Edgar Zapata - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Edgar Zapata
Academia.edu, 2023
Design and technology decisions present unique difficulties for large-scale complex products when... more Design and technology decisions present unique difficulties for large-scale complex products when the goal is to reduce costs at every phase of the systems life cycle - in up-front development, and production, and future operations. A product must "have it all" when the operator, buyer, or potential market "wants it all." This is not a novel situation in competitive industries, always seeking efficiencies to achieve more tomorrow for less than yesterday. Yet this sense remains alien in parts of the aerospace sector that have historically been shielded from competitive pressures. Even so, NASA discovered a welcome break from this trend in its commercial program to get cargo to the International Space Station. Here we show how business practices determining efficiency interact with design and technology choices determining effectiveness. We found this lends invaluable insight into what is happening, and the potential benefits, as NASA and other government agencies adopt similar programs. We show how design and technology that is effective long-term flourishes only when pursued efficiently. Otherwise, improvements and related market growth are prohibitively expensive near-term. In inefficient organizational practice, advances always fight a losing battle. We apply models and "models of models" using genetic algorithms to the case of reusable launch systems. Aerospace assumes "a stitch in time saves nine." Some effort now will have some payoff later. A more significant gain in the future requires more effort now. Here we discover and understand (quantitatively) a shift where a significantly lower investment than would otherwise be predicted also achieves significant results. We explore these differing contexts for a reusable launch system with a design/technology model, an organizational process/practice model, and automation, exploring possibilities no human could ever go through in a lifetime. "What," meet "how"-via an AI.
NASA, 2017
In May 2012, the SpaceX Dragon spacecraft became the first commercial spacecraft to arrive at the... more In May 2012, the SpaceX Dragon spacecraft became the first commercial spacecraft to arrive at the International Space Station (ISS). This achievement, and that of other partners in the NASA Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program, would surface difficult questions about NASA’s other more traditional development processes and their traditionally high costs. The cost of the non-traditional COTS public private partnership for the development of spacecraft and launch systems, and later the prices for services to deliver cargo to the ISS, would be praised or criticized by one measure of cost versus another, often with little regard for consistency or data.
The goal here is to do the math, to bring rigorous life cycle cost (LCC) analysis into discussions about COTS program costs. We gather publicly available cost data, review the data for credibility, check for consistency among sources, and rigorously define and analyze specific cost metrics.
This paper shows quantitatively that the COTS development and later the operational Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) are significant advances in affordability by any measure. To understand measurable improvements in context, we also create and analyze an apples-to-apples scenario where the Space Shuttle would have fulfilled the ISS cargo requirement versus the COTS/CRS launchers and spacecraft. Alternately, we review valid questions that arise where measures or comparisons are not easy or break down, with no quantitative path to clear conclusions. Understanding the costs of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), the sister program to the COTS cargo program, and other programs made possible from post-Shuttle funding, is inseparable from these more difficult questions.
In addition, we review briefly the significance of the COTS/CRS and CCP in estimating potential costs to NASA for future deep space exploration systems using public-private partnerships. These future programs need many new spacecraft, launch vehicles, and facilities. As NASA struggles with the cost of a Journey to Mars, the significance of new, improved cost data in liquid propulsion, stages, spacecraft, avionics, infrastructure, and more will prove priceless.
NASA, 2017
In 2011, NASA released a report assessing the market for commercial crew and cargo services to lo... more In 2011, NASA released a report assessing the market for commercial crew and cargo services to low Earth orbit (LEO). The report stated that NASA had spent a few hundred million dollars in the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program on the portion related to the development of the Falcon 9 launch vehicle. Yet a NASA cost model predicted the cost would have been significantly more with a non-commercial cost-plus contracting approach. By 2016 a NASA request for information stated it must “maximize the efficiency and sustainability of the Exploration Systems development programs”, as “critical to free resources for re-investment…such as other required deep space exploration capabilities.”
This work joins the previous two events, showing the potential for commercial, public private partnerships, modeled on programs like COTS, to reduce the cost to NASA significantly for “…other required deep space exploration capabilities.” These other capabilities include landers, stages and more. We mature the concept of “costed baseball cards”, adding cost estimates to NASA’s space systems “baseball cards.” ,
We show some potential costs, including analysis, the basis of estimates, data sources and caveats to address a critical question – based on initial assessment, are significant agency resources justified for more detailed analysis and due diligence to understand and invest in public private partnerships for human deep space exploration systems? The cost analysis spans commercial to cost-plus contracting approaches, for smaller elements vs. larger, with some variation for lunar or Mars.
By extension, we delve briefly into the potentially much broader significance of the individual cost estimates if taken together as a NASA investment portfolio where public private partnership are stitched together for deep space exploration. How might multiple improvements in individual systems add up to NASA human deep space exploration achievements, realistically, affordably, sustainably, in a relevant timeframe?
NASA, 2017
Historically, NASA human spaceflight planning has included healthy doses of life cycle cost analy... more Historically, NASA human spaceflight planning has included healthy doses of life cycle cost analysis. Planners put projects and their cost estimates in a budget context. Estimated costs became expected budgets. Regardless, real budgets rarely matched expectations. , , So plans would come and go as NASA canceled projects. New projects would arise and the cycle would begin again. Repeatedly, NASA schedule and performance ambitions come up against costs growing at double-digit rates while budgets barely rise a couple of percent a year. Significant skepticism greets proposed NASA programs at birth, as cost estimates for new projects are traditionally very high, and worse, far off the mark for those carried forward. In this environment the current “capability driven framework” for NASA human spaceflight evolved, where long term life cycle cost analysis are even viewed as possibly counter-productive. Here, a space exploration project, for example the Space Launch System, focuses on immediate goals. A life cycle is that of a project, not a program, and for only that span of time to a near term milestone like a first test launch.
Unfortunately, attempting to avoid some pitfalls in long-term life cycle cost analysis breeds others. Government audits have noted that limiting the scope of cost analysis “does not provide the transparency necessary to assess long-term affordability” making it difficult to understand if NASA “is progressing in a cost-effective and affordable manner.” Even in this short-term framework, NASA realizes the importance of long-term considerations, that it must “maximize the efficiency and sustainability of the Exploration Systems development programs”, that this is “critical to free resources for re-investment…such as other required deep space exploration capabilities.”
Assuming the value of long-term life cycle cost analysis, where due diligence meets reconnaissance, and accepting past shortcomings, the work here approaches life cycle cost analysis for human spaceflight differently.
- If costs have traditionally been so high that adding them up is discouraging, are there any new facts on the ground offering paths to significantly lower costs?
- If NASA’s spaceflight budget and process is an over-arching constraint, with its planning limitations favoring short-term outlooks, is there a way to step outside the budget box?
