Xinli Wang （王新力） | Juniata College (original) (raw)

Published Papers by Xinli Wang （王新力）

Philosophy East & West, 2018

The recent success of many fruitful comparative studies between Western Philosophy and Chinese ph... more The recent success of many fruitful comparative studies between Western Philosophy and Chinese philosophy seems, for many comparative philosophers, to have put the threat of cultural relativism to the viability of comparative philosophy to rest. Does cultural relativist conviction that the existence of incommensurable conceptual and cultural schemes inevitably lead to the cross-cultural communication breakdown no longer pose a mortal threat to the viability of comparative philosophy? I tend to believe otherwise and intend to show that the incommensurability between the two cultural/intellectual traditions continues to impede the effort of comparative philosophy. Consequently, comparative philosophy between two radically distinct cultural-language communities is severely compromised. Rational comparison

摘要：通常所接受对库恩有关不可通约性的分类学解释的理解建立在不可译性概念之上，因而是相当不完善的。为了弥补此不足，本文在分类之逻辑语义理论 (a logical-semantic theory ... more 摘要：通常所接受对库恩有关不可通约性的分类学解释的理解建立在不可译性概念之上，因而是相当不完善的。为了弥补此不足，本文在分类之逻辑语义理论 (a logical-semantic theory of taxonomy)、真值语义理论 (a semantic theory of truth-value)，以及跨语言交流的真值条件理论 (a truth-value conditional theory of cross-language communication) 之基础上，对库恩有关不可通约性的分类学解释进行了重建。根据这种重建，如果两个科学语言具有不相匹配的分类结构，则当一科学语言的核心语句在其所属语境中具有真值、而在另一科学语言之语境中考虑缺乏真值时，这两种科学语言乃不可通约。通过这种重建，库恩对于不可通约性的成熟解释并非基于保真 (truth-preserving) 可译性或不可译性的概念，而是基于保留真值状态 (truth-value-preserving) 的跨语言交流概念之上。这种重建使得库恩有关不可通约性的解释更具坚实的理论基础、也在概念上更加完整。

关键词：不可通约性 (incommensurability)；托马斯· 库恩 (Thomas, Kuhn)；分类结构 (taxonomy)；词汇系统 (lexicon)；真值 (truth-value)；不可译性 (untranslatability)；跨语言交流 (cross-language communication)

The current discussions of conceptual schemes and related topics are misguided; for they have bee... more The current discussions of conceptual schemes and related topics are misguided; for they have been focused too much on the truth-conditional notions of meaning/concepts and translation/interpretation in Tarski's style. It is exactly due to such a Quinean interpretation of the notion of conceptual schemes that the very notion of conceptual schemes falls prey to Davidson's attack. I argue that what should concern us in the discussions of conceptual schemes and related issues, following the initiatives of I. Hacking, T. Kuhn, and N. Rescher, is not the truth-values of assertions, but rather the truthvalue-status of the sentences used to make the assertions. This is because the genuine conceptual innovation between alternative theories/languages does not lie in differences in determining the truth-values of their sentences, but turns on whether these sentences have truth-values when considered within the context of a competing one. The core of conceptual relativism does not consist in the claim that different conceptual schemes may yield incommensurable truth claims, but rather that different conceptual schemes may yield incompatible truth-value-status and therefore lead to distinct perceptions of reality. Conceptual schemes are no longer seen as sentential languages consisting of a set of sentences accepted as true, but rather seen as metaphysical presuppositions of presuppositional languages.

What the authors attempts to address in this paper is a Kantian question: not whether, but how is... more What the authors attempts to address in this paper is a Kantian question: not whether, but how is cross-cultural understanding possible? And specifically, what is a more effective approach for cross-cultural understanding? The answer lies in an analysis of two different models of cross-cultural understanding, that is, propositional and hermeneutic understanding. To begin with, the authors presents a linguistic interpretation of culture, i.e., a culture as a linguistically formulated and transmitted symbolic system with its conceptual core as a scheme of basic cultural presuppositions. Such a symbolic system is referred to as a cultural language. After exploring the essential role of cultural presuppositions in cross-cultural understanding, the authors discusses the traditional model of cross-cultural understanding, namely, the propositional model. Through critically examining the two popular versions of the propositional model, i.e., the projective approach and the adoptive approach to cross-cultural understanding, it is found that cross-cultural propositional understanding is doomed to failure. To move us beyond the absolutism-relativism trap embedded within propositional understanding, the authors first introduces and discusses Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutic understanding, and then applies Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutic model of understanding to cross-cultural understanding. It is finally concluded that cross-cultural understanding is essentially hermeneutic - including the case of cultural learning, not propositional. Therefore, cross-cultural understanding is hermeneutically possible.

