Francisca Jiménez Jiménez | Universidad de Jaén (original) (raw)

Papers by Francisca Jiménez Jiménez

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2004

In this paper we obtain empirical evidence of the relationship between individuals&am... more In this paper we obtain empirical evidence of the relationship between individuals' risk attitudes and individuals' beliefs on their rival's choices in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. We find that (i) Risk-averse subjects seem to think that their opponent will defect, (ii) Risk-loving individuals tend to think that their opponent will cooperate with higher probabilities, and (iii) finally, those subjects who

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2011

Learning literature typically assumes that initial attractions to choose each possible alternativ... more Learning literature typically assumes that initial attractions to choose each possible alternative are given exogenously. However, evidence shows that current behaviour depends on past experiences. In this paper, we design an experiment to control for the initial experience in decisions from experience by providing decision makers with an exogenous history (successful vs. unsuccessful) prior to initiating the decision task. Moreover, varying the initial endowment level for fixed histories we investigate the income effect. We are also interested in analysing the duration of both effects (history and income). We find significant treatment effects in the sense that more risk taking behaviour is associated with good histories and with low income levels. According to previous literature, our results confirm the transitory nature of both effects, although the duration of the income effect doubles the duration of the history effect. In the long run, risky choice behaviour converges across different treatments.

Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 2010

In this paper we focus on inefficient product quality arising from a free-riding problem in agric... more In this paper we focus on inefficient product quality arising from a free-riding problem in agricultural cooperatives. Individual incentives are not aligned with group gains in cooperatives because individual members bear the costs of offering higher qualities, whereas the benefits from these higher qualities are shared among all members. We present a blind mechanism whose qualityenhancing properties are analyzed in a theoretical model. This mechanism, which does not require individual monitoring, consists of individually punishing coop members by using aggregate coop performance in such way that the better the coop quality, the lower the exclusion probability. In a computerized environment, using experimental methods, we specifically test the effectiveness of our mechanism in alleviating the incentive problem. Experimental results show that our blind punishment mechanism achieves significant efficiency gains.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the nature of a two-party contractual relationship between an... more The aim of this paper is to analyse the nature of a two-party contractual relationship between an olive oil co-operative society and a producer in the principalagent framework. In this model, the principal (co-operative firm) delegates to the agent (producer) responsibili ty for the production of the olive oil . In general, the co-operative firm can’ t fully observe (or at least cannot verify) the producer’s actions. In this context, we analyse the design of an incentives system to the producer to obtain good quali ty olive and the producer’s decisions are brought as far as possible into alignment with cooperative firm wishes (in the quality terms), without the necessity of enforcing costly monitoring mechanisms. Our fundamental object is that the co-operative firm incentives the quality of the olive, and not the quantity, such as the actual payoffs system does.

In this paper we examine the determinants of the evolution of migrant density in the EU-15 countr... more In this paper we examine the determinants of the evolution of migrant density in the EU-15 countries during the decade 2000-2010 and its relationship with the characteristics of the destination country. Using statistics from Eurostat, a panel data model is estimated with country and year fixed effects. Like previous research, we find that per capita income and networks increase sig nificantly immigrant inflows. As outstanding factors, we introduce the produc tion structure and the migratory policy in our analysis. Our results show that whereas agriculture and construction sectors exert pull forces, manufacturing sector reduces considerably migrant density. Lastly, we also find that immigra tion policy influences significantly on the share of immigrants.

Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics, 2020

Abstract A test approach to the model selection problem for multinomial data based on penalized ϕ... more Abstract A test approach to the model selection problem for multinomial data based on penalized ϕ -divergences is proposed. The test statistic is a sample version of the difference of the distances between the population and each competing model. The null distribution of the test statistic is derived, showing that it depends on whether the competing models intersect or not and whether certain parameter is positive or not. All possible cases are characterized, and we give rules to decide if a model provides a better explanation for the available data than the other. The practical behavior of the proposal is evaluated by means of an extensive simulation experiment. The method is applied to a real data set related to the classification of individuals according to their social preferences.

