jerome C wakefield - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by jerome C wakefield

The MIT Press eBooks, Feb 16, 2021

An obstacle to understanding Freud’s philosophical contribution is that he is primarily known as ... more An obstacle to understanding Freud’s philosophical contribution is that he is primarily known as a clinician and clinical theoretician who put forward theories of repression and the dynamic unconscious to explain the symptoms of psychopathology. Many of his admirers prize that strictly clinical image of Freud. However, as I document in this chapter, Freud clearly indicated throughout his work that at the foundation of his clinical contribution was a more basic philosophical thesis that mental states can be unconscious. In this chapter, I disentangle Freud’s clinical theorizing about the dynamic unconscious from his philosophical argument about the descriptive unconscious to set the stage for the analysis to come.

Social Service Review, Sep 1, 1994

and organized education. If one argues that such "ideal self" images have no real conse... more and organized education. If one argues that such "ideal self" images have no real consequences for individual behavior, then the implication is that religion and education have, in fact, few social consequences. There is no single model of the "ideal self," either as defined by socializing agents or as self-defined through social interaction with others, but a number of versions of the ideal self do include elements of unequal sharing and selfsacrifice. Moreover, "ideal self" images are defined in terms of relationships with others. Even models of the ideal self that are highly ego-centered require recognition, and acknowledgment, by others to be even partially realized. These "preferred images" of self behavior may, indeed, be selective. Both social distance, or relatedness, and moral approval, or disapproval, play a role in the decisions that people make about sharing-given a limit on personal resources for sharing in any given situation. The criterion that "altruism" must be universal, and totally nonjudgmental, if it is considered to exist at all, simply becomes a semantic device for denying that unequal, nonreciprocal sharing ever can exist at a level that makes it a significant factor in any social order. What is particularly intriguing in this discussion is that the professional function of the participants in this panel assumes that socialization is an important part of the "humanness" of individuals, over and beyond biological drives. While attention is directed toward the philosophical underpinnings of social work and other "helping professions," education, and particularly those aspects of higher education that are not primarily concerned with economically applicable production skills, totally depends on the assumption that socialization is a real phenomenon that has real consequences. Indeed, many of the issues raised about altruism can also be raised about the pursuit by individuals of non-technical-, non-skills-focused education that has no specific economic consequence. I doubt that any of the panelists is ready to give much credence publicly to a philosophical position that suggests that participation as a student in liberal arts education in the humanities, arts, and sciences is primarily a search for personal economic advantage or is only the context of a search for a high-priority biological mate or that the actual content of the education has no significance for the individual or for organized society. I admire the initiative of the School of Social Service Administration and

Psychoanalytic Psychology, Jul 1, 2017

Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 7, 2014

Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Nov 1, 2009

Evolutionary psychology, 2017

In this chapter, we review the results of a research program aimed at testing a controversial hyp... more In this chapter, we review the results of a research program aimed at testing a controversial hypothesis that was generated by an evolutionary approach to psychopathology. The evolutionary approach is in conflict with the standard symptom-based approach to diagnosis utilized by the American Psychiatric Association’s official Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association (APA), 2013). The conflict arises because many biologically designed features that are part of normal human functioning may be undesirably “symptomatic” or undesirable from our present value perspective. Such problematic normal conditions range from the pain of childbirth and the discomfort of teething to the intensity of grief, anxious vigilance regarding potential threats, and taste for fat and sugar. Evolutionarily shaped features such as these were presumably useful or neutral when they evolved but may be undesirable in our present quite different context. Such features, although often deserving treatment or some other social response (Cosmides & Tooby, 1999), are not necessarily medical disorders simply because they entail suffering or socially disvalued behavior. Distress and perceived need for help also occur in normal conditions in which nothing is going wrong in the organism because evolution has favored fitness over comfort and pleasure. This perspective has implications for the classification, research, and treatment of mental disorders as well as for DSM-5’s nosological distinction between disorders and what DSM-5 lists as “Z Codes,” that is, non-disorders about which clinicians may nonetheless be consulted.

