Matthew MacKenzie | Colorado State University (original) (raw)

Books by Matthew MacKenzie

This book deepens and extends the dialogue between Buddhist philosophy and 4E philosophy of mind ... more This book deepens and extends the dialogue between Buddhist philosophy and 4E philosophy of mind and phenomenology. It engages with core issues in the philosophy of mind broadly construed in and through the dialogue between Buddhism and enactivism. Indian philosophers developed and defended philosophically sophisticated and phenomenologically rich accounts of mind, self, cognition, perception, embodiment, and more. As a work of cross-cultural philosophy, the book investigates the nature of mind and experience in dialogue with Indian and Western thinkers. On the basis of this cross-traditional dialogue, the book articulates and defends a dynamic, non-substantialist, and embodied account of experience, subjectivity, and self.

Papers by Matthew MacKenzie

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2024

This paper sketches a phenomenological-structural account of consciousness that distinguishes phe... more This paper sketches a phenomenological-structural account of consciousness that distinguishes phenomenal consciousness, subjectivity, and the self. On this account, minimal subjectivity is an inherent feature of human phenomenal consciousness. This minimal subjectivity is then understood as, in Indian Buddhist terms, mere reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedanamātra), or in Western phenomenological terms, minimal pre-reflective self-awareness. This minimal subjectivity is also distinguished from the richer phenomenon of the sense of self. It is possible to have consciousness without a sense of self, but that consciousness would still be minimally subjective.

Emotional Self-Knowledge, 2023

Classical Indian thinkers-philosophers, dramatists, poets, medical practitioners-developed a rang... more Classical Indian thinkers-philosophers, dramatists, poets, medical practitioners-developed a range of sophisticated accounts of the emotions. The aim of this chapter is to introduce readers to the rich philosophical insights of this tradition and to contribute to a more fully cross-cultural inquiry into the emotions and self-knowledge. First, the chapter will survey some influential accounts of the emotions in classical Indian thought, particularly Bharat's theory of basic emotions and the early Buddhist account of vedanā ("feeling"). Second, it will turn to the connections between emotion and cognition and the role of emotion in self-knowledge. Third, the chapter will take up the issue of emotion and liberation. Are emotions impediments or aids to liberation? Does liberation ultimately entail the transcendence of all emotion? Classical Indian thinkers argued for both transcendent and immanent accounts of liberation and the emotions. In the final section, it will be argued that the central debates about emotion are based on two distinct and conflicting accounts of the nature and structure of subjectivity.

The enactivist paradigm of embodied cognition represents a powerful alternative to Cartesian and ... more The enactivist paradigm of embodied cognition represents a powerful alternative to Cartesian and cognitivist approaches in the philosophy of mind. On this view, the body plays a constitutive role in the integrated functioning of perception, affect and other cognitive processes. Enactivism shares many of the central themes of feminist theory, and is extended to apply to social and political concerns. Following a discussion of the key components of the enactive approach, we apply it to explain more complex social manifestations, specifically gender performance and its reproduction through time. By employing Judith Butler’s notion of performativity, we demonstrate how gender, as one marker of social identity and difference, emerges through processes of embodied and embedded sense-making as articulated by enactive theory. We argue that more attention to embodied and embedded values allows for the interruption and transformation of histories of oppressive practices and opens the door to more liberatory possibilities.

In this paper, I will pursue a contemporary philosophical reconstruction of the connections, both... more In this paper, I will pursue a contemporary philosophical reconstruction of the connections, both conceptual and phenomenological, between reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana) and the subjective and objective aspects (svākāra, viṣayākāra) of experience in Śāntarakṣita’s philosophy of mind. Focusing on the Madhyamakālaṁkāra (with Mipham’s commentary) , I argue that there is a deep connection between (1) the rejection of the transparency of experience (viz. sākāravāda); (2) the dual-aspect (dvairūpya) structure of experience; (3) reflexive awareness as the distinguishing mark (svalakṣana) and ineliminable core of conscious experience; and (4) the embrace of a form of idealism at the conventional level. These connected ideas, taken together, form an integrated, multi-modal theory of consciousness that can be brought into fruitful dialogue with contemporary philosophy of mind and phenomenology.

