Tom McClelland | University of Cambridge (original) (raw)

Papers on Mental Action by Tom McClelland

This paper argues for three claims: In the foregoing sketch of my proposal I have made three main... more This paper argues for three claims:
In the foregoing sketch of my proposal I have made three main claims:
i. That to make sense of the puzzles surrounding suffering we should adopt a disruption model on which suffering is constituted by the unpleasant impact of a suffered state on our wider mental lives.
ii. That to make sense of the disruption constitutive of suffering we should acknowledge that suffering is, to some extent, under our agential control.
iii. That to make sense of the agential status of suffering we should recognise the presence of disruptive mental urges triggered by suffered mental states.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2019

Affordances are possibilities for action. As you wander through a park, a football might afford k... more Affordances are possibilities for action. As you wander through a park, a football might afford kicking, a bench might afford sitting and a tree might afford climbing. The term ‘affordance’ was introduced by ecological psychologist J.J. Gibson. He explains ‘[t]he affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill.’ (1979, p. 127). Gibson put forward a rich set of claims about affordances and their theoretical significance. I will be building on two of those claims in particular. The first claim is that affordances have a constitutive connection to the acting agent. Gibson explains ‘[t]he verb to afford is found in the dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment.’ (1979 p. 127). The football, for example, affords kicking by me - its being kickable is a property it has relative to my capacities for action. The second claim is that affordances are perceptible properties. Gibson states that this is ‘…a radical hypothesis, for it implies that the “values” and “meanings” of things in the environment can be directly perceived.’ (1979, p. 127). On this view the football’s property of being kickable, for example, is not something you explicitly infer on the basis of what you perceive but rather something you see directly.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Our successful engagement with the world is plausibly underwritten by our sensitivity to affordan... more Our successful engagement with the world is plausibly underwritten by our sensitivity to affordances in our immediate environment. The considerable literature on affordances focuses almost exclusively on affordances for bodily actions such as gripping, walking or eating. I propose that we are also sensitive to affordances for mental actions such as attending, imagining and counting. My case for this ‘Mental Affordance Hypothesis’ is motivated by a series of examples in which our sensitivity to mental affordances mirrors our sensitivity to bodily affordances. Specifically, subjects perceive opportunities to perform a mental action and their doing so leads, under the right conditions, to the automatic preparation of that action. I conclude by sketching a mental affordance research program that would reinforce my case for the Mental Affordance Hypothesis and establish its ramifications for a number of debates across philosophy and psychology.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

To perceive an affordance is to perceive an object or situation as presenting an opportunity for ... more To perceive an affordance is to perceive an object or situation as presenting an opportunity for action. The concept of affordances has been taken up across wide range of disciplines, including AI. I explore an interesting extension of the concept of affordances in robotics. Among the affordances that artificial systems have been engineered to detect are affordances to deliberate. In psychology, affordances are typically limited to bodily action, so the it is noteworthy that AI researchers have found it helpful to extend the concept to encompass mental actions. I propose that psychologists can learn from this extension, and argue that human subjects can perceive mental affordances, such as affordances to attend, affordances to imagine and affordances to count.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

The Ubiquity of Inner Awareness thesis (UIA) states that all conscious states of normal adult hum... more The Ubiquity of Inner Awareness thesis (UIA) states that all conscious states of normal adult humans are characterised by an inner awareness of that very state. UIA-Backers support this thesis while UIA-Skeptics reject it. At the heart of their dispute is a recalcitrant phenomenological disagreement. UIA-Backers claim that phenomenological investigation reveals ‘peripheral inner awareness’ (or ‘pre-reflective self-consciousness’) to be a constant presence in their non-introspective experiences. UIA-Skeptics deny that their non-introspective experiences are characterised by inner awareness, and maintain that inner awareness is only gained when they explicitly introspect. Each camp has put forward a range of arguments designed to resolve this dispute, but I argue that none of these arguments has genuine dialectical purchase. This leads me to develop a compromise position that trades on the contribution that affordances can make to our phenomenology. According to the Affordance Model of inner awareness, all conscious states of normal adult humans are characterised by an affordance of introspectability.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Papers on Consciousness by Tom McClelland

