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Books by Massimiliano Vignolo

La logica modale è nata per studiare i ragionamenti su ciò che è possibile e ciò che è necessario... more La logica modale è nata per studiare i ragionamenti su ciò che è possibile e ciò che è necessario. Negli ultimi decenni, a partire dal lavoro di logici e filosofi quali Rudolf Carnap, Saul Kripke e David Lewis, la sua applicazione è stata progressivamente estesa ad altri ambiti, quali il ragionamento sul tempo, sulla conoscenza e sui sistemi di norme. Queste ricerche hanno condotto a un complesso e intrigante dialogo con alcune fondamentali branche della filosofia: la metafisica, l’epistemologia, la filosofia del linguaggio. Lo scopo del volume è offrire una panoramica di questo dialogo al contempo accessibile e rigorosa, pensata sia per gli studenti di un corso universitario, sia per il lettore non specialista. Se da un lato tutte le necessarie nozioni tecniche sono rese accessibili ai non addetti ai lavori, dall'altro si restituisce un'immagine fedele delle sfide concettuali che la ricerca in questi settori è oggi chiamata ad affrontare.

Papers by Massimiliano Vignolo

VIII Congresso Nazionale della Società Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio, 2002

Formal Ontology in Information Systems, Jul 29, 2010

Grazer Philosophische Studien, Aug 12, 2010

Metaphysical and epistemological considerations make some kinds of facts—eg moral facts, aestheti... more Metaphysical and epistemological considerations make some kinds of facts—eg moral facts, aesthetic facts, modal facts, mathematical facts— appear weird and problematic to some philosophers. As a result, those phi-losophers attempt to avoid commitment to such facts. ...

I will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptnes... more I will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness is consistent with a version of dežationsim. My line of argument assumes the use conception of meaning. is brings out an interesting consequence sincemostly the philosophers who endorse the use conception ofmeaning, e.g. Paul Horwich, hold that dežationism is inconsistent with the strategy of implementing non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness and thereby urge a reformulation of non-factualism

In Overlooking Conventions Michael Devitt argues in defence of the traditional approach to semant... more In Overlooking Conventions Michael Devitt argues in defence of the traditional approach to semantics. Devitt\u2019s main line of argument is an inference to the best explanation: nearly all cases that linguistic pragmatists discuss in order to challenge the traditional approach to semantics are better explained by adding conventions into language, in the form of expanding the range of polysemy or the range of indexicality (in the broad sense of linguistically governed context sensitivity). In this paper, we discuss three aspects of a draft of Devitt\u2019s Overlooking Conventions, which was discussed at a conference in Dubrovnik in September 2018. First, we try to show that his rejection of Bach\u2019s distinction between convention and standardization overlooks important features of standardization. Second, we elaborate on Devitt\u2019s argument against linguistic pragmatism based on the normative aspect of meaning and show that a similar argument can be mounted against semantic mi...

Polimetrica International Scientific Publisher, 2006

Abstract. I argue that the Tarski-like definition of truth in L suffices to establish truth as a ... more Abstract. I argue that the Tarski-like definition of truth in L suffices to establish truth as a genuine property. I defend the Tarski-like definition against (i) the modal objection (Soames 1984; Etchmendy 1988; Putnam 1994),(ii) the explanatory force objection (Field 1972),(iii) ...

In the rule-following considerations Kripke’s Wittgenstein raises the objection that dispositions... more In the rule-following considerations Kripke’s Wittgenstein raises the objection that dispositions cannot be the appropriate base for a reduction of meaning properties since they are finite, while meanings have an infinitary character. The objection charges any dispositionalist theory of meaning with indeterminacy. Paul Horwich (1995) has attempted a defence of dispositionalism pointing out that the argument for indeterminacy presupposes an inflationary conception of truth-theoretic notions. In his view a deflationary approach to truth-theoretic notions helps elude the sceptical conclusion. Alexander Miller (2000) has reacted to Horwich’s attempt and maintained that the distinction between inflationism and deflationism does not play any substantial role in the anti-dispositionalism argument. I agree with Miller on this point, nevertheless I argue that Miller’s criticism of Horwich’s defence of dispositionalism is question begging against the conception of meaning that Horwich espouses.

