The End of Strategic Stability?: Nuclear Weapons and the Challenge of Regional Rivalries (original) (raw)
Related papers
2008
Another major conclusion of this study is that although nuclear weapons could have destabilizing consequences in certain situations, on net they have reinforced national security and regional stability in Asia. It is possible to argue that fledgling and small nuclear arsenals would be more vulnerable to preventive attacks; that the related strategic compulsion for early use may lead to early launch postures and crisis situations; that limited war under nuclear conditions to alter or restore the political status quo can intensify tensions and carry the risk of escalation to major war; that inadequate command, control, and safety measures could result in accidents; and that nuclear facilities and material may be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. These are legitimate concerns, but thus far nuclear weapons have not undermined national security and regional stability in Asia. Instead, they have ameliorated national security concerns, strengthened the status quo, increased deterrence domin...
Level of Analysis Problem in the Post-Cold War Deterrence: The Need for Regional Perspectives
The end of the Cold War has had profound effect on deterrence theory and practice. Contrary to the perceived belief that deterrence was a dead conceptafter the demise of the Cold War rivalries, it lives, even grabs more attentions with recent developments in international relations. During the entire Cold War period, deterrence had been studied within a systemic context in which nuclear superpowers operated in a bipolar world. In the post-Cold War era, with a renewing interest in deterrence theory and practice, deterrenceat regional levelappears to be more pertinent to new security environment. However, current literature on the concept does not pay adequate attention todeterrence atthislevel. In this sense, Regional Security Complex Theory(RSCT) has an important explanatory power for resolving regional dynamics in which deterrence practice isgenerally shaped.This article aims to bridge the gap between deterrence studies and regions, as a level of analysis, by integrating RSCT within the wider deterrence discussion.
Growing Reliance on Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Case Study of US, Russia and Pakistan
This paper argues that, due to their inherent strategic competition, Washington and Moscow rely on low-yield or Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) to overcome intrinsic geo-strategic uncertainties of international politics. It further explores the nuclear policy of the US and Russia while positing that both states are depending on the use of battlefield nuclear weapons for ensuring nuclear deterrence stability. It also maintains that Pakistan's policy of full-spectrum deterrence and its declaration to use TNWs, when certain red lines will be crossed, is in line with the policy of above-mentioned states.
The end of the Cold War has had profound effect on deterrence theory and practice. Contrary to the perceived belief that deterrence was a dead concept after the demise of the Cold War rivalries, it lives, even grabs more attentions with recent developments in international relations. During the entire Cold War period, deterrence had been studied within a systemic context in which nuclear superpowers operated in a bipolar world. In the post-Cold War era, with a renewing interest in deterrence theory and practice, deterrence at regional level appears to be more pertinent to new security environment. However, current literature on the concept does not pay adequate attention to deterrence at this level. In this sense, Regional Security Complex Theory(RSCT) has an important explanatory power for resolving regional dynamics in which deterrence practice is generally shaped. This article aims to bridge the gap between deterrence studies and regions, as a level of analysis, by integrating RSCT within the wider deterrence discussion.
Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-Russian Relations Beyond the Moscow Treaty (2005)
This study assesses alternative roles of strategic nuclear weapons in US-Russian relations after expiration of the 2002 Moscow Agreement, a successor agreement to the START I Treaty. A range of alternative nuclear futures beyond a QDR-defined baseline in a post-2012 security environment are explored, focused on the degree in which the U.S. would require nuclear weapons to manage its relationship with Russia and other states, key indicators of changes in U.S-Russian security relationships, future threats and political utility of nuclear weapons under alternative futures and nuclear force postures. Key questions for investigation are: • To what degree will the US need nuclear weapons after 2012? • Will the United States need nuclear weapons to manage its relationship with Russia after 2012? • What direction might future American and Russian nuclear force postures take after expiration of the Moscow Agreement after 2012? What are the indicators of change? • For the US and Russia, will the future political utility of nuclear weapons increase or decrease after 2012? • Given a degree of uncertainty in the US-Russian cooperative relations, what combination of currently planned and programmed strategic force investments offer the least risk? Six alternative nuclear futures are outlines and assessed.