Naturalism, Human Flourishing, and Asian Philosophy, 2020

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise, 2020

On initial analysis, Indian Buddhist philosophers seem to have an inconsistent set of commitments... more On initial analysis, Indian Buddhist philosophers seem to have an inconsistent set of commitments with regard to the nature of action. First, they are committed to the reality of karman (Skt: action), which concerns the moral quality of actions and the short- and long-term effects of those actions on the agent. Skillful or wholesome (kuśala) actions will tend to have positive consequences for oneself, while unskillful or unwholesome (akuśala) actions will tend to have negative consequences. Second, they are committed to an understanding of karma as deeply connected with intention or volition (cetanā). Third, they are committed to the idea that,
through Buddhist practice, one may become liberated from the afflictions of craving, aversion, and ignorance and achieve nirvāṇa. Thus, it is not surprising that the relationship between volition, action, and the results of action for the agent constitutes a central theme of Indian Buddhist philosophy. Yet, fourth, while Buddhist philosophers are committed to the reality of action and its results, they are also committed to the unreality of any substantial self or agent of actions. How can one affirm the reality of volition, action, efficacious practice, and liberation, while denying the existence of agents, practitioners, or liberated beings? Reconciling the doctrine of no-self (anātman) with an account of agency and karma was a central task of great Buddhist philosophers such as Vasubandhu (fl. 4th to 5th century CE). This chapter will discuss Buddhist philosophy of action in the context of their views of the self, general ontology, ethics, and
soteriology. After discussing some important preliminaries, section 2 will examine the connection between intention, action, and the skillful. Section 3 takes up the Buddhist account of agency without agents. Section 4 examines the important Buddhist idea of skillful means (upāyakauśalya) in ethics and soteriology. Section 5 will discuss the thorny issue of the discontinuity between awakened and unawakened forms of action.

This chapter will discuss the important connections between virtues, self-transcendence, and spir... more This chapter will discuss the important connections between virtues, self-transcendence, and spiritual liberation in the Indian traditions of Pātañjala Yoga and Buddhism. Both Yoga and Buddhism are philosophical systems (darśana) as well as carefully articulated paths (marga) for the cultivation of virtue and, ultimately, spiritual liberation (mokṣa, nirvāṇa). Furthermore, in both traditions, self-transcendence in the form of the progressive overcoming of egoism is thought to be a necessary condition of virtue and liberation. For the Yogic and Buddhist schools, hypo-egoic forms of psychological functioning are reciprocally linked to the development of central virtues, such as non-violence (ahiṃsa), contentment (saṃtoṣa), compassion (karuṇā), and equanimity (upekṣa). With regard to spiritual liberation, both schools hold that liberation (at least in part) consists in the irreversible transcendence of egoic modes of psychological functioning. However, despite these similarities, the two schools profoundly disagree on the metaphysical status of the self (ātman, puruṣa). Whereas in Yoga, the ego is transcended in order to realize the true spiritual self, Buddhists deny the existence of the self as such. The chapter will begin (section 1) with a discussion of the basic philosophical commitments of each school as well as their respective eight-fold paths of spiritual development. Section 2 will discuss in more detail the central virtues of each school as well as virtue and vice in their connections with hyper- and hypo-egoic modes of psychological functioning. Section 3, will discuss the theories of self and ego in each tradition, as well as the differing accounts of spiritual liberation. Finally, section 4 will conclude with a general discussion of virtue and self-transcendence in Indian philosophy and avenues for further research.