This paper identifies some epistemic problems surrounding knowledge of our own conscious states, ... more This paper identifies some epistemic problems surrounding knowledge of our own conscious states, and argues that these puzzles can be overcome if phenomenal states are regarded as reflexive mental representations. I discuss the epistemic principle of Receptivity, which claims that a subject can have epistemic contact with entities only insofar as they are affected by those entities. I show why this principle is unable to accommodate the distinctive self¬-knowledge afforded by conscious experience. I offer two arguments showing how Receptivity entails that knowledge of our own phenomenology is impossible, and two further arguments showing how it entails that knowledge of our own awareness is impossible. I then explore a contemporary account of consciousness: Kriegel’s Self-Representationalism. I argue that Self-Representationalism is uniquely equipped to provide a satisfactory account of how phenomenal self-knowledge is possible. I conclude that phenomenal self-knowledge is a principled exception to the Receptivity principle.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

This thesis aims to provide a compelling and distinctive response to the Problem of Consciousness... more This thesis aims to provide a compelling and distinctive response to the Problem of Consciousness. This is achieved by offering a bipartite analysis of the epistemic gap at the heart of that problem, and by building upon the hypothesis that the apparent problem is symptomatic of our limited conception of the physical.
Chapter 1 introduces the problem. The key question is whether phenomenal consciousness is onticly dependent on the physical, or onticly independent of it. There are powerful arguments for the Primitivist view that consciousness is independent of the physical. These arguments rest on the apparent epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal. I propose that this apparent gap must be understood as a composite of two deeper conceptual gaps pertaining to the subjective character and qualitative character of consciousness respectively. The ‘–tivity gap’ claims that physical states are objective, phenomenal states are subjective and that there is no entailment from the objective to the subjective. The ‘–trinsicality gap’ claims that physical properties are extrinsic (structural), that phenomenal qualities are intrinsic (non-structural) and that there is no entailment from the extrinsic to the intrinsic. After refining the case for Primitivism, I consider the compelling reasons for rejecting Primitivism in favour of Physicalism. The challenge posed by the Problem of Consciousness is to resolve this antinomy between Primitivism and Physicalism.
In Chapter 2 I consider standard responses to the problem. The failings of these positions lead me to introduce three criteria that an adequate response must satisfy. I reject the view that Primitivism can be salvaged, and hold that a satisfactory response to the problem must protect Physicalism. I reject standard ‘Type-A’ responses according to which there is no epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal, and argue that a satisfactory response cannot deny the manifest reality of phenomenal consciousness. Finally, I reject ‘Type-B’ responses according to which the epistemic gap does not entail ontic distinctness. I hold that if Physicalism is true, the entailment from the physical facts to the phenomenal facts must be knowable a priori for an epistemically ideal subject.
Chapter 3 evaluates a non-standard Type-A response to the Problem of Consciousness which promises to satisfy all three criteria. According to Stoljar’s Epistemic View (EV), consciousness only seems inexplicable in physical terms because we have a limited conception of the physical. I argue that EV should be supported iff two demanding challenges can be met: the Relevance Condition requires adequate reason to believe that unknown physical properties could address the –tivity gap and the –trinsicality gap. The Integration Condition requires adequate reason to believe that there is a specific blind-spot in our current conception of the physical that is plausibly occupied by properties that perform the requisite explanatory role. To satisfy these conditions, the advocate of EV must make positive claims about the content of our proposed ignorance.
In Chapter 4 I argue that EV stands or falls with the plausibility of the Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis (RIH). According to RIH, we have no concepts of the intrinsic properties of physical entities, and those intrinsic properties are integral to the physical explanation of consciousness. I argue that we are indeed conceptually ignorant of intrinsic physical properties. I also argue that RIH meets the Integration Condition, and goes some way to satisfying the Relevance Condition. RIH plausibly undermines the –trinsicality gap by showing that some physical properties are intrinsic, though they are beyond our current conception. The apparent gap is then an illusion resulting from the fact that all known physical properties are extrinsic. RIH fails, however, to address the –tivity gap. I conclude that no version of EV can offer a full response to the Problem of Consciousness.
In Chapter 5 I explore an entirely different kind of response to the Problem of Consciousness. Representationalism claims that consciousness is explicable in terms of intentional properties, and that intentional properties are explicable in terms of physical properties. I argue that standard Representationalist proposals are unable to account for the qualitative character of conscious states, and diagnose this failure in terms of the –trinsicality gap. However, the prospects for a Representationalist account of subjective character are more promising. Specifically, Kriegel’s Self-Representationalism holds that a mental state is a phenomenal state in virtue of suitably representing itself. I argue that this proposal plausibly addresses the –tivity gap.
RIH and Self-Representationalism each deal with one of the two apparent conceptual gaps between the physical and the phenomenal, but not the other. In Chapter 6 I develop a hybrid proposal that combines the best of both positions. The ‘Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis’ (NRIH) claims that a mental state is a phenomenal state at all in virtue of suitably representing itself, and has its qualitative character in virtue of the intrinsic physical properties involved in its implementation. I expand this claim and defend it against a number of potential criticisms. I also explore the relationship between its two components, suggesting that they are each founded on a common epistemic insight. I argue that NRIH successfully addresses the –tivity and –trinsicality gaps and, moreover, that it provides a compelling account of why consciousness appears to be inexplicable in physical terms. I conclude that NRIH offers a powerful response to the Problem of Consciousness that successfully undermines the case for Primitivism. Furthermore, I conclude that NRIH has substantial advantages over competing attempted responses, and offers the best possible way of capitalising on the insights of EV and Representationalism.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

