Lawrence Rubin | Georgia Institute of Technology (original) (raw)
Lawrence Rubin is an associate professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology and a faculty affiliate of the Center for International Strategy Technology, and Policy. His research interests include Middle East politics and international security with a specific focus on Islam and politics, Arab foreign policies, and nuclear proliferation. He has conducted research in Morocco, Egypt, Israel, the UAE, and Yemen.
Rubin is the author of Islam in the Balance: Ideational Threats in Arab Politics(Stanford University Press, 2014). His other work has been published in International Studies Review, Politics, Religion & Ideology,Middle East Policy, Terrorism and Political Violence, Contemporary Security Policy, and the Washington Post. Rubin is a co-editor and contributor Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-terrorism (Routledge 2011).
Prior to coming to Georgia Tech, Rubin was a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs with the Dubai Initiative in Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government (2009-2010) and was lecturer on the Robert and Myra Kraft chair in Arab politics at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University (2008-2009). Outside of Academia, he has held positions at the National Defense University’s Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and the RAND Corporation. Rubin serves as the Associate Editor for the journal Terrorism and Political Violence.
Rubin received his PhD in Political Science from UCLA (2009) and earned degrees from University of Oxford, London School of Economics, and UC Berkeley. His research has been supported by the Hollings Center for International Dialogue, the Institute of Global Cooperation and Conflict, the U.S. Department of Education, Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy, Project on Middle East Political Science, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
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Papers by Lawrence Rubin
Presented on September 16, 2013 from 5:00 pm- 6:30 pm in Clough Commons, room 102.Faculty from GT... more Presented on September 16, 2013 from 5:00 pm- 6:30 pm in Clough Commons, room 102.Faculty from GT’s Sam Nunn School of International Affairs (INTA) will examine the Syrian crisis from several angles and discuss the implications of US policy. Panelists: Dr. Bob Kennedy, Professor, INTA Legalities of military action under international law and US Constitutional issues associated with the use of military force ; Dr. Margaret E. Kosal, Assistant Professor, INTA WMD dimensions and potential US military responses ; Dr. Jenna Jordan, Assistant Professor, INTA Alternative force strategies and Hezbollah ; Dr. Larry Rubin, Assistant Professor, INTA Implications for regional security; Dr. Adam N. Stulberg, Moderator: Associate Professor and Co-Director of CISTP, INTA.Runtime: 99:32 minutes.To intervene or not to intervene: is that the question? What are the strategic, regional, political, and other drivers and consequences of U.S. action amid unfolding events in Syria? Given the recent events surrounding the suspected use of chemical weapons in Syria and contemplation of use of military force, CISTP is hosting a panel discussion on Syrian Crisis, the implications for WMD proliferation and terrorism, and broader security repercussions in the Middle East The purpose of this panel will be to answer questions and to help the audience navigate these difficult policy considerations fostering an informed public debate
Presented on September 16, 2014 at 5:00 PM in the Clough Undergraduate Learning Commons, room 102.
The Washington Quarterly, 2016
In the last few years, the Islamic State, or IS, has become a central focus of public debates abo... more In the last few years, the Islamic State, or IS, has become a central focus of public debates about U.S. national security. A May 2016 poll by the Pew Research Center reported that 80 percent of Am...
International Journal of Middle East Studies
The case study for Oman titled “Sultan Qaboos and Operation Eagle Claw” reinforces Gresh’s argume... more The case study for Oman titled “Sultan Qaboos and Operation Eagle Claw” reinforces Gresh’s argument in that news that the United States had used Oman as a way station during the Iranian hostage rescue attempt without informing the Omanis proved awkward for both the sultan and President Carter. In the end, diplomacy and a bolstered aid package enabled the United States to maintain a small footprint on the island of Masirah at the northwestern end of the Northern Arabian Gulf. Assigned to a Military Sealift Command oiler operating off Masirah during the tanker wars of the mid-1980s, I can attest to the critical role the Masirah facility played in sustaining US Navy operations that kept the Strait of Hormuz open. Perhaps as thought provoking as Gresh’s internal/external security framework are his observations in the concluding section. His first chapter “Oil and War” makes it clear that access to cheap energy sources drove American interests in the region. Now that the United States is reachieving energy independence, how will American foreign policy in the region change? Certainly the United States will want to continue to contain Iranian nuclear aspirations and support efforts to defeat radicalized terrorists. Gresh hints at a coming changing of the guard as China is becoming as dependent on the Gulf for energy supplies. As demonstrated by the Chinese construction of bases in the South China Sea and the opening of a facility in Djibouti, the Chinese are working to secure their sea lanes to and from the region. The forthcoming regional competition between the United States and China need not be confrontational. It’s a coming reality that warrants further examination. Most impressive is Gresh’s use of primary source materials. I found it strange that no bibliography of secondary sources was provided. Instead, secondary sources, when used, are buried in the endnotes. One personal annoyance is that he misidentified me as an employee of the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) and identified the Bahrain book research papers I loaned him as being part of the NHHC archives. There are Winkler Papers at NHHC—the collection of papers associated with my US–USSR Incidents at Sea dissertation. For the near future I intend to retain the Bahrain book papers at my Naval Historical Foundation office.
