Silver Bronzo | University of Chicago (original) (raw)

Books by Silver Bronzo

The distinction between sense and nonsense is central to Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is at the ... more The distinction between sense and nonsense is central to Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is at the basis of his conception of philosophy as a struggle against illusions of sense generated by misunderstandings of the logic of our language. Moreover, it informs the notions of "grammar" (in the later work) and "logical syntax" (in the early work), whose investigation serves to clear up those misunderstandings. This Element contrasts two exegetical approaches: one grounding charges of nonsensicality in a theory of sense specifying criteria that are external to the linguistic performance under indictment; and one rejecting any such theory. The former pursues the idea of a nonsensicality test; the latter holds that illusions of sense can only be overcome from within, through the very capacity of which they constitute defective exercises. The Element connects the two approaches to opposite understandings of Wittgenstein's conception of language, and defends a version of the second approach.

Papers by Silver Bronzo

Iride, 2021

I argue that the dominant concept of analytic philosophy among self-described analytic philosophe... more I argue that the dominant concept of analytic philosophy among self-described analytic philosophers is an identity concept. It involves a substantive and always contestable vision of the nature of analytic philosophy that is at the same time a vision of one’s own intellectual identity. In this non-pejorative sense, the concept is intrinsically ideological. I further argue that the anthology by Conant and Elliott (The Analytic Tradition, Norton 2017), while extraordinarily broad and comprehensive, retains this ideological character. I draw attention to four features of their substantive vision.

Analiza i Egzystencja, 2019

This paper argues that the Tractatus breaks deeply with Frege’s account of truth- bearers as mind... more This paper argues that the Tractatus breaks deeply with Frege’s account of truth- bearers as mind-independent entities, and is closer to the act-theoretic approach recently defended, for example, by Scott Soames and Peter Hanks. For the Tractatus, the primary truth-bearers are facts-in-use, which essentially involve acts, as well as facts functioning as instruments of representation. The Tractarian account, it is further argued, can vindicate three platitudes that constitute the main motivation of Frege’s approach.

Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning, edited by J. Conant and Sunday (Cambridge University Press, 2019)

Paul Horwich has advocated and attributed to the later Wittgenstein a “use-theory of meaning” tha... more Paul Horwich has advocated and attributed to the later Wittgenstein a “use-theory of meaning” that aims to demystify meaning by reducing it to pure regularities of use. This chapter challenges Horwich’s appropriation of Wittgenstein and seeks to make room for a different conception of the demystification of meaning. It argues that Wittgenstein does indeed aim to demystify meaning, but does not think that this involves any attempt to reduce meaning to something else.

Crisis and Critique: Philosophical Analysis and Current Events. Contributions to the 42nd Wittgenstein Symposium, 2019

Drawing on Pier Paolo Pasolini and his appropriation of Wittgenstein, this paper argues for the p... more Drawing on Pier Paolo Pasolini and his appropriation of Wittgenstein, this paper argues for the possibility of a radical sort of social critique based on the notion of form of life: the members of a society may not only have an objectionable form of life, but also lack a form of life altogether.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2019

Friederike Moltmann has recently proposed an account of truth-bearers that draws on Kazimierz Twa... more Friederike Moltmann has recently proposed an account of truth-bearers that draws on Kazimierz Twardowski's action/product distinction. Her account is meant to provide a third way between the dominant view of primary truth-bearers as mind-independent entities and the recently revived construal of them as mental or linguistic acts. This paper argues that there is no room for Twardowskian accounts, because they are based on a notion of "non-enduring product" that defies comprehension, and no need for them, because the linguistic data that Twardowskians take to refute the act-theoretic approach can in fact be handled by that approach.