We have reason to believe that phenomenal properties are nothing over and above certain physical ... more We have reason to believe that phenomenal properties are nothing over and above certain physical properties. However, doubt is cast on this by the apparent epistemic gap that arises for attempts to account for phenomenal properties in physical terms. I argue that the epistemic gap should be divided into two more fundamental conceptual gaps. The first of these pertains to the distinctive subjectivity of phenomenal states, and the second pertains to the intrinsicality of phenomenal qualities. Stoljar’s Ignorance Hypothesis (IH) attempts to undermine the epistemic gap by arguing that the apparent inexplicability of the phenomenal is merely a symptom of our limited conception of the non-phenomenal world. I establish some obstacles to IH, and argue that the correct analysis of the epistemic gap means these obstacles can only partially be overcome. I propose, nonetheless, that IH can still be put to good use as half of a hybrid account of phenomenal consciousness. This proposal combines a Self-Representationalist account of the subjectivity of phenomenal states with a Russellian version of IH that accommodates the qualitative character of those states. This Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis (NRIH) offers a distinctive way of undermining the epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Kriegel’s Self-Representationalist (SR) theory of phenomenal consciousness pursues two projects. ... more Kriegel’s Self-Representationalist (SR) theory of phenomenal consciousness pursues two projects. The first is to offer a positive account of how conscious experience arises from physical brain processes. The second is to explain why consciousness misleadingly appears to be irreducible to the physical i.e. to ‘demystify’ consciousness. This paper seeks to determine whether SR succeeds on the second project. Kriegel trades on a distinction between the subjective character and qualitative character of conscious states. Subjective character is the property of being a conscious state at all, while qualitative character determines what it is like to be in that state. Kriegel claims that SR explains why subjective character misleadingly appears irreducible, thereby neutralising the apparent irreducibility of consciousness. I argue that although SR credibly demystifies subjective character, it cannot explain why qualitative character also appears irreducible. I conclude that we should pursue the possibility of a hybrid position that combines SR with an account that does explain the apparent irreducibility of qualitative character.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Phenomenal consciousness presents a distinctive explanatory problem. Some regard this problem as ... more Phenomenal consciousness presents a distinctive explanatory problem. Some regard this problem as ‘hard’, which has troubling implications for the science and metaphysics of consciousness. Some regard it as ‘easy’, which ignores the special explanatory difficulties that consciousness offers. Others are unable to decide between these two uncomfortable positions. All three camps assume that the problem of consciousness is either easy or hard. I argue against this disjunction and suggest that the problem may be ‘tricky’—that is, partly easy and partly hard. This possibility emerges when we recognise that consciousness raises two explanatory questions. The Consciousness Question concerns why a subject is conscious rather than unconscious. The Character Question concerns why a conscious subject’s experience has the phenomenology it has rather than some other. I explore the possibility of one or other of these explanatory challenges being hard and the other easy, and consider the dialectical ramifications this has for all sides of the debate.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Conservatives claim that all phenomenal properties are sensory. Liberals countenance non-sensory ... more Conservatives claim that all phenomenal properties are sensory. Liberals countenance non-sensory phenomenal properties such as what it’s like to perceive some high-level property, and what it’s like to think that p. A hallmark of phenomenal properties is that they present an explanatory gap, so to resolve the dispute we should consider whether experience has non-sensory properties that appear ‘gappy’. The classic tests for ‘gappiness’ are the invertibility test and the zombifiability test. I suggest that these tests yield conflicting results: non-sensory properties lend themselves to zombie scenarios but not to inversion scenarios. Which test should we trust? Against Carruthers & Veillet (2011), I argue that invertibility is not a viable condition of phenomenality. In contrast, being zombifiable is credibly necessary and sufficient for phenomenality. I conclude that there are non-sensory properties of experience that are ‘gappy’ in the right way, and that liberalism is therefore the most plausible position.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