International Area Studies Review
A number of recent studies have recognized the importance of status in international politics. Wh... more A number of recent studies have recognized the importance of status in international politics. While this developing scholarship has largely focused on great and middle powers, the pursuit of status by small states remains underexplored. For example, many studies claim that small states such as Qatar ‘punch above their weight’ in international politics in pursuit of status. How do small states without significant military power acquire status? How can we assess change in status over time? This paper argues that small states can acquire status by increasing their involvement in international politics and one way states can do this is through mediation efforts. Acting as a mediator for international conflict can enhance a small state’s status relative to its peers by demonstrating its relevance and importance in the regional and international system. This public act of mediation produces commonly held beliefs that the mediator state is an influential player in the international system...
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Abstract This paper examines Islamic political activism among the Bedouin Arab citizens of Israel... more Abstract This paper examines Islamic political activism among the Bedouin Arab citizens of Israel who reside in the Negev/Naqab (southern Israel). It describes how a religious-political movement became the dominant political force among the non-Jewish communities of the Negev, in doing so, this paper explores the link between religious-political ideology, represented by the Islamic movement, and tribalism, the dominant social-cultural influence among this population. While this paper is a first cut at trying to understand these linkages, I suggest that Israeli Islamist political leaders have mobilized support in two interconnected ways. First, they have attracted support through dawa (religious education), social-welfare activities, and mobilizing symbols. Second, Islamic political activists have worked within and exploited one of the most salient features of Bedouin life, tribalism, by recruiting support from the lower-status, largely urbanized, and landless tribes. These activities have taken place within the broader context of a changing landscape of identity within these communities of the Negev.
Democracy and Security
ABSTRACT This article examines how and why four Arab states, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt,... more ABSTRACT This article examines how and why four Arab states, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt, have increased official Islam (OI) to counter the new challenges in the regional environment following the Arab uprisings. It argues that regimes responded to the initial rise of popular Islam as well as the threat from extremist groups by enhancing their support for official Islam. In an effort to control the religious space and legitimize their rule, these regimes have allocated financial resources, political capital, and institutional power to elements of official Islam. Furthermore, these regimes’ survival strategies vary according to the regime type and the presence or absence of inherited religious institutions. For example, we find that Tunisia turned to foreign training of their imams and greater cooperation with religious leaders in other countries. By contrast, Egypt, under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, further coopted al-Azhar and OI by setting the agenda for how religion institutions should engage society. Meanwhile, Jordan continued its long-standing development of OI while Morocco further expanded and internationalized OI. These similar goals but distinct approaches demonstrate the importance of the understanding the context in which these specific policies are developed.
Review of Middle East Studies, 2011
ABSTRACT This paper examines the curious case of the Islamic movement in Israel, from its origins... more ABSTRACT This paper examines the curious case of the Islamic movement in Israel, from its origins in the early 1970s, fragmentation in the mid-1990s, to its present state. It provides an overview of this Islamic movement as a window into an under-examined subject at the intersection of Israeli-Arab and Islamist politics.
Politics, Religion & Ideology, 2013
ABSTRACT This paper examines the development of ‘Official Islam’, or state-sponsored religious in... more ABSTRACT This paper examines the development of ‘Official Islam’, or state-sponsored religious institutions, in Jordan. We argue that Jordan's development went through three phases. From its independence in 1947 until the revolution, the state undertook minimal efforts to develop this institution. After the Iranian revolution, however, the state changed course by developing two such institutions – the Advisory Council of Dar al-Ifta (Department for Issuing Fatwas) and the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought. These institutional changes set the stage for the regime's new policy of seeking to manage the public religious space. With the rise of Global Jihadism in the late 1990s, however, the state has increasingly empowered both institutions seeking to actively shape the religious space and debate in Jordan.
