Francisco Martínez-Sánchez - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Francisco Martínez-Sánchez
Lecturas de Economía
Se analizan los efectos de una empresa imitadora en el comportamiento de una empresa innovadora. ... more Se analizan los efectos de una empresa imitadora en el comportamiento de una empresa innovadora. La estructura del análisis usada es un modelo de duopolio dinámico de diferenciación de producto vertical, donde tanto el innovador como el imitador compiten simultáneamente en precio y calidad. Se obtiene, que cuando el mercado es pequeño, la presencia de un imitador estimula al innovador a aumentar su proceso de innovación, de modo que la entrada de un imitador no debería ser obstruida; y cuando el mercado es grande, el imitador reduce los incentivos del innovador a invertir sus recursos en I+D y a producir una mayor calidad, de modo que la entrada del imitador no debería ser fomentada. Palabras Clave: líder, imitador, calidad, diferenciación del producto y consumidor. Clasificación JEL: L11, L13, L15. : We analyze the effects of an imitating firm on the behavior of the innovating firm. The framework of analysis used is a dynamic duopoly model of vertical product differentiation, where...
In this paper we analyze firms’ ability to tacitly collude on prices in an infinitely repeated du... more In this paper we analyze firms’ ability to tacitly collude on prices in an infinitely repeated duopoly game of vertical product differentiation. We show that firms collude if and only if their discount factor is high enough, i.e. if they value future profits sufficiently. We also show that a lower cost of copying facilitates collusion but that a higher quality of the copy hinders collusion. Thus, the overall effect of these new characteristics of copies made by consumers is ambiguous.
Prague Economic Papers, 2016
In the present paper, we develop a monopoly model of vertical product differentiation for analysi... more In the present paper, we develop a monopoly model of vertical product differentiation for analysing the monopolist's decision about the possibility of versioning goods as substitutes or complements when consumers can buy them simultaneously. In this context, we find that versioning goods as substitutes or complements is optimal for the monopolist if the cost of designing the bundle (the purchase of one unit of each version) is increasing, which implies that making variants of closer substitutes reduces costs. However, if making variants of closer substitutes is costly, the monopolist versions goods as complements only. The final result also depends on the degree of concavity and convexity of the cost function.
Series-Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 2014
In this study, we consider the role of a publicly owned platform and programme quality in the fre... more In this study, we consider the role of a publicly owned platform and programme quality in the free-to-air broadcasting industry. We compare the equilibrium levels of advertising under private and mixed duopoly competition, and show that the connection between programme quality and advertising incentives is drastically different in each scenario. We also consider the welfare implications of our analysis and generate policy implications regarding the optimal level of government intervention in the broadcasting industry. Keywords Quality • Mixed duopoly • Advertising • Media JEL Classification L11 • L33 • L82 • M37 We thank the Co-editor Guillermo Caruana, and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments, and participants at the
@tic. revista d'innovació educativa, 2013
Estimación de la frecuencia de copia entre estudiantes usando una lista aleatorizada* Resumen Las... more Estimación de la frecuencia de copia entre estudiantes usando una lista aleatorizada* Resumen Las recientes reformas educativas han llevado a un aumento de las tareas que los alumnos deben realizar fuera del horario lectivo. En el presente artículo estudiamos la proporción de alumnos que copian dichas tareas. Para ello, utilizamos la técnica de listas aleatorizadas, la cual mejora la fiabilidad de los datos reportados por los estudiantes porque disminuye sus incentivos a mentir. Los resultados obtenidos muestran la capacidad de dicho método para obtener información en este tipo de cuestiones de naturaleza sensible. Encontramos un alto porcentaje de alumnos que copian sus tareas (en torno al 35%), observando que los hombres copian con mayor frecuencia que las mujeres, excepto cuando nos restringimos a los estudiantes mejor formados. Palabras clave: copiar, lista aleatorizada, encuestas, cuestiones sensibles | ARTíCULO Resum Les recents reformes educatives han portat a un augment de les tasques que els alumnes han de realitzar fora de l'horari lectiu. En aquest article estudiem la proporció d'alumnes que copien aquestes tasques. Per això, utilitzem la tècnica de llistes aleatoritzades, la qual millora la fiabilitat de les dades reportades pels estudiants perquè disminueix els seus incentius a mentir. Els resultats obtinguts mostren la capacitat d'aquest mètode per obtenir informació en aquest tipus de qüestions de naturalesa sensible. Trobem un alt percentatge d'alumnes que copien les seues tasques (al voltant del 35%), observant que els homes copien amb més freqüència que les dones, excepte quan ens restringim als estudiants millor formats.