In his paper 'Are we ever aware of concepts? A critical question for the Global Neuronal Workspac... more In his paper 'Are we ever aware of concepts? A critical question for the Global Neuronal Workspace, Integrated Information, and Attended Intermediate-Level Representation theories of consciousness' (2015, this journal), Kemmerer defends a conservative account of consciousness, according to which concepts and thoughts do not characterize the contents of consciousness , and then uses that account to argue against both the Global Neuronal Workspace theory of consciousness and Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness, and as a point in favour of Prinz's Attended Intermediate-level Representations theory. We argue that there are a number of respects in which the contrast between conservative and liberal conceptions of the admissible contents of consciousness is more complex than Kemmerer's discussion suggests. We then consider Kemmerer's case for conservatism, arguing that it lumbers liberals with commitments that they need not – and in our view should not – endorse. We also argue that Kemmerer's attempt to use his case for conservatism against the Global Neuronal Workspace and Integrated Information theories of consciousness on the one hand, and as a point in favour of Prinz's Attended Intermediate Representations theory on the other hand, is problematic. Finally, we consider Kemmerer's overall strategy of using an account of the admissible contents of consciousness to evaluate theories of consciousness , and suggest that here too there are complications that Kemmerer's discussion overlooks.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Some claim that we are phenomenally aware of our experiences as being our own. Different theorist... more Some claim that we are phenomenally aware of our experiences as being our own. Different theorists offer different accounts of how pervasive this sense of mineness is, but what unites them is the claim that such a quality of experience exists. In this paper, I suggest that a compelling case for the existence of the sense of mineness has not yet been made. I then introduce four impediments that any such case must overcome: the Epistemic Impediment; the Representation Impediment; the Function Impediment; and the Malfunction Impediment. Although none of these constitutes a knock-down objection to the thesis that experiences are characterised by a sense of mineness, they each highlight a challenge that advocates of the sense of mineness must address. I propose that any case for mineness should be assessed relative to its ability to overcome these impediments.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

