Gustavo Cevolani | IMT Lucca (original) (raw)
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Papers by Gustavo Cevolani
Synthese, Mar 5, 2022
Reverse inference is a crucial inferential strategy used in cognitive neuroscience to derive conc... more Reverse inference is a crucial inferential strategy used in cognitive neuroscience to derive conclusions about the engagement of cognitive processes from patterns of brain activation. While widely employed in experimental studies, it is now viewed with increasing scepticism within the neuroscience community. One problem with reverse inference is that it is logically invalid, being an instance of abduction in Peirce's sense. In this paper, we offer the first systematic analysis of reverse inference as a form of abductive reasoning and highlight some relevant implications for the current debate. We start by formalising an important distinction that has been entirely neglected in the literature, namely the distinction between weak (strategic) and strong (justificatory) reverse inference. Then, we rely on case studies from recent neuroscientific research to systematically discuss the role and limits of both strong and weak reverse inference; in particular, we offer the first exploration of weak reverse inference as a discovery strategy within cognitive neuroscience.
Springer series in design and innovation, 2023
Synthese, Jan 4, 2023
This paper contributes to the debate on the question of whether a systematic connection obtains b... more This paper contributes to the debate on the question of whether a systematic connection obtains between one’s commitment to realism or antirealism and one’s attitude towards the possibility of radical theoretical novelty, namely, theory change affecting our best, most successful theories (see, e.g., Stanford in Synthese 196:3915–3932, 2019; Dellsén in Stud Hist Philos Sci 76:30–38, 2019). We argue that it is not allegiance to realism or antirealism as such that primarily dictates one’s response to the possibility of radical theoretical novelty: what matters the most is, rather, the proposed alternative’s promise to realize one’s favored cognitive aim(s). Our argument tells not only against Stanford’s account of how adherence to realism or antirealism orients how one responds to possible radical theoretical novelty, but also against what we call the “natural pairing thesis.” According to such a thesis, which has kept resurfacing in the history of the philosophy of science, one-to-one pairings obtain between realism/antirealism, on the one hand, and theoretical conservatism/openness to radical theoretical novelty, on the other hand. As our argument suggests, however, when faced with the possibility of radical theoretical novelty, realists can respond either in a conservative way or by being open to theory change, not unlike antirealists.
Starting with Popper, philosophers and logicians have proposed different accounts of verisimilitu... more Starting with Popper, philosophers and logicians have proposed different accounts of verisimilitude or truthlikeness. One way of classifying such accounts is to distinguish between "conjunctive" and "disjunctive" ones. In this paper, we focus on our own "basic feature" approach to verisimilitude, which naturally belongs to the conjunctive family. We start by surveying the landscape of conjunctive accounts; then, we introduce two new measures of verisimilitude and discuss their properties; finally, we conclude by hinting at some surprising relations between our conjunctive approach and a disjunctive account of verisimilitude widely discussed in the literature
Handbook of Abductive Cognition
Springer eBooks, Dec 7, 2022
Springer International Publishing eBooks, 2022
Synthese
After Karl Popper's original work, several approaches were developed to provide a sound explicati... more After Karl Popper's original work, several approaches were developed to provide a sound explication of the notion of verisimilitude. With few exceptions, these contributions have assumed that the truth to be approximated is deterministic. This collection of ten papers addresses the more general problem of approaching probabilistic truths. They include attempts to find appropriate measures for the closeness to probabilistic truth and to evaluate claims about such distances on the basis of empirical evidence. The papers employ multiple analytical approaches, and connect the research to related issues in the philosophy of science. The idea that science, and human knowledge more generally, aims at approaching the truth about the world is quite widespread among scientists, philosophers, and laypeople. Indeed, many more-or-less realist philosophers of science think that scientific progress consists in approach towards truth or increasing verisimilitude (or truthlikeness). A typical example of such position is the fallibilist program of Karl Popper (1963), who emphasized that scientific theories are always conjectural and
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2016
European Studies in Philosophy of Science, 2017
The so-called problem of measure sensitivity concerns the use of formal models in philosophical a... more The so-called problem of measure sensitivity concerns the use of formal models in philosophical argumentation: as it turns out, the soundness of many arguments is critically sensitive to the choice of the specific models employed. In this paper, I study how this issue affects the theory of truthlikeness (or verisimilitude) and its applications. As an illustration, I focus on the idea of cognitive progress as increasing truthlikeness. In particular, I show that some basic arguments concerning truth approximation through belief change are not invariant across the different truthlikeness measures proposed in the literature.
