Kalyanaraman S | Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (original) (raw)

Articles and Book Chapters by Kalyanaraman S

IDSA Issue Brief, 2021

Recent positive steps in India-Pakistan relations have led to expectations of a resumption of the... more Recent positive steps in India-Pakistan relations have led to expectations of a resumption of the discussions that got stalled in 2007. A return to the framework that drove the back-channel negotiations does not, however, appear to be a tenable proposition any longer. The Manmohan-Musharraf initiative was disowned by the Pakistan Establishment after Musharraf’s departure. Even if Pakistan were to be keen on reviving that formula, India is unlikely to favour it because of the Modi government’s commitment to regain Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. While this change in Indian policy may lead to the placement of the Kashmir issue on the back burner in the short and medium terms, it is likely to aggravate conflict in the long term.

IDSA Comment, 2020

China is no longer interested in maintaining previous patterns of its relationships with India an... more China is no longer interested in maintaining previous patterns of its relationships with India and US. It seeks to forge new types of relationships that are reflective of the extant balance of power. China expects India to demonstrate awed subservience and refrain from security cooperation with US.

Journal of Defence Studies, 2013

The UK’s limited importance for India is partly a function of the steady decline in its relative ... more The UK’s limited importance for India is partly a function of the
steady decline in its relative power over the last six decades, which has
translated into a diminished presence in Asia and an inability to play
an autonomous role in international affairs. Ongoing economic travails
and the consequent military downsizing will further reduce its ability to
carve out for itself a robust role in the Asian arena. What little presence the United Kingdom has in India’s neighbourhood will also be wound
down or has long become marginalized. Given all this, the UK is unlikely to serve as a useful partner for India in Asia. Nevertheless, New Delhi does see utility in broadening the scope of bilateral defence cooperation. But what is hampering the strategic partnership is a lack of alignment between their security perspectives.

Swarajya, 2016

NAM’s lack of utility was clearly demonstrated by the unfavourable diplomatic positions member co... more NAM’s lack of utility was clearly demonstrated by the unfavourable diplomatic positions member countries took against India at times of need.

IDSA Comment, 2019

India’s decision to ally with America would be contingent upon the degree of convergence between ... more India’s decision to ally with America would be contingent upon the degree of convergence between their positions on core issues and the extent of military assistance needed in a two-front war scenario.

Defending national territory, offshore assets and sea lanes of communication from external aggres... more Defending national territory, offshore assets and sea lanes of communication from external aggression, preserving national unity in the face of internal challenges, and protecting small South Asian neighbours from destabilisation by domestic and extraregional actors have been India's defence priorities until now. Intensifying economic links to the rest of Asia and aspiration to play a leading role have impelled an expansion in the country's interests throughout the Extended Neighbourhood spanning between Suez and Shanghai. While financial constraints and the imperative of not eroding extant capabilities against external and internal challenges render impractical the defence of interests in the extended neighbourhood, it should be feasible to adopt as a fourth priority the defence of the island countries and extended sea lanes of the Indian Ocean.

External balancing emerged as a component in India’s foreign policy during the last stages of the... more External balancing emerged as a component in India’s foreign policy during the last stages of the 1962 War with China and persisted until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It is once again emerging as an element in India’s China policy because of the combination of the yawning power asymmetry between India and China and China’s turn towards assertive behaviour and territorial claims. What form external balancing eventually assumes is likely to be determined by the scale and intensity of China’s challenge as well as the level of commitment and support that India and its partners seek and extend in their respective interactions with China.

China's territorial claims backed by efforts to establish facts on the ground and expressions of ... more China's territorial claims backed by efforts to establish facts on the ground and expressions of determination to use force constitute an emergent challenge to the territorial status quo in Asia and to the norms that underpin the current international order. It may be more prudent for India, Japan and their mutual partners to send an unambiguous message to China with regard to its territorial and hegemonic ambitions in Asia.

India’s practice of civil-military relations has had four distinct features: conscious subordinat... more India’s practice of civil-military relations has had four distinct features: conscious subordination of the military to civil authority; grant of a wide degree of autonomy to the military leadership in affairs internal to the services; reluctance to carry out reforms that may unwittingly result in an assertive military leadership, and intrusive monitoring of the military by the civilian bureaucracy. These features are the product of three major concerns that have dominated the thinking of the political leadership: the need to ensure that defence and development go hand in hand; the imperative of subordinating the military leadership to civilian authority; and not empowering the military leadership in any manner that might contribute to their assertiveness. These concerns are indeed endemic to all democracies. The theory of civil-military relations itself is based on democratic theory and its most fundamental principle – ensuring that the people have ultimate control over the government.

