Julien Daubanes - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Julien Daubanes
Social Science Research Network, 2007
In a simple model of resource depletion (isoelastic demand and constant unit extraction cost), we... more In a simple model of resource depletion (isoelastic demand and constant unit extraction cost), we fully characterize the set of linear eciency-inducing tax/subsidy schemes. We show that this set is innite and all the larger as the cost of extraction is low. Depending on the magnitude of the latter, we show that there may exist optimal linear strict taxes, thus allowing the regulator to induce eciency without subsidizing the mine industry at any date. We illustrate and argue that the exhaustibility constraint the monopolist extractor faces can be exploited by the regulator to relax the standard trade-o between inducing eciency and raising revenues from the monopoly.
Social Science Research Network, 2014
CIRANO Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies d... more CIRANO Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Le financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisations-membres, d'une subvention d'infrastructure du Ministère de l'Économie, de l'Innovation et des Exportations, de même que des subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de recherche. CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec Companies Act. Its infrastructure and research activities are funded through fees paid by member organizations, an infrastructure grant from the Ministère de l' l'Économie, de l'Innovation et des Exportations, and grants and research mandates obtained by its research teams.
Canadian Journal of Economics, Aug 1, 2019
There exists no formal treatment of non-renewable resource (NRR) supply, systematically deriving ... more There exists no formal treatment of non-renewable resource (NRR) supply, systematically deriving quantity as function of price. We establish instantaneous restricted (fixed reserves) and unrestricted NRR supply functions. The supply of a NRR at any date and location not only depends on the local contemporary price of the resource but also on prices at all other dates and locations. Besides the usual law of supply, which characterizes the own-price effect, cross-price effects have their own law. They can be decomposed into a substitution effect and a stock compensation effect. We show that the substitution effect always dominates: A price increase at some point in space and time causes NRR supply to decrease at all other points. This new but orthodox supply setting extends to NRRs the partial equilibrium analysis of demand and supply policies. Thereby, it provides a generalization of many results about policy-induced changes on NRR markets. The properties of restricted and unrestricted supply functions are characterized for Hotelling (homogeneous) as well as Ricardian (non homogeneous) reserves, for a single deposit as well as for several deposits that endogenously come into production or cease to be active.
L'Actualité économique, 2019
L'intérêt des marchés internationaux de droits à polluer réside dans leur potentiel à atteindre u... more L'intérêt des marchés internationaux de droits à polluer réside dans leur potentiel à atteindre un objectif de réduction de pollution de manière efficiente. Malheureusement, la tendance des pays participants à taxer localement les biens polluants remet en cause ce potentiel. Nous proposons un modèle permettant d'examiner l'intérêt des pays participant à un marché de droits à polluer à taxer le bien qui génère la pollution. En particulier, cet intérêt dépend de la distribution initiale des droits entre les pays participants. Nous montrons comment les droits doivent être alloués aux différents pays participants de sorte à garantir l'efficience du marché. Ces allocations optimales requièrent de distribuer gratuitement une fraction suffisamment large des droits plutôt que de les mettre aux enchères.
OECD Economics Department working papers, Jul 23, 2018
By Julien Xavier Daubanes OECD Working Papers should not be reported as representing the official... more By Julien Xavier Daubanes OECD Working Papers should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or of its member countries. The opinions expressed and arguments employed are those of the author(s).
Environmental and Resource Economics, Aug 1, 2010
This paper extends the literature on the taxation of polluting exhaustible resources by taking in... more This paper extends the literature on the taxation of polluting exhaustible resources by taking international heterogeneities and national tax-setting into account. We propose a two-country Romer model of endogenous growth in which the South is endowed with the stock of an essential polluting non-renewable resource and world economic growth is driven by a northern research sector. We consider the stock of pollution as affecting global welfare. First, we characterize the optimal environmental taxation policies. Second, we examine the impacts of national taxes. Their time profile determines the extraction path, the dynamics of pollution accumulation and that of world output. Their respective levels entail inter-country interactions by altering the efficiency of the world resource allocation, the tax revenues and the resource rents. We study isolatedly the distortional and distributional effects of local taxes. Then, we completely assess the overall impact of a unilateral tax increase. Finally, we find that, even if heterogeneous countries coordinate their taxation policies to correct the global environmental problem, their divergent strategic interests cause another global, non-environmental distortion in the allocation of the resource.