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

Explaining framing effects is one of the main challenges faced by decision theories. This researc... more Explaining framing effects is one of the main challenges faced by decision theories. This research experimentally examines how different contextual frames influence competitive behaviour in a Bertrand duopoly game (repeatedly played under a stranger matching), unexplored so far. The design comprises four frames: one abstract (a beauty-contest framing), two meaningful (the standard Bertrand framing and an access-to-river framing) and one evocative (a take-from-fund framing). Our findings show that, at first, the evocative frame differentiates from the rest mostly in market prices. While the evocative frame induces subjects to behave closer to the theoretical predictions initially, the others need some repetitions until convergence is achieved. Differences across frames eventually vanish at the end. During the transition, in the Bertrand frame, a quicker decay in prices is observed due to the behavioural reactions to historical market prices. Lastly, irrespectively of frames, behavioural reactions to immediate past information allow to explain strategic interaction in the long-run: a force-balance situation which is consistent with the related literature on price floors in Bertrand games.

Economics of Governance

This paper experimentally investigates how inter- and intragroup heterogeneity (related to indivi... more This paper experimentally investigates how inter- and intragroup heterogeneity (related to individual cooperative preferences) influences intergroup coordination. Coordination incentives are implemented through an intergroup rank-order competition. A pre-competition phase determines how individual heterogeneity is distributed across groups within an organisation. Two treatments are compared: a horizontal-heterogeneity treatment (H-Hetero, baseline), where individual differences are randomly distributed within and between groups, and a vertical-heterogeneity treatment (V-Hetero), in which groups are internally homogeneous but differ considerably from each other. In contrast to expectations, I find that vertical (intergroup) heterogeneity, when being accompanied by intragroup homogeneity, does not reduce the ability of groups to coordinate and keeps overall performance at very high levels. Indeed, subjects react more strongly to the coordination/competition incentives in vertically he...

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2023

Explaining framing effects is one of the main challenges faced by decision theories. This researc... more Explaining framing effects is one of the main challenges faced by decision theories. This research experimentally examines how different contextual frames influence competitive behaviour in a Bertrand duopoly game (repeatedly played under a stranger matching), unexplored so far. The design comprises four frames: one abstract (a beauty-contest framing), two meaningful (the standard Bertrand framing and an access-to-river framing) and one evocative (a take-from-fund framing). Our findings show that, at first, the evocative frame differentiates from the rest mostly in market prices. While the evocative frame induces subjects to behave closer to the theoretical predictions initially, the others need some repetitions until convergence is achieved. Differences across frames eventually vanish at the end. During the transition, in the Bertrand frame, a quicker decay in prices is observed due to the behavioural reactions to historical market prices. Lastly, irrespectively of frames, behavioural reactions to immediate past information allow to explain strategic interaction in the long-run: a force-balance situation which is consistent with the related literature on price floors in Bertrand games.

Economics of Governance, 2022

This paper experimentally investigates how inter-and intragroup heterogeneity (related to individ... more This paper experimentally investigates how inter-and intragroup heterogeneity (related to individual cooperative preferences) influences intergroup coordination. Coordination incentives are implemented through an intergroup rank-order competition. A pre-competition phase determines how individual heterogeneity is distributed across groups within an organisation. Two treatments are compared: a horizontal-heterogeneity treatment (H-Hetero, baseline), where individual differences are randomly distributed within and between groups, and a vertical-heterogeneity treatment (V-Hetero), in which groups are internally homogeneous but differ considerably from each other. In contrast to expectations, I find that vertical (intergroup) heterogeneity, when being accompanied by intragroup homogeneity, does not reduce the ability of groups to coordinate and keeps overall performance at very high levels. Indeed, subjects react more strongly to the coordination/competition incentives in vertically heterogenous organisations. Further analysis suggests that group dynamics are mainly driven by a positive orientation towards inequality (distributional preferences) of the members of the initially least cooperative groups, and their nonconditional cooperative behaviour. These results have implications for the design of group-based incentives and governance in organisations and societies.

for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. She gratefully acknowledges financi... more for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. She gratefully acknowledges financial support from University of Jaén and Jaén Caja Rural research project (#20210/148).

Estudios de economía aplicada, 2021

Documentos De Trabajo, 2000

Derecho Internacional Economico Y De Las Inversiones Internacionales Vol 1 2009 Isbn 978 612 4047 12 1 Pags 189 222, 2009

The aim of this investigation is to analyze theoretically how a marriage make their decisions and... more The aim of this investigation is to analyze theoretically how a marriage make their decisions and what are the implications on significative variables, such as fertility rate and labor supply of the members. So, we design a simple familiar decision model under four different approaches: individual decisions, consensual decisions, altruistic decisions and, finally, bargaining process.