Until now, the principal endeavour of India’s foreign policy has been to leverage the conditions ... more Until now, the principal endeavour of India’s foreign policy has been to leverage the conditions of economic interdependence and general tranquility in the Asia-Pacific for fostering closer economic, political and security relationships with all the major players in the region. Such an omnibus approach of developing closer relationships with all the major actors of the Asia-Pacific may; however, neither suffice nor be practicable in the unfolding circumstances of the region’s emerging economic and security rivalries.

The modern State has sufficient force at its disposal to crush any insurgency. India is no except... more The modern State has sufficient force at its disposal to crush any insurgency. India is no exception in this regard. Yet, the most distinctive feature of the Indian way in countering insurgency has been the deliberate restraint exercised in the use of military force. The Indian State has demonstrated such restraint even in the face of direct external involvement in the insurgencies directed against it. This is evident from the Indian response over the last decade to Pakistan’s widely-acknowledged involvement and encouragement to international terrorist activities in Kashmir. Even at the time of the Pakistani intrusions in Kargil in the summer of 1999, India exercised remarkable restraint in its use of military force despite the fact that the fighting took place in one of the most difficult terrains. And though its military has been in a state of mobilization for war since December 2001, India has continued to demonstrate its resolve not to take precipitate action provided Islamabad wound down its involvement in cross-border terrorist activities. The Indian State has had one of the longest experiences in countering insurgencies and a unique one at that. The unique nature of this experience arises from the Indian perception of the causes underlying these insurgencies. India essentially sees and responds to insurgencies within its frontiers as challenges to the project of nation-building. And it is this perception that has determined the Indian way in counter-insurgency.

Ceding PoK as part of a settlement does not comport with India’s national and strategic interests... more Ceding PoK as part of a settlement does not comport with India’s national and strategic interests, especially in terms of dealing with the challenge posed by China-Pakistan collaboration.

There are three main reasons Kautilya’s Arthashastra must be studied. First, it is the earliest t... more There are three main reasons Kautilya’s Arthashastra must be studied. First, it is the earliest treatise on statecraft written anywhere in the world and being Indian in origin there is a need to celebrate this heritage by providing it a prominent place in the Indian discourse on International
Relations. Second, the Arthashastra continues to be relevant because of the key insights it provides about the enduring nature of the state and of the inter-state system as well as because of the framework of thought and action it prescribes for states to navigate through this system. The third and even more important reason for studying the Arthashastra
is to provide a boost for the discipline of International Relations in India, a discipline that is widely acknowledged as continuing to wallow on the margins of the global discourse in this field.

It is widely believed that India agreed to the ceasefire because of the advice tendered by Genera... more It is widely believed that India agreed to the ceasefire because of the advice tendered by General Chaudhuri, the then Chief of Army Staff, based on his erroneous belief that the war effort could no longer be sustained given that “most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up”. But the reality was different: the Indian Army had used up only 14 per cent of its frontline ammunition and it possessed “twice the number” of tanks than the Pakistan Army. In contrast, the Pakistan Army is believed to have been “short of supplies” and “running out of ammunition” by then. It has been argued that under these circumstances, if India had continued the war “for another week, Pakistan would have been forced to surrender.” There are, however, four problems with this narrative. First, it is based on the erroneous claim that the Indian Army possessed twice the number of tanks than the Pakistan Army at the end of the war. Second, it rests on the unverified assumption that the Pakistan Army's ammunition and spare parts would not have lasted for more than a few days after 22 September. Third, the narrative fails to comprehend the context of the conversation between Prime Minister Shastri and Chaudhuri about extending the war for some more days. And finally, it fails to take into account military and diplomatic factors that actually determined the Cabinet's ceasefire decision, some of which Chaudhuri himself highlighted in a written assessment he shared with Defence Minister Chavan.