To understand Self-Representationalism (SR) you need to understand its family. Self-Representatio... more To understand Self-Representationalism (SR) you need to understand its family. Self-Representationalism is a branch of the Meta-Representationalist family, and according to theories in this family what distinguishes conscious mental representations from unconscious mental representations is that conscious ones are themselves the target of a mental meta¬-representational state. A mental state M1 is thus phenomenally conscious in virtue of being suitably represented by some mental state M2. What distinguishes the Self-Representationalist branch of the family is the claim that M1 and M2 must be the same token mental state, so a mental state is phenomenally conscious in virtue of suitably representing itself. This Self-Representationalist branch of the family divides into further branches, giving us specific implementations of the Self-Representationalist approach. But before asking whether we should adopt Self-Representationalism, and in what form, we should reflect on why Meta-Representationalism is an attractive family in the first place. After all, Self-Representationalist theories trade on their family name, claiming to deliver on the promises that drive the Meta-Representationalist approach. The two most important promises of Meta-Representationalism are: a) the promise of capturing the transitivity of consciousness and; b) the promise of rendering consciousness naturalisable. I discuss each in turn.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Jackson’s (1982) formulation of the knowledge argument (KA) has had an inestimable influence on t... more Jackson’s (1982) formulation of the knowledge argument (KA) has had an inestimable influence on the discussion of consciousness and the apparent problem it presents for physicalism. A common objection to KA is the ‘ignorance objection’. According to this objection, our intuitions about Mary merely reflect our ignorance of physical facts that are integral to the explanation of phenomenal consciousness (e.g. Dennett 1991; Stoljar 2006). Armed with the insights of a future science, Mary would actually be able to deduce what it’s like to see red. We only have the intuition that Mary would learn something new because we don’t know the things she knows. Those sympathetic to KA have brushed away the ignorance objection on the grounds that even though we don’t know what the future science of consciousness will reveal, we do know what kind of facts it will contain and know that this is the wrong kind of fact from which to deduce facts about phenomenal consciousness. In other words, they suggest that the insight that underwrites KA is ‘future-proof’: it is not the kind of insight that could be displaced by new scientific knowledge. I argue that this strategy for defending KA is dialectically problematic and reveals a fundamental limitation of the argument.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Papers on Perception by Tom McClelland

From the first-person point of view, seeing a red square is very different from thinking about a ... more From the first-person point of view, seeing a red square is very different from thinking about a red square, hearing an alarm sound is very different from thinking that an alarm is sounding, and smelling freshly-roasted coffee is very different from thinking that there is feshly-roasted coffee in one's vicinity. How might the familiar contrast between representing a fact in thought and representing it in perception be captured? One influential idea is that perceptual states are phenomenally conscious whereas thoughts are not. However, those theorists who hold that thoughts have a distinctive kind of phenomenal character – often known as " cognitive phenomenology " – cannot account for the contrast between thought and perception in this manner. This paper examines the various options that are available to advocates of cognitive phenomenology for capturing the experiential contrast between thought and perception, and argues that each of them faces serious challenges. keywords mental content, cognitive phenomenology, perceptual content, fregean content, representational format

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

The ongoing debate over the 'admissible contents of perceptual expe-rience' concerns the range of... more The ongoing debate over the 'admissible contents of perceptual expe-rience' concerns the range of properties that human beings are directly acquainted with in perceptual experience. Regarding vision, it is relatively uncontroversial that the following properties can figure in the contents of visual experience: colour, shape, illumination, spatial relations, motion, and texture. The controversy begins when we ask whether any properties besides these figure in visual experience. We argue that 'ensemble properties' should be added to the list of visually admissible properties. Ensemble properties are features that belong to a set of perceptible objects as a whole as opposed to the individuals that constitute that set. They include such features as the mean size of an array of shapes or the average emotional expression of an array of faces. Recent work in vision science has yielded compelling evidence that the visual system routinely encodes such properties. We argue that epistemological considerations provide strong reasons to think that these properties figure in visual experience. Judgements about ensemble properties are immediately warranted by our perceptual experience, and the only plausible way that a perceptual experience could confer this warrant is if it confers awareness of ensemble properties. Tim Bayne and Tom McClelland have contributed equally to this paper, and the order of authors has been determined alphabetically.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Formal apparatus can be used to deduce whether something is possible, impossible, contingent or n... more Formal apparatus can be used to deduce whether something is possible, impossible, contingent or necessary. Sloman has observed, however, that our capacity to discern such modal properties cannot be an exclusively formal capacity. The axioms of geometry, for example, can be used to deduce a number of necessary truths, but the necessity of the axioms themselves cannot be deduced formally. This suggests we have more primitive ‘modal competencies’ that enable us to disern modal properties. But where do these competencies come from and why do we have them? I propose that modal competencies are built upon the capacity for affordance perception: our ability to see what actions are possible or impossible in a given environment.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

I propose that high-level properties of scenes, such as the property of being a forest, being a s... more I propose that high-level properties of scenes, such as the property of being a forest, being a street or being a desert, figure in the contents of visual experience. My case for
this conclusion adopts a novel hybrid strategy that targets particular features of experience using phenomenal contrast cases, then uses empirical findings to discern the best explanation of these features. I show that the standard counter-arguments used to deflate putative cases of high-level perception are ineffective against the examples discussed. I also propose that my argument for high-level perception of scenes has considerable advantages over existing arguments for high-level perception of objects.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2019

