Lana Kühle | Illinois State University (original) (raw)

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Papers by Lana Kühle

(438 words) Our emotional states affect how we perceive the world. If I am stressed, annoyed, or ... more (438 words) Our emotional states affect how we perceive the world. If I am stressed, annoyed, or irritated, I might experience the sound of children laughing and screaming as they play around the house in a negative manner — it is unpleasant, loud, piercing, and so on. Yet, if I'm in a relaxed, happy, loving mood, the very same sounds might be experienced as pleasant, playful, warm, and so on. The sounds being made by the children are the same in both cases, but how they are experienced differs. The auditory experience is affected by the emotional state that I am in. I perceive the sounds differently depending on how I'm feeling. Although this might at first seem to be a trivial observation, it certainly is not. We take for granted that our perceptual experiences give rise to justified beliefs and knowledge. Thus, if my perceptual experience of an object can differ based on my emotional state, and I take my perceptual experience to justify my beliefs and even lead to knowledge, then we might have a problem. If emotions — which are not fixed and in large part uncontrolled — affect our ability to accurately perceive the world, then they may undermine the justified beliefs and knowledge gained on the basis of our perceptual experience of the world. My goal here is to explore this potential problem. I consider how we might understand the effect that emotions have on the justification of our perceptual beliefs about the world, beliefs that we acquire from a variety of sensory modalities — audition, gustation olfaction, and so on. I take the problem to be associated with one of two forms of perceptual influence: penetration or multisensory integration. In any given perceptual moment there are multiple sensory modalities and mental states at play, each affecting the overall experience. Whether we understand the influence of emotion on perception as a form of non-perceptual penetration or a form of non-visual sensory perception of the inner body — interoception — the potential epistemological difficulties remain: how can we be said to acquire justified beliefs and knowledge on the basis of such influenced perceptual experience. As has been the norm, only the five exteroceptive senses of vision, audition, olfaction, taste and touch are typically discussed in the context of sensory perception. However, as I argue, there is strong reason to accept the claim that emotional experience is a form of interoception, and that interoception ought to be considered when discussing sensory perception. In this way, then, I propose that clarifying the role played by interoception in sense perception across modalities is necessary if we are to make progress on the epistemological problems at hand.

Traditionally, philosophers of mind have been guided by a brainbound approach: the mind, whatever... more Traditionally, philosophers of mind have been guided by a brainbound approach: the mind, whatever it turns out to be, will be related to or identical with the brain. The body, under this approach, plays a merely instrumental role—it is what keeps the brain alive and healthy. Over the past few decades there has been increasing resistance to the brainbound approach, and a strongly supported push for taking a non-brainbound approach: the body is not merely instrumental, but in many ways constitutive of the mind —the mind, whatever it turns out to be, is bodily in many fundamental respects. Thus, in explaining the mind, we must consider not only brain states, but also wider bodily processes. What those wider bodily processes are and how they constitute certain mental states, are the key questions that we now face as non-brainbound—embodied mind—philosophers of mind. Perhaps it is time to make a similar shift in psychiatry. There are certain disorders, such as anorexia nervosa, that have proven quite problematic to treat. The DSM-5 classifies anorexia nervosa as an eating disorder—one consisting of behavioral and cognitive disturbances. The suggested treatment protocols have been focused on correcting those behavioral and cognitive problems. Yet, anorexia nervosa continues to have a very high relapse rate and a very high mortality rate. In short, we haven't been successful in treating this disorder. Perhaps the reason for our lack of success stems from the starting assumptions we've used to guide our understanding and treatments. Is anorexia nervosa properly classified as an eating disorder? Are its main disturbances mainly behavioral and cognitive? I propose here that we consider anorexia nervosa from an embodied mind approach. If the mind is embodied, then we must also look at how mental disorders might be bodily disorders. Though this has not been the standard approach in psychiatry, perhaps it is time we start to consider it.

Experiential consciousness is characterized by a subjectivity. As Nagel (1974) famously asserted:... more Experiential consciousness is characterized by a subjectivity. As Nagel (1974) famously asserted: " [N]o matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experiences at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism. " (p. 436) There is something it is like to be a subject of experience — a first-personal perspective, a what-it-is-like-for-me. In this paper I defend two proposals. First, I contend that to understand the subjectivity of consciousness we must turn to the subject: we are embodied subjects of experience. Thus, I argue, the subjectivity of experiential consciousness should be understood as a bodily subjectivity. Second, if we take this approach, I propose that we can finally begin to explain the structure of experiential consciousness as subjective by looking at certain bodily processes — in particular interoception.