Vittorio Villa (2010) argues that the pragmatist view in semantics is the one that is suitable fo... more Vittorio Villa (2010) argues that the pragmatist view in semantics is the one that is suitable for contemporary theories of legal interpretation that accord a constitutive role to the notion of interpretation. In this critical note I raise two difficulties in Villa\u2019s theory, not from a point of view internal to the debate among legal theories but from that point of view of the philosophy of language. The first difficulty concerns whether illocutionary acts (and propositional attitudes) can be ascribed to legislators. The second difficulty concerns the kind of attitude that relates legislators, who lay down legal dispositions, and jurists, judges and public officers, who create legal norms by interpreting legal dispositions. The difficulties I raise are not meant to be knockdown arguments but evidence that some aspects in Villa\u2019s theory still need to be worked out. Finally, I consider the possibility that another theory in semantics\u2014semantic relativism\u2014is the one ...

Synthese

One recurrent objection against minimalism is that minimal contents have no theoretical role. It ... more One recurrent objection against minimalism is that minimal contents have no theoretical role. It has recently been argued that minimal contents serve to draw the distinction between lying and misleading. In Sect. 1 and Sect. 2 I summarise the main argument in support of that claim and contend that it is inconclusive. In Sect. 3 I discuss some cases of lying and some of misleading that raise difficulties for minimalism. In Sect. 4 I make a diagnosis of the failure of minimalism with those cases. In Sect. 5 I strengthen the case against minimal contents by addressing two received says-based definitions of lying. My analysis of the failure of minimalism suggests that the distinction between lying and misleading, at least in some important cases, calls for a kind of utterance content that is grounded on conventions of language.

La logica modale è nata per studiare i ragionamenti su ciò che è possibile e ciò che è necessario... more La logica modale è nata per studiare i ragionamenti su ciò che è possibile e ciò che è necessario. Negli ultimi decenni, a partire dal lavoro di logici e filosofi quali Rudolf Carnap, Saul Kripke e David Lewis, la sua applicazione è stata progressivamente estesa ad altri ambiti, quali il ragionamento sul tempo, sulla conoscenza e sui sistemi di norme. Queste ricerche hanno condotto a un complesso e intrigante dialogo con alcune fondamentali branche della filosofia: la metafisica, l’epistemologia, la filosofia del linguaggio. Lo scopo del volume è offrire una panoramica di questo dialogo al contempo accessibile e rigorosa, pensata sia per gli studenti di un corso universitario, sia per il lettore non specialista. Se da un lato tutte le necessarie nozioni tecniche sono rese accessibili ai non addetti ai lavori, dall'altro si restituisce un'immagine fedele delle sfide concettuali che la ricerca in questi settori è oggi chiamata ad affrontare.

VIII Congresso Nazionale della Società Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio, 2002

Formal Ontology in Information Systems, Jul 29, 2010

Grazer Philosophische Studien, Aug 12, 2010

Metaphysical and epistemological considerations make some kinds of facts—eg moral facts, aestheti... more Metaphysical and epistemological considerations make some kinds of facts—eg moral facts, aesthetic facts, modal facts, mathematical facts— appear weird and problematic to some philosophers. As a result, those phi-losophers attempt to avoid commitment to such facts. ...

I will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptnes... more I will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness is consistent with a version of dežationsim. My line of argument assumes the use conception of meaning. is brings out an interesting consequence sincemostly the philosophers who endorse the use conception ofmeaning, e.g. Paul Horwich, hold that dežationism is inconsistent with the strategy of implementing non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness and thereby urge a reformulation of non-factualism

In Overlooking Conventions Michael Devitt argues in defence of the traditional approach to semant... more In Overlooking Conventions Michael Devitt argues in defence of the traditional approach to semantics. Devitt\u2019s main line of argument is an inference to the best explanation: nearly all cases that linguistic pragmatists discuss in order to challenge the traditional approach to semantics are better explained by adding conventions into language, in the form of expanding the range of polysemy or the range of indexicality (in the broad sense of linguistically governed context sensitivity). In this paper, we discuss three aspects of a draft of Devitt\u2019s Overlooking Conventions, which was discussed at a conference in Dubrovnik in September 2018. First, we try to show that his rejection of Bach\u2019s distinction between convention and standardization overlooks important features of standardization. Second, we elaborate on Devitt\u2019s argument against linguistic pragmatism based on the normative aspect of meaning and show that a similar argument can be mounted against semantic mi...