Terrorism and Political Violence, 2008
... Gerges challenges the conventional wisdom that Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Ossama bin Laden, and other... more ... Gerges challenges the conventional wisdom that Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Ossama bin Laden, and others always had a global agenda. The author carefully examines Ayman Al-Zawahiri's own words and actions to demonstrate this point. ...
Terrorism and Political Violence, 2008
Terrorism and Political Violence, 2007
How and why has the use of force become a counterterrorism strategy, not just an important tactic... more How and why has the use of force become a counterterrorism strategy, not just an important tactic? Kinetic options are not the only, or even primary, answer to countering terrorism and often result in suboptimal strategies which weaken U.S. power and lead to a greater loss of American lives.
As the presidential campaigns launch into full swing, there is little doubt that debating the eff... more As the presidential campaigns launch into full swing, there is little doubt that debating the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to combat ISIS will take center stage. Critics of the current administration's policy have argued that the strategy of containment to " degrade and destroy " ISIS has been ineffective. This camp asserts that ISIS is a long way from being destroyed and is not even being contained: ISIS has expanded its reach to other territories, increased its attacks on targets outside its borders, and its ideological appeal shows no sign of decline. Meanwhile, supporters of the current approach remind us that this will be a long war and also point out that Islamic State has lost significant territory, its finances are being depleted, its recruitment is down, and local counter-ISIS forces are getting stronger. Yet both views miss the mark about a crucial aspect of U.S. policy: containment. Cultivated in the early days of the Cold War to prevent the expanding influence of the Soviet Union, a massive state with a strong ideology and robust military, George Kennan's interpretation of containment highlights its limitations within the context of ISIS. Containment cannot be applied the same way it was against ISIS, an elusive adversary that has the characteristics of a state, a transnational terrorist organization and a social movement. Moreover, it is much harder to contain an ideological threat than a military one, as the U.S. experience with the Soviet Union showed. It is essential that policy makers recognize what containment can and can't do against ISIS. Instead, containment should be understood as a way to limit ISIS's territorial expansion in Iraq and Syria, and not as an effort to destroy the organization. This is a tall order during a highly charged election season, where the policy alternatives range from carpet bombing to committing large numbers of troops. Thus, to move the counter-ISIS efforts into the win column, the United States should set three realistic expectations. First, it should make clear that the United States can contain ISIS as a state or an insurgent group, but it cannot contain its ideology. Second, the United States can prevent ISIS's expansion in the peripheral areas by bolstering communal resilience to contain its transnational affiliates. Third, the United States should continue to bolster our defenses against attacks on U.S. soil. What Is Containment? Defined as restricting the activities of an actor to a demarcated territory, containment has been the cornerstone of the administration's strategy to eventually defeat and eliminate ISIS. The logic that undergirds this effort is that it avoids a large scale and costly military intervention that could cause more harm than good.
Presented on September 16, 2013 from 5:00 pm- 6:30 pm in Clough Commons, room 102.Faculty from GT... more Presented on September 16, 2013 from 5:00 pm- 6:30 pm in Clough Commons, room 102.Faculty from GT’s Sam Nunn School of International Affairs (INTA) will examine the Syrian crisis from several angles and discuss the implications of US policy. Panelists: Dr. Bob Kennedy, Professor, INTA Legalities of military action under international law and US Constitutional issues associated with the use of military force ; Dr. Margaret E. Kosal, Assistant Professor, INTA WMD dimensions and potential US military responses ; Dr. Jenna Jordan, Assistant Professor, INTA Alternative force strategies and Hezbollah ; Dr. Larry Rubin, Assistant Professor, INTA Implications for regional security; Dr. Adam N. Stulberg, Moderator: Associate Professor and Co-Director of CISTP, INTA.Runtime: 99:32 minutes.To intervene or not to intervene: is that the question? What are the strategic, regional, political, and other drivers and consequences of U.S. action amid unfolding events in Syria? Given the recent events surrounding the suspected use of chemical weapons in Syria and contemplation of use of military force, CISTP is hosting a panel discussion on Syrian Crisis, the implications for WMD proliferation and terrorism, and broader security repercussions in the Middle East The purpose of this panel will be to answer questions and to help the audience navigate these difficult policy considerations fostering an informed public debate
Presented on September 16, 2014 at 5:00 PM in the Clough Undergraduate Learning Commons, room 102.