Iniciacion a La Investigacion, 2006

Theory and Decision, 2021

This paper investigates experimentally the effects of communication in distinct games with comple... more This paper investigates experimentally the effects of communication in distinct games with complete information. We design four games resulting from the interaction between two incentive elements: strategic complementarity and coordination. These incentive elements allow to analyse the use of cheap talk as an efficiency-enhancing and coordinating device. We implement a restricted communication protocol (one-sided, optional, and closed-form) in repeated settings with fixed partners. Our findings provide robust evidence about how cheap talk interacts with incentives to explain strategic behaviour in a dynamic way. As expected, cheap talk increases efficiency under complementarity incentives, and the coordination level under coordination incentives. As novelty, the use of limited communication in repeated interactions has led to identify specific time-varying message profiles as the most effective messages in the coordination games. While the content of messages is explained by the complementarity incentives, faithfulness to credible messages is determined by the coordination incentives.

Sustainability, 2020

Crowdfunding constitutes one of the financial solutions to achieve the sustainable development go... more Crowdfunding constitutes one of the financial solutions to achieve the sustainable development goals, by fostering innovation and economic growth. This paper conducts an empirical two-country analysis (the UK and Spain) of characteristics of successful offerings to assess the distribution of overfunding in equity crowdfunding. Unlike previous research, which has usually comprised campaigns posted on single-country portals, our study is based on an international leading platform operating with country-differentiated websites, Crowdcube. Such an approach allows us to identify influential factors which are dependent on country and, simultaneously, to control for those platform-related factors. To focus on the overfunding distribution, a quantile regression methodology is adopted for a total sample of 299 overfunded campaigns from 2015 to 2018. Overall, empirical results show that the effects of key campaign features (equity, voting rights and social capital) are stronger and more signi...

ICERI2018 Proceedings, 2018

Revista De Economia Mundial, 2014

Resumen en: In this paper we examine the determinants of the evolution of migrant density in the ... more Resumen en: In this paper we examine the determinants of the evolution of migrant density in the EU-15 countries during the decade 2000-2010 and its relationship wit...

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2004

In this paper we obtain empirical evidence of the relationship between individuals&am... more In this paper we obtain empirical evidence of the relationship between individuals' risk attitudes and individuals' beliefs on their rival's choices in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. We find that (i) Risk-averse subjects seem to think that their opponent will defect, (ii) Risk-loving individuals tend to think that their opponent will cooperate with higher probabilities, and (iii) finally, those subjects who

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2011

Learning literature typically assumes that initial attractions to choose each possible alternativ... more Learning literature typically assumes that initial attractions to choose each possible alternative are given exogenously. However, evidence shows that current behaviour depends on past experiences. In this paper, we design an experiment to control for the initial experience in decisions from experience by providing decision makers with an exogenous history (successful vs. unsuccessful) prior to initiating the decision task. Moreover, varying the initial endowment level for fixed histories we investigate the income effect. We are also interested in analysing the duration of both effects (history and income). We find significant treatment effects in the sense that more risk taking behaviour is associated with good histories and with low income levels. According to previous literature, our results confirm the transitory nature of both effects, although the duration of the income effect doubles the duration of the history effect. In the long run, risky choice behaviour converges across different treatments.

Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 2010

In this paper we focus on inefficient product quality arising from a free-riding problem in agric... more In this paper we focus on inefficient product quality arising from a free-riding problem in agricultural cooperatives. Individual incentives are not aligned with group gains in cooperatives because individual members bear the costs of offering higher qualities, whereas the benefits from these higher qualities are shared among all members. We present a blind mechanism whose qualityenhancing properties are analyzed in a theoretical model. This mechanism, which does not require individual monitoring, consists of individually punishing coop members by using aggregate coop performance in such way that the better the coop quality, the lower the exclusion probability. In a computerized environment, using experimental methods, we specifically test the effectiveness of our mechanism in alleviating the incentive problem. Experimental results show that our blind punishment mechanism achieves significant efficiency gains.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the nature of a two-party contractual relationship between an... more The aim of this paper is to analyse the nature of a two-party contractual relationship between an olive oil co-operative society and a producer in the principalagent framework. In this model, the principal (co-operative firm) delegates to the agent (producer) responsibili ty for the production of the olive oil . In general, the co-operative firm can’ t fully observe (or at least cannot verify) the producer’s actions. In this context, we analyse the design of an incentives system to the producer to obtain good quali ty olive and the producer’s decisions are brought as far as possible into alignment with cooperative firm wishes (in the quality terms), without the necessity of enforcing costly monitoring mechanisms. Our fundamental object is that the co-operative firm incentives the quality of the olive, and not the quantity, such as the actual payoffs system does.