History, philosophy and theory of the life sciences, 2015

Was the DSM-5 revision process based on careful evaluation of scientific evidence, as the DSM-5 T... more Was the DSM-5 revision process based on careful evaluation of scientific evidence, as the DSM-5 Task Force repeatedly claimed? The counterfeit of science is pseudoscience, the systematic motivated deviation from basic canons of rational scientific evaluation of evidence to create the false appearance of scientific support for a favored hypothesis. In this chapter, I consider the arguments that were used to support the DSM-5’s controversial decision to eliminate the bereavement exclusion (BE) to major depressive disorder (MDD). I consider three central arguments: that the BE had to be eliminated for reasons of consistency; that the BE excluded cases from MDD that would respond to treatment; and that the BE leads to missing suicidal cases. The analysis reveals forms of rhetoric by which the question at issue was obfuscated or misconstrued, and the scientific evidence sidelined, rendered impotent, or outmaneuvered to make it seem to support elimination, despite strong evidence to the contrary. I conclude that the arguments for elimination of the BE were largely pseudoscientific and the BE’s elimination unwarranted by the evidence.

SAGE Publications Ltd eBooks, May 15, 2012

The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Feb 1, 2008

The 'policeman fantasies' in Freud 's case of Little Hans, famous for being Freud 's most direct ... more The 'policeman fantasies' in Freud 's case of Little Hans, famous for being Freud 's most direct evidence for specifically sexual oedipal desire by Hans for his mother, are reconsidered. The Hans case is the first recorded instance of psychoanalytic supervision, and recent studies suggest that it is common for patients in supervised treatment to experience fantasies about the supervisor. It is argued that the policeman fantasies are the first recorded instances of such transference fantasies about psychoanalytic supervision and the patienttherapist-supervisor triangle. The explanatory power of this interpretation is supported by the nuances of the features of the fantasies themselves, as well as by the context in which they occurred that might serve as 'day residues'. Moreover, this interpretation provides an answer to the central mystery of the two fantasies, which goes unaddressed by Freud 's oedipal interpretation: Who is the policeman?

Neuroethics, Apr 12, 2017

Journal of Affective Disorders, 2017

Uncomplicated major depressive disorder (UMDD) is defined as MDD that does not include any of six... more Uncomplicated major depressive disorder (UMDD) is defined as MDD that does not include any of six pathosuggestive features: more than six months duration, marked functional impairment, sense of worthlessness, suicidal ideation, psychotic ideation, and psychomotor retardation. Complicated MDD (CMDD) includes all episodes containing one or more of these features. UMDD has been shown to be lower than CMDD and indistinguishable from no-MDD-history on predictive pathology validators. This study&amp;#39;s purpose is to establish where on the number-of-symptoms depressive continuum UMDD is located, using the criterion of predictive validity. Using two-wave longitudinal community data, seven baseline depression history subgroups were identified: no MDD symptoms (n=23,214), one MDD screener symptom (n=609), subthreshold or &amp;quot;minor&amp;quot; depression (mD; 2-4 MDD symptoms; n=2,623), UMDD (n=505), and complicated MDD with 5-6 symptoms (n=1,106), 7 symptoms (n=1,200), and 8-9 symptoms (n=2,408). Predictive validity was evaluated by four follow-up variables: major depressive episode; generalized anxiety disorder; suicide attempt; and manic/hypomanic episode. UMDD predictive pathology validator rates are not significantly different from rates for subthreshold mD but significantly different from those for all other depression categories; UMDD is higher in symptoms but lower in validator levels than 5-6 symptom CMDD. Baseline and follow-up diagnoses were based on respondents&amp;#39; fallible retrospective symptom reports in response to a lay-administered structured questionnaire, which may not yield diagnoses comparable to clinicians&amp;#39; assessments. Uncomplicated MDD&amp;#39;s follow-up outcomes resemble subthreshold depression, not CMDD, even when CMDD has less symptoms. Clinical decisions should reflect the relatively benign prognosis of uncomplicated MDD.

