Kaplan Hasanoglu | Emmanuel College, Boston (original) (raw)
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Papers by Kaplan Hasanoglu
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 2018
I argue that conscious visual experience is essentially a non-representational demonstration of a... more I argue that conscious visual experience is essentially a non-representational demonstration of a skill. The explication and defense of this position depends on both phenomenological and empirical considerations. The central phenomenological claim is this: as a matter of human psychology, it is impossible to produce a conscious visual experience of a mind-independent object that is sufficiently like typical cases, without including concomitant proprioceptive sensations of the sort of extra-neural behavior that allows us to there and then competently detect such objects. I then argue that this view, which is a version of enactivism, best explains the tem-porality of conscious experience-what is often called the specious present.
South African Journal of Philosophy, 2016
Stroud has argued for many years that skepticism is conditionally correct. We cannot, he claims, ... more Stroud has argued for many years that skepticism is conditionally correct. We cannot, he claims, both undergo a Cartesian-style examination of the extent of our knowledge as well as avoid skepticism. One reason Stroud's position appears quite plausible is the so-called "totality condition" imposed for this kind of examination: as inquiring philosophers we are called upon to assess all of our knowledge, all at once. However, in this paper I argue that Stroud's apparent understanding of the totality condition is mistaken. Evidently, Stroud thinks that honoring the totality condition amounts to imposing the strong requirement that we initially assume that we don't know anything about external reality. However, there is a weaker requirement available: that we initially not assume that we know anything about external reality. I argue i) that the weaker conception of the totality condition is most suitable for the kind of philosophical examination that Stroud seems to have in mind; and ii) that according to this same conception skepticism is not conditionally correct.
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 2016
This paper argues that various phenomenological considerations support a non-representational cau... more This paper argues that various phenomenological considerations support a non-representational causal account of visual experience. This position claims that visual experiences serve as a non-representational causally efficacious medium for the production of beliefs concerning the external world. The arguments are centered on defending a non-representational causal account’s understanding of the cognitive significance of visual experience. Among other things, such an account can easily explain the inextricable role that background beliefs and conceptual capacities play in perceptually-based external world belief-formation processes, the fact that visual mental states constrain beliefs because of their presentational phenomenology, and the phenomenon known as the transparency of visual experience.
Dissertation (2011) by Kaplan Hasanoglu
I argue that philosophical skepticism is mistaken, and that on the contrary the position that we ... more I argue that philosophical skepticism is mistaken, and that on the contrary the position that
we know plenty about external reality follows from a proper philosophical examination of
the matter. Initially, something much like the traditional line of reasoning for skepticism is
rehearsed. I argue that the position that we know nothing of external reality follows once it
is conceded that the skeptical scenarios—such as the brain-in-a-vat scenario--are
epistemically possible. However, I then argue that this last position is itself wedded to a
belief in a certain mistaken (albeit popular) theory of perception. I call it a conjunctive
theory of perception. According to this view, ordinary experience of spatiotemporal reality
can be best described as follows: a subject has a certain perceptual experience, and that
experience also matches up (more or less independently, depending upon the particular
version of the view) with what is really the case. I address the problem of skepticism by
defending a contrary theory of perception. According to this contrary view—what I call a
non-cognitive theory of perception—ordinary veridical experience is defined by continuous,
sensitive behavioral interaction with spatiotemporal objects of the appropriate size, shape,
hardness, speed, etc. Knowing that this theory of perception characterizes one’s ordinary
experience of the world is equivalent to knowing that one knows plenty about external
reality. This is ultimately because if a non-cognitive theory of perception is true, then just by
enjoying an ordinary perceptual experience one knows that the skeptical scenarios fail to
obtain. A non-cognitive theory of ordinary experience is then defended on largely
phenomenological grounds, roughly in tandem with the articulation of a methodological
framework for carrying out this defense. Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of this
framework is that it provides support for a non-cognitive theory, in part, by unearthing
various questionable premises involved in the oft-employed arguments for both skepticism,
as well as for a conjunctive theory of perceptual experience.