- If life cycle answers have historically been too uncertain to be useful, is there a process where stakeholders gain valuable insights merely from emphasizing a common understanding around questions?
We analyze the potential life cycle cost of assorted NASA human spaceflight architectures – an architecture as a sum of individual systems, working together. With the prior questions of high costs, limited budgets and uncertainties in mind, public private partnerships are central in these architectures. The cost data for current commercial public private partnerships is encouraging, as are cost estimates for future partnership approaches beyond low Earth orbit. Private capital, directly or indirectly, an ingredient of public private partnerships, may be a significant factor in finding a path around the limits of the NASA spaceflight budget. Also, understanding and reviewing the pros, cons and uncertainties of assorted architectures can assist in developing a common understanding around key questions as important if not more so than the numbers and answers.
Lastly, a scenario planning technique is briefly explored that can mature a common understanding about the agencies situation at hand and how diverse stakeholders can go forward together. Scenario planning, rather than focusing on answers, places emphasis on stakeholders developing a common understanding about the future. Putting aside costs, this is especially true of questions about sustainability and growth, results, benefits and expectations. While efficiency exercises or analysis look to reduce resources in one place to apply them elsewhere, moving around slices in a pie, scenario planning can get at the heart of the matter, growing the pie, transforming it, and making the pieces relevant. Especially important is the question of sustainability for different scenarios in the broad sense of the word – not just the narrow ability to survive or continue, but also the ability to adapt, prosper and grow.
AIAA, 2016
To support the goals of expanding our human presence and current economic sphere beyond LEO, a ne... more To support the goals of expanding our human presence and current economic sphere beyond LEO, a new plan was constructed for NASA to enter into partnerships with industry to foster and incentivize a new era of lunar industrialization. For NASA to finally be successful in achieving sustainable human exploration missions beyond LEO, lessons learned from our space history have shown that it is essential for current program planning to include affordable and economic development goals as well as address top national priorities to obtain much needed public support. In the last 58 years of NASA's existence, only Apollo's human exploration missions beyond LEO were successful since it was proclaimed to be a top national priority during the 1960's. However, the missions were not sustainable and ended abruptly in 1972 due to lack of funding and insufficient economic gain. Ever since Apollo, there have not been any human missions beyond LEO because none of the proposed program plans were economical or proclaimed a top national priority. The proposed plan outlines a new campaign of low-cost, commercial-enabled lunar COTS (Commercial Orbital Transfer Services) missions which is an update to the Lunar COTS plan previously described. The objectives of this new campaign of missions are to prospect for resources, determine the economic viability of extracting those resources and assess the value proposition of using these resources in future exploration architectures such as Mars. These missions would be accomplished in partnership with commercial industry using the well-proven COTS Program acquisition model. This model proved to be very beneficial to both NASA and its industry partners as NASA saved significantly in development and operational costs, as much as tenfold, while industry partners successfully expanded their market share and demonstrated substantial economic gain. Similar to COTS, the goals for this new initiative are 1) to develop and demonstrate cost-effective, cis-lunar commercial services, such as lunar transportation, lunar mining and lunar ISRU operations; 2) enable development of an affordable and economical exploration architecture for future missions to Mars and beyond; and 3) to incentivize the creation of new lunar markets through use of lunar resources for economic benefit to NASA, commercial industry and the international community. These cost-effective services would not only enable NASA to economically and sustainably achieve its human exploration missions to the Moon, Mars and beyond but it would also kickstart a new era of lunar industrialization. This paper will describe the goals, objectives and approach for implementing this new campaign of missions. It will also describe the potential benefits and progress that can be accomplished with these low-cost, Lunar COTS missions. Lastly, a preliminary economic analysis approach is proposed for understanding the cost and potential return on investment in the use of lunar resources to reach the goal of lunar industrialization and an expanded and sustainable human presence into cis-lunar space and beyond.
IEEE International Conference on Wireless for Space and Extreme Environments, 2015
Provide an overview of emerging US space launch and space systems trends that are critical to the... more Provide an overview of emerging US space launch and space systems trends that are critical to the future of new space business cases –like space solar power
NexGen Space LLC, 2015
This study's primary purpose was to assess the feasibility of new approaches for achieving our na... more This study's primary purpose was to assess the feasibility of new approaches for achieving our national goals in space. NexGen assembled a team of former NASA executives and engineers who assessed the economic and technical viability of an Evolvable Lunar Architecture (ELA) that leverages commercial capabilities and services that are existing or likely to emerge in the near-term.
AIAA, 2015
The NASA COTS (Commercial Orbital Transportation Services) Program was a very successful ... more The NASA COTS (Commercial Orbital Transportation Services) Program was a
very successful program that developed and demonstrated cost-effective
development and acquisition of commercial cargo transportation services to the International Space Station (ISS). The COTS acquisition strategy utilized a newer
model than normally accepted in traditional procurement practices. This new model used Space Act Agreements where NASA entered into partnerships with industry to
jointly share cost, development and operational risks to demonstrate new capabilities for mutual benefit. This model proved to be very beneficial to both NASA and its industry partners as NASA saved significantly in development and operational costs while industry partners successfully expanded their market share of the global launch transportation business.The authors, who contributed to
the development of the COTS model, would like to extend this model to lunar commercial services program that will push development of technologies and capabilities that will serve a Mars architecture and lead to an economical and sustainable pathway to transporting humans to Mars. Over the past few decades,
several architectures for the Moon and Mars have been proposed and studied but ultimately halted or not even started due to the projected costs significantly exceeding NASA’s budgets. Therefore a new strategy is needed that will fit within NASA’s projected budgets and takes advantage of the US commercial industry along with its creative and entrepreneurial attributes. The authors propose a new
COTS-like program to enter into partnerships with industry to demonstrate
cost-effective, cis-lunar commercial services, such as lunar transportation, lunar ISRU operations, and cis-lunar propellant depots that can enable an economical and
sustainable Mars architecture. Similar to the original COTS program, the goals of the proposed program, being notionally referred to as Lunar Commercial Orbital Transfer
Services (LCOTS) program will be to:1) reduce development and operational costs
by sharing costs with industry; 2) create new markets in cis-lunar space to fu
rther reduce operational costs; and 3) enable NASA to develop an affordable and economical exploration Mars architecture. The paper will describe a plan for a proposed LCOTS program, its potential impact to an eventual Mars architecture
and its many benefits to NASA, commercial space industry and the US economy.
AIAA, 2015
It is possible and desirable to consider many NASA human spaceflight scenarios, along with all th... more It is possible and desirable to consider many NASA human spaceflight scenarios, along with all their elements, within a long-term NASA budget context. While there is an abundance of cost analysis of specific space system elements in a narrow context or performance analysis of broad scenarios with no NASA budget context, approaches that balance the details in-hand alongside a NASA budget context across possible scenarios have been absent.
