Replace some uses of the deprecated mktemp function by EliahKagan · Pull Request #1770 · gitpython-developers/GitPython (original) (raw)

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EliahKagan

@EliahKagan

The tempfile.mktemp function is deprecated, because of a race condition where the file may be concurrently created between when its name is generated and when it is opened. Other faciliies in the tempfile module overcome this by generating a name, attempting to create the file or directory in a way that guarantees failure if it already existed, and, in the occasional case that it did already exist, generating another name and trying again (stopping after a predefined limit). For further information on mktemp deprecation:

The security risk of calls to mktemp in this project's test suite is low. However, it is still best to avoid using it, because it is deprecated, because it is (at least slightly) brittle, and because any use of mktemp looks like a potential security risk and thereby imposes a burden on working with the code (which could potentially be addressed with detailed comments analyzing why it is believed safe in particular cases, but this would typically be more verbose, and at least as challenging to add, as replacing mktemp with a better alternative).

This commit replaces some uses of mktemp in the test suite: those where it is readily clear how to do so in a way that preserves the code's intent:

Other cases in the test suite should also be feasible to replace, but are left alone for now. Some of them are ambiguous in their intent, with respect to whether the file should be retained after a test failure. Others appear deliberately to avoid creating a file or directory where the code under test should do so, possibly to check that this is done properly. (One way to preserve that latter behavior, while avoiding the weakness of using mktemp and also avoiding inadverently reproducing that weakness by other means, could be to use a path in a temporary directory made for the test.)

This commit also doesn't address the one use of mktemp in the code under test (i.e., outside the test suite, inside the git module).

@EliahKagan

This makes two related changes to git.index.util.TemporaryFileSwap:

A small amount of related refactoring is included. The interface is not changed, even where it could be simplified (by letting exit return None), and resource acquisition remains done on construction rather than in enter, because changing those aspects of the design could break some existing uses.

Although the use of mktemp replaced here was in the git module and not the test suite, its use was to generate filenames for use in a directory that would ordinarily be under the user's control, such that the ability to carry out typical mktemp-related attacks would already require the ability to achieve the same goals more easily and reliably. Although TemporaryFileSwap is a public class that may be used directly by applications, it is only useful for making a temporary file in the same directory as an existing file. Thus the intended benefits of this change are mainly to code quality and a slight improvement in robustness.

This was referenced

Dec 13, 2023

EliahKagan added a commit to EliahKagan/GitPython that referenced this pull request

Dec 21, 2023

@EliahKagan

This is a general test for TemporaryFileSwap, but by being parametrized by the type of file_path, it reveals a regression introduced in 9e86053 (gitpython-developers#1770). TemporaryFileSwap still works when file_path is a string, but is now broken when it is a Path. That worked before, and the type annotations document that it should be able to work. This is at least a bug because TemporaryFileSwap is public. (I am unsure whether, in practice, GitPython itself uses it in a way that sometimes passes a Path object as file_path. But code that uses GitPython may call it directly and pass Path.)

EliahKagan added a commit to EliahKagan/GitPython that referenced this pull request

Dec 21, 2023

@EliahKagan

This fixes the regression introduced in 9e86053 (gitpython-developers#1770) where the file_path argument to TemporaryFileSwap.init could no longer be a Path object.

The change also makes this truer to the code from before gitpython-developers#1770, still without the race condition fixed there, in that str was called on file_path then as well. However, it is not clear that this is a good thing, because this is not an idiomatic use of mkstemp. The reason the prefix cannot be a Path is that it is expected to be a filename prefix, with leading directories given in the dir argument.

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Dec 21, 2023

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Jan 10, 2024

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Jan 11, 2024

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EliahKagan added a commit to EliahKagan/GitPython that referenced this pull request

Feb 29, 2024

@EliahKagan

This expands the comment added in 41fac85 (gitpython-developers#1770) to make more clear that this particular cleanup is deliberately done only when the operation was successful (and why).

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Apr 6, 2024

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
GitPython
==3.1.40 -> ==3.1.41
age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
adoption](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
passing](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)

[!WARNING] Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-22190

Summary

This issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2023-40590. On Windows, GitPython uses an untrusted search path if it uses a shell to run git, as well as when it runs bash.exe to interpret hooks. If either of those features are used on Windows, a malicious git.exe or bash.exe may be run from an untrusted repository.

