Mutually dependent, balanced contributions, and the priority value (original) (raw)
Abstract
The Priority value (Béal et al. in Int J Game Theory 51:431–450, 2022) is an allocation rule for TU-games with a priority structure, which distributes the Harsanyi dividend of each coalition among the set of its priority players. In this paper we propose two variants of the differential marginality of mutually dependent players axiom for TU-games with a priority structure, and extend the classical axiom of balanced contributions to TU-games with a priority structure. We provide several new characterizations of the Priority value which invoke these modified axioms and the standard axioms: efficiency, the null player property, the priority player out and the null player out.
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Notes
- This axiom states that if a coalition is a carrier, then the total payoff of all its members equals the worth generated by the coalition. A coalition \( C \) is defined as a carrier if \( v(S) = v(S \cap C) \), for any coalition \( S \subseteq N \).
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Acknowledgements
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72371151).
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- School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai, 200444, People’s Republic of China
Songtao He, Erfang Shan & Yuxin Sun
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- Songtao He
- Erfang Shan
- Yuxin Sun
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Correspondence toErfang Shan.
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He, S., Shan, E. & Sun, Y. Mutually dependent, balanced contributions, and the priority value.J Comb Optim 50, 10 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-025-01340-0
- Accepted: 17 July 2025
- Published: 31 July 2025
- Version of record: 31 July 2025
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-025-01340-0