aug 24, 2013
One need not be a scholar to understand the folly of John Quigley’s Aug. 17 op-ed favoring cessat... more One need not be a scholar to understand the folly of John Quigley’s Aug. 17 op-ed favoring cessation of American military aid to Egypt...
TransConflict, May 13, 2011
Dodik’s decision to postpone a controversial entity-wide referendum on the decisions of the inter... more Dodik’s decision to postpone a controversial entity-wide referendum on the decisions of the international high representative will likely amount to yet another postponement of the much needed critical reexamination of the politics of the region and the political institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Politics, Religion & Ideology, Nov 22, 2023
Journal of global security studies, Jan 9, 2024
How do religiously salient issues influence the peaceful resolution of interstate territorial dis... more How do religiously salient issues influence the peaceful resolution of interstate territorial disputes? Conflict scholars tend to represent “religious” disputes as uniquely resistant to compromise owing to their supposed symbolic indivisibility and the ideological inflexibility of the actors who pursue them. Rather, we argue that religious regimes’ preferred forums to advance peaceful resolution depend upon interactions between the breadth of a dispute’s religious salience and a claimant regime’s domestic religious legitimacy. Secular regimes lack both religious legitimacy and political motivation to engage. Thus, their dispute resolution forum preferences are unrelated to religious salience. Highly religious regimes command significant religious legitimacy and are therefore empowered to directly negotiate over broadly salient religious issues. Yet their political dependence upon religious constituencies causes them to strictly avoid legally binding conflict management over narrowly salient religious issues. By contrast, moderately religious regimes lack sufficient religious legitimacy to directly negotiate over both broadly and narrowly salient issues, rendering them particularly dispute-resolution avoidant. We test and generally confirm these propositions, utilizing new data measuring the religious salience of interstate territorial disputes in the post-Cold War era.
Political Science Quarterly, 2014
Journal of Peace Research, Jul 1, 2015
International territorial conflicts are frequently characterized by political recourse to narrati... more International territorial conflicts are frequently characterized by political recourse to narratives of nationalist entitlement, stifling conflict resolution by raising domestic audience costs and discursively limiting bargaining flexibility. Conflict incentivizes elite employment of such claims precisely because security threats and fear of violence heighten popular resonance of adversarial collective identity frames. This article argues, however, that consensus mobilization behind nationalist territorial claims is highly dependent upon the particular narratives elites select to justify them. Employing controlled individual-level experiments administered to diverse populations in Israel, it demonstrates how exposure to competing narratives of homeland, security, economic prosperity, and settlement impacts support for control of East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. Although indivisible claims to ‘United Jerusalem’, the Golan, and West Bank settlement blocs and strategic highlands are generally considered popular consensus issues in Israel, only particular narratives trigger consensus mobilization behind each. Some narratives even encourage conciliatory policy attitudes against such appeals. As a democracy embroiled in multiple enduring territorial disputes, analysis of the Israeli case contributes to understanding of the limits and political consequences of elite rhetoric. Demonstrating the affinity between narrative frames and popular policy preferences, this article also lends insight into the intersubjective beliefs that drive mass support for nationalist territorial claims.
Journal of Peace Research, May 21, 2023
How and under what conditions do religious factors explain the militarization of interstate terri... more How and under what conditions do religious factors explain the militarization of interstate territorial disputes? We argue that inconclusive findings in previous studies stem from inadequate consideration of the interaction between challenger state religiosity and the domestic constituencies actually invested in religiously salient territorial claims. To address this gap, this article differentiates between secular regimes, which provide minimal support to their state’s dominant religion and religious regimes, which strongly support their dominant religion. It also considers narrowly salient coreligionist populations, which appeal almost exclusively to religious audiences, versus broadly salient contested sacred sites, which appeal to much broader constituencies. We argue that the interaction between these two factors produces very different patterns of interstate conflict behavior. Secular regimes avoid escalation over narrowly salient religious claims because they do not depend upon religious constituents for support. However, they lack the necessary religious legitimacy to manage outbidding challenges that frequently arise over more broadly salient claims. Religious regimes, by contrast, enjoy high domestic religious legitimacy, enabling more peaceful engagement with broadly salient religious claims. Yet their political dependence upon religious constituencies incentivizes conflict when disputes involve narrowly salient religious claims. We test these propositions utilizing original data on the religious salience of interstate territorial disputes in the post-Cold War era, from 1990 to 2010. Analyses, using both dichotomous and continuous measures of regime religiosity, confirm these inferences and contribute to highly nuanced understandings of how state-religion policy and religious salience interact to influence patterns of interstate violence.