This situation is not for lack of enough data, understanding, cost models or mission definition. Uncertainty in selecting or having a mandate for a specific spaceflight direction should not be cause to avoid looking at any scenarios at all, especially if many very different scenarios can be analyzed rather well. Insufficient emphasis on a NASA budget context as an input into long term planning, the treatment of budgets and schedules as an output of proposed initiatives, rather than an input, and a lack of understanding of NASA budget-nuances likely all contribute to the lack of life cycle cost analysis for spaceflight scenarios.
Given the importance of a NASA budget context, life cycle cost modeling and analysis for NASA’s spaceflight pioneering investments cannot afford to ignore where or who and the types of money in the NASA budget. Similarly, valuing situational awareness, it is not advantageous or necessary to await a specific mandate or decision only to analyze slight variations on that single directions life cycle costs later. This is akin to being in the wilderness, but refusing to explore your surroundings until after a decision on which way to go -and then proceeding strictly in that direction. Rather, reconnaissance in many directions is valuable, feedback on which way to go, regardless of uncertainty about eventual choices.
The modeling and analysis here will show that it is not necessary to define every part of every possible space exploration scenario in order to gain valuable insights. A scenario planning approach that explores many life cycle possibilities is valuable and feasible, by combining the more defined space system elements alongside a thorough understanding of NASA budgets as context.
Commercial and Government Responsive Access to Space Technology Exchange (CRASTE) Conference, 2014
Recent technology advancements have enabled the development of small cheap satellites that can pe... more Recent technology advancements have enabled the development of small cheap satellites that can perform useful functions in the space environment. Currently, the only low cost option for getting these payloads into orbit is through ride share programs-small satellites awaiting the launch of a larger satellite, and then riding along on the same launcher. As a result, these small satellite customers await primary payload launches and a backlog exists. An alternative option would be dedicated nano-launch systems built and operated to provide more flexible launch services, higher availability, and affordable prices. The potential customer base that would drive requirements or support a business case includes commercial, academia, civil government and defense. Further, NASA technology investments could enable these alternative game changing options.
With this context, in 2013 the Game Changing Development (GCD) program funded a NASA team to investigate the feasibility of dedicated nano-satellite launch systems with a recurring cost of less than $2 million per launch for a 5 kg payload to low Earth orbit. The team products would include potential concepts, technologies and factors for enabling the ambitious cost goal, exploring the nature of the goal itself, and informing the GCD program technology investment decision making process.
This paper provides an overview of the life cycle analysis effort that was conducted in 2013 by an inter-center NASA team. This effort included the development of reference nano-launch system concepts, developing analysis processes and models, establishing a basis for cost estimates (development, manufacturing and launch) suitable to the scale of the systems, and especially, understanding the relationship of potential game changing technologies to life cycle costs, as well as other factors, such as flights per year.
AIAA, 2014
The affordability of transportation to or from space is of continued interest across numerous and... more The affordability of transportation to or from space is of continued interest across numerous and diverse stakeholders in our aerospace industry. Such an important metric as affordability deserves a clear understanding among stakeholders about what is meant by affordability, costs, and related terms, as otherwise it’s difficult to see where specific improvements are needed or where to target specific investments. As captured in the famous words of Lewis Carroll, “If you don't know where you are going, any road will get you there”. As important as understanding a metric may be, with terms such as costs, prices, specific costs, average costs, marginal costs, etc., it is equally important to understand the relationship among these measures. In turn, these measures intermingle with caveats and factors that introduce more measures in need of a common understanding among stakeholders. These factors include flight rates, capability, and payload. This paper seeks to review the costs of space transportation systems and the relationships among the many factors involved in costs from the points of view of diverse decision makers. A decision maker may have an interest in acquiring a single launch considering the best price (along with other factors in their business case), or an interest in many launches over time. Alternately, a decision maker may have a specific interest in developing a space transportation system that will offer certain prices, or flight rate capability, or both, at a certain up-front cost. The question arises for the later, to reuse or to expend? As it is necessary in thinking about the future to clearly understand the past and the present, this paper will present data and graphics to assist stakeholders in visualizing trends and the current state of affairs in the launch industry. At all times, raw data will be referenced (or made available separately) alongside detailed explanations about the data, so as to avoid the confusion or misleading conclusions that occur more often than not with complex graphs or statements when such context is lacking.
Joint Army Navy NASA Air Force (JANNAF) Conference, 2013
This paper presents the results of a 2012 life cycle cost (LCC) study of hybrid Reusable Booster ... more This paper presents the results of a 2012 life cycle cost (LCC) study of hybrid Reusable Booster Systems (RBS) conducted by NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). The work included the creation of a new cost estimating model and an LCC analysis, building on past work where applicable, but emphasizing the integration of new approaches in life cycle cost estimation. Specifically, the inclusion of industry processes/practices and indirect costs were a new and significant part of the analysis. The focus of LCC estimation has traditionally been from the perspective of technology, design characteristics, and related factors such as reliability. Technology has informed the cost related support to decision makers interested in risk and budget insight. This traditional emphasis on technology occurs even though it is well established that complex aerospace systems costs are mostly about indirect costs, with likely only partial influence in these indirect costs being due to the more visible technology products. Organizational considerations, processes/practices, and indirect costs are traditionally derived (" wrapped ") only by relationship to tangible product characteristics. This traditional approach works well as long as it is understood that no significant changes, and by relation no significant improvements, are being pursued in the area of either the government acquisition or industry's indirect costs. In this sense then, most launch systems cost models ignore most costs. The alternative was implemented in this LCC study, whereby the approach considered technology and process/practices in balance, with as much detail for one as the other. This RBS LCC study has avoided point-designs, for now, instead emphasizing exploring the trade-space of potential technology advances joined with potential process/practice advances. Given the range of decisions, and all their combinations, it was necessary to create a model of the original model and use genetic algorithms to explore results. A strong business case occurs when viable paths are identified for an affordable up-front investment, and these paths can credibly achieve affordable, responsive operations, characterized by smaller direct touch labor efforts at the wing level from flight to flight. The results supporting this approach, its potential, and its conclusions are presented here.
AIAA, 2011
Many cost estimating tools use weight as a major parameter in projecting the cost. This is often ... more Many cost estimating tools use weight as a major parameter in projecting the cost. This is often combined with modifying factors such as complexity, technical maturity of design, environment of operation, etc. to increase the fidelity of the estimate. For a set of conceptual designs, all meeting the same requirements, increased weight can be a major driver in increased cost. However, once a design is fixed, increased weight generally decreases cost, while decreased weight generally increases cost-and the relationship is not linear.