Military change in India has been a function of the evolving capabilities of Pakistan and China a... more Military change in India has been a function of the evolving capabilities of Pakistan and China and the limited resources available for modernisation. Consequently, most changes in military goals and organisational structures have been incremental and adaptive. Limited resources have also meant that India’s military effort has principally focused upon the immediate threat from Pakistan. The more latent challenge from China has been dealt with mainly through diplomacy at the bilateral and multilateral levels. Major change has occurred only in India’s strategy and service doctrines vis-à-vis Pakistan. India’s strategy towards Pakistan has evolved from annihilation in full-scale war until the late 1980s to exhaustion in limited war since then, mainly as a result of Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons capability. And given the imperative of attaining a swift victory before international diplomatic or military intervention ensued, the Army’s doctrine has evolved from attrition to manoeuvre and now, in the Cold Start doctrine, to a creative combination of attrition, manoeuvre and surprise. The Air Force doctrine has successively evolved from attaining a favourable air situation to command of the air to in-theatre air superiority. And the Navy’s doctrine has evolved from security of the coast to limited command of the sea.

India's Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases, 2014

That Jawaharlal Nehru was an internationalist is an acknowledged fact. But the extent to which Ne... more That Jawaharlal Nehru was an internationalist is an acknowledged fact. But the extent to which Nehru’s internationalist ideas informed and permeated the foreign policy that he crafted and practised has not been hitherto fully explored. Nehru’s was moreover not a lone view. Internationalism was an integral element of the Indian National Congress’ expression of nationalism during the struggle for freedom, as evidenced in the Quit India Resolution. Further, ideas relating to Pan-Asianism, Asian solidarity and Asian Federation were also an integral part of Indian internationalism. The impact of these ideas on independent India’s foreign policy can be clearly seen in the five major elements of the foreign policy that Nehru crafted, namely—opposition to colonialism, imperialism and racialism, nonalignment vis-à-vis the two Cold War blocs and creating an ‘area of peace’, playing an active mediatory role to prevent Cold War tensions from boiling over, advocating universal nuclear disarmament, and emphasis upon peaceful co-existence as embodied in the Panchsheel agreement. The principal objective behind these elements was the fostering of peace and co-operation among free nations, thus engendering the emergence of a normative world order, the One World that Nehru repeatedly invoked in his speeches and statements.

Strategic Analysis, Aug 2, 2013

Nearly 2,500 years ago the Greek historian Thucydides noted that the foreign policy of Athens was... more Nearly 2,500 years ago the Greek historian Thucydides noted that the foreign policy of Athens was driven by fear, interest and honour. That these motives continue to drive policy even today is reflected in the three approaches most commonly employed in the study of international relations: realism and neo-realism, which emphasise the
pursuit of power and security in an anarchical international system characterised by the security dilemma; liberalism and neo-liberalism, which highlight interdependence and the pursuit of economic interests; and institutionalism and constructivism, which stress upon identity and the quest for prestige and social recognition. How does India’s approach to its Asian neighbourhood fit within this three-dimensional framework of fear, interest and honour? That is the question which this commentary explores.

Journal of Defence Studies, Jul 2012

The Indian intervention in Sri Lanka throws up five major lessons for future regional stability o... more The Indian intervention in Sri Lanka throws up five major lessons for future regional stability operations. Firstly, it is imperative to define the mission unambiguously and establish a clear mandate. Secondly, there is need for a robust military contingency planning process as well as discussions at various levels within the system to refine plans and provide an adequate force to meet possible eventualities. Thirdly, clear command and control needs to be established at the outset and the appropriate field formation must be designated as the headquarters. Fourthly, intelligence planning and coordination need to be made comprehensive, and adequate expertise and capabilities must be built up in advance. Finally, the importance of engaging in civil affairs tasks must be factored into the planning process, for which purpose the requisite data must be collated and plans formulated.

Strategic Analysis, Mar 2012

Democracies and Small Wars, edited by Efraim Inbar, 2003

IDSA Issue Brief, 2021

IDSA Comment, 2020

Journal of Defence Studies, 2013

Swarajya, 2016

IDSA Comment, 2019

India's Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases, 2014

Strategic Analysis, Aug 2, 2013

Journal of Defence Studies, Jul 2012

Strategic Analysis, Mar 2012

Democracies and Small Wars, edited by Efraim Inbar, 2003

India Quarterly, 2020

What was the first Modi sarkar’s record in dealing with the security challenges confronting India... more What was the first Modi sarkar’s record in dealing with the security challenges confronting India? How far did it reform the national security management system? Further, what are the policy issues it is likely to face in its second term? These are the questions addressed by the volume under review.