The hard problem of consciousness lies in explaining what constitutes the subjectivity of conscio... more The hard problem of consciousness lies in explaining what constitutes the subjectivity of consciousness. I argue that significant headway can be made on the problem from an embodied mind view, and particularly if we turn to William James’ theory of emotions. The challenge is one of explaining how bodily subjectivity arises from biological processes. I argue that the solution to this problem lies in our sense of interoception, and James’ theory which suggests emotional feelings are the cascade of changing bodily states. Through James’ account, I show how the biological body can give rise to a bodily subjectivity in experiential consciousness, and thus move towards a solution of the hard problem.

In “What is the state-of-the-art on lucid dreaming? Recent advances and questions for future rese... more In “What is the state-of-the-art on lucid dreaming? Recent advances and questions for future research,” Ursula Voss and Allan Hobson provide a detailed view of the features characterizing lucid dreaming and put forward four innovative hypotheses to explain why and how lucid dreaming occurs, as well as how lucid dream states are related to other states of consciousness. Their aim is to show that not only is there benefit in studying lucid dreaming in itself, as this would give us a deeper understanding of dream consciousness, but it is also an important endeavor because of the kind of conscious state lucid dreaming is. To be sure, Voss and Hobson make important in-roads into the empirical study of lucid dreaming that ought to sprout new and exciting research in the area. As I will show, however, there remains much conceptual work to be done. In this commentary I tease out three aspects of Voss and Hobson’s view that would greatly benefit from philosophical considerations. First, I highlight the lingering confusion with what exactly insight is, and I point to how one might go about clarifying this notion. Second, I argue that our understanding of insight and meta-awareness in lucid dreaming could be greatly increased by looking at how these concepts are used and understood in relation to meditative states. Lastly, I explore the role of the body in lucid dreaming and argue that one’s bodily awareness in lucid dreams is far more multi-faceted than at first suspected.

Research on bodily awareness has focused on body illusions with an aim to explore the possible di... more Research on bodily awareness has focused on body illusions with an aim to explore the possible dissociation of our bodily awareness from our own body. It has provided insights into how our sensory modalities shape our sense of embodiment, and it has raised important questions regarding the malleability of our sense of ownership over our own body. The issue, however, is that this research fails to consider an important distinction in how we experience our body. There are indeed two ways in which we can be aware of our body: via observational awareness, which involves attending to the body as an object, and via non-observational awareness, where the body is given as the subject of experience and does not involve attention. The research to date has focused on the former — observational bodily awareness — and has left the latter — non-observational bodily awareness — in the dark. This is detrimental to ever formulating a complete account of how we are aware of our body. It is understandable, however, because of the inherent problem in studying non-observational bodily awareness: how would you instruct a subject to report on their unattended awareness of the body? In view to resolving this problem, I propose here a working hypothesis on the basis of research on interoception and the rubber hand illusion, and on the effect of meditation on awareness and attention. This working hypothesis can show us a way to begin studying non-observational bodily awareness, and finally build a complete theory of bodily awareness.

Teaching Philosophy Statement by Lana Kühle

To do philosophy one must engage in a conversa5on; one must engage in the prac5ce of exchanging a... more To do philosophy one must engage in a conversa5on; one must engage in the prac5ce of exchanging and evalua5ng ideas, both one's own and others'. This is done in many ways, ranging from talking about various ideas to wri5ng about them. It seems at first glance, then, that doing philosophy is an ac5ve and dynamic exercise. Yet, the tradi5onal university learning environment is not always the most conducive to this manner of engagement. All too oCen courses are taught solely by lecturing, where the student is expected to sit in one place for a prolonged period of 5me and listen to what is said by the instructor. Although I strongly believe that giving a lecture is very valuable and has an important role to play in good pedagogy, I do not think that learning, that is, deep and meaningful learning, can happen solely via this teaching strategy. It is my firm belief that in order to get students to engage in doing philosophy, one must get students engaging in the conversa)on of philosophy.

