Consistent Voting Systems with a Continuum of Voters (original) (raw)

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An Erratum to this article was published on 04 July 2006

Abstract

Voting problems with a continuum of voters and finitely many alternatives are considered. Since the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem persists in this model, we relax the non-manipulability requirement as follows: are there social choice functions (SCFs) such that for every profile of preferences there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the alternative assigned by the SCF? Such SCFs are called exactly and strongly consistent. The paper extends the work of Peleg (Econometrica 46:153–161, 1978a) and others. Specifically, a class of anonymous SCFs with the required property is characterized through blocking coefficients of alternatives and through associated effectivity functions.

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Authors and Affiliations

1. Institute of Mathematics and Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Feldman Building, Givat-Ram, 91904, Jerusalem, Israel
   B Pezaleleleg
2. Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200, MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands
   Hans Peters

Authors

1. B Pezaleleleg
2. Hans Peters

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Correspondence toB Pezaleleleg.

Additional information

An erratum to this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0174-3

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Pezaleleleg, B., Peters, H. Consistent Voting Systems with a Continuum of Voters.Soc Choice Welfare 27, 477–492 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0140-0

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• Received: 19 December 2002
• Accepted: 10 July 2005
• Published: 05 May 2006
• Issue date: December 2006
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0140-0

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