Polimetrica International Scientific Publisher, 2006

Abstract. I argue that the Tarski-like definition of truth in L suffices to establish truth as a ... more Abstract. I argue that the Tarski-like definition of truth in L suffices to establish truth as a genuine property. I defend the Tarski-like definition against (i) the modal objection (Soames 1984; Etchmendy 1988; Putnam 1994),(ii) the explanatory force objection (Field 1972),(iii) ...

In the rule-following considerations Kripke’s Wittgenstein raises the objection that dispositions... more In the rule-following considerations Kripke’s Wittgenstein raises the objection that dispositions cannot be the appropriate base for a reduction of meaning properties since they are finite, while meanings have an infinitary character. The objection charges any dispositionalist theory of meaning with indeterminacy. Paul Horwich (1995) has attempted a defence of dispositionalism pointing out that the argument for indeterminacy presupposes an inflationary conception of truth-theoretic notions. In his view a deflationary approach to truth-theoretic notions helps elude the sceptical conclusion. Alexander Miller (2000) has reacted to Horwich’s attempt and maintained that the distinction between inflationism and deflationism does not play any substantial role in the anti-dispositionalism argument. I agree with Miller on this point, nevertheless I argue that Miller’s criticism of Horwich’s defence of dispositionalism is question begging against the conception of meaning that Horwich espouses.

Vittorio Villa (2010) argues that the pragmatist view in semantics is the one that is suitable fo... more Vittorio Villa (2010) argues that the pragmatist view in semantics is the one that is suitable for contemporary theories of legal interpretation that accord a constitutive role to the notion of interpretation. In this critical note I raise two difficulties in Villa\u2019s theory, not from a point of view internal to the debate among legal theories but from that point of view of the philosophy of language. The first difficulty concerns whether illocutionary acts (and propositional attitudes) can be ascribed to legislators. The second difficulty concerns the kind of attitude that relates legislators, who lay down legal dispositions, and jurists, judges and public officers, who create legal norms by interpreting legal dispositions. The difficulties I raise are not meant to be knockdown arguments but evidence that some aspects in Villa\u2019s theory still need to be worked out. Finally, I consider the possibility that another theory in semantics\u2014semantic relativism\u2014is the one ...

Synthese

One recurrent objection against minimalism is that minimal contents have no theoretical role. It ... more One recurrent objection against minimalism is that minimal contents have no theoretical role. It has recently been argued that minimal contents serve to draw the distinction between lying and misleading. In Sect. 1 and Sect. 2 I summarise the main argument in support of that claim and contend that it is inconclusive. In Sect. 3 I discuss some cases of lying and some of misleading that raise difficulties for minimalism. In Sect. 4 I make a diagnosis of the failure of minimalism with those cases. In Sect. 5 I strengthen the case against minimal contents by addressing two received says-based definitions of lying. My analysis of the failure of minimalism suggests that the distinction between lying and misleading, at least in some important cases, calls for a kind of utterance content that is grounded on conventions of language.

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2021

Since Machery et al. Cognition 92, B1-B12 (2004) attacked Kripke’s refutation of classical descri... more Since Machery et al. Cognition 92, B1-B12 (2004) attacked Kripke’s refutation of classical descriptivism, their experiment has been repeated several times, in its original version or in some revised ones, by theorists with contrasting intents. Some repeated the experiment for confirming its results, others for proving them unreliable. One striking characteristic of those surveys is that they mostly replicated the data collected in Machery et al.’s Cognition 92, B1-B12, 2004 experiment: less than 60% of Westerners showed preference for the causal-historical response. We side with the critics of Machery et al.’s experiment. In this paper, we present the results of a survey that tests some hypotheses for explaining that percentage of Westerners’ preferences without taking it as evidence that more than 40% of Westerners have descriptivist intuitions on semantic reference. The aim of our paper is not merely to question the reliability of Machery et al.’s experiment. In sections 4 and 5 w...