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2019
In a recent paper in this journal, entitled 'Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to Truth is ... more In a recent paper in this journal, entitled 'Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to Truth is Not Enough' (2017), Moti Mizrahi argues that the view of progress as approximation to the truth or increasing verisimilitude is plainly false. The key premise of his argument is that on such a view of progress, in order to get closer to the truth one only needs to arbitrarily add a true disjunct to a hypothesis or theory. Since quite clearly scientific progress is not a matter of adding true disjuncts to theories, the argument goes, the view of progress as approximation to the truth is untenable. We show that the key premise of Mizrahi's argument is false: according to verisimilitude-based accounts of progress, adding arbitrary true disjuncts to existing theories is just not enough to get closer to the truth.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2016
The so-called Preface Paradox seems to show that one can rationally believe two logically incompa... more The so-called Preface Paradox seems to show that one can rationally believe two logically incompatible propositions. We address this puzzle, relying on the notions of truthlikeness and approximate truth as studied within the post-Popperian research programme on verisimilitude. In particular, we show that adequately combining probability, approximate truth, and truthlikeness leads to an explanation of how rational belief is possible in the face of the Preface Paradox. We argue that our account is superior to other solutions of the paradox, including a recent one advanced by Hannes Leitgeb (Analysis 74.1).
Erkenntnis, 2016
The Preface Paradox apparently shows that it is sometimes rational to believe logically incompati... more The Preface Paradox apparently shows that it is sometimes rational to believe logically incompatible propositions. In this paper, I propose a way out of the paradox based on the ideas of fallibilism and verisimilitude (or truthlikeness). More precisely, I defend the view that a rational inquirer can fallibly believe or accept a proposition which is false, or likely false, but verisimilar; and I argue that this view makes the Preface Paradox disappear. Some possible objections to my proposal, and an alternative view of fallible belief, are briefly discussed in the final part of the paper.
Trends in Logic, 2014
Some authors, most notably Luciano Floridi, have recently argued for a notion of "strongly" seman... more Some authors, most notably Luciano Floridi, have recently argued for a notion of "strongly" semantic information, according to which information "encapsulates" truth (the so-called "veridicality thesis"). We propose a simple framework to compare different formal explications of this concept and assess their relative merits. It turns out that the most adequate proposal is that based on the notion of "partial truth", which measures the amount of "information about the truth" conveyed by a given statement. We conclude with some critical remarks concerning the veridicality thesis in connection with the role played by truth and information as relevant cognitive goals of inquiry. Keywords (Strongly) Semantic information • Truth • Misinformation • Veridicality thesis • Verisimilitude • Truthlikeness • Partial truth • Informative truth • Cognitive decision theory
Synthese, Mar 5, 2022
Reverse inference is a crucial inferential strategy used in cognitive neuroscience to derive conc... more Reverse inference is a crucial inferential strategy used in cognitive neuroscience to derive conclusions about the engagement of cognitive processes from patterns of brain activation. While widely employed in experimental studies, it is now viewed with increasing scepticism within the neuroscience community. One problem with reverse inference is that it is logically invalid, being an instance of abduction in Peirce's sense. In this paper, we offer the first systematic analysis of reverse inference as a form of abductive reasoning and highlight some relevant implications for the current debate. We start by formalising an important distinction that has been entirely neglected in the literature, namely the distinction between weak (strategic) and strong (justificatory) reverse inference. Then, we rely on case studies from recent neuroscientific research to systematically discuss the role and limits of both strong and weak reverse inference; in particular, we offer the first exploration of weak reverse inference as a discovery strategy within cognitive neuroscience.
Springer series in design and innovation, 2023
Synthese, Jan 4, 2023
This paper contributes to the debate on the question of whether a systematic connection obtains b... more This paper contributes to the debate on the question of whether a systematic connection obtains between one’s commitment to realism or antirealism and one’s attitude towards the possibility of radical theoretical novelty, namely, theory change affecting our best, most successful theories (see, e.g., Stanford in Synthese 196:3915–3932, 2019; Dellsén in Stud Hist Philos Sci 76:30–38, 2019). We argue that it is not allegiance to realism or antirealism as such that primarily dictates one’s response to the possibility of radical theoretical novelty: what matters the most is, rather, the proposed alternative’s promise to realize one’s favored cognitive aim(s). Our argument tells not only against Stanford’s account of how adherence to realism or antirealism orients how one responds to possible radical theoretical novelty, but also against what we call the “natural pairing thesis.” According to such a thesis, which has kept resurfacing in the history of the philosophy of science, one-to-one pairings obtain between realism/antirealism, on the one hand, and theoretical conservatism/openness to radical theoretical novelty, on the other hand. As our argument suggests, however, when faced with the possibility of radical theoretical novelty, realists can respond either in a conservative way or by being open to theory change, not unlike antirealists.