Zusammenfassung: Neuere Forschungsergebnisse aus der kognitiven Neurowissenschaft zeigen, dass be... more Zusammenfassung: Neuere Forschungsergebnisse aus der kognitiven Neurowissenschaft zeigen, dass bei der bloßen Beobachtung einer bestimmten Handlung einer anderen Person im eigenen prämotorischen Cortex die gleichen Neuronen aktiv werden, die bei der Ausführung dieser Handlung durch den Beobachter selbst aktiv würden. Man spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von "Spiegelneuronen". Das Prinzip eines "externen" oder "interpersonellen" Isomorphismus, das die Gestaltpsychologen Köhler und Koffka in den Zwanziger- bis Vierziger-Jahren des vorigen Jahrhunderts postuliert haben, nahm wichtige Aspekte dieser Entdeckung der "Spielneuronen" vorweg. Mehr noch: Die auf dem Prinzip des interpersonellen Isomorphismus aufbauenden Thesen der Gestalttheoretiker und Galleses neuere, von der Entdeckung der Spielneuronen inspirierte Simulationstheorie stimmen in der zentralen Annahme überein, dass die menschliche Fähigkeit, die Handlungen, Gefühle und Intentionen eines ...

Behavior and Social Issues, May 1, 2008

As part of a larger argument about why token economy treatment for schizophrenia was largely aban... more As part of a larger argument about why token economy treatment for schizophrenia was largely abandoned despite demonstrated behavioral gains, I (Wakefield, 2006) analyzed Paul and Lentz's (1977) classic study of social-learning treatment of schizophrenia, sometimes cited as the best in this field. I argued that it failed to demonstrate or even test generalization of gains to uncontrolled natural environments, a serious drawback in an age of deinstitutionalization. In his response, Paul (2006) rejects my contention and argues that there are three sources of data in the study that support generalization: gains were maintained during a no-treatment baseline at 4 years into the study, during an 18-month period following a change in aversive time out procedures for aggressive acts, and during the 18-month follow-up of patients released to community aftercare. In this reply, I examine Paul's counterarguments and argue that the evidence strongly supports my original contention that Paul and Lentz's study provides no support for generalization.

In Analysis

Contexte Freud considère sa théorie du complexe d’Œdipe comme étant sa plus importante contributi... more Contexte Freud considère sa théorie du complexe d’Œdipe comme étant sa plus importante contribution scientifique ; il en fait la pièce maîtresse de sa théorie clinique de l’étiologie et de la guérison des psychonévroses et la défend tout au long de son œuvre. Cette théorie domine la psychanalyse pendant près d’un siècle et détermine comment les problèmes d’innombrables patients sont interprétés. Cependant, des études récentes suggèrent que les arguments utilisés par Freud pour soutenir sa théorie ne sont pas solides et que, loin d’être une pseudo-science inoffensive, la théorie de l’Œdipe constitue une forme oppressive de « savoir-pouvoir » au sens foucaldien, qui réorganise les relations familiales de manière socio-syntonique mais émotionnellement nuisible. L’identification continue de la psychanalyse à la théorie œdipienne constitue un obstacle à une pensée psychanalytique nouvelle et à la crédibilité de la discipline. Pour libérer la psychanalyse de son carcan œdipien, il semble essentiel de comprendre clairement les origines erronées et les effets délétères de cette théorie. Objectifs et méthode Cet article reprend les conclusions de deux livres récents qui examinent comment et pourquoi Freud défend avec acharnement la théorie de l’Œdipe et les effets délétères sur la famille moderne qui en résultent. Après l’échec de sa théorie de la séduction, Freud élabore la théorie œdipienne pour défendre sa revendication théorique centrale, la théorie sexuelle des névroses. Cependant, la théorie œdipienne demeure une position tout à fait ad hoc, scientifiquement peu convaincante et dépourvue de nouveaux éléments probants, moins dépendants de la méthode psychanalytique qui a également été mise en doute par l’échec de la théorie de la séduction. Freud tente de fournir des preuves « plus directes » avec le cas du petit Hans, sur lequel porte mon analyse. En ce qui concerne l’évaluation des preuves fournies par Freud, la méthode employée ici s’inspire de la philosophie des sciences : la reconstruction logique, l’analyse et l’évaluation des arguments proposés par Freud. Les effets de la théorie sont examinés à l’aide de l’approche néo-foucaldienne centrée sur la manière dont l’acceptation de la théorie a modifié les relations de pouvoir au sein de la famille — autrement dit, le savoir-pouvoir de la théorie. Résultats J’identifie quatre arguments centraux que Freud présente dans le cas du petit Hans pour soutenir la théorie de l’Œdipe. Chaque argument paraît brillant en tant que construction logique mais semble peu solide lorsqu’il est comparé aux preuves de l’histoire du cas du petit Hans. J’analyse ensuite le pouvoir de connaissance de la théorie œdipienne telle qu’elle apparaît dans le cas du petit Hans ainsi que dans la vie familiale moderne. L’acceptation ou la prise de conscience de cette théorie sert à créer un sentiment de danger dans la relation affective entre la mère et le fils, ce qui conduit à séparer les enfants de leurs parents — surtout à l’heure du coucher — afin de protéger le lit conjugal dans la nouvelle ère du mariage sexuel et affectif égalitaire qui commence à peu près au moment où la théorie de l’Œdipe a été proposée. Conclusion Les arguments de Freud défendant la théorie de l’Œdipe sont brillamment conçus, mais Freud interprète mal les faits relatifs au cas du petit Hans de sorte que ses arguments ne sont pas solides. En ne parvenant pas à confirmer les nouvelles prédictions, la théorie œdipienne de Freud reste ad hoc et scientifiquement inacceptable. Elle a été néanmoins largement acceptée en raison de son pouvoir de connaissance spécifique, qui soutient la nature évolutive du mariage d’une manière qui limite l’interaction parent–enfant, le coucher ensemble et l’affection. La théorie du complexe d’Œdipe est à la fois fausse et nuisible, et dans l’intervention clinique, elle constitue une forme de contre-transfert théorique.