(438 words) Our emotional states affect how we perceive the world. If I am stressed, annoyed, or ... more (438 words) Our emotional states affect how we perceive the world. If I am stressed, annoyed, or irritated, I might experience the sound of children laughing and screaming as they play around the house in a negative manner — it is unpleasant, loud, piercing, and so on. Yet, if I'm in a relaxed, happy, loving mood, the very same sounds might be experienced as pleasant, playful, warm, and so on. The sounds being made by the children are the same in both cases, but how they are experienced differs. The auditory experience is affected by the emotional state that I am in. I perceive the sounds differently depending on how I'm feeling. Although this might at first seem to be a trivial observation, it certainly is not. We take for granted that our perceptual experiences give rise to justified beliefs and knowledge. Thus, if my perceptual experience of an object can differ based on my emotional state, and I take my perceptual experience to justify my beliefs and even lead to knowledge, then we might have a problem. If emotions — which are not fixed and in large part uncontrolled — affect our ability to accurately perceive the world, then they may undermine the justified beliefs and knowledge gained on the basis of our perceptual experience of the world. My goal here is to explore this potential problem. I consider how we might understand the effect that emotions have on the justification of our perceptual beliefs about the world, beliefs that we acquire from a variety of sensory modalities — audition, gustation olfaction, and so on. I take the problem to be associated with one of two forms of perceptual influence: penetration or multisensory integration. In any given perceptual moment there are multiple sensory modalities and mental states at play, each affecting the overall experience. Whether we understand the influence of emotion on perception as a form of non-perceptual penetration or a form of non-visual sensory perception of the inner body — interoception — the potential epistemological difficulties remain: how can we be said to acquire justified beliefs and knowledge on the basis of such influenced perceptual experience. As has been the norm, only the five exteroceptive senses of vision, audition, olfaction, taste and touch are typically discussed in the context of sensory perception. However, as I argue, there is strong reason to accept the claim that emotional experience is a form of interoception, and that interoception ought to be considered when discussing sensory perception. In this way, then, I propose that clarifying the role played by interoception in sense perception across modalities is necessary if we are to make progress on the epistemological problems at hand.

Traditionally, philosophers of mind have been guided by a brainbound approach: the mind, whatever... more Traditionally, philosophers of mind have been guided by a brainbound approach: the mind, whatever it turns out to be, will be related to or identical with the brain. The body, under this approach, plays a merely instrumental role—it is what keeps the brain alive and healthy. Over the past few decades there has been increasing resistance to the brainbound approach, and a strongly supported push for taking a non-brainbound approach: the body is not merely instrumental, but in many ways constitutive of the mind —the mind, whatever it turns out to be, is bodily in many fundamental respects. Thus, in explaining the mind, we must consider not only brain states, but also wider bodily processes. What those wider bodily processes are and how they constitute certain mental states, are the key questions that we now face as non-brainbound—embodied mind—philosophers of mind. Perhaps it is time to make a similar shift in psychiatry. There are certain disorders, such as anorexia nervosa, that have proven quite problematic to treat. The DSM-5 classifies anorexia nervosa as an eating disorder—one consisting of behavioral and cognitive disturbances. The suggested treatment protocols have been focused on correcting those behavioral and cognitive problems. Yet, anorexia nervosa continues to have a very high relapse rate and a very high mortality rate. In short, we haven't been successful in treating this disorder. Perhaps the reason for our lack of success stems from the starting assumptions we've used to guide our understanding and treatments. Is anorexia nervosa properly classified as an eating disorder? Are its main disturbances mainly behavioral and cognitive? I propose here that we consider anorexia nervosa from an embodied mind approach. If the mind is embodied, then we must also look at how mental disorders might be bodily disorders. Though this has not been the standard approach in psychiatry, perhaps it is time we start to consider it.

Experiential consciousness is characterized by a subjectivity. As Nagel (1974) famously asserted:... more Experiential consciousness is characterized by a subjectivity. As Nagel (1974) famously asserted: " [N]o matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experiences at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism. " (p. 436) There is something it is like to be a subject of experience — a first-personal perspective, a what-it-is-like-for-me. In this paper I defend two proposals. First, I contend that to understand the subjectivity of consciousness we must turn to the subject: we are embodied subjects of experience. Thus, I argue, the subjectivity of experiential consciousness should be understood as a bodily subjectivity. Second, if we take this approach, I propose that we can finally begin to explain the structure of experiential consciousness as subjective by looking at certain bodily processes — in particular interoception.