The Washington Quarterly, 2016
In the last few years, the Islamic State, or IS, has become a central focus of public debates abo... more In the last few years, the Islamic State, or IS, has become a central focus of public debates about U.S. national security. A May 2016 poll by the Pew Research Center reported that 80 percent of Am...
International Journal of Middle East Studies
The case study for Oman titled “Sultan Qaboos and Operation Eagle Claw” reinforces Gresh’s argume... more The case study for Oman titled “Sultan Qaboos and Operation Eagle Claw” reinforces Gresh’s argument in that news that the United States had used Oman as a way station during the Iranian hostage rescue attempt without informing the Omanis proved awkward for both the sultan and President Carter. In the end, diplomacy and a bolstered aid package enabled the United States to maintain a small footprint on the island of Masirah at the northwestern end of the Northern Arabian Gulf. Assigned to a Military Sealift Command oiler operating off Masirah during the tanker wars of the mid-1980s, I can attest to the critical role the Masirah facility played in sustaining US Navy operations that kept the Strait of Hormuz open. Perhaps as thought provoking as Gresh’s internal/external security framework are his observations in the concluding section. His first chapter “Oil and War” makes it clear that access to cheap energy sources drove American interests in the region. Now that the United States is reachieving energy independence, how will American foreign policy in the region change? Certainly the United States will want to continue to contain Iranian nuclear aspirations and support efforts to defeat radicalized terrorists. Gresh hints at a coming changing of the guard as China is becoming as dependent on the Gulf for energy supplies. As demonstrated by the Chinese construction of bases in the South China Sea and the opening of a facility in Djibouti, the Chinese are working to secure their sea lanes to and from the region. The forthcoming regional competition between the United States and China need not be confrontational. It’s a coming reality that warrants further examination. Most impressive is Gresh’s use of primary source materials. I found it strange that no bibliography of secondary sources was provided. Instead, secondary sources, when used, are buried in the endnotes. One personal annoyance is that he misidentified me as an employee of the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) and identified the Bahrain book research papers I loaned him as being part of the NHHC archives. There are Winkler Papers at NHHC—the collection of papers associated with my US–USSR Incidents at Sea dissertation. For the near future I intend to retain the Bahrain book papers at my Naval Historical Foundation office.
International Area Studies Review
A number of recent studies have recognized the importance of status in international politics. Wh... more A number of recent studies have recognized the importance of status in international politics. While this developing scholarship has largely focused on great and middle powers, the pursuit of status by small states remains underexplored. For example, many studies claim that small states such as Qatar ‘punch above their weight’ in international politics in pursuit of status. How do small states without significant military power acquire status? How can we assess change in status over time? This paper argues that small states can acquire status by increasing their involvement in international politics and one way states can do this is through mediation efforts. Acting as a mediator for international conflict can enhance a small state’s status relative to its peers by demonstrating its relevance and importance in the regional and international system. This public act of mediation produces commonly held beliefs that the mediator state is an influential player in the international system...
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
Abstract This paper examines Islamic political activism among the Bedouin Arab citizens of Israel... more Abstract This paper examines Islamic political activism among the Bedouin Arab citizens of Israel who reside in the Negev/Naqab (southern Israel). It describes how a religious-political movement became the dominant political force among the non-Jewish communities of the Negev, in doing so, this paper explores the link between religious-political ideology, represented by the Islamic movement, and tribalism, the dominant social-cultural influence among this population. While this paper is a first cut at trying to understand these linkages, I suggest that Israeli Islamist political leaders have mobilized support in two interconnected ways. First, they have attracted support through dawa (religious education), social-welfare activities, and mobilizing symbols. Second, Islamic political activists have worked within and exploited one of the most salient features of Bedouin life, tribalism, by recruiting support from the lower-status, largely urbanized, and landless tribes. These activities have taken place within the broader context of a changing landscape of identity within these communities of the Negev.
Democracy and Security
ABSTRACT This article examines how and why four Arab states, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt,... more ABSTRACT This article examines how and why four Arab states, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt, have increased official Islam (OI) to counter the new challenges in the regional environment following the Arab uprisings. It argues that regimes responded to the initial rise of popular Islam as well as the threat from extremist groups by enhancing their support for official Islam. In an effort to control the religious space and legitimize their rule, these regimes have allocated financial resources, political capital, and institutional power to elements of official Islam. Furthermore, these regimes’ survival strategies vary according to the regime type and the presence or absence of inherited religious institutions. For example, we find that Tunisia turned to foreign training of their imams and greater cooperation with religious leaders in other countries. By contrast, Egypt, under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, further coopted al-Azhar and OI by setting the agenda for how religion institutions should engage society. Meanwhile, Jordan continued its long-standing development of OI while Morocco further expanded and internationalized OI. These similar goals but distinct approaches demonstrate the importance of the understanding the context in which these specific policies are developed.