Politics and Religion, Feb 10, 2020
Interstate conflicts involving religion are commonly argued to be more severe and more protracted... more Interstate conflicts involving religion are commonly argued to be more severe and more protracted than other forms of conflict. Although various arguments have sought to explain religion's apparent contributions to global violence, few consider the foreign policy goals over which religious actors actually fight. This article does so by examining whether religiously-exclusive states tend to militarize interstate territorial disputes (MIDs) over issues of strategic material or identity salience. Insofar as religiously-exclusive states seek to "defend the faith" against internal and external challengers, identitysalient disputes should be a particularly attractive target for militarization. We however find the opposite. Although religiously-exclusive states do initiate territorial MIDs more frequently than their secular counterparts, they are significantly more likely to do so owing to disputed territories' strategic rather than symbolic value. These results challenge accepted wisdom regarding religion's influence on international conflict and suggest critical new avenues for research.
Religions, May 31, 2022
This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative... more This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Jun 24, 2022
Ideology may directly provide motive and indirectly capacity for collective violence, thus making... more Ideology may directly provide motive and indirectly capacity for collective violence, thus making armed conflicts longer and bloodier. We investigate these propositions by drawing on an innovative global dataset which codes ideological claims by rebel groups and governments in intrastate armed conflicts since 1946. Results demonstrate that although ideology increases conflict duration, these effects vary by type and timing. Whereas secular ideological conflicts tended to be more protracted during the Cold War, religious ideology has become increasingly important since. We, however, find little evidence that ideology increases conflict intensity. Rather, rebel criminality best accounts for intensity. So, while immaterial resources like ideology sustain willingness to fight, ideology’s influence upon conflict intensity is limited, especially after the Cold War. Future studies need to take ideology seriously and need to investigate its characteristics more in-depth and in conjunction with material, identity related and international variables.
Terrorism and Political Violence
Journal of Peace Research
How and under what conditions do religious factors explain the militarization of interstate terri... more How and under what conditions do religious factors explain the militarization of interstate territorial disputes? We argue that inconclusive findings in previous studies stem from inadequate consideration of the interaction between challenger state religiosity and the domestic constituencies actually invested in religiously salient territorial claims. To address this gap, this article differentiates between secular regimes, which provide minimal support to their state’s dominant religion and religious regimes, which strongly support their dominant religion. It also considers narrowly salient coreligionist populations, which appeal almost exclusively to religious audiences, versus broadly salient contested sacred sites, which appeal to much broader constituencies. We argue that the interaction between these two factors produces very different patterns of interstate conflict behavior. Secular regimes avoid escalation over narrowly salient religious claims because they do not depend up...
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Ideology may directly provide motive and indirectly capacity for collective violence, thus making... more Ideology may directly provide motive and indirectly capacity for collective violence, thus making armed conflicts longer and bloodier. We investigate these propositions by drawing on an innovative global dataset which codes ideological claims by rebel groups and governments in intrastate armed conflicts since 1946. Results demonstrate that although ideology increases conflict duration, these effects vary by type and timing. Whereas secular ideological conflicts tended to be more protracted during the Cold War, religious ideology has become increasingly important since. We, however, find little evidence that ideology increases conflict intensity. Rather, rebel criminality best accounts for intensity. So, while immaterial resources like ideology sustain willingness to fight, ideology’s influence upon conflict intensity is limited, especially after the Cold War. Future studies need to take ideology seriously and need to investigate its characteristics more in-depth and in conjunction w...
Contains replication data and code for "Uneasy Lies the Crown: External Threats to Religious... more Contains replication data and code for "Uneasy Lies the Crown: External Threats to Religious Legitimacy and Interstate Dispute Militarization". See read-me file for full details.
American Politics Research
To what extent do white nationalists influence Congressional representative conservatism? Althoug... more To what extent do white nationalists influence Congressional representative conservatism? Although ethnocentrism, out-group prejudice, and racial threats strongly predict American political attitudes and voter behavior, how social movements predicated on these beliefs shape political outcomes is rarely considered. We argue that white nationalist activities significantly contribute to the radicalization of Congressional representatives’ policy agendas in a manner non-reducible to demographic or socioeconomic conditions. By mobilizing white voters against racial status threats, they indirectly compel politicians to adopt more radically conservative agendas. We quantitatively test these propositions by examining distributions of white nationalist groups in the American South against Congressional representative conservatism from 2010–2017. Analyses reveal that white nationalists indeed appear to significantly impact representative radical conservatism, even controlling for numerous fac...
Religions
The International Religious Freedom Act, passed by Congress in 1998, set international religious ... more The International Religious Freedom Act, passed by Congress in 1998, set international religious freedom promotion (IRF) as a core objective of American foreign policy. Although formally empowering the president to enact punitive sanctions in instances of extreme religious repression, IRF is primarily a soft power instrument, with the expressed intent to persuade rather than coerce states into greater respect for religious freedom. Nearly a quarter century since its enactment, however, religious discrimination has markedly increased worldwide. This paper therefore seeks to quantitatively evaluate the extent to which American soft power, measured via levels of popular approval for the United States in countries surveyed by various polling agencies from 2002 to 2014, has correlated with shifts in governmental religious discrimination (GRD) since 1998. We find that not only do higher levels of approval of the United States correlate with greater increases in GRD, but this effect is par...