Master's Thesis (2006) by Kaplan Hasanoglu
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 2018
I argue that conscious visual experience is essentially a non-representational demonstration of a... more I argue that conscious visual experience is essentially a non-representational demonstration of a skill. The explication and defense of this position depends on both phenomenological and empirical considerations. The central phenomenological claim is this: as a matter of human psychology, it is impossible to produce a conscious visual experience of a mind-independent object that is sufficiently like typical cases, without including concomitant proprioceptive sensations of the sort of extra-neural behavior that allows us to there and then competently detect such objects. I then argue that this view, which is a version of enactivism, best explains the tem-porality of conscious experience-what is often called the specious present.
South African Journal of Philosophy, 2016
Stroud has argued for many years that skepticism is conditionally correct. We cannot, he claims, ... more Stroud has argued for many years that skepticism is conditionally correct. We cannot, he claims, both undergo a Cartesian-style examination of the extent of our knowledge as well as avoid skepticism. One reason Stroud's position appears quite plausible is the so-called "totality condition" imposed for this kind of examination: as inquiring philosophers we are called upon to assess all of our knowledge, all at once. However, in this paper I argue that Stroud's apparent understanding of the totality condition is mistaken. Evidently, Stroud thinks that honoring the totality condition amounts to imposing the strong requirement that we initially assume that we don't know anything about external reality. However, there is a weaker requirement available: that we initially not assume that we know anything about external reality. I argue i) that the weaker conception of the totality condition is most suitable for the kind of philosophical examination that Stroud seems to have in mind; and ii) that according to this same conception skepticism is not conditionally correct.
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 2016
This paper argues that various phenomenological considerations support a non-representational cau... more This paper argues that various phenomenological considerations support a non-representational causal account of visual experience. This position claims that visual experiences serve as a non-representational causally efficacious medium for the production of beliefs concerning the external world. The arguments are centered on defending a non-representational causal account’s understanding of the cognitive significance of visual experience. Among other things, such an account can easily explain the inextricable role that background beliefs and conceptual capacities play in perceptually-based external world belief-formation processes, the fact that visual mental states constrain beliefs because of their presentational phenomenology, and the phenomenon known as the transparency of visual experience.
I argue that philosophical skepticism is mistaken, and that on the contrary the position that we ... more I argue that philosophical skepticism is mistaken, and that on the contrary the position that
we know plenty about external reality follows from a proper philosophical examination of
the matter. Initially, something much like the traditional line of reasoning for skepticism is
rehearsed. I argue that the position that we know nothing of external reality follows once it
is conceded that the skeptical scenarios—such as the brain-in-a-vat scenario--are
epistemically possible. However, I then argue that this last position is itself wedded to a
belief in a certain mistaken (albeit popular) theory of perception. I call it a conjunctive
theory of perception. According to this view, ordinary experience of spatiotemporal reality
can be best described as follows: a subject has a certain perceptual experience, and that
experience also matches up (more or less independently, depending upon the particular
version of the view) with what is really the case. I address the problem of skepticism by
defending a contrary theory of perception. According to this contrary view—what I call a
non-cognitive theory of perception—ordinary veridical experience is defined by continuous,
sensitive behavioral interaction with spatiotemporal objects of the appropriate size, shape,
hardness, speed, etc. Knowing that this theory of perception characterizes one’s ordinary
experience of the world is equivalent to knowing that one knows plenty about external
reality. This is ultimately because if a non-cognitive theory of perception is true, then just by
enjoying an ordinary perceptual experience one knows that the skeptical scenarios fail to
obtain. A non-cognitive theory of ordinary experience is then defended on largely
phenomenological grounds, roughly in tandem with the articulation of a methodological
framework for carrying out this defense. Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of this
framework is that it provides support for a non-cognitive theory, in part, by unearthing
various questionable premises involved in the oft-employed arguments for both skepticism,
as well as for a conjunctive theory of perceptual experience.