Soumendu Sarkar | University of Delhi (original) (raw)
I am an Assistant Professor in Delhi School of Economics. I teach Game Theory. My major research interests are mechanism design, market design and strategic social choice.
less
Related Authors
University of Alicante / Universidad de Alicante
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR), Mumbai, India
Uploads
Papers by Soumendu Sarkar
Theory and Decision, Nov 1, 2022
Indian Statistical Institute Series, 2021
A buyer wants to purchase multiple contiguous items from sellers holding an item each. We refer t... more A buyer wants to purchase multiple contiguous items from sellers holding an item each. We refer to such situations as assembly problems. We model contiguity of items through graphs where each node represents an item and an edge between two nodes denotes physical adjacency. The buyer wants to purchase a path of a desired length, called a feasible path. A seller is critical if he lies on every feasible path. We investigate subgame perfect equilibria of an infinite horizon alternate-offer bargaining game between the buyer and the sellers. We show that the buyer can extract full surplus within two periods if the valuations of the sellers are symmetric and there are no critical sellers. Further, we show that if the valuations of the sellers are asymmetric, there does not exist any equilibria where the buyer extracts full surplus. Our paper thus brings out the role of complementarity in location and competition in valuation in assembly problems. JEL Classification: C78
The land acquisition problem is an exchange problem with one buyer and multiple sellers with the ... more The land acquisition problem is an exchange problem with one buyer and multiple sellers with the buyer having demand for more than one units and each seller holding one unit of a homogeneous good. We show that under incomplete information, no mechanism designed for the problem can be fully satisfactory. Then we characterize different “second best” mechanisms to address this problem. ∗My supervisor Professor Arunava Sen encouraged me to to look into the problem of land acquisition. I owe both him and Professor Debasis Mishra for their invaluable advice, inspiration and patience. Thanks also to my colleagues Anup Pramanik, Dushyant and Mridu Prabal Goswami for their valuable suggestions. Errors and omissions are only mine. †Indian Statistical Institute and TERI University, New Delhi; E-mail:sarkarsoumendu@gmail.com
Review of Economic Design, 2021
Mathematical Social Sciences
International Journal of Game Theory, 2016
International Journal of Management Practice
Theory and Decision, Nov 1, 2022
Indian Statistical Institute Series, 2021
A buyer wants to purchase multiple contiguous items from sellers holding an item each. We refer t... more A buyer wants to purchase multiple contiguous items from sellers holding an item each. We refer to such situations as assembly problems. We model contiguity of items through graphs where each node represents an item and an edge between two nodes denotes physical adjacency. The buyer wants to purchase a path of a desired length, called a feasible path. A seller is critical if he lies on every feasible path. We investigate subgame perfect equilibria of an infinite horizon alternate-offer bargaining game between the buyer and the sellers. We show that the buyer can extract full surplus within two periods if the valuations of the sellers are symmetric and there are no critical sellers. Further, we show that if the valuations of the sellers are asymmetric, there does not exist any equilibria where the buyer extracts full surplus. Our paper thus brings out the role of complementarity in location and competition in valuation in assembly problems. JEL Classification: C78
The land acquisition problem is an exchange problem with one buyer and multiple sellers with the ... more The land acquisition problem is an exchange problem with one buyer and multiple sellers with the buyer having demand for more than one units and each seller holding one unit of a homogeneous good. We show that under incomplete information, no mechanism designed for the problem can be fully satisfactory. Then we characterize different “second best” mechanisms to address this problem. ∗My supervisor Professor Arunava Sen encouraged me to to look into the problem of land acquisition. I owe both him and Professor Debasis Mishra for their invaluable advice, inspiration and patience. Thanks also to my colleagues Anup Pramanik, Dushyant and Mridu Prabal Goswami for their valuable suggestions. Errors and omissions are only mine. †Indian Statistical Institute and TERI University, New Delhi; E-mail:sarkarsoumendu@gmail.com
Review of Economic Design, 2021
Mathematical Social Sciences
International Journal of Game Theory, 2016
International Journal of Management Practice