Julz Naliaka | Kabarak University (original) (raw)

Julz Naliaka

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Papers by Julz Naliaka

Research paper thumbnail of managerial accounting

Research paper thumbnail of Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings

Journal of Accounting & Economics, 1995

This article hypothesizes that the level of managerial ownership affects both the informativeness... more This article hypothesizes that the level of managerial ownership affects both the informativeness of earnings and the magnitude of discretionary accounting accrual adjustments. The hypothesis draws on the theory of the firm, and exploits: (1) separation of ownership from control of economic decisions, (2) the extent and consequences of accounting-based contractual constraints, and (3) managers' incentives in selecting and applying accounting techniques. Results show managerial ownership is positively associated with earnings' explanatory power for returns and inversely related to the magnitude of accounting accrual adjustments. Moreover, ownership is less important for regulated corporations, suggesting regulation monitors managers' accounting choices.

Research paper thumbnail of managerial accounting

Research paper thumbnail of Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings

Journal of Accounting & Economics, 1995

This article hypothesizes that the level of managerial ownership affects both the informativeness... more This article hypothesizes that the level of managerial ownership affects both the informativeness of earnings and the magnitude of discretionary accounting accrual adjustments. The hypothesis draws on the theory of the firm, and exploits: (1) separation of ownership from control of economic decisions, (2) the extent and consequences of accounting-based contractual constraints, and (3) managers' incentives in selecting and applying accounting techniques. Results show managerial ownership is positively associated with earnings' explanatory power for returns and inversely related to the magnitude of accounting accrual adjustments. Moreover, ownership is less important for regulated corporations, suggesting regulation monitors managers' accounting choices.

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