A familiar account of the debate between Buddhists and the brahmanical schools over the nature an... more A familiar account of the debate between Buddhists and the brahmanical schools over the nature and existence of the self: the brahmanical schools accept the existence of the tman (the substantial self), while the Buddhists reject the tman, adopting a reductionist or irrealist account of persons. Thus while the Buddhists are similar to Hume, Locke, and Parfit, the tmavadins are, though diverse, basically Cartesian in their approach to the self. Yet, as a number of scholars have pointed out, this view of the debates on the nature of the self is far too simplistic. Indeed, as Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (2011) argues, there are (at least) two distinct debates going on. The first debate concerns the nature of the empirical person (pudgala) and the ego-sense (ahakra), whether the person (or ego) is constructed or ontologically fundamental, as well as questions of synchronic and diachronic personal identity. The second debate concerns the existence and nature of an 'impersonal subjectivity' which may constitute the (formal) ground of empirical personhood. In this debate questions such as the reflexivity, unity, and continuity of consciousness are emphasised. My concern here is with second type of debate over the nature of consciousness and its relation to tman. In particular, I want to examine the similarities and differences between the Advaitin notion of tman as pure consciousness, or sheer reflexive subjectivity and the Buddhist notion – found in some Yogcra, Yogcra-Madhyamaka, and tathgatagarbha texts and well developed in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition – that the deep nature of consciousness is non-dual reflexive awareness. Both traditions, I will argue, recognise the empirical and the transcendental aspects of consciousness, and both link the inherent reflexivity or luminosity of consciousness to its transcendental aspect. So, have the Buddhists smuggled in the tman through the back door? Or have the Advaitins so separated the tman (as pure consciousness) from the first-person perspective of the individual self that they have become proponents of no-self in all but name? To try to get a better grip on the distinction between these two views, I will discuss akara's critique of Buddhist theories of mind, paying special attention to his argument that recognition (pratyabhijñ) requires a robust notion of the diachronic unity of consciousness. Finally, drawing on ntarakita's account of luminous consciousness and Husserl's discussion of the complex temporality of consciousness, I will argue that a Buddhist view, properly modified, has the resources to respond to the Advaita critique. The view of consciousness as ever-present self-luminous awareness does not require a commitment to even the Advaitin's attenuated notion of tman.

This chapter presents an overview and discussion of the primary Buddhist virtues within the conte... more This chapter presents an overview and discussion of the primary Buddhist virtues within the context of the Buddhist path of moral and spiritual development. Buddhist ethics counsels practitioners to overcome the three poisons of greed, hatred, and ignorance and to cultivate those states and traits of mind (and the actions they motivate) that conduce to the genuine happiness and spiritual freedom of oneself and others. The chapter discusses the four immeasurable states of loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity. It then discusses the six perfections of generosity, moral discipline, forbearance, vigor, meditation, and wisdom. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the prospects of a Buddhist virtue ethics.

According to Vasubandhu’s Trisvabhāvanirdeśa or Treatise on the Three Natures, experiential pheno... more According to Vasubandhu’s Trisvabhāvanirdeśa or Treatise on the Three Natures, experiential phenomena can be understood in terms of three natures: the constructed (parikalpita), the dependent (paratantra), and the consummate (pariniṣpanna). This paper will examine internalist and anti-internalist or non-dualist interpretations of the Yogācāra theory of the three natures of experience. The internalist interpretation is based on representationalist theory of experience wherein the contents of experience are logically independent of their cause and various interconnected cognitive processes continually create an integrated internal world-model that is transparent to the cognitive system that creates and uses it. In contrast, the anti-internalist interpretation begins, not from the constructed nature of experiential objects, but from the perfected nature of mind-world non-duality. This interpretation treats the distinctions between inside and outside, subject and object, mind and world as distinctions drawn within experience rather than between experience and something else. And experience here refers to the continuous dynamic interplay of factors constituting our sentient embodied (nāma-rūpa) existence. Having examined each interpretation, the paper will suggest some reasons to favor the non-dualist view.