Bulletin of Economic Research, 2012
We analyse the decision of firms about when to launch their products on the market when they prod... more We analyse the decision of firms about when to launch their products on the market when they produce differentiated goods and compete on prices. We find two subgame perfect equilibria: one in which the high‐quality firm holds its leadership in quality, and another in which the low‐quality firm leapfrogs its rival. When the initial level of differentiation is high enough, the low‐quality firm always launches first. Finally, we extend this model to analyse commercial piracy. We obtain that pirates are highly unlikely to launch the illegal copy first because they would bear a higher penalty and a higher risk of being detected.
* I thank my advisor Javier M. López-Cuñat for his helpful guidance and patience. I also thank Ra... more * I thank my advisor Javier M. López-Cuñat for his helpful guidance and patience. I also thank Ramón Faulí-Oller, Joel Sandonís, Nikolaos Georgantzis, Ángel Hernando-Veciana, Luis Úbeda and Thibaud Vergé for their useful comments and suggestions. I began writing this paper while I was visiting the University of Southampton under a Marie Curie Fellowship. The hospitality and financial support obtained are gratefully acknowledged. Finally, I thank the participants at the XXI JEI (Bilbao), ASSET 2005 (Rethymnon), XXX SAE (Murcia) and the seminar participants at the universities of Alicante, Jaume I and Murcia for their comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are alone mine.
In this paper, we analyze the differences in piracy rates from one country to another. Like previ... more In this paper, we analyze the differences in piracy rates from one country to another. Like previous papers on the topic, we find that more developed countries have lower incentives for pirating. Unlike previous papers, we find that the piracy rate is positively correlated with the tax burden rate but negatively correlated with the domestic market size and exports over GDP. We also separate the impacts of education and R&D on piracy, and find two effects with opposite signs. Moreover, we find that those countries with smaller, more efficient bureaucracies are likely to protect intellectual property more effectively. Finally, we show that the spread of access to the Internet is negatively correlated with the software piracy rate.
Journal of Economics, 2013
We consider the role of the endogenous choice of platform quality in a broadcasting duopoly marke... more We consider the role of the endogenous choice of platform quality in a broadcasting duopoly market where competing media platforms choose also their level of advertising. We compare the equilibrium levels of quality, advertising and welfare under private and mixed duopoly competition. We show that the welfare comparison between the private and mixed duopoly regimes depends, crucially, on the interplay between the net direct effect of advertising on welfare and the degree of substitutability between platforms. We also consider the effects on quality and welfare of recent policies tending to eliminate advertising as a way of financing publicly-owned platforms.
In this paper we develop a common agency model to analyze the problem of pirates entering the mar... more In this paper we develop a common agency model to analyze the problem of pirates entering the market, in which the incumbent and the consumers form pressure groups to lobby the government on policies to prevent piracy while the pirates try to avoid being stopped. We show that a monopoly is not an equilibrium when both the incumbent and consumers lobby the government, and that the cost of monitoring commercial piracy is very important in determining (truthful) equilibria, as is the case where there is no lobby competition. However, it is now more difficult getting the pirate to enter the market.
In this paper we analyze the strategic decisions of the government, the incumbent and the pirate ... more In this paper we analyze the strategic decisions of the government, the incumbent and the pirate in a market where the good is piratable. We show that deterred or accommodated piracy can occur in equilibrium, but pure monopoly cannot occur for any anti-piracy policy. We also show that the initial quality differential between the original and the pirated product is essential to explain the effects of an increase in the quality of pirated product on both the level of piracy and the optimal monitoring rate. Assuming a onestage entry process and a sufficiently high quality differential, we prove that the incumbent always prefers to move first and make a credible commitment to a price. However, this is not true with a two-stage entry process.
In this paper we analyze firms' ability to tacitly collude on prices in an infinitely repeated du... more In this paper we analyze firms' ability to tacitly collude on prices in an infinitely repeated duopoly game of vertical product differentiation. We show that firms collude if and only if their discount factor is high enough, i.e. if they value future profits sufficiently. We also show that a lower cost of copying facilitates collusion but that a higher quality of the copy hinders collusion. Thus, the overall effect of these new characteristics of copies made by consumers is ambiguous.
In this note we check the robustness of some results of the model developed by Sanjo (Sanjo, Y. (... more In this note we check the robustness of some results of the model developed by Sanjo (Sanjo, Y. (2009). Bertrand Competition in a Mixed Duopoly Market, The Manchester School, Vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 373–397).