Economie & prevision, 2009
ABSTRACT To study transfers between oil-consuming developed countries and oil-producing developin... more ABSTRACT To study transfers between oil-consuming developed countries and oil-producing developing countries, we use a dynamic decentralized general-equilibrium model (GEM) with two countries : a rich, altruistic, and resource-poor country (North) and a poor , resource-rich country (South), where resource-owners live alongside impoverished workers. On the one hand, North’s taxation of resource use extracts a portion of South’s mining rents in a distorting manner. On the other hand, North distributes foreign aid to improve the situation of South’s poor. The coexistence of these transfers in opposite directions illustrates the interference between North’s tax and international-aid policies. We analyze the interference and suggest a contractual solution based on coordination between the two sets of policies.
Journal of Public Economics, Jul 1, 2016
Demand for oil is very price inelastic. Facing such demand, an extractive cartel induces the high... more Demand for oil is very price inelastic. Facing such demand, an extractive cartel induces the highest price that does not destroy its demand, unlike the conventional Hotelling analysis: the cartel tolerates ordinary substitutes to its oil but deters high-potential ones. Limit-pricing equilibria of non-renewable-resource markets sharply differ from usual Hotelling outcomes. Resource taxes have no effect on current extraction; extraction may only be reduced by supporting its ordinary substitutes. The carbon tax applies to oil and also penalizes its ordinary (carbon) substitutes, inducing the cartel to increase current oil production. The carbon tax further affects ultimately-abandoned oil reserves ambiguously.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Aug 1, 2012
The "green paradox" literature points out that environmental policies which are anticipated to be... more The "green paradox" literature points out that environmental policies which are anticipated to become gradually more stringent over time may induce a more rapid extraction of fossil fuels, thus having a detrimental effect to the environment. The manifestation of such phenomena has been extensively studied in the case of taxes directly applied to the extraction of a polluting non-renewable resource and of subsidies applied to its nonpolluting substitutes. This paper examines the effects of subsidies to "clean" R&D activities, aimed to improve the productivity of non-polluting substitutes. We borrow standard assumptions from the directed-technical-change literature to take a full account of the private incentives to perform R&D and of the patterns of complementarity/substitutability between dirty resource and clean non-resource sectors. We show that a gradual increase in relative subsidies to clean R&D activities does not have the adverse green paradox effect, which contradicts an earlier made conjecture. Instead, the presence of several R&D sectors implies arbitrages which give rise to other quite paradoxical results. However substitutable or complementary sectors are, and whatever the induced technological bias is, clean-R&D-support policies always enhance the long-run productivity of the resource and thus result in a less rapid extraction.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2010
Economie & prévision, 2009
To study transfers between oil-consuming developed countries and oil-producing developing countri... more To study transfers between oil-consuming developed countries and oil-producing developing countries, we use a dynamic decentralized general-equilibrium model (GEM) with two countries: a rich, altruistic, and resource-poor country (North)and a poor, resource-rich country (South), where resource-owners live alongside impoverished workers. On the one hand,North’s taxation of resource use extracts a portion of South’s mining rents in a distorting manner. On the other hand, North distributes foreign aid to improve the situation of South’s poor. The coexistence of these transfers in opposite directions illustrates the interference between North’s tax and international-aid policies. We analyze the interference and suggest a contractual solution based on coordination between the two sets of policies.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, May 2, 2014
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2009
We study the revenue transfers between a rich oil importing country (North) and a two-class oil e... more We study the revenue transfers between a rich oil importing country (North) and a two-class oil exporting country (South) where rich resource holders coexist with poor workers. On the one hand the North captures some of the South's mining rents with distortional oil taxes. On the other hand the North transfers some of its revenue to the South with foreign aid. We use a dynamic general equilibrium model to illustrate the inefficiency of these simultaneous transfers and we propose a Pareto improving contractual solution.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2009
Julien Daubanes § Toulouse Sciences Economiques (MPSE et LERNA) Cette version, 5 Juillet 2007 * J... more Julien Daubanes § Toulouse Sciences Economiques (MPSE et LERNA) Cette version, 5 Juillet 2007 * Je remercie Jean Tirole et Christian Gollier pour leur conance, Toulouse Sciences Economiques pour son soutien nancier et André Grimaud, Raphaël Levy et François Salanié pour leurs suggestions d'amélioration.