Synthese, 2019

It is almost universally accepted that the Frege-Geach Point is necessary for explaining the infe... more It is almost universally accepted that the Frege-Geach Point is necessary for explaining the inferential relations and compositional structure of truth-functionally complex propositions. I argue that this claim rests on a disputable view of propositional structure, which models truth-functionally complex propositions on atomic propositions. I propose an alternative view of propositional structure, based on a certain notion of simulation, which accounts for the relevant phenomena without accepting the Frege-Geach Point. The main contention is that truth-functionally complex propositions do not include as their parts truth-evaluable propositions, but their simulations, which are neither forceful nor truth-evaluable. The view makes room for the idea that there is no such thing as the forceless expression of propositional contents and is attractive because it provides the resources for avoiding a fundamental problem generated by the Frege-Geach Point concerning the relation between forceless and forceful expressions of propositional contents. I further argue that the acceptance of the Frege-Geach Point mars Peter Hanks' and François Recanati's recent attempts to resist the widespread idea that assertoric force is extrinsic to the expression of propositional contents. Rejecting this idea, I maintain, requires a deeper break with the tradition than Hanks and Recanati have allowed for.

Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy, 2017

Frege appears to hold both (a) that thoughts are internally articulated, in a way that mirrors th... more Frege appears to hold both (a) that thoughts are internally articulated, in a way that mirrors the semantic articulation of the sentences that express them, and (b) that the same thought can be analyzed in different ways, none of which has to be more fundamental than the others. Commentators have often taken these theses to be mutually incompatible and have tended to polarize into two camps, each of which attributes to Frege one of the theses, but maintains that he is only apparently committed to the other. This paper argues (i) that there are good exegetical and philosophical reasons for reconciling the two theses; (ii) that this reconciliation can be achieved by rejecting an assumption shared by the two opposite camps of the exegetical debate, i.e., the assumption that essential articulatedness implies unique articulation; and finally (iii), that this crucial assumption can be resisted by appreciating Frege’s anti-atomistic and ‘organic’ conception of the internal complexity of thoughts.

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2017

This paper identifies a tension in Frege's philosophy and offers a diagnosis of its origins. Freg... more This paper identifies a tension in Frege's philosophy and offers a diagnosis of its origins. Frege's Context Principle can be used to dissolve the problem of propositional unity. However, Frege's official response to the problem does not invoke the Context Principle, but the distinction between 'saturated' and 'unsaturated' propositional constituents. I argue that such a response involves assumptions that clash with the Context Principle. I suggest, however, that this tension is not generated by deep-seated philosophical commitments, but by Frege's occasional attempt to take a dubious shortcut in the justification of his conception of propositional structure.

European Journal of Philosophy, 2017

This paper argues that Wittgenstein opposed theories of meaning, and did so for good reasons. The... more This paper argues that Wittgenstein opposed theories of meaning, and did so for good reasons. Theories of meaning, in the sense discussed here, are attempts to explain what makes it the case that certain sounds, shapes, or movements are meaningful linguistic expressions. It is widely believed that Wittgenstein made fundamental contributions to this explanatory project. I argue, by contrast, that in both his early and later work, Wittgenstein endorsed a disjunctivist conception of language which rejects the assumption underlying the question that such theories seek to answer—namely, the assumption that the notion of a meaningful linguistic expression admits of non-circular analysis. Moreover, I give two arguments in favor of the view I ascribe to Wittgenstein: one based on later Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning skepticism, and one based on considerations concerning the identity of linguistic expressions.

A Companion to Wittgenstein, ed. by H.-J. Glock and J. Hyman, 2017

This chapter aims to demonstrate, through a reconstruction of some relevant features of “the" de... more This chapter aims to demonstrate, through a reconstruction of some relevant features of “the" debate between resolute readings of the Tractatus, that at this point there are in fact several orthogonal debates taking place, confusedly cast as contributions to a single debate. In so doing, the authors indicate some of the respects in which the term “resolute reading” has come to acquire different meanings – and sometimes even (what one might term) a different logic. By thus tracing the shifts in the meaning of the term “resolute reading” and the related family of cognate and contrastive expressions, and thereby also tracing correlative shifts in the contours of the ongoing debate, the authors hope to remove certain obstacles to genuine progress and mutual understanding and to discriminate and pinpoint some of the existing loci of genuine disagreement.