Alternative approaches to estimating cost without using weight (except perhaps for materials costs) have been attempted to try to produce a tool usable throughout the design process-from concept studies through development.
This paper will address the pros and cons of using weight based models for cost estimating, using liquid rocket engines as the example. It will then examine approaches that minimize the imp~ct of weight based cost estimating. The Rocket Engine-Cost Model (RECM) is an attribute based model developed internally by Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne for NASA. RECM will be presented primarily to show a successful method to use design and programmatic parameters instead of weight to estimate both design and development costs and production costs. An operations model developed by KSC, the Launch and Landing Effects Ground Operations model (LLEGO), will also be discussed.
Pros, Cons, and Alternates to Weight Based Cost Estimating
47th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference & Exhibit, 2011
Joint Army Navy NASA Air Force (JANNAF) Conference, 2011
This paper presents a method and an initial analysis of the costs of a reusable booster system (R... more This paper presents a method and an initial analysis of the costs of a reusable booster system (RBS) as envisioned by the US Department of Defense (DoD) and numerous initiatives that form the concept of Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). This paper leverages the knowledge gained from decades of experience with the semi-reusable NASA Space Shuttle to understand how the costs of a military next generation semi-reusable space transport might behave in the real world-and how it might be made as affordable as desired. The NASA Space Shuttle had a semi-expendable booster, that being the reusable Solid Rocket Motors/Boosters (SRM/SRB) and the expendable cryogenic External Tank (ET), with a reusable cargo and crew capable orbiter. This paper will explore DoD concepts that invert this architectural arrangement, using a reusable booster plane that flies back to base soon after launch, with the in-space elements of the launch system being the expendable portions. Cost estimating in the earliest stages of any potential, large scale program has limited usefulness. As a result, the emphasis here is on developing an approach, a structure, and the basic concepts that could continue to be matured as the program gains knowledge. Where cost estimates are provided, these results by necessity carry many caveats and assumptions, and this analysis becomes more about ways in which drivers of costs for diverse scenarios can be better understood. The paper is informed throughout with a design-for-cost philosophy whereby the design and technology features of the proposed RBS (who and what, the "architecture") are taken as linked at the hip to a desire to perform a certain mission (where and when), and together these inform the cost, responsiveness, performance and sustainability (how) of the system. Concepts for developing, acquiring, producing or operating the system will be shown for their inextricable relationship to the "architecture" of the system, and how these too relate to costs. Design and technology features bear special relevance to early program research and development directions. Given the uncertainties involved in both their actual performance promise and their relation to costs of operational systems, this later relationship is also given special attention.
A Reliability, Maintainability, and Safety Model to Support the Assessment of Space Vehicles
International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management, 2010
The focus of this paper is on reliability and availability design goals. It aims to provide top-l... more The focus of this paper is on reliability and availability design goals. It aims to provide top-level estimates of the safety and maintainability of future spacecraft systems.
AIAA, 2010
This paper will review lessons learned for space transportation systems from the viewpoint of the... more This paper will review lessons learned for space transportation systems from the viewpoint of the NASA, Industry and academia Space Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST). The paper provides the basic idea and history of "lessons learned". Recommendations that are extremely relevant to NASA's future investments in research, program development and operations are"'provided. Lastly, a novel and useful approach to documenting lessons learned is recommended, so as to most effectively guide future NASA investments. Applying lessons learned can significantly improve access to space for cargo or people by focusing limited funds on the right areas and needs for improvement. Many NASA human space flight initiatives have faltered, been redirected or been outright canceled since the birth of the Space Shuttle program. The reasons given at the time have been seemingly unique. It will be shown that there are common threads as lessons learned in many a past initiative.
AIAA, 2009
Much debate and national soul searching has taken place over the value of the Space Shuttle which... more Much debate and national soul searching has taken place over the value of the Space Shuttle which first flew in 1981 and which is currently scheduled to be retired in 2010. Originally developed post-Saturn Apollo to emphasize affordability and safety, the reusable Space Shuttle instead came to be perceived as economically unsustainable and lacking the technology maturity to assure safe, routine access to low earth orbit (LEO). After the loss of two crews, aboard Challenger and Columbia, followed by the decision to retire the system in 2010, it is critical that this three decades worth of human space flight experience be well understood.
Understanding of the past is imperative to further those goals for which the Space Shuttle was a stepping-stone in the advancement of knowledge. There was significant reduction in life cycle costs between the Saturn Apollo and the Space Shuttle. However, the advancement in life cycle cost reduction from Saturn Apollo to the Space Shuttle fell far short of its goal. This paper will explore the reasons for this shortfall.
Shortfalls and lessons learned can be categorized as related to design factors, at the architecture, element and subsystem levels, as well as to programmatic factors, in terms of goals, requirements, management and organization. Additionally, no review of the Space Shuttle program and attempt to take away key lessons would be complete without a strategic review. That is, how do national space goals drive future space transportation development strategies? The lessons of the Space Shuttle are invaluable in all respects – technical, as in design, program-wise, as in organizational approach and goal setting, and strategically, within the context of the generational march toward an expanded human presence in space. Beyond lessons though (and the innumerable papers, anecdotes and opinions published on this topic) this paper traces tangible, achievable steps, derived from the Space Shuttle program experience, that must be a part of any 21st century initiatives furthering a growing human presence beyond earth.
Shuttle Shortfalls and Lessons Learned for the Sustainment of Human Space Exploration
45th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference & Exhibit, 2009
45th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference, 2009
Cost control must be implemented through the establishment of requirements and controlled continu... more Cost control must be implemented through the establishment of requirements and controlled continually by managing to these requirements. Cost control of the non-recurring side of life cycle cost has traditionally been implemented in both commercial and government programs. The government uses the budget process to implement this control. The commercial approach is to use a similar process of allocating the non-recurring cost to major elements of the program. This type of control generally manages through a work breakdown structure (WBS) by defining the major elements of the program.
If the cost control is to be applied across the entire program life cycle cost (LCC), the approach must be addressed very differently. A functional breakdown structure (FBS) is defined and recommended. Use of a FBS provides the visibifity to allow the choice of an integrated solution reducing the cost of providing many different elements of like function. The different functional solutions that drive the hardware logistics, quantity of documentation, operational labor, reliability and maintainability balance, and total integration of the entire system from DDT&E through the life of the program must be fully defined, compared, and final decisions made among these competing solutions.
The major drivers of recurring cost have been identified and are presented and discussed. The LCC requirements must be established and flowed down to provide control of LCC. This LCC control will require a structured rigid process similar to the one traditionally used to control weight/performance for space transportation systems throughout the entire program.
It has been demonstrated over the last —30 years that without a firm requirement and methodically structured cost control, it is unlikely that affordable and sustainable space transportation system LCC will be achieved.