Social Science Research Network, 2021
Since 1977, the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) has been a focal poin... more Since 1977, the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) has been a focal point for research on energy and environmental policy at MIT. CEEPR promotes rigorous, objective research for improved decision making in government and the private sector, and secures the relevance of its work through close cooperation with industry partners from around the globe. Drawing on the unparalleled resources available at MIT, affiliated faculty and research staff as well as international research associates contribute to the empirical study of a wide range of policy issues related to energy supply, energy demand, and the environment. An important dissemination channel for these research efforts is the MIT CEEPR Working Paper series. CEEPR releases Working Papers written by researchers from MIT and other academic institutions in order to enable timely consideration and reaction to energy and environmental policy research, but does not conduct a selection process or peer review prior to posting. CEEPR's posting of a Working Paper, therefore, does not constitute an endorsement of the accuracy or merit of the Working Paper. If you have questions about a particular Working Paper, please contact the authors or their home institutions.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Aug 1, 2006
We construct a North-South Romer model of endogenous growth in which the South is endowed with th... more We construct a North-South Romer model of endogenous growth in which the South is endowed with the entire stock of an essential polluting non-renewable resource and in which world economic growth is driven by a northern research sector. We consider the stock of pollution as representing the greenhouse eect, thus inuencing global welfare. We rst solve the optimum allocation. Then, we characterize the optimal policy in equilibrium. Next, we examine the eects of the time-prole and the levels of environmental taxes. The time-prole of the tax determines when the resource is extracted and thus the growth rate of world output. The tax levels determine the magnitude of world production, the location of this production and both northern and southern consumption levels. We show that the tax levels aect the eciency of the global economy through relocation, while also affecting the split of total production between North and South through both relocation and rent extraction. Finally, we completely assess the eects of an increase in the northern environmental tax level depending on both northern and southern initial environmental tax levels. In particular, we study the northern tax's impacts in the region of the scal competition equilibrium.
Resource and Energy Economics, Jun 1, 2023
Social Science Research Network, 2013
We analyze the consequences of activism in a regulated industry where the regulator has been capt... more We analyze the consequences of activism in a regulated industry where the regulator has been captured by the industry. Unlike ordinary economic agents, activists are insensitive to monetary incentives. Moreover, they are less well informed than regulators and their actions generate dead-weight costs. Yet we find that activism may increase social welfare because it disciplines captured regulators and reduces the social cost of imperfect regulatory systems.
Social Science Research Network, 2021
Most developed countries will be facing severe public budget constraints. We derive a formula for... more Most developed countries will be facing severe public budget constraints. We derive a formula for how extraction or use of nonrenewable resources should be taxed when governments need to collect commodity tax revenues. Moreover, we show how it can be directly used to indicate how carbon taxation should be increased in the presence of public-revenue needs. The obtained tax is an augmented, dynamic version of the standard Ramsey taxation rule. It distorts developed reserves, which are reduced, and their depletion, which is slowed down, going further in the direction prescribed for the resolution of the climate externality. We present a simple calibrated application of our results to illustrate how the carbon taxation of oil should be augmented, and the incidence on oil use and tax revenues.