Security Studies, 2022
Although often argued that religion should significantly influence international conflict, the em... more Although often argued that religion should significantly influence international conflict, the empirical record is mixed. For every recurrent inter-religious conflict, there are numerous examples of sustained inter-religious cooperation. So too, conflict frequently mars the oft-assumed peaceful relations between shared-religion states. We argue that religion is an important intervening factor in interstate dispute militarization, especially between internally-threatened rivals. In mixed-religion dyads, conflict often follows oppression of cross-border coreligionists, while in shared-religion dyads, conflict occurs as one side disproportionately increases its official support for that religion. In both instances, dispute militarization is primarily an effort to undercut domestic competitors, whose challenge is augmented by external threats to leaders' religious legitimacy. We test these propositions using new, long-term data on religious demography and state-religion policy, identifying rivalries via antecedent interstate territorial disputes. Findings largely confirm our hypotheses, substantially clarifying the conditions under which religion contributes to international militarized conflict.
This paper analyzes the impact of the international community's failure to punish Sudan as a ... more This paper analyzes the impact of the international community's failure to punish Sudan as a means to bring an end to ongoing conflict in its western region of Darfur. Focusing on the actions and rhetoric of the United Nations Security Council with respect to its recent adoption of the "responsibility to protect" doctrine, it is claimed that the Council has emphasized the importance of its collective responsibility to protect innocents to the detriment of holding failed states accountable for their role in fermenting and/or exacerbating intrastate violence. While recognizing as legitimate the multiple factors responsible for the shift in international practice from imposing punitive measures against norm violating states to international and individual accountability, it is argued that all have resulted in the unintended consequence of vastly expanding an environment of impunity in which individual conflicts may eventually be arrested but the conditions allowing the outbreak of such violence remain unaffected. Moreover, this deferral of state-targeted punishment by the Security Council has ramifications beyond the individual case's borders such that failed states may no longer be held to account for their actions. This has resulted in the reinforcement of orthodox normative understandings and practical respect of sovereignty inappropriate to post-Cold War security realities further impairing the ability of the Council to ensure the preservation of international peace and security. As such, it is critical that the international community re-recognize the importance of state-targeted coercion as an instrument of multilateral diplomacy and as a legitimate means to maintain international order.
Security Studies
ABSTRACT When are domestic publics most sympathetic to nationalist territorial ambitions? Conflic... more ABSTRACT When are domestic publics most sympathetic to nationalist territorial ambitions? Conflict scholars commonly assume support should be greatest when territory is framed as being of intangible value to national identity over tangible importance to national security and economic prosperity. This should be especially true regarding lost homelands, territories wherein a state has previously exercised sovereignty and to which it has enduring ethnic ties. This article presents experimental evidence that directly challenges these assumptions, demonstrating the variability of Serbian popular attachments to three lost territories: Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro. It finds that intangible framings do not necessarily engender stronger assertions that such territories belong to the homeland than tangible framings do. Nor do they necessarily motivate greater support for nationalist territorial agendas. These findings cast doubt on conventional wisdom regarding domestic publics' contributions to territorial conflict and offer refined insights regarding in which instances intangible claims are most conflict-prone.
Journal of Peace Research, 2015
Oxford University Press eBooks, Sep 21, 2023
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To what extent do minority grievances contribute to intrastate conflict? Against the backdrop of ... more To what extent do minority grievances contribute to intrastate conflict? Against the backdrop of rising discrimination against religious minorities worldwide, Religious Minorities at Risk offers new insights into classic debates on the influences of discrimination, deprivation, and inequality (DDI) on minority grievances and conflict behavior. It does so by utilizing original data on 771 religious minorities in 183 countries between 2000 and 2014. The book demonstrates that DDI is a significant cause of minority grievances which, in turn, deeply influence their conflict behaviors.
It also shows the different effects of governmental and societal religious discrimination versus political and economic and marginalization. Religious, political, and economic grievances each escalate conflict intensity by aggrieved minorities in different ways. Ultimately, the book shows that collective grievances remain a powerful explanation for minorities' conflict behaviors; although influenced by DDI, they are not reducible to them. Second, while religious factors, including religious discrimination and grievances, uniquely contribute to minority conflict behavior, the overall patterns observed for religious minorities closely mirror those typically theorized for other minority groups. Finally, minority conflict intensity reflects the difficulties states encounter in accommodating them. Whereas religious grievances are relatively easily accommodated and therefore rarely escalate beyond rioting, political grievances influence a wider range, from non-violent protest to violence
against civilians. Economic grievances, which demand costly systemic reforms, more often escalate to rebellion. An essential work on the causes of intercommunal and intrastate conflict, this will assist policymakers dealing with these issues.