Lecturas de Economía
Se analizan los efectos de una empresa imitadora en el comportamiento de una empresa innovadora. ... more Se analizan los efectos de una empresa imitadora en el comportamiento de una empresa innovadora. La estructura del análisis usada es un modelo de duopolio dinámico de diferenciación de producto vertical, donde tanto el innovador como el imitador compiten simultáneamente en precio y calidad. Se obtiene, que cuando el mercado es pequeño, la presencia de un imitador estimula al innovador a aumentar su proceso de innovación, de modo que la entrada de un imitador no debería ser obstruida; y cuando el mercado es grande, el imitador reduce los incentivos del innovador a invertir sus recursos en I+D y a producir una mayor calidad, de modo que la entrada del imitador no debería ser fomentada. Palabras Clave: líder, imitador, calidad, diferenciación del producto y consumidor. Clasificación JEL: L11, L13, L15. : We analyze the effects of an imitating firm on the behavior of the innovating firm. The framework of analysis used is a dynamic duopoly model of vertical product differentiation, where...
In this paper we analyze firms’ ability to tacitly collude on prices in an infinitely repeated du... more In this paper we analyze firms’ ability to tacitly collude on prices in an infinitely repeated duopoly game of vertical product differentiation. We show that firms collude if and only if their discount factor is high enough, i.e. if they value future profits sufficiently. We also show that a lower cost of copying facilitates collusion but that a higher quality of the copy hinders collusion. Thus, the overall effect of these new characteristics of copies made by consumers is ambiguous.
Prague Economic Papers, 2016
In the present paper, we develop a monopoly model of vertical product differentiation for analysi... more In the present paper, we develop a monopoly model of vertical product differentiation for analysing the monopolist's decision about the possibility of versioning goods as substitutes or complements when consumers can buy them simultaneously. In this context, we find that versioning goods as substitutes or complements is optimal for the monopolist if the cost of designing the bundle (the purchase of one unit of each version) is increasing, which implies that making variants of closer substitutes reduces costs. However, if making variants of closer substitutes is costly, the monopolist versions goods as complements only. The final result also depends on the degree of concavity and convexity of the cost function.
Series-Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 2014
In this study, we consider the role of a publicly owned platform and programme quality in the fre... more In this study, we consider the role of a publicly owned platform and programme quality in the free-to-air broadcasting industry. We compare the equilibrium levels of advertising under private and mixed duopoly competition, and show that the connection between programme quality and advertising incentives is drastically different in each scenario. We also consider the welfare implications of our analysis and generate policy implications regarding the optimal level of government intervention in the broadcasting industry. Keywords Quality • Mixed duopoly • Advertising • Media JEL Classification L11 • L33 • L82 • M37 We thank the Co-editor Guillermo Caruana, and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments, and participants at the
@tic. revista d'innovació educativa, 2013
Estimación de la frecuencia de copia entre estudiantes usando una lista aleatorizada* Resumen Las... more Estimación de la frecuencia de copia entre estudiantes usando una lista aleatorizada* Resumen Las recientes reformas educativas han llevado a un aumento de las tareas que los alumnos deben realizar fuera del horario lectivo. En el presente artículo estudiamos la proporción de alumnos que copian dichas tareas. Para ello, utilizamos la técnica de listas aleatorizadas, la cual mejora la fiabilidad de los datos reportados por los estudiantes porque disminuye sus incentivos a mentir. Los resultados obtenidos muestran la capacidad de dicho método para obtener información en este tipo de cuestiones de naturaleza sensible. Encontramos un alto porcentaje de alumnos que copian sus tareas (en torno al 35%), observando que los hombres copian con mayor frecuencia que las mujeres, excepto cuando nos restringimos a los estudiantes mejor formados. Palabras clave: copiar, lista aleatorizada, encuestas, cuestiones sensibles | ARTíCULO Resum Les recents reformes educatives han portat a un augment de les tasques que els alumnes han de realitzar fora de l'horari lectiu. En aquest article estudiem la proporció d'alumnes que copien aquestes tasques. Per això, utilitzem la tècnica de llistes aleatoritzades, la qual millora la fiabilitat de les dades reportades pels estudiants perquè disminueix els seus incentius a mentir. Els resultats obtinguts mostren la capacitat d'aquest mètode per obtenir informació en aquest tipus de qüestions de naturalesa sensible. Trobem un alt percentatge d'alumnes que copien les seues tasques (al voltant del 35%), observant que els homes copien amb més freqüència que les dones, excepte quan ens restringim als estudiants millor formats.