Social Science Research Network, 2007
In a simple model of resource depletion (isoelastic demand and constant unit extraction cost), we... more In a simple model of resource depletion (isoelastic demand and constant unit extraction cost), we fully characterize the set of linear eciency-inducing tax/subsidy schemes. We show that this set is innite and all the larger as the cost of extraction is low. Depending on the magnitude of the latter, we show that there may exist optimal linear strict taxes, thus allowing the regulator to induce eciency without subsidizing the mine industry at any date. We illustrate and argue that the exhaustibility constraint the monopolist extractor faces can be exploited by the regulator to relax the standard trade-o between inducing eciency and raising revenues from the monopoly.
Social Science Research Network, 2014
CIRANO Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies d... more CIRANO Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Le financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisations-membres, d'une subvention d'infrastructure du Ministère de l'Économie, de l'Innovation et des Exportations, de même que des subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de recherche. CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec Companies Act. Its infrastructure and research activities are funded through fees paid by member organizations, an infrastructure grant from the Ministère de l' l'Économie, de l'Innovation et des Exportations, and grants and research mandates obtained by its research teams.
Canadian Journal of Economics, Aug 1, 2019
There exists no formal treatment of non-renewable resource (NRR) supply, systematically deriving ... more There exists no formal treatment of non-renewable resource (NRR) supply, systematically deriving quantity as function of price. We establish instantaneous restricted (fixed reserves) and unrestricted NRR supply functions. The supply of a NRR at any date and location not only depends on the local contemporary price of the resource but also on prices at all other dates and locations. Besides the usual law of supply, which characterizes the own-price effect, cross-price effects have their own law. They can be decomposed into a substitution effect and a stock compensation effect. We show that the substitution effect always dominates: A price increase at some point in space and time causes NRR supply to decrease at all other points. This new but orthodox supply setting extends to NRRs the partial equilibrium analysis of demand and supply policies. Thereby, it provides a generalization of many results about policy-induced changes on NRR markets. The properties of restricted and unrestricted supply functions are characterized for Hotelling (homogeneous) as well as Ricardian (non homogeneous) reserves, for a single deposit as well as for several deposits that endogenously come into production or cease to be active.
L'Actualité économique, 2019
L'intérêt des marchés internationaux de droits à polluer réside dans leur potentiel à atteindre u... more L'intérêt des marchés internationaux de droits à polluer réside dans leur potentiel à atteindre un objectif de réduction de pollution de manière efficiente. Malheureusement, la tendance des pays participants à taxer localement les biens polluants remet en cause ce potentiel. Nous proposons un modèle permettant d'examiner l'intérêt des pays participant à un marché de droits à polluer à taxer le bien qui génère la pollution. En particulier, cet intérêt dépend de la distribution initiale des droits entre les pays participants. Nous montrons comment les droits doivent être alloués aux différents pays participants de sorte à garantir l'efficience du marché. Ces allocations optimales requièrent de distribuer gratuitement une fraction suffisamment large des droits plutôt que de les mettre aux enchères.
OECD Economics Department working papers, Jul 23, 2018
By Julien Xavier Daubanes OECD Working Papers should not be reported as representing the official... more By Julien Xavier Daubanes OECD Working Papers should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or of its member countries. The opinions expressed and arguments employed are those of the author(s).
Environmental and Resource Economics, Aug 1, 2010
This paper extends the literature on the taxation of polluting exhaustible resources by taking in... more This paper extends the literature on the taxation of polluting exhaustible resources by taking international heterogeneities and national tax-setting into account. We propose a two-country Romer model of endogenous growth in which the South is endowed with the stock of an essential polluting non-renewable resource and world economic growth is driven by a northern research sector. We consider the stock of pollution as affecting global welfare. First, we characterize the optimal environmental taxation policies. Second, we examine the impacts of national taxes. Their time profile determines the extraction path, the dynamics of pollution accumulation and that of world output. Their respective levels entail inter-country interactions by altering the efficiency of the world resource allocation, the tax revenues and the resource rents. We study isolatedly the distortional and distributional effects of local taxes. Then, we completely assess the overall impact of a unilateral tax increase. Finally, we find that, even if heterogeneous countries coordinate their taxation policies to correct the global environmental problem, their divergent strategic interests cause another global, non-environmental distortion in the allocation of the resource.