This paper takes up the problem of the qualitative dimension from the perspectives of enactivism ... more This paper takes up the problem of the qualitative dimension from the perspectives of enactivism and John Dewey's pragmatic naturalism. I suggest that the pragmatic naturalism of Dewey, combined with recent work on enactivism, points the way to a new account of the qualitative dimension, beyond the bifurcation of nature into the subjective and objective, or the qualitative and quantitative. The pragmatist-enactivist view I sketch here has both methodological-explanatory and ontological dimensions. Following the work of Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson, I suggest that the qualitative dimension should be explained in experientialist and ecological terms. Following Dewey, I suggest that the ontology of the qualitative dimension should be understood in dynamic, relational, and 'transactional' terms. The world in which we immediately live, that in which we strive, succeed, and are defeated is preeminently a qualitative world. What we act for, suffer, and enjoy are things in their qualitative determinations. This world forms the field of characteristic modes of thinking, characteristic in that thought is definitely regulated by qualitative considerations. John Dewey The conviction that motivates the enactive approach is that cognition is not the representation of an independent world by an independent mind, but the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of embodied action. Evan Thompson

This paper aims to take up the complex dialectic between self and selflessness as raised in the t... more This paper aims to take up the complex dialectic between self and selflessness as raised in the target papers of this issue and in classical Buddhist thought. I'll argue that the recognition that the self is constructed can lead, in the right theoretical and practical context, to (i) the deconstruction of fixed views of self, (ii) the decentring of self-experience within a larger horizon of awareness, and (iii) the reconstruction of a more fluid self as a skilful means to cultivating and embodying wisdom and compassion.

The aim of this article is to take up three closely connected questions. First, does consciousnes... more The aim of this article is to take up three closely connected questions. First, does consciousness essentially involve subjectivity? Second, what is the connection, if any, between pre-reflective self-consciousness and subjectivity? And, third, does consciousness necessarily involve an ego or self? I will draw on the Yogācāra–Madhyamaka synthesis of Śāntaraks:ita (eighth century common era) to develop an account of the relation between consciousness, subjectivity, and the self. I will argue, first, that phenomenal consciousness is reflexive or self-illuminating (svaprakāśya). Second, I will argue that consciousness necessarily involves minimal subjectivity. Third, I will argue that neither the reflexivity nor the subjectivity of consciousness implies that there is any entity such as the self or ego over and above reflexive consciousness. Fourth, I will argue that what we normally think of as ‘the self’ is best understood as a complex, multi-layered process (ahaṁkāra, ‘I-making’) that emerges within the pre-egoic flow of subjective consciousness.

In this paper, I take up the problem of the self through bringing together the insights, while co... more In this paper, I take up the problem of the self through bringing together the insights, while correcting some of the shortcomings, of Indo–Tibetan Buddhist and enactivist accounts of the self. I begin with an examination of the Buddhist theory of non-self (anātman) and the rigorously reductionist interpretation of this doctrine developed by the Abhidharma school of Buddhism. After discussing some of the fundamental problems for Buddhist reductionism, I turn to the enactive approach to philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that human beings, as dynamic systems, are characterized by a high degree of self-organizing autonomy. Therefore, human beings are not reducible to the more basic mental and physical events that constitute them. I critically examine Francisco Varela’s enactivist account of the self as virtual and his use of Buddhist ideas in support of this view. I argue, in contrast, that while the self is emergent and constructed, it is not merely virtual. Finally I sketch a Buddhist-enactivist account of the self. I argue for a non- reductionist view of the self as an active, embodied, embedded, self-organizing process—what the Buddhists call ‘I’-making (ahaṃkāra). This emergent process of self-making is grounded in the fundamentally recursive processes that characterize lived experience: autopoiesis at the biological level, temporalization and self- reference at the level of conscious experience, and conceptual and narrative
construction at the level of intersubjectivity. In Buddhist terms, I will develop an account of the self as dependently originated and empty, but nevertheless real.

In this paper, I show that a robust, reflexivist account of self-awareness (such as was defended ... more In this paper, I show that a robust, reflexivist account of self-awareness (such as was defended by Digna¯ga and Dharmakı¯rti, most phenomenologists, and others) is compatible with reductionist view of persons, and hence with a rejection of the existence of a substantial, separate self. My main focus is on the tension between Buddhist reflexivism and the central Buddhist doctrine of no-self. In the first section of the paper, I give a brief sketch of reflexivist accounts of self-awareness, using the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakı¯rti as my example. In the next section, I examine reductionism as it relates to accounts of the self. I then, in the third section, argue that a reductionist account of persons can account for the unique features of first-person contents and our deep and multi-layered sense of self.