Academia.edu, 2023
Design and technology decisions present unique difficulties for large-scale complex products when... more Design and technology decisions present unique difficulties for large-scale complex products when the goal is to reduce costs at every phase of the systems life cycle - in up-front development, and production, and future operations. A product must "have it all" when the operator, buyer, or potential market "wants it all." This is not a novel situation in competitive industries, always seeking efficiencies to achieve more tomorrow for less than yesterday. Yet this sense remains alien in parts of the aerospace sector that have historically been shielded from competitive pressures. Even so, NASA discovered a welcome break from this trend in its commercial program to get cargo to the International Space Station. Here we show how business practices determining efficiency interact with design and technology choices determining effectiveness. We found this lends invaluable insight into what is happening, and the potential benefits, as NASA and other government agencies adopt similar programs. We show how design and technology that is effective long-term flourishes only when pursued efficiently. Otherwise, improvements and related market growth are prohibitively expensive near-term. In inefficient organizational practice, advances always fight a losing battle. We apply models and "models of models" using genetic algorithms to the case of reusable launch systems. Aerospace assumes "a stitch in time saves nine." Some effort now will have some payoff later. A more significant gain in the future requires more effort now. Here we discover and understand (quantitatively) a shift where a significantly lower investment than would otherwise be predicted also achieves significant results. We explore these differing contexts for a reusable launch system with a design/technology model, an organizational process/practice model, and automation, exploring possibilities no human could ever go through in a lifetime. "What," meet "how"-via an AI.
NASA, 2017
In May 2012, the SpaceX Dragon spacecraft became the first commercial spacecraft to arrive at the... more In May 2012, the SpaceX Dragon spacecraft became the first commercial spacecraft to arrive at the International Space Station (ISS). This achievement, and that of other partners in the NASA Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program, would surface difficult questions about NASA’s other more traditional development processes and their traditionally high costs. The cost of the non-traditional COTS public private partnership for the development of spacecraft and launch systems, and later the prices for services to deliver cargo to the ISS, would be praised or criticized by one measure of cost versus another, often with little regard for consistency or data.
The goal here is to do the math, to bring rigorous life cycle cost (LCC) analysis into discussions about COTS program costs. We gather publicly available cost data, review the data for credibility, check for consistency among sources, and rigorously define and analyze specific cost metrics.
This paper shows quantitatively that the COTS development and later the operational Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) are significant advances in affordability by any measure. To understand measurable improvements in context, we also create and analyze an apples-to-apples scenario where the Space Shuttle would have fulfilled the ISS cargo requirement versus the COTS/CRS launchers and spacecraft. Alternately, we review valid questions that arise where measures or comparisons are not easy or break down, with no quantitative path to clear conclusions. Understanding the costs of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), the sister program to the COTS cargo program, and other programs made possible from post-Shuttle funding, is inseparable from these more difficult questions.
In addition, we review briefly the significance of the COTS/CRS and CCP in estimating potential costs to NASA for future deep space exploration systems using public-private partnerships. These future programs need many new spacecraft, launch vehicles, and facilities. As NASA struggles with the cost of a Journey to Mars, the significance of new, improved cost data in liquid propulsion, stages, spacecraft, avionics, infrastructure, and more will prove priceless.
NASA, 2017
In 2011, NASA released a report assessing the market for commercial crew and cargo services to lo... more In 2011, NASA released a report assessing the market for commercial crew and cargo services to low Earth orbit (LEO). The report stated that NASA had spent a few hundred million dollars in the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program on the portion related to the development of the Falcon 9 launch vehicle. Yet a NASA cost model predicted the cost would have been significantly more with a non-commercial cost-plus contracting approach. By 2016 a NASA request for information stated it must “maximize the efficiency and sustainability of the Exploration Systems development programs”, as “critical to free resources for re-investment…such as other required deep space exploration capabilities.”
This work joins the previous two events, showing the potential for commercial, public private partnerships, modeled on programs like COTS, to reduce the cost to NASA significantly for “…other required deep space exploration capabilities.” These other capabilities include landers, stages and more. We mature the concept of “costed baseball cards”, adding cost estimates to NASA’s space systems “baseball cards.” ,
We show some potential costs, including analysis, the basis of estimates, data sources and caveats to address a critical question – based on initial assessment, are significant agency resources justified for more detailed analysis and due diligence to understand and invest in public private partnerships for human deep space exploration systems? The cost analysis spans commercial to cost-plus contracting approaches, for smaller elements vs. larger, with some variation for lunar or Mars.
By extension, we delve briefly into the potentially much broader significance of the individual cost estimates if taken together as a NASA investment portfolio where public private partnership are stitched together for deep space exploration. How might multiple improvements in individual systems add up to NASA human deep space exploration achievements, realistically, affordably, sustainably, in a relevant timeframe?
NASA, 2017
Historically, NASA human spaceflight planning has included healthy doses of life cycle cost analy... more Historically, NASA human spaceflight planning has included healthy doses of life cycle cost analysis. Planners put projects and their cost estimates in a budget context. Estimated costs became expected budgets. Regardless, real budgets rarely matched expectations. , , So plans would come and go as NASA canceled projects. New projects would arise and the cycle would begin again. Repeatedly, NASA schedule and performance ambitions come up against costs growing at double-digit rates while budgets barely rise a couple of percent a year. Significant skepticism greets proposed NASA programs at birth, as cost estimates for new projects are traditionally very high, and worse, far off the mark for those carried forward. In this environment the current “capability driven framework” for NASA human spaceflight evolved, where long term life cycle cost analysis are even viewed as possibly counter-productive. Here, a space exploration project, for example the Space Launch System, focuses on immediate goals. A life cycle is that of a project, not a program, and for only that span of time to a near term milestone like a first test launch.
Unfortunately, attempting to avoid some pitfalls in long-term life cycle cost analysis breeds others. Government audits have noted that limiting the scope of cost analysis “does not provide the transparency necessary to assess long-term affordability” making it difficult to understand if NASA “is progressing in a cost-effective and affordable manner.” Even in this short-term framework, NASA realizes the importance of long-term considerations, that it must “maximize the efficiency and sustainability of the Exploration Systems development programs”, that this is “critical to free resources for re-investment…such as other required deep space exploration capabilities.”
Assuming the value of long-term life cycle cost analysis, where due diligence meets reconnaissance, and accepting past shortcomings, the work here approaches life cycle cost analysis for human spaceflight differently.
- If costs have traditionally been so high that adding them up is discouraging, are there any new facts on the ground offering paths to significantly lower costs?
- If NASA’s spaceflight budget and process is an over-arching constraint, with its planning limitations favoring short-term outlooks, is there a way to step outside the budget box?
