Vicente Medina - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Vicente Medina
I would like to express my gratitude to Professors Irfan Khawaja, Graham Parsons, and Theresa Fan... more I would like to express my gratitude to Professors Irfan Khawaja, Graham Parsons, and Theresa Fanelli for having read my work and for offering illuminating suggestions, comments and criticisms from which I have learned quite a bit. Irfan deserves special recognition for having taken the lead in organizing this event. I am also grateful to the dean of Arts and Sciences, Professor George Abaunza, and members of the administration and faculty who have made this event possible.
The polemic was an important cultural event in 19th-century Cuba. From 1838 to 1840, issues of me... more The polemic was an important cultural event in 19th-century Cuba. From 1838 to 1840, issues of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, pedagogy, and the influence of Victor Cousin's eclecticism were discussed in the island's leading newspapers. A brief historical account preceding the polemic is offered. I argue that the predominant view of the polemic, which is motivated by a widespread desire for Cuba's independence from Spain, is misleading in its promotion of an emancipatory myth. Lastly, I argue that José de la Luz y Caballero's appeal to patriotism during the polemic unwittingly established a dangerous precedent for self-appointed guardians of patriotism to condition public debates. Resumen en español La polémica fue un importante evento cultural durante el siglo diecinueve en Cuba. Entre 1838 a 1840 se debatieron en los principales periódicos de la isla temas en torno a la metafísica, la epistemología, la ética, la pedagogía y la influencia del eclecticismo de Víctor Cousin. Narro brevemente algunos de los hechos históricos que antecedieron esta polémica. Sostengo que es inexacta la interpretación predominante que esta polémica fue motivada por el deseo de independizar a Cuba de España. Tal interpretación promueve un mito de emancipación. Según mi análisis, cuando en su intervención en la polémica José de la Luz y Caballero apela al patriotismo, establece sin saberlo un precedente peligroso que usarán los autodenominados protectores del patriotismo para restringir los debates públicos. Resumo em português A polêmica foi um importante evento cultural durante o século dezenove em Cuba. Entre 1838 e 1840 se debateram nos principais jornais da ilha temas em torno da metafísica, a epistemologia, a ética, a pedagogia e a influência do eclecticismo de Víctor Cousin. Narro brevemente alguns dos fatos históricos que antecederam esta polêmica. Sustenho que é inexacta a interpretação predominante que esta polêmica foi motivada por o desejo de dissociar a Cuba da Espanha. Tal interpretação promove um mito de emancipação. Segundo meu análise, quando em sua intervencão na polêmica José de la Luz y Caballero apela ao patriotismo, establece sim saber um precedente perigoso que usarão os autodenominados protetores do patriotismo para restringir os debates públicos.
Choice Reviews Online, 1991
Books, images, historic newspapers, maps, archives and more. Social Contract Theories: Political ... more Books, images, historic newspapers, maps, archives and more. Social Contract Theories: Political Obligation or Anarchy? Studies. Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and-Core The Political Theory of Anarchism-DiText there is no single generic item known as social contract theory in this regard,. giving rise to obligations of justice. all living ethical anarchists, confronted with such a of the initial contractors is irrelevant to present-tense political discussion.