Despite D. Davidson’s influential criticism of the very notion of conceptual schemes, the notion ... more Despite D. Davidson’s influential criticism of the very notion of conceptual schemes, the notion continues enjoying its popularity in contemporary philosophy and, accordingly, conceptual relativism is still very much alive. There is one major reason responsible for Davidson’s failure which has not been widely recognized: What Davidson attacks fiercely is not the very notion, but a notion of conceptual schemes, namely, the Quinean notion of conceptual schemes and its underlying Kantian scheme-content dualism. However, such a notion simply cannot carry the weight of conceptual relativism for it does not catch the essences of conceptual relativism. Consequently, I argue that the very notion of conceptual schemes and conceptual relativism have survived Davidson’s attack. Therefore, the failure of the Quinean notion of conceptual schemes and Kantian scheme-content dualism, even if Davidson can claim victory, does not mark the end of the very notion of conceptual schemes.

It is a common wisdom that linguistic communication is different from linguistic understanding. H... more It is a common wisdom that linguistic communication is different from linguistic understanding. However, the distinction between communication and understanding is not as clear as it seems to be. Presumably, the relationship between linguistic communication and understanding depends upon the notions of understanding and communication involved. Thinking along the line of propositional understanding and informative communication, communication can be reduced to mutual understanding. In contrast, operating along the line of hermeneutic understanding and dialogical communication, the process of understanding is in essence a process of communication.

哲学(西方人文社科前沿述评, Series on Western Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Philosophy Volume, editors, Jiyuan Yu & Zhewei Zhang, pp. 1-47, 2008

内容提要：本文综合评述当代认识论的现状以及主干近10 年来主要发展趋势和最新理论贡献。它首先介绍一些必要的理论背景：盖梯尔难题，闭合原则，内在论与外在论之争 (第 2节)，然后分 6 节集中讨... more 内容提要：本文综合评述当代认识论的现状以及主干近10 年来主要发展趋势和最新理论贡献。它首先介绍一些必要的理论背景：盖梯尔难题，闭合原则，内在论与外在论之争 (第 2节)，然后分 6 节集中讨论、评述：(i) 温和基础主义的兴起及发展 (第 3 节) ； (ii) 对认知怀疑论的最新表述及回应 (第 4 节) ； (iii) 认知无限辨明论 (第 5 节) ；(iv) 认知语境主义的兴起，其理论贡献，以及存在的问题；(v) 德性认识论的二个模型，它们的优点,和现有的问题。最后简单讨论当代认识论面临的危机与机遇。

Abstract: This article surveys the current state of affairs and some important new developments of epistemology in the past 10 years. It first introduces some necessary theoretical background (the Gettier problem, the closure principle, and internalism vs. externalism), and then focuses on (i) the rise and development of modest forms of foundationalism, (ii) recent debates on epistemic skepticism, (iii) epistemic infinitism, (iv) epistemic contextualism and its contributions and problems, (v) two models of virtue epistemology, its merits and existing issues. It ends with a brief review of the theoretical crisis faced with contemporary epistemology and its opportunities.

The Proceedings of the 22nd World Congress of Philosophy (August, 2008, Seoul, Korea), Vol. 39 (Philosophy of Language): 267-275, 2012

D. Davidson argues that the existence of alternative conceptual schemes presupposes the Kantian s... more D. Davidson argues that the existence of alternative conceptual schemes presupposes the Kantian scheme-content dualism, which requires a scheme-neutral empirical content and a fixed, sharp scheme-content distinction. The dismantlement of such a Kantian scheme-content dualism, which Davidson calls “the third dogma of empiricism”, would render the notion of alternative conceptual schemes groundless. To counter Davidson’s attack on the notion of alternative conceptual schemes, I argue that alternative conceptual schemes neither entail nor presuppose the Kantian scheme-content dualism. On the contrary, it is exactly the abandonment of the concept-neutral content and the denial of a fixed, absolute scheme-content distinction that turns the Kantian conceptual absolutism upside down and thus makes alternative conceptual schemes possible. Proposing common-sense experience as the empirical content of alternative schemes, I construct and defend a non-Kantian scheme-content dualism based on a non-fixed, relative scheme-content distinction. The proposed non-Kantian scheme-content dualism is not only “innocent” enough to be immune from Davidson’s charge of the third dogma of empiricism, but also “solid” enough to be able to sustain alternative conceptual schemes. I conclude that in terms of our conceptual schemes, we are connected to the world as closely as possible; only through conceptual schemes can we be connected to the world.

