Txetxu Ausín | CSIC (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas-Spanish National Research Council) (original) (raw)

Papers by Txetxu Ausín

AI & Society, 2022

The increasing application of artificial intelligence (AI) to healthcare raises both hope and eth... more The increasing application of artificial intelligence (AI) to healthcare raises both hope and ethical concerns. Some advanced machine learning methods provide accurate clinical predictions at the expense of a significant lack of explainability. Alex John London has defended that accuracy is a more important value than explainability in AI medicine. In this article, we locate the trade-off between accurate performance and explainable algorithms in the context of distributive justice. We acknowledge that accuracy is cardinal from outcome-oriented justice because it helps to maximize patients' benefits and optimizes limited resources. However, we claim that the opaqueness of the algorithmic black box and its absence of explainability threatens core commitments of procedural fairness such as accountability, avoidance of bias, and transparency. To illustrate this, we discuss liver transplantation as a case of critical medical resources in which the lack of explainability in AI-based allocation algorithms is procedurally unfair. Finally, we provide a number of ethical recommendations for when considering the use of unexplainable algorithms in the distribution of health-related resources.

Even though Łukasiewicz never developed a treatment of graduality and in fact was prompted to imp... more Even though Łukasiewicz never developed a treatment of graduality and in fact was prompted to implement his many-valued logics by considerations quite different from those which underlye theories of degrees of truth, his logical calculi have nevertheless been taken to constitute the canonical framework for approaches to fuzzy set theory, ever since Lofti Zadeh inaugurated the fuzzy line of research in the middle 60's. There are several reasons for that. Łukasiewicz logics are characterized by the following properties: (1) Biimplicative formulae of the form p↔q (1.a) take a value 1 iff the value of p equals that of q ; (1.b) take a value of 0 iff one of those values is 1 and the other 0; (1.c) take an intermediate value otherwise, which is the higher the smaller the distance in truth-value between p and q ; and (1.d) there is no jump or discontinuity as regards the possible values of biimplicative formulae (i.e. it is not the case that there are three values x ≥ y ≥ z, such that p→q can take value x, can take value z but never takes value y. (2) Only value 1 is designated (i.e. true). Nothing can be asserted unless if it has as its truth value the value 1, i.e.. TRUTH. (3) The principles of noncontradiction and excluded middle are abandoned, but that of self-implication is retained. (4) The value of a disjunction is the higher (or truer) of the values of the two disjuncts. (5) The principle of Factor obtains, namely p→q→.p→.p∧q , or-what within usual frameworks amounst to the same-p→q↔.p↔.p∧q , i.e. the principle of equivalence, namely that for a proposition to imply another is for the former to be equivalent to the conjunction of both.

This is a reply to G.K. Harrison's article «Hyper Libertarianism and Moral Luck». There he argues... more This is a reply to G.K. Harrison's article «Hyper Libertarianism and Moral Luck». There he argues for the advantage of hyper-libertarianism upon reason-responsive compatibilism in virtue of its integration of moral luck in a principled way. I shall try to show that his argument is unsound. Crucial to my reply will be that Harrison's idea of moral luck is an unjustifiedly narrow one. Although the aim of establishing an appropriate connection between the issues of moral luck and free will is worth pursuing, I shall argue that moral luck cannot solve the free will dispute in the way Harrison intends. WHITHER MORALITY IN A HARD DETERMINIST WORLD? by Nick Trakakis What would the world be like if hard determinism were true, that is, if all events were determined in such a way as to render all our decisions and actions unfree? In particular, what would morality be like? Indeed, could there be anything distinctively moral in such a world, or would we be left with a moral nihilism in which nothing of moral significance remains? In this paper I explore the ethical implications of hard determinism, focusing on the consequences that our lack of free will would have for moral responsibility (and thus praise and blame), moral obligation, moral rightness and wrongness, and moral goodness. I argue that the truth of hard determinism would compel us to significantly revise our commonsensical understanding of these moral categories. I add, however, that this change in moral outlook would not have dire practical consequences, for we would retain the attitudes and emotions that are essential to forming good interpersonal relationships and to developing morally. In fact, far from being a threat to human flourishing, hard determinism offers the prospect of a life that is morally deeper and more fulfilling than in a world in which we are free. ESSENTIAL DEPENDENCE AND REALISM by Daniel Laurier It has recently been suggested that realism about some subject matter is best construed as the claim that the facts pertaining to this subject matter are essentially independent from the mind, in a sense to be explained, and not as the admittedly weaker claim that they are modally

Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits has been highly influential since the beginning of ... more Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits has been highly influential since the beginning of this century. It can be read as a systematic response to scepticism. One of the most important notions in this response is the notion of «evidence,» which will be the focus of the present paper. I attempt to show primarily two things. First, the notion of evidence invoked by Williamson does not address the sceptical worry: he stipulates an objective notion of evidence, but this begs the question against his opponent. Second, his related thesis «Evidence equals Knowledge» does not sit well with his own content externalism: he promises to relate epistemology to philosophy of mind, but he fails to live up to this commitment in his crucial chapter on scepticism. Other minor problems concerning evidence will also be discussed in due course.

En: Palavras e pensamentos: Uma perspectiva analitica Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, 2003... more En: Palavras e pensamentos: Uma perspectiva analitica Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, 2003, pp. 443-453. ISBN 84-9750-141-1

Cantidad, calidad y honestidad en los servicios públicos Cualquier Estado, desde la más remota an... more Cantidad, calidad y honestidad en los servicios públicos Cualquier Estado, desde la más remota antigüedad, asumió-para tutelar el bien común-la tarea de establecer y administrar una panoplia de servicios públicos, o sea, la organización de actividades mancomunadas bajo la dirección de la autoridad social con vistas a favorecer la utilidad pública. Ese concepto es, ciertamente, indeterminado-como lo son casi todos aquellos que se emplean en la praxis jurídica-. De modo general, podemos proponer esta idea: es de utilidad pública cualquier actividad tal que existen buenas razones que aconsejan emprenderla mancomunadamente bajo la dirección de la autoridad legítima que gobierna la sociedad, cuando ello sea conducente a una mayor prosperidad general (concepto asimismo indeterminado, pero determinable). Con el auge de las teorías del individualismo liberal decimonónico, parecía quererse circunscribir el Estado a un papel de guardián del orden. No fue así. Al revés. Entre mediados del siglo XIX y finales del XX asistimos a una enorme expansión del servicio público en todos los países. Ya en 1863 el gran economista alemán Adolph Wagner formuló la ley que lleva su nombre y que refleja la tendencia creciente del gasto público dentro del PIB. Durante más de cien años los datos empíricos parecen haber confirmado esa ley. En el último cuarto de siglo se ha producido, sin embargo, una inversión de tendencia, con la boga de corrientes doctrinales que preconizan el adelgazamiento de las actividades administrativas públicas.

se creó en 1986 con una clara vocación por cultivar la filosofía práctica en un sentido lato y en... more se creó en 1986 con una clara vocación por cultivar la filosofía práctica en un sentido lato y en su relación con las ciencias, la cultura y la sociedad.

This paper is a defense of such abortions as aim at avoiding a miserable post-birth human life

Proyecto de Investigacion de I+D+i solicitado en 2009 para estudiar los fundamentos filosoficos d... more Proyecto de Investigacion de I+D+i solicitado en 2009 para estudiar los fundamentos filosoficos de una axiologia juridica.

Gaceta Sanitaria, 2021

La eficiencia no basta. Análisis ético y recomendaciones para la distribución de recursos escasos... more La eficiencia no basta. Análisis ético y recomendaciones para la distribución de recursos escasos en situación de pandemia

Studies in Global Justice, 2016

For almost 30 years, until 2012, Spain had benefitted from a public healthcare system with univer... more For almost 30 years, until 2012, Spain had benefitted from a public healthcare system with universal coverage. That year, a new law denied ordinary healthcare for undocumented adult migrants. This law is in blunt contradiction to the idea that healthcare is a fundamental human right. We argue in this chapter that not only a deep and flagrant injustice results from that law, but also an ineffective health system, because important population groups remain out of health control, treatment and prevention, and because denying healthcare to undocumented migrants has not been translated into significant savings. This situation has provoked a strong backlash, from the Spanish society at large and, in particular, among health professionals who have decided to become conscientious objectors against the governmental request to withdraw healthcare from undocumented migrants. Interestingly, in this case, claims of conscience are not associated with personal interest or convictions—as they usually are—but rather with an ethical decision by professionals to take care of their patients, regardless of their administrative status. Promoting social justice is a foundational purpose of welfare states. When they fail in this objective, conscientious objection may become an instrument of last resort to uphold people’s rights.