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Kantian Humility (KH) holds that the intrinsic properties of objects are unknowable for agents su... more Kantian Humility (KH) holds that the intrinsic properties of objects are unknowable for agents such as ourselves. Categorial properties, such as being an object, present a potential threat to KH. Cowling (2010) argues that knowing KH to be true requires knowledge of categorial properties. However, if such properties are shown to be intrinsic properties, then KH is committed to their being unknowable. I defend KH by presenting three alternative responses to this challenge. First, that categorial properties are not properties in the sense relevant to KH. Second, that if they are properties, they are not intrinsic properties. Third, that if they are intrinsic properties, KH is not committed to their being unknowable. I also show how these responses can be applied to a related objection to KH offered by Moore (2001).

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

According to the virtual self theory (VST), selves are merely virtual entities. On this view, our... more According to the virtual self theory (VST), selves are merely virtual entities. On this view, our self-representations do not refer to any concrete object and the self is a merely intentional entity. This contemporary version of the 'no-self' theory is driven by a number of psychological and philosophical considerations indicating that our representations of the self are pervasively inaccurate. I present two problems for VST. First, the case for VST fails to rule out a more moderate position according to which the self exists but is systematically misrepresented by us. This position regards the self as a real entity that has illusory appearances, rather than as a hallucinated entity that has a merely intentional existence. Second, I suggest that this 'illusion model' of self-misrepresentation is preferable to VST. Advocates of VST must acknowledge the existence of an entity—typically the brain—that is the bearer of our misrepresenta-tions of the self. I argue that, other things being equal, we should regard the bearer of our self-representations as the self, even if that entity diverges dramatically from the way we represent the self to be. So by acknowledging the existence of a bearer of self-representations, advocates of VST are in a poor position to deny the existence of the self. I conclude that VST not only fails to rule out the illusion model, but that we have prima facie reason to prefer the illusion model to VST.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

There are two respects in which the medium of film and the discipline of philosophy intersect. Fi... more There are two respects in which the medium of film and the discipline of philosophy intersect. First, the philosophy of film asks philosophical questions about the nature of film. Second, the notion of film as philosophy (FAP) proposes that films themselves can contribute to a range of philosophical debates. FAP raises some troubling conceptual problems. How is it possible for film to contribute to philosophical debate? And, if it is possible, why should we turn to film for those contributions rather than to traditional academic sources? I address these problems with a ‘Socratic Model’ of the role of film in philosophical debate. I argue that the representational limitations of motion pictures are compatible with film acting as a ‘midwife’ for philosophical insights in its audience. Furthermore, where a film fascilitates insights into the philosophy of film, I argue that it can be better positioned to prompt those realisations than an academic text. I put this model in to practice with an account of the philosophical value of Hitchcock’s Rear Window, which invites its audience to consider moral and epistemic issues surrounding the activity of film viewing.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Films have been claimed to play the role of philosophical thought experiments. Thought experiment... more Films have been claimed to play the role of philosophical thought experiments. Thought experiments use hypothetical scenarios to motivate certain philosophical conclusions, so the hypothetical scenarios depicted in films can, it is claimed, perform much the same role. A complication with this proposal is that the role of thought experiments in philosophy is itself contentious. Worries have been raised about whether thought experiments are characteristic of philosophical thinking and whether they are capable of justifying philosophical conclusions. These worries complicate the analogy between film and thought experiment in at least two ways. First, if thought experiments are not characteristic of philosophy then the intellectual contributions of film may fail to be distinctively philosophical. I overcome this worry by using subject matter as a criterion of philosophical thought experiment. Second, there are difficulties with the claim that thought experiments can warrant philosophical conclusions. If thought experiments are bad tools for doing philosophy, then it seems film can only make bad contributions to philosophy. I suggest that the putative limitations of thought experiments are surmountable, and that film may be especially well-placed to surmount them.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Review of Derk Pereboom, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Book Review of Uriah Kriegel, The Varieties of Consciousness, OUP. Review forthcoming in Philosop... more Book Review of Uriah Kriegel, The Varieties of Consciousness, OUP. Review forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Review of Varela, Thompson and Rosch - The Embodied Mind 2nd Ed