Bulletin of Economic Research, 2012
We analyse the decision of firms about when to launch their products on the market when they prod... more We analyse the decision of firms about when to launch their products on the market when they produce differentiated goods and compete on prices. We find two subgame perfect equilibria: one in which the high‐quality firm holds its leadership in quality, and another in which the low‐quality firm leapfrogs its rival. When the initial level of differentiation is high enough, the low‐quality firm always launches first. Finally, we extend this model to analyse commercial piracy. We obtain that pirates are highly unlikely to launch the illegal copy first because they would bear a higher penalty and a higher risk of being detected.
* I thank my advisor Javier M. López-Cuñat for his helpful guidance and patience. I also thank Ra... more * I thank my advisor Javier M. López-Cuñat for his helpful guidance and patience. I also thank Ramón Faulí-Oller, Joel Sandonís, Nikolaos Georgantzis, Ángel Hernando-Veciana, Luis Úbeda and Thibaud Vergé for their useful comments and suggestions. I began writing this paper while I was visiting the University of Southampton under a Marie Curie Fellowship. The hospitality and financial support obtained are gratefully acknowledged. Finally, I thank the participants at the XXI JEI (Bilbao), ASSET 2005 (Rethymnon), XXX SAE (Murcia) and the seminar participants at the universities of Alicante, Jaume I and Murcia for their comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are alone mine.
In this paper, we analyze the differences in piracy rates from one country to another. Like previ... more In this paper, we analyze the differences in piracy rates from one country to another. Like previous papers on the topic, we find that more developed countries have lower incentives for pirating. Unlike previous papers, we find that the piracy rate is positively correlated with the tax burden rate but negatively correlated with the domestic market size and exports over GDP. We also separate the impacts of education and R&D on piracy, and find two effects with opposite signs. Moreover, we find that those countries with smaller, more efficient bureaucracies are likely to protect intellectual property more effectively. Finally, we show that the spread of access to the Internet is negatively correlated with the software piracy rate.
Journal of Economics, 2013
We consider the role of the endogenous choice of platform quality in a broadcasting duopoly marke... more We consider the role of the endogenous choice of platform quality in a broadcasting duopoly market where competing media platforms choose also their level of advertising. We compare the equilibrium levels of quality, advertising and welfare under private and mixed duopoly competition. We show that the welfare comparison between the private and mixed duopoly regimes depends, crucially, on the interplay between the net direct effect of advertising on welfare and the degree of substitutability between platforms. We also consider the effects on quality and welfare of recent policies tending to eliminate advertising as a way of financing publicly-owned platforms.
In this paper we develop a common agency model to analyze the problem of pirates entering the mar... more In this paper we develop a common agency model to analyze the problem of pirates entering the market, in which the incumbent and the consumers form pressure groups to lobby the government on policies to prevent piracy while the pirates try to avoid being stopped. We show that a monopoly is not an equilibrium when both the incumbent and consumers lobby the government, and that the cost of monitoring commercial piracy is very important in determining (truthful) equilibria, as is the case where there is no lobby competition. However, it is now more difficult getting the pirate to enter the market.
In this paper we analyze the strategic decisions of the government, the incumbent and the pirate ... more In this paper we analyze the strategic decisions of the government, the incumbent and the pirate in a market where the good is piratable. We show that deterred or accommodated piracy can occur in equilibrium, but pure monopoly cannot occur for any anti-piracy policy. We also show that the initial quality differential between the original and the pirated product is essential to explain the effects of an increase in the quality of pirated product on both the level of piracy and the optimal monitoring rate. Assuming a onestage entry process and a sufficiently high quality differential, we prove that the incumbent always prefers to move first and make a credible commitment to a price. However, this is not true with a two-stage entry process.
In this paper we analyze firms' ability to tacitly collude on prices in an infinitely repeated du... more In this paper we analyze firms' ability to tacitly collude on prices in an infinitely repeated duopoly game of vertical product differentiation. We show that firms collude if and only if their discount factor is high enough, i.e. if they value future profits sufficiently. We also show that a lower cost of copying facilitates collusion but that a higher quality of the copy hinders collusion. Thus, the overall effect of these new characteristics of copies made by consumers is ambiguous.
In this note we check the robustness of some results of the model developed by Sanjo (Sanjo, Y. (... more In this note we check the robustness of some results of the model developed by Sanjo (Sanjo, Y. (2009). Bertrand Competition in a Mixed Duopoly Market, The Manchester School, Vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 373–397).