In this paper we examine the determinants of the evolution of migrant density in the EU-15 countr... more In this paper we examine the determinants of the evolution of migrant density in the EU-15 countries during the decade 2000-2010 and its relationship with the characteristics of the destination country. Using statistics from Eurostat, a panel data model is estimated with country and year fixed effects. Like previous research, we find that per capita income and networks increase sig nificantly immigrant inflows. As outstanding factors, we introduce the produc tion structure and the migratory policy in our analysis. Our results show that whereas agriculture and construction sectors exert pull forces, manufacturing sector reduces considerably migrant density. Lastly, we also find that immigra tion policy influences significantly on the share of immigrants.

Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics, 2020

Abstract A test approach to the model selection problem for multinomial data based on penalized ϕ... more Abstract A test approach to the model selection problem for multinomial data based on penalized ϕ -divergences is proposed. The test statistic is a sample version of the difference of the distances between the population and each competing model. The null distribution of the test statistic is derived, showing that it depends on whether the competing models intersect or not and whether certain parameter is positive or not. All possible cases are characterized, and we give rules to decide if a model provides a better explanation for the available data than the other. The practical behavior of the proposal is evaluated by means of an extensive simulation experiment. The method is applied to a real data set related to the classification of individuals according to their social preferences.

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

Explaining framing effects is one of the main challenges faced by decision theories. This researc... more Explaining framing effects is one of the main challenges faced by decision theories. This research experimentally examines how different contextual frames influence competitive behaviour in a Bertrand duopoly game (repeatedly played under a stranger matching), unexplored so far. The design comprises four frames: one abstract (a beauty-contest framing), two meaningful (the standard Bertrand framing and an access-to-river framing) and one evocative (a take-from-fund framing). Our findings show that, at first, the evocative frame differentiates from the rest mostly in market prices. While the evocative frame induces subjects to behave closer to the theoretical predictions initially, the others need some repetitions until convergence is achieved. Differences across frames eventually vanish at the end. During the transition, in the Bertrand frame, a quicker decay in prices is observed due to the behavioural reactions to historical market prices. Lastly, irrespectively of frames, behavioural reactions to immediate past information allow to explain strategic interaction in the long-run: a force-balance situation which is consistent with the related literature on price floors in Bertrand games.

Economics of Governance

This paper experimentally investigates how inter- and intragroup heterogeneity (related to indivi... more This paper experimentally investigates how inter- and intragroup heterogeneity (related to individual cooperative preferences) influences intergroup coordination. Coordination incentives are implemented through an intergroup rank-order competition. A pre-competition phase determines how individual heterogeneity is distributed across groups within an organisation. Two treatments are compared: a horizontal-heterogeneity treatment (H-Hetero, baseline), where individual differences are randomly distributed within and between groups, and a vertical-heterogeneity treatment (V-Hetero), in which groups are internally homogeneous but differ considerably from each other. In contrast to expectations, I find that vertical (intergroup) heterogeneity, when being accompanied by intragroup homogeneity, does not reduce the ability of groups to coordinate and keeps overall performance at very high levels. Indeed, subjects react more strongly to the coordination/competition incentives in vertically he...

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2023

Explaining framing effects is one of the main challenges faced by decision theories. This researc... more Explaining framing effects is one of the main challenges faced by decision theories. This research experimentally examines how different contextual frames influence competitive behaviour in a Bertrand duopoly game (repeatedly played under a stranger matching), unexplored so far. The design comprises four frames: one abstract (a beauty-contest framing), two meaningful (the standard Bertrand framing and an access-to-river framing) and one evocative (a take-from-fund framing). Our findings show that, at first, the evocative frame differentiates from the rest mostly in market prices. While the evocative frame induces subjects to behave closer to the theoretical predictions initially, the others need some repetitions until convergence is achieved. Differences across frames eventually vanish at the end. During the transition, in the Bertrand frame, a quicker decay in prices is observed due to the behavioural reactions to historical market prices. Lastly, irrespectively of frames, behavioural reactions to immediate past information allow to explain strategic interaction in the long-run: a force-balance situation which is consistent with the related literature on price floors in Bertrand games.