- If life cycle answers have historically been too uncertain to be useful, is there a process where stakeholders gain valuable insights merely from emphasizing a common understanding around questions?
We analyze the potential life cycle cost of assorted NASA human spaceflight architectures – an architecture as a sum of individual systems, working together. With the prior questions of high costs, limited budgets and uncertainties in mind, public private partnerships are central in these architectures. The cost data for current commercial public private partnerships is encouraging, as are cost estimates for future partnership approaches beyond low Earth orbit. Private capital, directly or indirectly, an ingredient of public private partnerships, may be a significant factor in finding a path around the limits of the NASA spaceflight budget. Also, understanding and reviewing the pros, cons and uncertainties of assorted architectures can assist in developing a common understanding around key questions as important if not more so than the numbers and answers.
Lastly, a scenario planning technique is briefly explored that can mature a common understanding about the agencies situation at hand and how diverse stakeholders can go forward together. Scenario planning, rather than focusing on answers, places emphasis on stakeholders developing a common understanding about the future. Putting aside costs, this is especially true of questions about sustainability and growth, results, benefits and expectations. While efficiency exercises or analysis look to reduce resources in one place to apply them elsewhere, moving around slices in a pie, scenario planning can get at the heart of the matter, growing the pie, transforming it, and making the pieces relevant. Especially important is the question of sustainability for different scenarios in the broad sense of the word – not just the narrow ability to survive or continue, but also the ability to adapt, prosper and grow.
AIAA, 2016
To support the goals of expanding our human presence and current economic sphere beyond LEO, a ne... more To support the goals of expanding our human presence and current economic sphere beyond LEO, a new plan was constructed for NASA to enter into partnerships with industry to foster and incentivize a new era of lunar industrialization. For NASA to finally be successful in achieving sustainable human exploration missions beyond LEO, lessons learned from our space history have shown that it is essential for current program planning to include affordable and economic development goals as well as address top national priorities to obtain much needed public support. In the last 58 years of NASA's existence, only Apollo's human exploration missions beyond LEO were successful since it was proclaimed to be a top national priority during the 1960's. However, the missions were not sustainable and ended abruptly in 1972 due to lack of funding and insufficient economic gain. Ever since Apollo, there have not been any human missions beyond LEO because none of the proposed program plans were economical or proclaimed a top national priority. The proposed plan outlines a new campaign of low-cost, commercial-enabled lunar COTS (Commercial Orbital Transfer Services) missions which is an update to the Lunar COTS plan previously described. The objectives of this new campaign of missions are to prospect for resources, determine the economic viability of extracting those resources and assess the value proposition of using these resources in future exploration architectures such as Mars. These missions would be accomplished in partnership with commercial industry using the well-proven COTS Program acquisition model. This model proved to be very beneficial to both NASA and its industry partners as NASA saved significantly in development and operational costs, as much as tenfold, while industry partners successfully expanded their market share and demonstrated substantial economic gain. Similar to COTS, the goals for this new initiative are 1) to develop and demonstrate cost-effective, cis-lunar commercial services, such as lunar transportation, lunar mining and lunar ISRU operations; 2) enable development of an affordable and economical exploration architecture for future missions to Mars and beyond; and 3) to incentivize the creation of new lunar markets through use of lunar resources for economic benefit to NASA, commercial industry and the international community. These cost-effective services would not only enable NASA to economically and sustainably achieve its human exploration missions to the Moon, Mars and beyond but it would also kickstart a new era of lunar industrialization. This paper will describe the goals, objectives and approach for implementing this new campaign of missions. It will also describe the potential benefits and progress that can be accomplished with these low-cost, Lunar COTS missions. Lastly, a preliminary economic analysis approach is proposed for understanding the cost and potential return on investment in the use of lunar resources to reach the goal of lunar industrialization and an expanded and sustainable human presence into cis-lunar space and beyond.
IEEE International Conference on Wireless for Space and Extreme Environments, 2015
Provide an overview of emerging US space launch and space systems trends that are critical to the... more Provide an overview of emerging US space launch and space systems trends that are critical to the future of new space business cases –like space solar power
NexGen Space LLC, 2015
This study's primary purpose was to assess the feasibility of new approaches for achieving our na... more This study's primary purpose was to assess the feasibility of new approaches for achieving our national goals in space. NexGen assembled a team of former NASA executives and engineers who assessed the economic and technical viability of an Evolvable Lunar Architecture (ELA) that leverages commercial capabilities and services that are existing or likely to emerge in the near-term.
AIAA, 2015
The NASA COTS (Commercial Orbital Transportation Services) Program was a very successful ... more The NASA COTS (Commercial Orbital Transportation Services) Program was a
very successful program that developed and demonstrated cost-effective
development and acquisition of commercial cargo transportation services to the International Space Station (ISS). The COTS acquisition strategy utilized a newer
model than normally accepted in traditional procurement practices. This new model used Space Act Agreements where NASA entered into partnerships with industry to
jointly share cost, development and operational risks to demonstrate new capabilities for mutual benefit. This model proved to be very beneficial to both NASA and its industry partners as NASA saved significantly in development and operational costs while industry partners successfully expanded their market share of the global launch transportation business.The authors, who contributed to
the development of the COTS model, would like to extend this model to lunar commercial services program that will push development of technologies and capabilities that will serve a Mars architecture and lead to an economical and sustainable pathway to transporting humans to Mars. Over the past few decades,
several architectures for the Moon and Mars have been proposed and studied but ultimately halted or not even started due to the projected costs significantly exceeding NASA’s budgets. Therefore a new strategy is needed that will fit within NASA’s projected budgets and takes advantage of the US commercial industry along with its creative and entrepreneurial attributes. The authors propose a new
COTS-like program to enter into partnerships with industry to demonstrate
cost-effective, cis-lunar commercial services, such as lunar transportation, lunar ISRU operations, and cis-lunar propellant depots that can enable an economical and
sustainable Mars architecture. Similar to the original COTS program, the goals of the proposed program, being notionally referred to as Lunar Commercial Orbital Transfer
Services (LCOTS) program will be to:1) reduce development and operational costs
by sharing costs with industry; 2) create new markets in cis-lunar space to fu
rther reduce operational costs; and 3) enable NASA to develop an affordable and economical exploration Mars architecture. The paper will describe a plan for a proposed LCOTS program, its potential impact to an eventual Mars architecture
and its many benefits to NASA, commercial space industry and the US economy.
AIAA, 2015
It is possible and desirable to consider many NASA human spaceflight scenarios, along with all th... more It is possible and desirable to consider many NASA human spaceflight scenarios, along with all their elements, within a long-term NASA budget context. While there is an abundance of cost analysis of specific space system elements in a narrow context or performance analysis of broad scenarios with no NASA budget context, approaches that balance the details in-hand alongside a NASA budget context across possible scenarios have been absent.