The Proceedings of the 21st World Congress of Philosophy (August, 2003, Istanbul, Turkey), Volume 6 (Epistemology), pp. 119-124, 2007

The current discussions of conceptual schemes and related topics are misguided; for they are base... more The current discussions of conceptual schemes and related topics are misguided; for they are based on a tacit assumption that the difference between two schemes consists in the different distributions in truth-values. I argue that what should concern us, in the discussions of conceptual schemes and related issues, is not truth-values of assertions, but rather the truth-value-status of the sentences used to make the assertions. This is because the genuine conceptual innovation between alternative theories or languages does not lie in differences in determining truth-values of their sentences, but turns on whether these sentences have truth-values when considered within the context of a competing one. This new interpretation of the notion of conceptual schemes, which I refer to as presuppositional languages, is not only good in itself—for establishing the intelligibility and tenability of the notion—but quite beneficial in its effect on other related issues.

What are there in the world? Against the traditional Aristotelian conception of ontology, accordi... more What are there in the world? Against the traditional Aristotelian conception of ontology, according to which the world is the totality of objects, Wittgenstein characterizes the world as the totality of facts. But what is the ontological status of facts? Especially, are facts mind-independent entities? Metaphysical factual realists (hereafter, MF-realists) think so. It is the burden of my paper to argue that facts are not mind-independent entities and therefore MF-realism is false.

Why is mutual understanding between two substantially different comprehensive language communitie... more Why is mutual understanding between two substantially different comprehensive language communities often problematic and even unattainable? To answer this question, I first introduce a notion of presuppositional languages. Based on the semantic structure of a presuppositional language, I identify a significant condition necessary for effective understanding of a language: the interpreter is able to effectively understand a language only if he/she is able to recognize and comprehend its metaphysical presuppositions. The essential role of the knowledge of metaphysical presuppositions in understand¬ing is further strengthened by developing a truth-value conditional theory of understanding. I conclude that if the interpreter approaches an incompatible alien language from the standpoint of the interpreter's own language by projecting the metaphysical presuppositions of his/her own language onto the alien language, then the mutual understanding between the two language communities is doomed to failure.

Kuhn’s alleged taxonomic interpretation of incommensurability is grounded on an ill defined notio... more Kuhn’s alleged taxonomic interpretation of incommensurability is grounded on an ill defined notion of untranslatability and is hence radically incomplete. To supplement it, I reconstruct
Kuhn’s taxonomic interpretation on the basis of a logical-semantic theory of taxonomy, a semantic theory of truth-value, and a truth-value conditional theory of cross-language communication. According to the reconstruction, two scientific languages are incommensurable when core sentences of one language, which have truth values when considered within its
own context, lack truth values when considered within the context of the other due to the unmatchable taxonomic structures underlying them. So constructed, Kuhn’s mature interpretation
of incommensurability does not depend upon the notion of truth-preserving (un)translatability, but rather depends on the notion of truth-value-status-preserving crosslanguage
communication. The reconstruction makes Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability a
well grounded, tenable and integrated notion.

Keywords: Incommensurability; Thomas Kuhn; Taxonomic structures; Lexicons; Truth-value; Untranslatability;
Cross-language communication

牟博主编, 《留美哲学博士文选：当代基础理论研究》（Contemporary Inquiries Into the Foundational Issues of Philosophy）， pp. 190-224, 2002

斯特劳逊（Strawson）的语义预设概念在语义学和语言哲学研究上颇有建树。尽管如此，语义预设概念一直遭受来自各方面的批判。概要说来，对语义预设概念之批判主要来自两个方面：其一，试图抽去语义预... more 斯特劳逊（Strawson）的语义预设概念在语义学和语言哲学研究上颇有建树。尽管如此，语义预设概念一直遭受来自各方面的批判。概要说来，对语义预设概念之批判主要来自两个方面：其一，试图抽去语义预设概念的逻辑基础，即非真值概念 (the notion of truthvaluelessness)，从而达到间接地拒斥语义预设概念之目的。其二，直接批判语义预设概念本身。他们或者论证此概念在理论上不自恰或微不足道，或者断定即使此概念本身在理论上自恰，但实为一空洞无物之概念。因为我们根本找任何一个语义预设的具体例证。所以，语义预设概念不具任何真正的哲学意义。它只是一个当代神话，理应拒斥。