In this article, it is argued that a significant internal tension exists in John Rawls' political... more In this article, it is argued that a significant internal tension exists in John Rawls' political liberalism. He holds the following positions that might plausibly be considered incongruous: (1) a commitment to tolerating a broad right of freedom of political speech, including a right of subversive advocacy; (2) a commitment to restricting this broad right if it is intended to incite and likely to bring about imminent violence; and (3) a commitment to curbing this broad right only if there is a constitutional crisis. By supporting a broad right of freedom of political speech in Political Liberalism, he allows militant intolerant people such as Jihadists, White Supremacists and Neo-Nazis to advocate publicly their dangerously intolerant beliefs. Public advocacy of dangerously intolerant beliefs can be construed as subversive advocacy. As demonstrated by the historical examples of the Weimar Republic and the Second Spanish Republic, militant intolerant groups could use a right of subversive advocacy to threaten the stability of liberal democracies. Hence, by allowing them to exercise a broad right of freedom of political speech, Rawls could jeopardize that which he intends to defend, namely the actual political stability of a liberal democratic order. Lastly, Rawls' conception of ideal constitutional interpretation, which privileges a broad right of freedom of political speech, might be insufficient to deal effectively with the threat posed by militant intolerant groups. Yet a tradition of American constitutional interpretation that balances freedom of speech with other important constitutional and/or political values has overcome a civil war, two world wars, the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks without abandoning democracy or permanently renouncing those values. Still, Rawls' ideal approach to constitutional interpretation might, in hindsight, help us to understand some of the excesses and deficiencies of American jurisprudence in times of emergency. My argument in this article is divided into three parts. In the first part, I explain the notion of militant intolerant people and how they can be viewed as holding politically unreasonable beliefs. By virtue of holding these beliefs, they might challenge the stability of John Rawls' political liberalism, which depends on three commitments that might plausibly be considered incongruous: a commitment to tolerating a broad right of freedom of political speech, including a right of subversive advocacy; a commitment to restricting this right if it is intended to incite and is likely to bring about imminent violence; and a commitment to curbing this right only if there is a constitutional crisis. In the second part, I contend that while he argues for a broad right of freedom of political speech, he also allows for restricting it when its exercise is intended to incite and likely to bring about imminent violence. By allowing such restriction, he could be seen as intolerant, and hence, in the eyes of militant intolerant people, his toleration could be seen as a sham. But that need not be so. His intolerance can be seen as politically reasonable because he argues for the stability of a political order that in principle could protect the security of all citizens-tolerant and intolerant alike. Still, in the third and last part, I argue that his view of ideal constitutional interpretation, which privileges a broad right of freedom of political speech that can be curbed only if
I would like to express my gratitude to Professors Irfan Khawaja, Graham Parsons, and Theresa Fan... more I would like to express my gratitude to Professors Irfan Khawaja, Graham Parsons, and Theresa Fanelli for having read my work and for offering illuminating suggestions, comments and criticisms from which I have learned quite a bit. Irfan deserves special recognition for having taken the lead in organizing this event. I am also grateful to the dean of Arts and Sciences, Professor George Abaunza, and members of the administration and faculty who have made this event possible.
The polemic was an important cultural event in 19th-century Cuba. From 1838 to 1840, issues of me... more The polemic was an important cultural event in 19th-century Cuba. From 1838 to 1840, issues of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, pedagogy, and the influence of Victor Cousin's eclecticism were discussed in the island's leading newspapers. A brief historical account preceding the polemic is offered. I argue that the predominant view of the polemic, which is motivated by a widespread desire for Cuba's independence from Spain, is misleading in its promotion of an emancipatory myth. Lastly, I argue that José de la Luz y Caballero's appeal to patriotism during the polemic unwittingly established a dangerous precedent for self-appointed guardians of patriotism to condition public debates. Resumen en español La polémica fue un importante evento cultural durante el siglo diecinueve en Cuba. Entre 1838 a 1840 se debatieron en los principales periódicos de la isla temas en torno a la metafísica, la epistemología, la ética, la pedagogía y la influencia del eclecticismo de Víctor Cousin. Narro brevemente algunos de los hechos históricos que antecedieron esta polémica. Sostengo que es inexacta la interpretación predominante que esta polémica fue motivada por el deseo de independizar a Cuba de España. Tal interpretación promueve un mito de emancipación. Según mi análisis, cuando en su intervención en la polémica José de la Luz y Caballero apela al patriotismo, establece sin saberlo un precedente peligroso que usarán los autodenominados protectores del patriotismo para restringir los debates públicos. Resumo em português A polêmica foi um importante evento cultural durante o século dezenove em Cuba. Entre 1838 e 1840 se debateram nos principais jornais da ilha temas em torno da metafísica, a epistemologia, a ética, a pedagogia e a influência do eclecticismo de Víctor Cousin. Narro brevemente alguns dos fatos históricos que antecederam esta polêmica. Sustenho que é inexacta a interpretação predominante que esta polêmica foi motivada por o desejo de dissociar a Cuba da Espanha. Tal interpretação promove um mito de emancipação. Segundo meu análise, quando em sua intervencão na polêmica José de la Luz y Caballero apela ao patriotismo, establece sim saber um precedente perigoso que usarão os autodenominados protetores do patriotismo para restringir os debates públicos.