Realism - Realism - Constructivism. Contributions to the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 2015

This paper proposes a disjunctivist interpretation of the relation between Tractarian "symbols" a... more This paper proposes a disjunctivist interpretation of the relation between Tractarian "symbols" and Tractarian "signs" and argues that, if such an interpretation is correct, the Tractarian conception of language is neither realist nor constructivist.

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 2014

Iride. Filosofia e discussione pubblica, 2013

In the first half of the interview, Diamond discusses various aspects of her intellectual biogra... more In the first half of the interview, Diamond discusses various aspects of her intellectual biography, including her first encounter with philosophy, what it was like to study philosophy at Oxford in the early Sixties, the way she gradually came to Wittgenstein, the decision to become a vegetarian, how this relates to her interest in animal ethics, and how the political climate during the Vietnam War influenced her decision to move back to the US. In the second half, Diamond discusses major aspects of her philosophy: her reading of Wittgenstein and why it is misleading to call it «quietistic»; her views about conceptual change, rationality and truth; the unity of her theoretical and moral philosophy; and what she finds most attractive in Anscombe and Murdoch.

Wittgenstein-Studien, 2013

The main claim of this paper is one that many readers will find surprising, namely that some cent... more The main claim of this paper is one that many readers will find surprising, namely that some central aspects of the Tractatus' conception of language can be illuminated with the help of the philosophy of Stanley Cavell. One reason such a claim will seem surprising is that the Tractatus as standardly read is advancing an atomistic conception of language. I will be rejecting such a reading. I begin with an overview of the Tractatus' contextualism and of the atomistic conception of language that it opposes. Then I show how some Cavellian ideas can help us to make good sense of the Tractarian view. I show (a) that according to Tractarian contextualism, language requires our personal contribution, i. e. the exercise of our own judgment. I suggest (b) that a desire to evade the need of this contribution is at least part of what explains why we are naturally attracted to the atom-istic approach and find the Tractarian view disappointing. And finally (c), I spell out the sense in which such a conception of what is involved in the use of language reveals it to be characterized by a pervasive ethical dimension.

Wittgenstein-Studien, 2012

This paper provides an introduction to the literature on the so-called " resolute reading " of Wi... more This paper provides an introduction to the literature on the so-called " resolute reading " of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. It (1) places the resolute reading in its historical and dialectical context, (2) discusses the differences between the main variants of the resolute reading, (3) surveys the main objections that have been mounted against the resolute reading, as well as the replies that have been given by resolute readers, (4) examines the so-called " elucidatory " readings of the Tractatus, which purports to occupy a middle ground between resolute and traditional readings, and (5) provides an extensive bibliography of the literature that engages explicitly with the resolute reading.

Beyond the Tractatus Wars: The New Wittgenstein Debated, ed. by R. Read and M. Lavery, 2011

This paper aims to show that the Tractatus can be coherently committed, at one and the same time,... more This paper aims to show that the Tractatus can be coherently committed, at one and the same time, to a strong version of the context principle (sufficiently strong to entail the austere conception of nonsense) and to a version of the principle of compositionality. It is quite natural to interpret these two semantic principles in a manner that renders them mutually incompatible. Taking my cue from some remarks in the Tractatus, I develop alternative understandings of the two principles according to which they are compatible with one another and indeed positively interdependent. I show that (1) there is good reason to attribute to the Tractatus the alternative understandings of each of these principles that I develop in the paper, and that (2) these alternative ways of understanding the two principles are philosophically superior to those that render them mutually incompatible .

Rivista di Filosofia, 2006

Reviews by Silver Bronzo

Iride. Filosofia e discussione pubblica, 2018

Nordic Wittgenstein Review, 2016