Starting with Popper, philosophers and logicians have proposed different accounts of verisimilitu... more Starting with Popper, philosophers and logicians have proposed different accounts of verisimilitude or truthlikeness. One way of classifying such accounts is to distinguish between "conjunctive" and "disjunctive" ones. In this paper, we focus on our own "basic feature" approach to verisimilitude, which naturally belongs to the conjunctive family. We start by surveying the landscape of conjunctive accounts; then, we introduce two new measures of verisimilitude and discuss their properties; finally, we conclude by hinting at some surprising relations between our conjunctive approach and a disjunctive account of verisimilitude widely discussed in the literature
Handbook of Abductive Cognition
Springer eBooks, Dec 7, 2022
Springer International Publishing eBooks, 2022
Synthese
After Karl Popper's original work, several approaches were developed to provide a sound explicati... more After Karl Popper's original work, several approaches were developed to provide a sound explication of the notion of verisimilitude. With few exceptions, these contributions have assumed that the truth to be approximated is deterministic. This collection of ten papers addresses the more general problem of approaching probabilistic truths. They include attempts to find appropriate measures for the closeness to probabilistic truth and to evaluate claims about such distances on the basis of empirical evidence. The papers employ multiple analytical approaches, and connect the research to related issues in the philosophy of science. The idea that science, and human knowledge more generally, aims at approaching the truth about the world is quite widespread among scientists, philosophers, and laypeople. Indeed, many more-or-less realist philosophers of science think that scientific progress consists in approach towards truth or increasing verisimilitude (or truthlikeness). A typical example of such position is the fallibilist program of Karl Popper (1963), who emphasized that scientific theories are always conjectural and
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2016
European Studies in Philosophy of Science, 2017
The so-called problem of measure sensitivity concerns the use of formal models in philosophical a... more The so-called problem of measure sensitivity concerns the use of formal models in philosophical argumentation: as it turns out, the soundness of many arguments is critically sensitive to the choice of the specific models employed. In this paper, I study how this issue affects the theory of truthlikeness (or verisimilitude) and its applications. As an illustration, I focus on the idea of cognitive progress as increasing truthlikeness. In particular, I show that some basic arguments concerning truth approximation through belief change are not invariant across the different truthlikeness measures proposed in the literature.
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2019
In a recent paper in this journal, entitled 'Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to Truth is ... more In a recent paper in this journal, entitled 'Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to Truth is Not Enough' (2017), Moti Mizrahi argues that the view of progress as approximation to the truth or increasing verisimilitude is plainly false. The key premise of his argument is that on such a view of progress, in order to get closer to the truth one only needs to arbitrarily add a true disjunct to a hypothesis or theory. Since quite clearly scientific progress is not a matter of adding true disjuncts to theories, the argument goes, the view of progress as approximation to the truth is untenable. We show that the key premise of Mizrahi's argument is false: according to verisimilitude-based accounts of progress, adding arbitrary true disjuncts to existing theories is just not enough to get closer to the truth.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2016
The so-called Preface Paradox seems to show that one can rationally believe two logically incompa... more The so-called Preface Paradox seems to show that one can rationally believe two logically incompatible propositions. We address this puzzle, relying on the notions of truthlikeness and approximate truth as studied within the post-Popperian research programme on verisimilitude. In particular, we show that adequately combining probability, approximate truth, and truthlikeness leads to an explanation of how rational belief is possible in the face of the Preface Paradox. We argue that our account is superior to other solutions of the paradox, including a recent one advanced by Hannes Leitgeb (Analysis 74.1).
Erkenntnis, 2016
The Preface Paradox apparently shows that it is sometimes rational to believe logically incompati... more The Preface Paradox apparently shows that it is sometimes rational to believe logically incompatible propositions. In this paper, I propose a way out of the paradox based on the ideas of fallibilism and verisimilitude (or truthlikeness). More precisely, I defend the view that a rational inquirer can fallibly believe or accept a proposition which is false, or likely false, but verisimilar; and I argue that this view makes the Preface Paradox disappear. Some possible objections to my proposal, and an alternative view of fallible belief, are briefly discussed in the final part of the paper.
Trends in Logic, 2014
Some authors, most notably Luciano Floridi, have recently argued for a notion of "strongly" seman... more Some authors, most notably Luciano Floridi, have recently argued for a notion of "strongly" semantic information, according to which information "encapsulates" truth (the so-called "veridicality thesis"). We propose a simple framework to compare different formal explications of this concept and assess their relative merits. It turns out that the most adequate proposal is that based on the notion of "partial truth", which measures the amount of "information about the truth" conveyed by a given statement. We conclude with some critical remarks concerning the veridicality thesis in connection with the role played by truth and information as relevant cognitive goals of inquiry. Keywords (Strongly) Semantic information • Truth • Misinformation • Veridicality thesis • Verisimilitude • Truthlikeness • Partial truth • Informative truth • Cognitive decision theory