Economics of Governance, 2022

This paper experimentally investigates how inter-and intragroup heterogeneity (related to individ... more This paper experimentally investigates how inter-and intragroup heterogeneity (related to individual cooperative preferences) influences intergroup coordination. Coordination incentives are implemented through an intergroup rank-order competition. A pre-competition phase determines how individual heterogeneity is distributed across groups within an organisation. Two treatments are compared: a horizontal-heterogeneity treatment (H-Hetero, baseline), where individual differences are randomly distributed within and between groups, and a vertical-heterogeneity treatment (V-Hetero), in which groups are internally homogeneous but differ considerably from each other. In contrast to expectations, I find that vertical (intergroup) heterogeneity, when being accompanied by intragroup homogeneity, does not reduce the ability of groups to coordinate and keeps overall performance at very high levels. Indeed, subjects react more strongly to the coordination/competition incentives in vertically heterogenous organisations. Further analysis suggests that group dynamics are mainly driven by a positive orientation towards inequality (distributional preferences) of the members of the initially least cooperative groups, and their nonconditional cooperative behaviour. These results have implications for the design of group-based incentives and governance in organisations and societies.

for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. She gratefully acknowledges financi... more for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. She gratefully acknowledges financial support from University of Jaén and Jaén Caja Rural research project (#20210/148).

Estudios de economía aplicada, 2021

Documentos De Trabajo, 2000

Derecho Internacional Economico Y De Las Inversiones Internacionales Vol 1 2009 Isbn 978 612 4047 12 1 Pags 189 222, 2009

The aim of this investigation is to analyze theoretically how a marriage make their decisions and... more The aim of this investigation is to analyze theoretically how a marriage make their decisions and what are the implications on significative variables, such as fertility rate and labor supply of the members. So, we design a simple familiar decision model under four different approaches: individual decisions, consensual decisions, altruistic decisions and, finally, bargaining process.

Iniciacion a La Investigacion, 2006

Theory and Decision, 2021

This paper investigates experimentally the effects of communication in distinct games with comple... more This paper investigates experimentally the effects of communication in distinct games with complete information. We design four games resulting from the interaction between two incentive elements: strategic complementarity and coordination. These incentive elements allow to analyse the use of cheap talk as an efficiency-enhancing and coordinating device. We implement a restricted communication protocol (one-sided, optional, and closed-form) in repeated settings with fixed partners. Our findings provide robust evidence about how cheap talk interacts with incentives to explain strategic behaviour in a dynamic way. As expected, cheap talk increases efficiency under complementarity incentives, and the coordination level under coordination incentives. As novelty, the use of limited communication in repeated interactions has led to identify specific time-varying message profiles as the most effective messages in the coordination games. While the content of messages is explained by the complementarity incentives, faithfulness to credible messages is determined by the coordination incentives.

Sustainability, 2020

Crowdfunding constitutes one of the financial solutions to achieve the sustainable development go... more Crowdfunding constitutes one of the financial solutions to achieve the sustainable development goals, by fostering innovation and economic growth. This paper conducts an empirical two-country analysis (the UK and Spain) of characteristics of successful offerings to assess the distribution of overfunding in equity crowdfunding. Unlike previous research, which has usually comprised campaigns posted on single-country portals, our study is based on an international leading platform operating with country-differentiated websites, Crowdcube. Such an approach allows us to identify influential factors which are dependent on country and, simultaneously, to control for those platform-related factors. To focus on the overfunding distribution, a quantile regression methodology is adopted for a total sample of 299 overfunded campaigns from 2015 to 2018. Overall, empirical results show that the effects of key campaign features (equity, voting rights and social capital) are stronger and more signi...

ICERI2018 Proceedings, 2018

Revista De Economia Mundial, 2014

Resumen en: In this paper we examine the determinants of the evolution of migrant density in the ... more Resumen en: In this paper we examine the determinants of the evolution of migrant density in the EU-15 countries during the decade 2000-2010 and its relationship wit...