Review of Middle East Studies, 2011
ABSTRACT This paper examines the curious case of the Islamic movement in Israel, from its origins... more ABSTRACT This paper examines the curious case of the Islamic movement in Israel, from its origins in the early 1970s, fragmentation in the mid-1990s, to its present state. It provides an overview of this Islamic movement as a window into an under-examined subject at the intersection of Israeli-Arab and Islamist politics.
Politics, Religion & Ideology, 2013
ABSTRACT This paper examines the development of ‘Official Islam’, or state-sponsored religious in... more ABSTRACT This paper examines the development of ‘Official Islam’, or state-sponsored religious institutions, in Jordan. We argue that Jordan's development went through three phases. From its independence in 1947 until the revolution, the state undertook minimal efforts to develop this institution. After the Iranian revolution, however, the state changed course by developing two such institutions – the Advisory Council of Dar al-Ifta (Department for Issuing Fatwas) and the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought. These institutional changes set the stage for the regime's new policy of seeking to manage the public religious space. With the rise of Global Jihadism in the late 1990s, however, the state has increasingly empowered both institutions seeking to actively shape the religious space and debate in Jordan.
Terrorism and Political Violence, 2008
... Gerges challenges the conventional wisdom that Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Ossama bin Laden, and other... more ... Gerges challenges the conventional wisdom that Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Ossama bin Laden, and others always had a global agenda. The author carefully examines Ayman Al-Zawahiri's own words and actions to demonstrate this point. ...
Terrorism and Political Violence, 2008
Terrorism and Political Violence, 2007
How and why has the use of force become a counterterrorism strategy, not just an important tactic... more How and why has the use of force become a counterterrorism strategy, not just an important tactic? Kinetic options are not the only, or even primary, answer to countering terrorism and often result in suboptimal strategies which weaken U.S. power and lead to a greater loss of American lives.
As the presidential campaigns launch into full swing, there is little doubt that debating the eff... more As the presidential campaigns launch into full swing, there is little doubt that debating the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to combat ISIS will take center stage. Critics of the current administration's policy have argued that the strategy of containment to " degrade and destroy " ISIS has been ineffective. This camp asserts that ISIS is a long way from being destroyed and is not even being contained: ISIS has expanded its reach to other territories, increased its attacks on targets outside its borders, and its ideological appeal shows no sign of decline. Meanwhile, supporters of the current approach remind us that this will be a long war and also point out that Islamic State has lost significant territory, its finances are being depleted, its recruitment is down, and local counter-ISIS forces are getting stronger. Yet both views miss the mark about a crucial aspect of U.S. policy: containment. Cultivated in the early days of the Cold War to prevent the expanding influence of the Soviet Union, a massive state with a strong ideology and robust military, George Kennan's interpretation of containment highlights its limitations within the context of ISIS. Containment cannot be applied the same way it was against ISIS, an elusive adversary that has the characteristics of a state, a transnational terrorist organization and a social movement. Moreover, it is much harder to contain an ideological threat than a military one, as the U.S. experience with the Soviet Union showed. It is essential that policy makers recognize what containment can and can't do against ISIS. Instead, containment should be understood as a way to limit ISIS's territorial expansion in Iraq and Syria, and not as an effort to destroy the organization. This is a tall order during a highly charged election season, where the policy alternatives range from carpet bombing to committing large numbers of troops. Thus, to move the counter-ISIS efforts into the win column, the United States should set three realistic expectations. First, it should make clear that the United States can contain ISIS as a state or an insurgent group, but it cannot contain its ideology. Second, the United States can prevent ISIS's expansion in the peripheral areas by bolstering communal resilience to contain its transnational affiliates. Third, the United States should continue to bolster our defenses against attacks on U.S. soil. What Is Containment? Defined as restricting the activities of an actor to a demarcated territory, containment has been the cornerstone of the administration's strategy to eventually defeat and eliminate ISIS. The logic that undergirds this effort is that it avoids a large scale and costly military intervention that could cause more harm than good.