This situation is not for lack of enough data, understanding, cost models or mission definition. Uncertainty in selecting or having a mandate for a specific spaceflight direction should not be cause to avoid looking at any scenarios at all, especially if many very different scenarios can be analyzed rather well. Insufficient emphasis on a NASA budget context as an input into long term planning, the treatment of budgets and schedules as an output of proposed initiatives, rather than an input, and a lack of understanding of NASA budget-nuances likely all contribute to the lack of life cycle cost analysis for spaceflight scenarios.
Given the importance of a NASA budget context, life cycle cost modeling and analysis for NASA’s spaceflight pioneering investments cannot afford to ignore where or who and the types of money in the NASA budget. Similarly, valuing situational awareness, it is not advantageous or necessary to await a specific mandate or decision only to analyze slight variations on that single directions life cycle costs later. This is akin to being in the wilderness, but refusing to explore your surroundings until after a decision on which way to go -and then proceeding strictly in that direction. Rather, reconnaissance in many directions is valuable, feedback on which way to go, regardless of uncertainty about eventual choices.
The modeling and analysis here will show that it is not necessary to define every part of every possible space exploration scenario in order to gain valuable insights. A scenario planning approach that explores many life cycle possibilities is valuable and feasible, by combining the more defined space system elements alongside a thorough understanding of NASA budgets as context.
Commercial and Government Responsive Access to Space Technology Exchange (CRASTE) Conference, 2014
Recent technology advancements have enabled the development of small cheap satellites that can pe... more Recent technology advancements have enabled the development of small cheap satellites that can perform useful functions in the space environment. Currently, the only low cost option for getting these payloads into orbit is through ride share programs-small satellites awaiting the launch of a larger satellite, and then riding along on the same launcher. As a result, these small satellite customers await primary payload launches and a backlog exists. An alternative option would be dedicated nano-launch systems built and operated to provide more flexible launch services, higher availability, and affordable prices. The potential customer base that would drive requirements or support a business case includes commercial, academia, civil government and defense. Further, NASA technology investments could enable these alternative game changing options.
With this context, in 2013 the Game Changing Development (GCD) program funded a NASA team to investigate the feasibility of dedicated nano-satellite launch systems with a recurring cost of less than $2 million per launch for a 5 kg payload to low Earth orbit. The team products would include potential concepts, technologies and factors for enabling the ambitious cost goal, exploring the nature of the goal itself, and informing the GCD program technology investment decision making process.
This paper provides an overview of the life cycle analysis effort that was conducted in 2013 by an inter-center NASA team. This effort included the development of reference nano-launch system concepts, developing analysis processes and models, establishing a basis for cost estimates (development, manufacturing and launch) suitable to the scale of the systems, and especially, understanding the relationship of potential game changing technologies to life cycle costs, as well as other factors, such as flights per year.
AIAA, 2014
The affordability of transportation to or from space is of continued interest across numerous and... more The affordability of transportation to or from space is of continued interest across numerous and diverse stakeholders in our aerospace industry. Such an important metric as affordability deserves a clear understanding among stakeholders about what is meant by affordability, costs, and related terms, as otherwise it’s difficult to see where specific improvements are needed or where to target specific investments. As captured in the famous words of Lewis Carroll, “If you don't know where you are going, any road will get you there”. As important as understanding a metric may be, with terms such as costs, prices, specific costs, average costs, marginal costs, etc., it is equally important to understand the relationship among these measures. In turn, these measures intermingle with caveats and factors that introduce more measures in need of a common understanding among stakeholders. These factors include flight rates, capability, and payload. This paper seeks to review the costs of space transportation systems and the relationships among the many factors involved in costs from the points of view of diverse decision makers. A decision maker may have an interest in acquiring a single launch considering the best price (along with other factors in their business case), or an interest in many launches over time. Alternately, a decision maker may have a specific interest in developing a space transportation system that will offer certain prices, or flight rate capability, or both, at a certain up-front cost. The question arises for the later, to reuse or to expend? As it is necessary in thinking about the future to clearly understand the past and the present, this paper will present data and graphics to assist stakeholders in visualizing trends and the current state of affairs in the launch industry. At all times, raw data will be referenced (or made available separately) alongside detailed explanations about the data, so as to avoid the confusion or misleading conclusions that occur more often than not with complex graphs or statements when such context is lacking.
Joint Army Navy NASA Air Force (JANNAF) Conference, 2013
This paper presents the results of a 2012 life cycle cost (LCC) study of hybrid Reusable Booster ... more This paper presents the results of a 2012 life cycle cost (LCC) study of hybrid Reusable Booster Systems (RBS) conducted by NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). The work included the creation of a new cost estimating model and an LCC analysis, building on past work where applicable, but emphasizing the integration of new approaches in life cycle cost estimation. Specifically, the inclusion of industry processes/practices and indirect costs were a new and significant part of the analysis. The focus of LCC estimation has traditionally been from the perspective of technology, design characteristics, and related factors such as reliability. Technology has informed the cost related support to decision makers interested in risk and budget insight. This traditional emphasis on technology occurs even though it is well established that complex aerospace systems costs are mostly about indirect costs, with likely only partial influence in these indirect costs being due to the more visible technology products. Organizational considerations, processes/practices, and indirect costs are traditionally derived (" wrapped ") only by relationship to tangible product characteristics. This traditional approach works well as long as it is understood that no significant changes, and by relation no significant improvements, are being pursued in the area of either the government acquisition or industry's indirect costs. In this sense then, most launch systems cost models ignore most costs. The alternative was implemented in this LCC study, whereby the approach considered technology and process/practices in balance, with as much detail for one as the other. This RBS LCC study has avoided point-designs, for now, instead emphasizing exploring the trade-space of potential technology advances joined with potential process/practice advances. Given the range of decisions, and all their combinations, it was necessary to create a model of the original model and use genetic algorithms to explore results. A strong business case occurs when viable paths are identified for an affordable up-front investment, and these paths can credibly achieve affordable, responsive operations, characterized by smaller direct touch labor efforts at the wing level from flight to flight. The results supporting this approach, its potential, and its conclusions are presented here.
AIAA, 2011
Many cost estimating tools use weight as a major parameter in projecting the cost. This is often ... more Many cost estimating tools use weight as a major parameter in projecting the cost. This is often combined with modifying factors such as complexity, technical maturity of design, environment of operation, etc. to increase the fidelity of the estimate. For a set of conceptual designs, all meeting the same requirements, increased weight can be a major driver in increased cost. However, once a design is fixed, increased weight generally decreases cost, while decreased weight generally increases cost-and the relationship is not linear.