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2024

Emotional Self-Knowledge, 2023

Naturalism, Human Flourishing, and Asian Philosophy, 2020

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise, 2020

Reasons and Empty Persons: Mind, Metaphysics, and Morality Essays in Honor of Mark Siderits, 2022

Some meditative experiences are reported to involve a change in the meditator’s sense of self. Fo... more Some meditative experiences are reported to involve a change in the meditator’s sense of self. For instance, some practitioners of body-scan meditation report a felt dissolution of bodily boundaries and a corresponding change in their bodily sense of self. In “pure-consciousness-events” some subjects report a sense of self as pure consciousness, while others report a loss of the sense of self. In this chapter, I will use recent philosophical and empirical work on the phenomenal self and the variability of self-experience to explore possible connections with particular types of meditative experience. In particular, I will differentiate minimal subjectivity from the more complex and plastic phenomena of self-identification, self-location, and a strong first-person perspective. I will discuss how certain reported meditative experiences transform key aspects of phenomenal self-experience, such as phenomenal (dis-)identification with the body, agency, spatial location, and the phenomenal field. I will then discuss implications for the study of consciousness, the self, and meditation.

Owen Flanagan has advocated for an interdisciplinary, cross-cultural inquiry into the nature and ... more Owen Flanagan has advocated for an interdisciplinary, cross-cultural inquiry into the nature and optimal conditions of human flourishing which he aptly terms eudaimonics. For Flanagan flourishing is multi-faceted, involving biological, psychological, and social dimensions. In this paper I will explore the spiritual dimension of human flourishing from a liberal naturalist perspective. My first core claim is that, at the root of human experience, there are capacities for sense-making and self-transcendence. These capacities allow us, indeed drive us to create, maintain, and transform spiritual ecologies. These ecologies allow us to find meaning, value, and purpose in our individual and shared worlds—that is, to be spiritually at home. My second core claim is that this spiritual dimension is a distinct and irreducible dimension of our flourishing. The spiritual dimension centrally involves the depth and integration of our human orientation to life. In my view, we are inescapably spiritual animals and any adequate eudaimonics must take this into account. has advocated for an interdisciplinary, cross-cultural inquiry into the nature and optimal conditions of human flourishing which he aptly terms eudaimonics. For Flanagan flourishing is multi-faceted, involving biological, psychological, and social dimensions. In this paper I will explore the spiritual dimension of human flourishing from a liberal naturalist perspective. My first core claim is that, at the root of human experience, there are capacities for sense-making and self-transcendence. These capacities allow us, indeed drive us to create, maintain, and transform spiritual ecologies. These ecologies allow us to find meaning, value, and purpose in our individual and shared worlds-that is, to be spiritually at home. My second core claim is that this spiritual dimension is a distinct and irreducible dimension of our flourishing. The spiritual dimension centrally involves the depth and integration of our human orientation to life. In my view, we are inescapably spiritual animals and any adequate eudaimonics must take this into account.

In his playful and provocative meditation, Arindam Chakrabarti explores the rich phenomenology of... more In his playful and provocative meditation, Arindam Chakrabarti explores the rich phenomenology of wonder. Wonder (vismaya), he points out, is considered one of the nine basic affects in classical Indian discussions of affectivity. It is also the basis of the aesthetic sentiment (rasa) of marvel (adbhuta). Chakrabarti argues that wonder is a transcendental affect—it is a condition of the possibility of any kind of emotion. Further, he argues that there is a transcendental form of reflexive wonder—wonder at the very subject (or subjectivity) that wonders. My response is divided three sections. In the first, I explore Chakrabarti’s claim that wonder is a transcendental affect. In the second, I offer some phenomenological reflections on the connections between affect, temporality, and sense-making. In the third, I explore the paradox of subjectivity in light of Chakrabarti’s reflections on wonder. Finally, I offer an interpretation of jīvanmukti (living liberation) inspired by his account of the embodied subject.