Memoria de 1808

Sumario 1.-Del final de una guerra (1714) al inicio de otra (1808) 2.-Diferencias esenciales entr... more Sumario 1.-Del final de una guerra (1714) al inicio de otra (1808) 2.-Diferencias esenciales entre los dos conflictos 3.-Similitudes entre ambas contiendas 4.-¿Era válido el acto jurídico transmisivo del rey anterior? 5.-Los fundamentos de legitimidad y la soberanía nacional §1.-Del final de una guerra (1714) al inicio de otra (1808) Habían transcurrido menos de tres generaciones desde el final de la guerra de sucesión cuando estallaba otra guerra en España (que-aunque en ínfima medida-fue también una guerra civil-o, al menos, algo tuvo de tal-, en la cual uno de los temas por los que se luchó fue el de saber a qué monarca-y, por lo tanto, a qué dinastíacorrespondía legítimamente reinar en España. 1 Entre la guerra de sucesión (1702-1714) y la de la independencia (1808-1814) existen diferencias abismales, que desacreditan como anacronismo cualquier pretensión de llevar muy lejos las analogías. Sin embargo, limitarse a constatar esa verdad-sin duda de Pero Grullo-significa estar ciegos ante los aspectos de concordancia o convergencia, que también se dieron.

Los derechos positivos

Que el disfrute de los derechos sociales o de prestación es susceptible de producirse de manera a... more Que el disfrute de los derechos sociales o de prestación es susceptible de producirse de manera abusiva es, desde luego, algo que se reconoce amplia y comúnmente, pero cuya adecuada comprensión suscita serias dificultades teoréticas. También se entiende que, un poco instintivamente, se suelan objetar las alegaciones de disfrute abusivo de un derecho social, aduciéndose que, cuando se ejercita un derecho, es porque se tiene, y que, si se tiene ese derecho, será lícito el ejercicio que se haga de él, sin sobrepasar los límites; sobrepasados éstos-sigue aduciéndose-, se saldría uno del ámbito del derecho. Aunque veremos luego más en detalle el meollo de esa objeción al concepto de abuso de un derecho social, ya de entrada nos sirven esas consideraciones como marco de nuestro problema.

Isegoría, 2002

Índice 1.-El caso judicial de Nicolás Perruche 2.-La vida, un derecho de libertad 3.-El derecho a... more Índice 1.-El caso judicial de Nicolás Perruche 2.-La vida, un derecho de libertad 3.-El derecho a no vivir 4.-La presumibilidad del consentimiento 5.-Circunstancias en las que más valdría no haber nacido 6.-El derecho a no vivir tiene límites 7.-El derecho de la madre a no abortar 8.-El derecho a la vida de las personas jurídicas 9.-Conclusiones: positivismo y jusnaturalismo §1.-El caso judicial de Nicolás Perruche Al recorrer la enorme discusión doctrinal, mediática y ensayística en torno al celebérrimo caso de Nicolás Perruche (NP en lo sucesivo), hallamos una serie de posiciones fundamentales.

No se le escapará al lector interesado que la denegación no nos ha impedido desarrollar, de otro ... more No se le escapará al lector interesado que la denegación no nos ha impedido desarrollar, de otro modo, muchas de esas ideas en trabajos posteriores algunos de los cuales ya están publicados, al haber podido proseguir nuestros estudios gracias a la aprobación de ...

Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic, 2000

This paper is devoted to proposing a system of gradualistic (fuzzy) paraconsistent deontic logic,... more This paper is devoted to proposing a system of gradualistic (fuzzy) paraconsistent deontic logic, a logic which implements the idea not just of degrees of truth (and falseness) but also that of degrees of obligatoriness and licitness. The system we propose (transitive deontic ...