The Tribune, 2019

The Costliest Pearl (by Bertil Lintner) is a useful contribution to our understanding of the new ... more The Costliest Pearl (by Bertil Lintner) is a useful contribution to our understanding of the new Asian Drama unfolding in the Indian Ocean.

Review Essay of Stephen P. Cohen, Shooting for a Century: Finding Answers to the India-Pakistan C... more Review Essay of Stephen P. Cohen, Shooting for a Century: Finding Answers to the India-Pakistan Conundrum:
He could well have said that India and Pakistan’s conflicting national identities and their struggle to define and distinguish these identities have led them to exaggerate
marginal cultural and political differences, mischaracterise the other, not compromise with the other, perceive the other as an existential threat and seek to overcome their security dilemma as well as realise territorial and moral claims through the pursuit of power in the internal and external domains.

The Book Review, Jan 2004

India has been the most reluctant member of the nuclear weapons club. And its entry into this clu... more India has been the most reluctant member of the nuclear weapons club. And its entry into this club was impelled by the threats posed by its adversaries as well as by the prevalent international order. Neglecting or ignoring these facts can only lead to the skewed perception that India is mesmerised by the nuclear dream, when in actual fact it is a prisoner of the nuclear dilemma.

In this first of two volumes, Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramaniam offers excellent and concise his... more In this first of two volumes, Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramaniam offers excellent and concise histories of India's wars and military operations, starting with the rescue and partial liberation of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-48 from depredating Pakistani irregulars and ending with the 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistan's genocidal rule. Based on published material available, and supplementing it with interviews, Subramaniam's India's Wars provides a layered perspective on the strategic, operational and tactical aspects of these wars and operations. While one agrees to a great extent with what the book has to say about the various land, air and naval campaigns, there are inevitable differences in perspectives, interpretations and nuances on specific issues. To begin with, Subramaniam observes that officers and personnel of the Indian National Army (INA) were not integrated in the post-independent Indian military because of a quid pro quo between British and Indian leaders: the British would treat INA personnel on trial leniently in return for Indian leaders not integrating them into the Indian Army. This is a false linkage...

Paul’s policy prescriptions are indeed sensible. However, the prospect of established and rising ... more Paul’s policy prescriptions are indeed sensible. However, the prospect of
established and rising powers actually pursuing cooperative policies aimed at avoiding competition and conflict is practically non-existent. Because, under the condition of anarchy, a state’s principal task is to maintain its relative power vis-à-vis others. Consequently, even when a state cooperates with other states, it seeks not only absolute gains for itself but also takes into account its gains relative to those of others. Such a calculation is necessary to ensure that its relative power is maintained, and the balance of power is not undermined. Given this imperative, peaceful accommodation is an unrealistic proposition because it entails established powers willingly diluting their status
and interests and thus their relative power and position as well as voluntarily welcoming enlargements in the status and interests and thus the relative power of rising states.

A crise de doklAm entre chinA e ÍndiA: implicAções regionAis e o fAtor estruturAl S. Kalyanaram... more A crise de doklAm entre chinA e ÍndiA: implicAções regionAis e o fAtor estruturAl

S. Kalyanaraman e Erik H. Ribeiro

A crise de Doklam marca o ponto mais baixo das relações China-Índia no período pós-Guerra Fria.
• As recorrentes crises de fronteira nos últimos anos refletem um conflito de interesse sino-indiano mais amplo dentro da ordem regional asiática.
• O desenvolvimento mais relevante após Doklam é o aprofundamento da parceria estratégica India-Japão, enquanto os Estados Unidos e o BRICS têm tido uma influência mais sutil, mas pervasiva na dinâmica sino-indiana de cooperação e conflito.

• The Doklam crisis marks the lowest point for China-India relations in the post-Cold War era. • ... more • The Doklam crisis marks the lowest point for China-India relations in the post-Cold War era.
• Recurrent border crises in recent years reﬂect a broader Sino-Indian conﬂict of interest in the Asian regional order.
• The most relevant development after Doklam is the deepening of India-Japan strategic partnership, while the U.S. and BRICS have had a more pervasive but subtle inﬂuence in the Sino-Indian cooperation and conﬂict dynamics.