Economie & prevision, 2009
ABSTRACT To study transfers between oil-consuming developed countries and oil-producing developin... more ABSTRACT To study transfers between oil-consuming developed countries and oil-producing developing countries, we use a dynamic decentralized general-equilibrium model (GEM) with two countries : a rich, altruistic, and resource-poor country (North) and a poor , resource-rich country (South), where resource-owners live alongside impoverished workers. On the one hand, North’s taxation of resource use extracts a portion of South’s mining rents in a distorting manner. On the other hand, North distributes foreign aid to improve the situation of South’s poor. The coexistence of these transfers in opposite directions illustrates the interference between North’s tax and international-aid policies. We analyze the interference and suggest a contractual solution based on coordination between the two sets of policies.
Journal of Public Economics, Jul 1, 2016
Demand for oil is very price inelastic. Facing such demand, an extractive cartel induces the high... more Demand for oil is very price inelastic. Facing such demand, an extractive cartel induces the highest price that does not destroy its demand, unlike the conventional Hotelling analysis: the cartel tolerates ordinary substitutes to its oil but deters high-potential ones. Limit-pricing equilibria of non-renewable-resource markets sharply differ from usual Hotelling outcomes. Resource taxes have no effect on current extraction; extraction may only be reduced by supporting its ordinary substitutes. The carbon tax applies to oil and also penalizes its ordinary (carbon) substitutes, inducing the cartel to increase current oil production. The carbon tax further affects ultimately-abandoned oil reserves ambiguously.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Aug 1, 2012
The "green paradox" literature points out that environmental policies which are anticipated to be... more The "green paradox" literature points out that environmental policies which are anticipated to become gradually more stringent over time may induce a more rapid extraction of fossil fuels, thus having a detrimental effect to the environment. The manifestation of such phenomena has been extensively studied in the case of taxes directly applied to the extraction of a polluting non-renewable resource and of subsidies applied to its nonpolluting substitutes. This paper examines the effects of subsidies to "clean" R&D activities, aimed to improve the productivity of non-polluting substitutes. We borrow standard assumptions from the directed-technical-change literature to take a full account of the private incentives to perform R&D and of the patterns of complementarity/substitutability between dirty resource and clean non-resource sectors. We show that a gradual increase in relative subsidies to clean R&D activities does not have the adverse green paradox effect, which contradicts an earlier made conjecture. Instead, the presence of several R&D sectors implies arbitrages which give rise to other quite paradoxical results. However substitutable or complementary sectors are, and whatever the induced technological bias is, clean-R&D-support policies always enhance the long-run productivity of the resource and thus result in a less rapid extraction.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2010
Economie & prévision, 2009
To study transfers between oil-consuming developed countries and oil-producing developing countri... more To study transfers between oil-consuming developed countries and oil-producing developing countries, we use a dynamic decentralized general-equilibrium model (GEM) with two countries: a rich, altruistic, and resource-poor country (North)and a poor, resource-rich country (South), where resource-owners live alongside impoverished workers. On the one hand,North’s taxation of resource use extracts a portion of South’s mining rents in a distorting manner. On the other hand, North distributes foreign aid to improve the situation of South’s poor. The coexistence of these transfers in opposite directions illustrates the interference between North’s tax and international-aid policies. We analyze the interference and suggest a contractual solution based on coordination between the two sets of policies.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, May 2, 2014
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2009
We study the revenue transfers between a rich oil importing country (North) and a two-class oil e... more We study the revenue transfers between a rich oil importing country (North) and a two-class oil exporting country (South) where rich resource holders coexist with poor workers. On the one hand the North captures some of the South's mining rents with distortional oil taxes. On the other hand the North transfers some of its revenue to the South with foreign aid. We use a dynamic general equilibrium model to illustrate the inefficiency of these simultaneous transfers and we propose a Pareto improving contractual solution.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2009
Julien Daubanes § Toulouse Sciences Economiques (MPSE et LERNA) Cette version, 5 Juillet 2007 * J... more Julien Daubanes § Toulouse Sciences Economiques (MPSE et LERNA) Cette version, 5 Juillet 2007 * Je remercie Jean Tirole et Christian Gollier pour leur conance, Toulouse Sciences Economiques pour son soutien nancier et André Grimaud, Raphaël Levy et François Salanié pour leurs suggestions d'amélioration.