Índice 1.-Finalismo y legitimismo en la justificación del ordenamiento jurídicopolítico 2.-Los ar... more Índice 1.-Finalismo y legitimismo en la justificación del ordenamiento jurídicopolítico 2.-Los argumentos de Leibniz a favor de la causa austríaca 3.-La coherencia entre los escritos políticos de Leibniz y su sistema jusfilosófico §1.-Finalismo y legitimismo en la justificación del ordenamiento jurídico-político Podemos clasificar en dos grandes grupos las teorías de la legitimidad o legitimación del poder político y de los cúmulos de preceptos que vienen promulgados por el poder. El primer grupo es la línea legitimista o genealógica o intrinsecista, según la cual el poder extrae de algún rasgo de su propia entidad intrínseca su legitimidad-o sea: su autenticidad, su autoridad para imponer su voluntad a los súbditos, la licitud de su potestad de mando. Hay muchos legitimismos. Para un legitimismo teocrático, es Dios, son los dioses, quienes gozan de un título, ontológicamente fundado, y cualquier poder humano tiene la legitimidad que le confiera o delegue la divinidad.

Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, 2011

Deontic logic or logic of norms is a kind of special logics, so-called 'extended logics'. 1 This ... more Deontic logic or logic of norms is a kind of special logics, so-called 'extended logics'. 1 This branch of logics tries to analyze the formal relations established among obligations, permissions, and prohibitions. To this end, the language of logic is supplemented with a new vocabulary that consists of three operators which refer to the above deontic qualifications: 'o' (obligation, duty), 'a' (allowed, permission) and 'v' (interdiction, forbidden). As Sánchez-Mazas says ([21], p. 25), the term 'Deontic Logic' is intended to cover today, in a general way, all studies on the peculiar logical structure of systems of norms of any kind or, if you will, on the sets of values, laws, and deduction rules that govern those systems. For example, if it is an obligation to vote for any political party, then is it allowed? If I have the right to move across the European Union, are prohibited to impede me? Is there a duty to provide the means to such places? If I am required to hold choice to do this or that, how will fulfil that duty, joining the first, or the second, or both requirements? If I have the obligation to attend the institutional acts of my university and I also have the duty not to lose any of my graduate lessons, am I subject to the joint obligation of both actions? Are the causal consequences of an allowed action lawful too? Etc. Many issues of this kind arise when we think about the framework of deontic qualifications or regulations that appear in all human relationships. In sum, the terms that contain such qualifications are norms (moral, legal) whose structure and inferential relations analyzes deontic logic. Thus, we can say that deontic logic is the theory of valid inference rules, that is, the analysis of the conditions and rules in which reasoning including qualifications of prohibition, duty, or permission, is correct. We assume, therefore, that there are structural relations among expressions that include qualifications as required, prohibited, permissible, right, duty, etc. That is, there is a principle of inference between the norms so that, from a structured set of norms, it is possible to establish deductive inferences (logical consequences). In this way, we treat norms as entities like propositions, which can be negated and 1 The term 'deontic logic' is generalized from von Wright's work (1951)[25] in order to refer to the study of inferential relations among norms. The word 'deontik' has been previously used by Mally (1926)[16] related to his 'logic of will' and by Broad (1950)[6], speaking about 'deontic propositions'. Bentham also used the term 'deontology' referring to ethics. The source of that expression is greek word 'tò deón', translated as 'duty' or 'obligation'.

AI & Society, 2022

This paper is a defense of such abortions as aim at avoiding a miserable post-birth human life

Gaceta Sanitaria, 2021

Studies in Global Justice, 2016

Memoria de 1808

Los derechos positivos

Isegoría, 2002

Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic, 2000

Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, 2011

For almost thirty years, until 2012, Spain had benefitted from a public healthcare system with un... more For almost thirty years, until 2012, Spain had benefitted from a public healthcare system with universal coverage. That year, a new law denied ordinary healthcare for undocumented adult migrants. This law is in blunt contradiction to the idea that healthcare is a fundamental human right. We argue in this chapter that not only a deep and flagrant injustice results from that law, but also an ineffective health system, because important population groups remain out of health control, treatment and prevention, and because denying healthcare to undocumented migrants has not been translated into significant savings. This situation has provoked a strong backlash, from the Spanish society at large and, in particular, among health professionals who have decided to become conscientious objectors against the governmental request to withdraw healthcare from undocumented migrants. Interestingly, in this case, claims of conscience are not associated with personal interest or convictions — as they usually are —but rather with an ethical decision by professionals to take care of their patients, regardless of their administrative status. Promoting social justice is a foundational purpose of welfare states. When they fail in this objective, conscientious objection may become an instrument of last resort to uphold people's rights.
Available at: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-41430-0_11