Alternative approaches to estimating cost without using weight (except perhaps for materials costs) have been attempted to try to produce a tool usable throughout the design process-from concept studies through development.
This paper will address the pros and cons of using weight based models for cost estimating, using liquid rocket engines as the example. It will then examine approaches that minimize the imp~ct of weight based cost estimating. The Rocket Engine-Cost Model (RECM) is an attribute based model developed internally by Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne for NASA. RECM will be presented primarily to show a successful method to use design and programmatic parameters instead of weight to estimate both design and development costs and production costs. An operations model developed by KSC, the Launch and Landing Effects Ground Operations model (LLEGO), will also be discussed.
Pros, Cons, and Alternates to Weight Based Cost Estimating
47th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference & Exhibit, 2011
Joint Army Navy NASA Air Force (JANNAF) Conference, 2011
This paper presents a method and an initial analysis of the costs of a reusable booster system (R... more This paper presents a method and an initial analysis of the costs of a reusable booster system (RBS) as envisioned by the US Department of Defense (DoD) and numerous initiatives that form the concept of Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). This paper leverages the knowledge gained from decades of experience with the semi-reusable NASA Space Shuttle to understand how the costs of a military next generation semi-reusable space transport might behave in the real world-and how it might be made as affordable as desired. The NASA Space Shuttle had a semi-expendable booster, that being the reusable Solid Rocket Motors/Boosters (SRM/SRB) and the expendable cryogenic External Tank (ET), with a reusable cargo and crew capable orbiter. This paper will explore DoD concepts that invert this architectural arrangement, using a reusable booster plane that flies back to base soon after launch, with the in-space elements of the launch system being the expendable portions. Cost estimating in the earliest stages of any potential, large scale program has limited usefulness. As a result, the emphasis here is on developing an approach, a structure, and the basic concepts that could continue to be matured as the program gains knowledge. Where cost estimates are provided, these results by necessity carry many caveats and assumptions, and this analysis becomes more about ways in which drivers of costs for diverse scenarios can be better understood. The paper is informed throughout with a design-for-cost philosophy whereby the design and technology features of the proposed RBS (who and what, the "architecture") are taken as linked at the hip to a desire to perform a certain mission (where and when), and together these inform the cost, responsiveness, performance and sustainability (how) of the system. Concepts for developing, acquiring, producing or operating the system will be shown for their inextricable relationship to the "architecture" of the system, and how these too relate to costs. Design and technology features bear special relevance to early program research and development directions. Given the uncertainties involved in both their actual performance promise and their relation to costs of operational systems, this later relationship is also given special attention.
A Reliability, Maintainability, and Safety Model to Support the Assessment of Space Vehicles
International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management, 2010
The focus of this paper is on reliability and availability design goals. It aims to provide top-l... more The focus of this paper is on reliability and availability design goals. It aims to provide top-level estimates of the safety and maintainability of future spacecraft systems.
AIAA, 2010
This paper will review lessons learned for space transportation systems from the viewpoint of the... more This paper will review lessons learned for space transportation systems from the viewpoint of the NASA, Industry and academia Space Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST). The paper provides the basic idea and history of "lessons learned". Recommendations that are extremely relevant to NASA's future investments in research, program development and operations are"'provided. Lastly, a novel and useful approach to documenting lessons learned is recommended, so as to most effectively guide future NASA investments. Applying lessons learned can significantly improve access to space for cargo or people by focusing limited funds on the right areas and needs for improvement. Many NASA human space flight initiatives have faltered, been redirected or been outright canceled since the birth of the Space Shuttle program. The reasons given at the time have been seemingly unique. It will be shown that there are common threads as lessons learned in many a past initiative.
AIAA, 2009
Much debate and national soul searching has taken place over the value of the Space Shuttle which... more Much debate and national soul searching has taken place over the value of the Space Shuttle which first flew in 1981 and which is currently scheduled to be retired in 2010. Originally developed post-Saturn Apollo to emphasize affordability and safety, the reusable Space Shuttle instead came to be perceived as economically unsustainable and lacking the technology maturity to assure safe, routine access to low earth orbit (LEO). After the loss of two crews, aboard Challenger and Columbia, followed by the decision to retire the system in 2010, it is critical that this three decades worth of human space flight experience be well understood.
Understanding of the past is imperative to further those goals for which the Space Shuttle was a stepping-stone in the advancement of knowledge. There was significant reduction in life cycle costs between the Saturn Apollo and the Space Shuttle. However, the advancement in life cycle cost reduction from Saturn Apollo to the Space Shuttle fell far short of its goal. This paper will explore the reasons for this shortfall.
Shortfalls and lessons learned can be categorized as related to design factors, at the architecture, element and subsystem levels, as well as to programmatic factors, in terms of goals, requirements, management and organization. Additionally, no review of the Space Shuttle program and attempt to take away key lessons would be complete without a strategic review. That is, how do national space goals drive future space transportation development strategies? The lessons of the Space Shuttle are invaluable in all respects – technical, as in design, program-wise, as in organizational approach and goal setting, and strategically, within the context of the generational march toward an expanded human presence in space. Beyond lessons though (and the innumerable papers, anecdotes and opinions published on this topic) this paper traces tangible, achievable steps, derived from the Space Shuttle program experience, that must be a part of any 21st century initiatives furthering a growing human presence beyond earth.
Shuttle Shortfalls and Lessons Learned for the Sustainment of Human Space Exploration
45th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference & Exhibit, 2009
45th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference, 2009
Cost control must be implemented through the establishment of requirements and controlled continu... more Cost control must be implemented through the establishment of requirements and controlled continually by managing to these requirements. Cost control of the non-recurring side of life cycle cost has traditionally been implemented in both commercial and government programs. The government uses the budget process to implement this control. The commercial approach is to use a similar process of allocating the non-recurring cost to major elements of the program. This type of control generally manages through a work breakdown structure (WBS) by defining the major elements of the program.
If the cost control is to be applied across the entire program life cycle cost (LCC), the approach must be addressed very differently. A functional breakdown structure (FBS) is defined and recommended. Use of a FBS provides the visibifity to allow the choice of an integrated solution reducing the cost of providing many different elements of like function. The different functional solutions that drive the hardware logistics, quantity of documentation, operational labor, reliability and maintainability balance, and total integration of the entire system from DDT&E through the life of the program must be fully defined, compared, and final decisions made among these competing solutions.
The major drivers of recurring cost have been identified and are presented and discussed. The LCC requirements must be established and flowed down to provide control of LCC. This LCC control will require a structured rigid process similar to the one traditionally used to control weight/performance for space transportation systems throughout the entire program.
It has been demonstrated over the last —30 years that without a firm requirement and methodically structured cost control, it is unlikely that affordable and sustainable space transportation system LCC will be achieved.