Determinism, Realism, and Probability in Evolutionary Theory | Philosophy of Science | Cambridge Core (original) (raw)

Abstract

Recent discussion of the statistical character of evolutionary theory has centered around two positions: (1) Determinism combined with the claim that the statistical character is eliminable, a subjective interpretation of probability, and instrumentalism; (2) Indeterminism combined with the claim that the statistical character is ineliminable, a propensity interpretation of probability, and realism. I point out some internal problems in these positions and show that the relationship between determinism, eliminability, realism, and the interpretation of probability is more complex than previously assumed in this debate. Furthermore, I take some initial steps towards a more adequate account of the statistical character of evolutionary theory.

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