The hard problem of consciousness lies in explaining what constitutes the subjectivity of conscio... more The hard problem of consciousness lies in explaining what constitutes the subjectivity of consciousness. I argue that significant headway can be made on the problem from an embodied mind view, and particularly if we turn to William James’ theory of emotions. The challenge is one of explaining how bodily subjectivity arises from biological processes. I argue that the solution to this problem lies in our sense of interoception, and James’ theory which suggests emotional feelings are the cascade of changing bodily states. Through James’ account, I show how the biological body can give rise to a bodily subjectivity in experiential consciousness, and thus move towards a solution of the hard problem.

In “What is the state-of-the-art on lucid dreaming? Recent advances and questions for future rese... more In “What is the state-of-the-art on lucid dreaming? Recent advances and questions for future research,” Ursula Voss and Allan Hobson provide a detailed view of the features characterizing lucid dreaming and put forward four innovative hypotheses to explain why and how lucid dreaming occurs, as well as how lucid dream states are related to other states of consciousness. Their aim is to show that not only is there benefit in studying lucid dreaming in itself, as this would give us a deeper understanding of dream consciousness, but it is also an important endeavor because of the kind of conscious state lucid dreaming is. To be sure, Voss and Hobson make important in-roads into the empirical study of lucid dreaming that ought to sprout new and exciting research in the area. As I will show, however, there remains much conceptual work to be done. In this commentary I tease out three aspects of Voss and Hobson’s view that would greatly benefit from philosophical considerations. First, I highlight the lingering confusion with what exactly insight is, and I point to how one might go about clarifying this notion. Second, I argue that our understanding of insight and meta-awareness in lucid dreaming could be greatly increased by looking at how these concepts are used and understood in relation to meditative states. Lastly, I explore the role of the body in lucid dreaming and argue that one’s bodily awareness in lucid dreams is far more multi-faceted than at first suspected.

Research on bodily awareness has focused on body illusions with an aim to explore the possible di... more Research on bodily awareness has focused on body illusions with an aim to explore the possible dissociation of our bodily awareness from our own body. It has provided insights into how our sensory modalities shape our sense of embodiment, and it has raised important questions regarding the malleability of our sense of ownership over our own body. The issue, however, is that this research fails to consider an important distinction in how we experience our body. There are indeed two ways in which we can be aware of our body: via observational awareness, which involves attending to the body as an object, and via non-observational awareness, where the body is given as the subject of experience and does not involve attention. The research to date has focused on the former — observational bodily awareness — and has left the latter — non-observational bodily awareness — in the dark. This is detrimental to ever formulating a complete account of how we are aware of our body. It is understandable, however, because of the inherent problem in studying non-observational bodily awareness: how would you instruct a subject to report on their unattended awareness of the body? In view to resolving this problem, I propose here a working hypothesis on the basis of research on interoception and the rubber hand illusion, and on the effect of meditation on awareness and attention. This working hypothesis can show us a way to begin studying non-observational bodily awareness, and finally build a complete theory of bodily awareness.

To do philosophy one must engage in a conversa5on; one must engage in the prac5ce of exchanging a... more To do philosophy one must engage in a conversa5on; one must engage in the prac5ce of exchanging and evalua5ng ideas, both one's own and others'. This is done in many ways, ranging from talking about various ideas to wri5ng about them. It seems at first glance, then, that doing philosophy is an ac5ve and dynamic exercise. Yet, the tradi5onal university learning environment is not always the most conducive to this manner of engagement. All too oCen courses are taught solely by lecturing, where the student is expected to sit in one place for a prolonged period of 5me and listen to what is said by the instructor. Although I strongly believe that giving a lecture is very valuable and has an important role to play in good pedagogy, I do not think that learning, that is, deep and meaningful learning, can happen solely via this teaching strategy. It is my firm belief that in order to get students to engage in doing philosophy, one must get students engaging in the conversa)on of philosophy.