玻尔(S. Ber)和莱肯(W. Lycan)对语义预设概念的批判集中代表了以上两个方面。据我所知，迄今不曾有人对他们的批判予以全面和公正的反驳，以致于许多人人云亦云，使得他们的论点至今颇有影响。给予玻尔和莱恩的批判以全面反驳乃本文初衷。于此相关，我以为很有必要澄清对语义预设概念的诸多误解，从而确立一个理论上自恰，实际上可行，和确有实质性内容的语义预设概念。基于以上考虑，我对语义预设概念批判之反驳包括正反两个方面。在第二节，我试图建立一个自恰，完备，非庸俗的语义预设概念。基于这一概念，第三节对玻尔和莱恩反对语义预设的两个核心批判予以全面反驳。第四节着重辩护非真值概念。本文的最后结论是：各种批判并未损伤斯特劳逊的语义预设概念的精髓。语义预设概念非但不是一个当代神话，而且具有重大哲学意义。

On the basis of the distinction between logical and factual probability, epistemic justification ... more On the basis of the distinction between logical and factual probability, epistemic justification is distinguished from logical justification of induction. It is argued that, contrary to the accepted interpretation of Hume, Hume believes that inductive inferences are epistemically legitimate and justifiable. Hence the beliefs arrived at via (correct) inductive inferences are rational beliefs. According to this interpretation, Hume is not a radical skeptic about induction.

IS THE NOTION OF SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITION EMPTY? Xinli Wang in Dialogos 73 (1999), pp. 61-91. Th... more IS THE NOTION OF SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITION EMPTY?
Xinli Wang
in Dialogos 73 (1999), pp. 61-91.

This paper is an attempt to clarify the notion of semantic presupposition and to refute Böer and Lycan's critique of that notion. I present a feasible and coherent formal definition of semantic presupposition after examining several popular definitions of the notion. In terms of my definition, two central arguments against semantic presup¬position presented by Böer and Lycan are analyzed and responded to with care. The conclusion is that the notion of semantic presupposition is not empty but rather is philo¬sophically interesting and fruitful.

The essay is a comprehensive criticism of the received translational interpretation of incommensu... more The essay is a comprehensive criticism of the received translational interpretation of incommensurability according to which incommensurability is viewed as untranslatability due to radical variance of meaning or reference of the terms in two competing languages. My conclusion is that the translational ap¬proach to incommensurability does not effectively clarify the concept of incommensurabil¬ity. Since it cannot provide us with tenable, integrated concept of incommensurabil¬ity, it should be rejected.

Books by Xinli Wang （王新力）

The Symbolic Logic Study Guide is designed to be used in conjunction with Language, Proof, and Lo... more The Symbolic Logic Study Guide is designed to be used in conjunction with Language, Proof, and Logic (LPL), by Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy, (CSLI Publications 2003). It is intended to help instructors teach and students learn the text more effectively. The guide helps students navigate the detailed contents and logical symbols covered in LPL. The first part of the guide contains condensed, essential lecture notes, which streamline and systematize the first fourteen chapters of the book into seven teaching sections, and thus provide an easy-to-follow, well-designed roadmap for the understanding of the text as follows: (1) Introduction; (2) Atomic sentences; (3) Conjunctions, Disjunctions, and Negations; (4) Conditionals and Biconditionals; (5) Introduction to Quantification; (6) Formal Proofs involving Quantifiers; (7) Some Specific Uses of Quantifiers. In addition, to help students prepare for the class tests, the second part of the Guide consists of twelve sample quizzes and solutions.

The Symbolic Logic Study Guide is essential for all instructors and students who use LPL in their symbolic logic classes.

Book Blurb/Description Title: Incommensurability and Cross-Language Communication The thesis ... more Book Blurb/Description

Title: Incommensurability and Cross-Language Communication

The thesis of incommensurability challenges a dominant epistemological assumption behind Western philosophy—i.e., some form of commonality between any languages, traditions, or cultures exists, which makes full cross-language/tradition/culture communication always attainable—by exploring why and how the communication between two conceptually disparate languages, traditions, or cultures is often problematic and even unattainable. However, this essential thrust of incommensurability is either neglected or misinterpreted in the current literature, as we can see clearly from the accepted translation-failure interpretation of incommensurability.

To rescue the above essence of the thesis of incommensurability, this book presents a presuppositional interpretation of incommensurability, according to which, when two comprehensive languages loaded with incompatible metaphysical presuppositions confront with each other, the confrontation leads to a truth-value gap, and consequently results in a communication breakdown between the two language communities. Therefore, we can never escape the real possibility that the others are radically different from us such that we may fail to fully communicate with alien languages, traditions, or cultures.

This book not only makes some significant, original contributions to the discussion of incommensurability and related issues in philosophy, such as the notion of conceptual schemes and the issue of cross-language understanding and communication, but also offers many valuable insights to the scholars in other fields, such as anthropology, communication, linguistics, scientific education, and cultural studies.