Philosophiques, May 18, 2006

Les critiques actuelles des diagnostics psychiatriques, qu'elles viennent des antipsychiatres, de... more Les critiques actuelles des diagnostics psychiatriques, qu'elles viennent des antipsychiatres, des béhavioristes, des constructionnistes sociaux, des szasziens et des foucaldiens, rejettent généralement l'idée que le concept de trouble mental est légitime du point de vue médical, ne laissant donc aucun argument solide à partir duquel il soit possible de mener une critique constructive et d'établir un dialogue avec la psychiatrie. Ces positions ne réussissent également pas à expliquer les fortes intuitions populaires qui permettent aux gens de distinguer les troubles psychologiques des autres conditions psychologiques négatives. Selon l'analyse de la dysfonction préjudiciable (DP) présentée dans cet article, un trouble mental est une condition : 1) préjudiciable, un concept évaluatif basé sur des valeurs sociales ; et 2) causée par une dysfonction psychologique, un concept factuel se rapportant à un mécanisme psychologique qui accomplit une fonction pour laquelle il a été biologiquement conçu (c'est-à-dire établie par la sélection naturelle). L'analyse DP est ainsi une position hybride qui requiert à la fois que des critères évaluatifs et factuels soient satisfaits pour garantir l'attribution d'un trouble. Nous argumentons que l'analyse DP réussit admirablement à expliquer les jugements intuitifs quant à ce qui est un trouble et à ce qui en n'est pas. La composante factuelle permet également de critiquer le critère diagnostique du DSM, ce que nous ferons à l'aide de plusieurs exemples (dépression, troubles du comportement). Ces critiques déterminent où le DSM a dévié de ses propres hypothèses et ainsi considéré comme des troubles ce qui n'en est pas. Elles expliquent également pourquoi les tentatives du DSM de remédier au problème en introduisant le critère du « cliniquement significatif » échouent. ABSTRACT.-Current antipsychiatric, behaviorist, social-constructivist, Szaszian, and Foucauldian critiques of psychiatric diagnosis generally reject mental disorder as a medically legitimate concept, thus allowing no place to stand from which to mount a constructive critique and dialogue with psychiatry. These views also fail to explain the robust folk intuitions by which people distinguish psychological disorders from other negative psychological conditions. According to the harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis presented in this paper, a mental disorder is condition that is (1) harmful, a value concept judged by social values ; and (2) caused by a psychological dysfunction, a factual concept referring to failure of a psychological mechanism to perform a function for which it is biologically designed (i.e., naturally selected). The HD analysis is thus a hybrid account that requires both value and factual criteria to be satisfied before attribution of disorder is warranted. It is argued that the HD analysis has considerable success in explaining intuitive judgments about disorder versus non-disorder. The factual component also allows for a