Social Science Research Network, 2021
Since 1977, the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) has been a focal poin... more Since 1977, the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) has been a focal point for research on energy and environmental policy at MIT. CEEPR promotes rigorous, objective research for improved decision making in government and the private sector, and secures the relevance of its work through close cooperation with industry partners from around the globe. Drawing on the unparalleled resources available at MIT, affiliated faculty and research staff as well as international research associates contribute to the empirical study of a wide range of policy issues related to energy supply, energy demand, and the environment. An important dissemination channel for these research efforts is the MIT CEEPR Working Paper series. CEEPR releases Working Papers written by researchers from MIT and other academic institutions in order to enable timely consideration and reaction to energy and environmental policy research, but does not conduct a selection process or peer review prior to posting. CEEPR's posting of a Working Paper, therefore, does not constitute an endorsement of the accuracy or merit of the Working Paper. If you have questions about a particular Working Paper, please contact the authors or their home institutions.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Aug 1, 2006
We construct a North-South Romer model of endogenous growth in which the South is endowed with th... more We construct a North-South Romer model of endogenous growth in which the South is endowed with the entire stock of an essential polluting non-renewable resource and in which world economic growth is driven by a northern research sector. We consider the stock of pollution as representing the greenhouse eect, thus inuencing global welfare. We rst solve the optimum allocation. Then, we characterize the optimal policy in equilibrium. Next, we examine the eects of the time-prole and the levels of environmental taxes. The time-prole of the tax determines when the resource is extracted and thus the growth rate of world output. The tax levels determine the magnitude of world production, the location of this production and both northern and southern consumption levels. We show that the tax levels aect the eciency of the global economy through relocation, while also affecting the split of total production between North and South through both relocation and rent extraction. Finally, we completely assess the eects of an increase in the northern environmental tax level depending on both northern and southern initial environmental tax levels. In particular, we study the northern tax's impacts in the region of the scal competition equilibrium.
Resource and Energy Economics, Jun 1, 2023
Social Science Research Network, 2013
We analyze the consequences of activism in a regulated industry where the regulator has been capt... more We analyze the consequences of activism in a regulated industry where the regulator has been captured by the industry. Unlike ordinary economic agents, activists are insensitive to monetary incentives. Moreover, they are less well informed than regulators and their actions generate dead-weight costs. Yet we find that activism may increase social welfare because it disciplines captured regulators and reduces the social cost of imperfect regulatory systems.
Social Science Research Network, 2021
Most developed countries will be facing severe public budget constraints. We derive a formula for... more Most developed countries will be facing severe public budget constraints. We derive a formula for how extraction or use of nonrenewable resources should be taxed when governments need to collect commodity tax revenues. Moreover, we show how it can be directly used to indicate how carbon taxation should be increased in the presence of public-revenue needs. The obtained tax is an augmented, dynamic version of the standard Ramsey taxation rule. It distorts developed reserves, which are reduced, and their depletion, which is slowed down, going further in the direction prescribed for the resolution of the climate externality. We present a simple calibrated application of our results to illustrate how the carbon taxation of oil should be augmented, and the incidence on oil use and tax revenues.