Choice Reviews Online, 1991
Books, images, historic newspapers, maps, archives and more. Social Contract Theories: Political ... more Books, images, historic newspapers, maps, archives and more. Social Contract Theories: Political Obligation or Anarchy? Studies. Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and-Core The Political Theory of Anarchism-DiText there is no single generic item known as social contract theory in this regard,. giving rise to obligations of justice. all living ethical anarchists, confronted with such a of the initial contractors is irrelevant to present-tense political discussion.
In this article, it is argued that a significant internal tension exists in John Rawls' political... more In this article, it is argued that a significant internal tension exists in John Rawls' political liberalism. He holds the following positions that might plausibly be considered incongruous: (1) a commitment to tolerating a broad right of freedom of political speech, including a right of subversive advocacy; (2) a commitment to restricting this broad right if it is intended to incite and likely to bring about imminent violence; and (3) a commitment to curbing this broad right only if there is a constitutional crisis. By supporting a broad right of freedom of political speech in Political Liberalism, he allows militant intolerant people such as Jihadists, White Supremacists and Neo-Nazis to advocate publicly their dangerously intolerant beliefs. Public advocacy of dangerously intolerant beliefs can be construed as subversive advocacy. As demonstrated by the historical examples of the Weimar Republic and the Second Spanish Republic, militant intolerant groups could use a right of subversive advocacy to threaten the stability of liberal democracies. Hence, by allowing them to exercise a broad right of freedom of political speech, Rawls could jeopardize that which he intends to defend, namely the actual political stability of a liberal democratic order. Lastly, Rawls' conception of ideal constitutional interpretation, which privileges a broad right of freedom of political speech, might be insufficient to deal effectively with the threat posed by militant intolerant groups. Yet a tradition of American constitutional interpretation that balances freedom of speech with other important constitutional and/or political values has overcome a civil war, two world wars, the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks without abandoning democracy or permanently renouncing those values. Still, Rawls' ideal approach to constitutional interpretation might, in hindsight, help us to understand some of the excesses and deficiencies of American jurisprudence in times of emergency. My argument in this article is divided into three parts. In the first part, I explain the notion of militant intolerant people and how they can be viewed as holding politically unreasonable beliefs. By virtue of holding these beliefs, they might challenge the stability of John Rawls' political liberalism, which depends on three commitments that might plausibly be considered incongruous: a commitment to tolerating a broad right of freedom of political speech, including a right of subversive advocacy; a commitment to restricting this right if it is intended to incite and is likely to bring about imminent violence; and a commitment to curbing this right only if there is a constitutional crisis. In the second part, I contend that while he argues for a broad right of freedom of political speech, he also allows for restricting it when its exercise is intended to incite and likely to bring about imminent violence. By allowing such restriction, he could be seen as intolerant, and hence, in the eyes of militant intolerant people, his toleration could be seen as a sham. But that need not be so. His intolerance can be seen as politically reasonable because he argues for the stability of a political order that in principle could protect the security of all citizens-tolerant and intolerant alike. Still, in the third and last part, I argue that his view of ideal constitutional interpretation, which privileges a broad right of freedom of political speech that can be curbed only if