Details

Although GitPython often avoids executing programs found in an untrusted search path since 3.1.33, two situations remain where this still occurs. Either can allow arbitrary code execution under some circumstances.

When a shell is used

GitPython can be told to run git commands through a shell rather than as direct subprocesses, by passing shell=True to any method that accepts it, or by both setting Git.USE_SHELL = True and not passing shell=False. Then the Windows cmd.exe shell process performs the path search, and GitPython does not prevent that shell from finding and running git in the current directory.

When GitPython runs git directly rather than through a shell, the GitPython process performs the path search, and currently omits the current directory by setting NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath in its own environment during the Popen call. Although the cmd.exe shell will honor this environment variable when present, GitPython does not currently pass it into the shell subprocess's environment.

Furthermore, because GitPython sets the subprocess CWD to the root of a repository's working tree, using a shell will run a malicious git.exe in an untrusted repository even if GitPython itself is run from a trusted location.

This also applies if Git.execute is called directly with shell=True (or after Git.USE_SHELL = True) to run any command.

When hook scripts are run

On Windows, GitPython uses bash.exe to run hooks that appear to be scripts. However, unlike when running git, no steps are taken to avoid finding and running bash.exe in the current directory.

This allows the author of an untrusted fork or branch to cause a malicious bash.exe to be run in some otherwise safe workflows. An example of such a scenario is if the user installs a trusted hook while on a trusted branch, then switches to an untrusted feature branch (possibly from a fork) to review proposed changes. If the untrusted feature branch contains a malicious bash.exe and the user's current working directory is the working tree, and the user performs an action that runs the hook, then although the hook itself is uncorrupted, it runs with the malicious bash.exe.

Note that, while bash.exe is a shell, this is a separate scenario from when git is run using the unrelated Windows cmd.exe shell.

PoC

On Windows, create a git.exe file in a repository. Then create a Repo object, and call any method through it (directly or indirectly) that supports the shell keyword argument with shell=True:

mkdir testrepo
git init testrepo
cp ... testrepo git.exe # Replace "..." with any executable of choice.
python -c "import git; print(git.Repo('testrepo').git.version(shell=True))"

The git.exe executable in the repository directory will be run.

Or use no Repo object, but do it from the location with the git.exe:

cd testrepo
python -c "import git; print(git.Git().version(shell=True))"

The git.exe executable in the current directory will be run.

For the scenario with hooks, install a hook in a repository, create a bash.exe file in the current directory, and perform an operation that causes GitPython to attempt to run the hook:

mkdir testrepo
cd testrepo
git init
mv .git/hooks/pre-commit.sample .git/hooks/pre-commit
cp ... bash.exe # Replace "..." with any executable of choice.
echo "Some text" >file.txt
git add file.txt
python -c "import git; git.Repo().index.commit('Some message')"

The bash.exe executable in the current directory will be run.

Impact

The greatest impact is probably in applications that set Git.USE_SHELL = True for historical reasons. (Undesired console windows had, in the past, been created in some kinds of applications, when it was not used.) Such an application may be vulnerable to arbitrary code execution from a malicious repository, even with no other exacerbating conditions. This is to say that, if a shell is used to run git, the full effect of CVE-2023-40590 is still present. Furthermore, as noted above, running the application itself from a trusted directory is not a sufficient mitigation.

An application that does not direct GitPython to use a shell to run git subprocesses thus avoids most of the risk. However, there is no such straightforward way to prevent GitPython from running bash.exe to interpret hooks. So while the conditions needed for that to be exploited are more involved, it may be harder to mitigate decisively prior to patching.

Possible solutions

A straightforward approach would be to address each bug directly:

These need only be done on Windows.


Release Notes

gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)

v3.1.41:

Compare Source

The details about the Windows security issue can be found in this advisory.

Special thanks go to @​EliahKagan who reported the issue and fixed it in a single stroke, while being responsible for an incredible amount of improvements that he contributed over the last couple of months ❤️.

What's Changed

New Contributors

Full Changelog: gitpython-developers/GitPython@3.1.40...3.1.41


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