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Philosophical Psychology, 2024

Discussion of affordance perception focuses almost exclusively on affordances for non-mental acti... more Discussion of affordance perception focuses almost exclusively on affordances for non-mental actions like climbing, walking and eating. This paper asks whether we might also perceive affordances for a specific class of mental action: acts of imagination. We first explore how the environment can present opportunities for imaginative action. We then combine phenomenological and theoretical considerations to argue that we do indeed perceive affordances for imaginative action. Putting this claim to work, we apply the concept of imaginative affordances to the topics of imaginative skill and imaginative tools.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Philosophical psychology, May 21, 2024

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

The inequitable distribution of domestic and caring labour in different‐sex couples has been a lo... more The inequitable distribution of domestic and caring labour in different‐sex couples has been a longstanding feminist concern. Some have hoped that having both partners at home during the COVID‐19 pandemic would usher in a new era of equitable work and caring distributions. Contrary to these hopes, old patterns seem to have persisted. Moreover, studies suggest this inequitable distribution often goes unnoticed by the male partner. This raises two questions. Why do women continue to shoulder a disproportionate amount of housework and childcare despite economic and cultural gains? And why is there a widespread one‐sided misrepresentation within different‐sex couples about how domestic and caring work is distributed between the two partners? We answer these questions by appealing to affordance perception – the perception of possibilities for action in one's environment. We propose an important gender disparity in the perception of affordances for domestic tasks such as the dishwashe...

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Nov 14, 2022

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2020

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2013

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2022

In this paper we focus on a kind of perceptual states that we call perceptual motivations, that i... more In this paper we focus on a kind of perceptual states that we call perceptual motivations, that is, perceptual experiences that plausibly motivate us to act, such as itching, perceptual salience and pain. Itching seems to motivate you to scratch, perceiving a stimulus as salient seems to motivate you to attend to it and feeling a pain in your hand seems to motivate actions such as withdrawing from the painful stimulus. Five main accounts of perceptual motivation are available: Descriptive, Conative, Imperativist, Reflexive and Dual Content views. Some of these have been developed in detail and others are natural extensions of existing views. However, we argue that none provides a satisfactory account of the target perceptual states. Driven by the failings of each account, we identify three conditions that any satisfactory theory of perceptual motivation must meet: Direct Motivational Force, Non-Obligatory Force and Intention-Independent Influence. Then we offer an account that attem...

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Philosophy of Suffering, 2019

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 2021

Debates surrounding the high-level contents of perceptual experience focus on whether weperceive ... more Debates surrounding the high-level contents of perceptual experience focus on whether weperceive the high-level properties of visual objects, such as the property of being a pine tree. Thispaper considers instead whether we perceive the high-level properties of visual scenes, such asthe property of being a forest. Liberals about the contents of perceptual experience have offered avariety of phenomenal contrast cases designed to reveal how the high-level properties of objectsfigure in our visual experience. I offer a series of equivalent phenomenal contrast cases intendedto show how the high-level properties of visual scenes also figure in visual experience. Thisfirst-person evidence of high-level scene perception is combined with third-person evidence fromthe extensive empirical literature on scene categorisation. Critics of liberalism have attempted todeflate existing phenomenal contrast cases by explaining the contrasts in terms of non-perceptualcontents or in terms of attentional...

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Erkenntnis, 2017

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Phenomenological Reviews, 2017

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2017

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2016

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2016

In their paper “What is the Bandwidth of Perceptual Experience” Cohen et al. contribute to a grow... more In their paper “What is the Bandwidth of Perceptual Experience” Cohen et al. contribute to a growing literature [1] on the implications of ensemble coding (also known as summary statistics) for accounts of the bandwidth of perception [2,3]. According to the sparse view, the bandwidth of perception is very narrow, and subjects have conscious access only to the handful of objects that get through the bottleneck of attention and/or working memory. Cohen et al. argue that ensemble coding research undermines the sparse view.

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2016

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact